I t ~WTP.O 2 z7 MM1 )D I hANK Tt C;HNICAI P'APE F1 NUMBI R 227 MARcH 19e9 ii Id ilA 1 E 1-iTNI CAL DE-PARTMENT SERIES Involuntary Resettlement in Africa Selected Papers from a Conference on Environment and Settlement Issues in Africa Edited by Cynthia C. Cook Al I 1. .12zzZ 1^---,,- '_ Lf . 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Economc Policy and Sector Inmestment Programs No. 189 Frederick, Balancing Water DLemands with Supplies: The Role of Management in a World of Increasing Scarty No.190 Mackdin, Agricultural Extension in India No. 191 Frederiksen, Water Resources Institutions: Some Principes and Practices No.192 McMillan, Painter, and Scudder, Settkment and Devdopment in the River Blindness Control Zone (List continues on the inside back cover) WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER NUMBER 227 AFRICA TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT SERIES Involuntary Resettlement in Africa Selected Papers from a Conference on Environment and Settlement Issues in Africa Edited by Cynthia C. Cook The World Bank Washingto, D.C. Copyright 0 1994 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD Dc 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, US.A. 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Permission to copy portions for classroom use is granted through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., Suite 910,222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Massachusetts 01923, The complete backlist of publications from the World Bank is shown in the annual Inder ofPublcatioms, which contains an alphabetical title list (with full ordering information) and indexes of subjects, autliors, and countries and regions. The latest edition is available free of charge from the Distribution Unit, Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433, USA., or from Publications, The World Bank, 66, avenue d'IEna, 75116 Paris, France. JSN: 0253-7494 Cynthia C Cook is principal sociologist in the Sustainable Development Division of the Africa Technical Department at the World Bank. Liblry of Congress Cataloging-i-Publication Data Inwoluntary resetlement in Africa : selected papers fom a conference on environment and settlement issues in Afica / edited by Cynthia C.Cook p. cmL - (World Bank ecnical paper, SSN M253-7494 i no. 227. Africa Technical Dqetment series) Sponsord by the World Bank and Makerere Institute of Social Research"-Pref Includes bibliographical srences (p. ). ISBN 0-8213-2632-5 1. Land settement-Africa-Case studies-Cmgsses. 2. Migration, Ineral-Africa--Caseestdies-Congesses. 3. PpationgeographyCasesudiesCongress. 4 Aica- Ecnonmic poic e studies L Cook, Cynta C, 194- . IL InaBankforRand Development III Makere Insttute of Sodal R L TV. Afian Confce on Environmet and Setlement (1991: Kampala Uganda) V. Series: World Bank techical paper; no. 227. VL Series: World Bank tedhnicalpaper. AfricaTechicalDepartmend ses. HD961515 1994 33363'16-c2 93-23727 aP AFRICA TECNICAL DEPARTMNT SERIES Teckscl Paper Serie No.122 Duseing, Supportfor Mienktp Lessons for SubShkaran Aftica No.130 Kiss, editor, Livng with Wildf Wif Rs urce AMagemnt nth Local Patcpation in Afica No. 132 Murphy, Casley, and Curry, Faes' Estimations as a Sou ceofProduction Data Medhod Guideines for C*a in AfJica ND.135 Walshe, Gdndle, Nell and Bachmn, Dairy Deveopment in Sub-Sdhn Afriav A Study ofls and Options No. 141 Riverson, Garia, and Thrscut, Rural Roads in SubSloan Afrm Leafm Word Bank No. 142 Kis and Meean, Igted Pest Mnmnt nd Afica Arult No. 143 Grut, Gray, and Egli, Forest Pricing an Concem Policiw Manging tk High Forsts of West and CentrdAfi*n No. 157 CritchIey, Reij, and Seznec, Wae Havrestingfor Plant Production, oL 11 Case Studies and Condusiomsfr Suba Afric No. 161 Riverson and Carapetis, Ink_de Means of Traort Sub-harnAfri Its PotnSilr Impovt g Rral Traud and Trnort No.165 Kelagharn and Greaney. Esig Eminations to hmprove Educatiom- A Shady in Fourteen African onteics No. 179 Su*s and Obls Wndnous Integrad FmingSysteims in the Sahe N.o.181 Minng Unit, Industy and Energy Dis, Strat efr Afri Mining No.188 Silverman,.PublicSedor D I i EconomcPotcyand Sector nvestm Prgm No.194 Saint, Lniritiesin Afti Stabilization and Revtliation No. 196 M oabgurqe,Praspctiveon rbian Land and lban Mangenend Polies in Sub-Sahrn Afric No. 197 Zymelmn, editor, Asing Engiig fEdcation in Sub-Sarn Afca No.199 Hussi, Murphy, Lindberg, and Brenneman, lhe Develown of Cooperatives and Other Rual Oqgmniaon te Rol of World Bank No.20B3 Clev,A Straty to Deelop Agriculture in Sub-Saran Afcta and a FofJbr the Word Dan No.26 Bindlish and Eveson, EsbEtan of the7Pfonce of T&V Extnsion i KeXya No. 209 Keith Pp Ta:A Prmtialc ManudlforAngoponeAJca No.214 B fioi,Ago i in adas a Strtgjfr SurvivhAn Essy on t Relationship betwen AntbogydSt No.218 Mdun, editor, Bbliphy ofubiion Techia Devrent, Afric Re&-lu 1987 to Decembe1992 N6.225 Dia, A GwmoenApprmck to Civil Service Rejorm in Sub-Sara Africa No.226 Bindish, Eve_son, and Gbetbouo, Evluat on of T&V-Bad Extension Burma Faws Dfsusiom Paper Series No.82 Par Why Educatimu Policies Can Fal An O vw of Sdlct African Expkriec No.83 Craig, CompartiveAfican Epemen in bnplentin8 Eduain Polce No.58 Kiros, nlmentig Educaiona Policis in Ethiop No.85 Eshwani, Implemntng EductinalPicies int Keny No.86 Galabawa, Impemnting Educatioal Poliies in Tanaia No.87 Thb*ni In_mmting Educiona Poicies in Lsotho D _a auln Papfr Sevi (continued) No.66 Maplul, Impl#emntlng Eductiol Polidh in Swiknd No,69 Odaet, lmplkntlu EUcnlg Poliks in Ugand No 90 Achola, Inieuting EducOnd Polcii n iZb No. 91 Maravuayika, Implentng Eduaioal Ploid in Z _bu No 101 Ruse adcbsen, and Sbnly, IntrnaiwMtigmand Deuepnnt in Subaharn Afia, vol. I: Overview No. 102 Ruuef Ja men, and Sanley, IntnaaMtguuion ad Ddopnent bi Sub-San Afri4, vL Hl Counby Anapsg No, 132 Fulle and Hat, editors, Adluting Edutional PAi Conservimg Rwao wie Raising Sduwl No. 147 Jage, The E&ft of EcOnIc Polkie on AfWn Agrindfure: Frwm Pat Hrm to Fuura Hope No. I7 Shanmugpran, Vedeld, Mur, and n,Rurc nagement and Patoml buItu*on Bhilig in the WestAfricnSah No. 181 Lmnboray and Elrmedof, COmhtifi AIDS and Ote SeaOy Trsmitxd Dses in Afri4u A Reiew ofthe World BankWs ApeforActdon No. 184 SpurHn& Pee, Mkmanga, andridNwany§M Africdural ewardi in SOtn Africa: A Fwnurk fir Adion No. 211 Weijemberg Dioni Fud*Crsch, Kdr and Lett Reitlizig Aglultrd Psearch in tah Sak A ProosedFrauewkfor Acion No. 219 Thiaajab, D elonw of Rurnl Fincial Madts in Sub-Saharan Afra CONTENTS Foreword vii Editor's Note viu Abstract ix introduction Cynva C. Cook and Frwncois Faloux 1 PART 1. IN RNATIONAL PERSPECIVES Chapter I African Population Resettlement in a Global Context Miducel M. Cernea 11 Chaptr 2 Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed Projects: Lessons from Experence mn Sub-Saharan rica Cyndia C. Cook and Aleb Mukndi 33 PART II. INVOLUNTARY R LEMT IN RURAL AREAS C1apter 3 Dislocation of Setled Communities in the Development Process: The Case of Kiambere Hydroelectric Project Edward K. Mburugu 49 Chapter 4 Resettlement and Rural Developmen Aspects of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project Mamso Tshabala 59 PART m. INVOLUNTARY R-Sl T IN URBAN AREAS Chapter 5 Resettlement of Displaced People in Conection with the Nylon Urban Upgrading Project in Douala, Cameon Louis Roger Manga 71 Capur 6 Involuntary Relocation in Urban Areas of Moambique Francisco Pereira 81 PART IV. LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF REEENT Chapr 7 Social Impacts of the Creation of Lak Karnba OustopherH. D. Magadza 89 Chapter 8 Long-Term impacts of Resettlement: The Akosombo Dam Experience Martha A. TamaWkloe 99 Chapter 9 The Kainji Lake Experience in Nigeria J.S.OAyeni, Wolf Roder, andJ. O.Ayanda 111 Cbapter 10 Environen and Settluemnt in Eastem Sudan: Some Major Policy Issues GunnaM. Sarb 125 PART V. MANAGING SPONTANEOUS SENIIIT Chapter 11 Resete and Iftegration of Pastoralists in the National Economy: Ranch Rest ng in Uganda Da'd Pudkol 137 Chapter 12 Settlement and Resettlement: Experience from Uganda's National Parks and Reserves MarkcA. Marquanq 147 apter 13 Development Stategies and Issues for Land Setulme m West Africa Delal MCdIm. Thomas Painter, and Thayer Sacdder 161 Chapter 14 Population Trends and Economic Growth in Sub-Sabaran Africa Jean-Maize Cowr 175 PART VL TOWARD A POUCY AGENDA Chapter 15 Envi and Setdement Issues in Afica. Toward a Polcy Agenda Cyta C. Cook 193 ANNEXES Annex 1 Confce Agenda r99 Anex 2 Partcipan 203 Annex 3 Opening Speech 209 Annex 4 Closing Speech 213 Annex 5 Bibliography 215 -vii- FOREWORD Populationgrowth, settmmmntpatterns, andman ent of naturalresources are fundamentl fcors deummining the sustinability ofthe economic development srategies adopted by Aficn govanmen. Trdiona production systems in Arica, based On sbiftig culvation and ramshunant paorism, depend on frequent populato movements to limit the exploitation of natural resources to a sustainable level. With rapidly increasing populao, these traditond systems no longer uon effectivdy. Environmenta degdation is forcing people to leave areas that are no longer sufficieny produtive and to inensify agriculural production on more limited areas of land. Sustainable and equitable growth strategies require attetion to the impacts of devlopment projects on the social and physical environment. Projects designed to promote development on a large scale may have negative effects on local people. especWaly on those who are displaced or forced to move as a result of project activits. From our experience with projects that mvolve mvowhtary resetdtcms, it may be possible to draw lessons that can help us in the broader task of policy formulatin and planing for en sustanable setlement in the future. This was the task set before the Conlerenc on Enviomn and Setteent Is m Afica, ssored by the World Bank and the Mkerere Insfite of Social Research, and held in Kmpala, Uganda, in October 1991. Selected papers from the conrence are presented in this volume. We are grateful to the Govenment of Uganda and to Makrere University for hosting this conferen. Special appreciton is due to Profssor Dan Muidoola, Drector of the Makerre lntit for Socia Research, and his stiff w cntrbuted to the pr ation of the confce an facilotated its work toughou the week Dr. Della McMillan, Consant, and Ms. Bereket Teferi of the Woodd Bank provided support for intrnatonl participants. Ted Howard, Consultant, assisted with the editig of sdeced papers for publication. Fiallly, we would li to express our appreciation to the Norwegian government which provided much of the fiancing for this conference. KCleaver Director Technical Departmn Africa Region -viiu- EDITOR'S NOTE This volume is dedicated to the memory of Professor Dan Mudoola, Director of die Makerere ldstitute of Social Research (MISR), Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda One of Africa's outstanding scholars, Professor Mudoola played a key role in the post-war reconsuctin of his country by applying social scien knowledge and technxq in the for*mlation of public policy. As Director of MISR, Professor Mudoola co-sponsored the Kampala confenc and made important contnbutions to its delrtions. Professor Mudoola died tragically in 1993 in an incident of random violence in Kampala. -ix- ABSTRACT Project-related involuntay resettlement is but one part of the broader issues of environment and settlement that will detemine Africa's development prospects in the future. Lessons learned from the expene with involuntary resettlement can, howev, hdp to guide fuitre govament policies for dealing with these broader isnues. These leson extend well beyond the limits of projects involving resettlement. They are petinet to the design of future land settlement projects, to the handling of spontaneo rural movement and of escalaing urban growth, and to the mnagemet of tWporary or permanent refugee popuations following oubalks of warfar or natural disasters. Because of the i-depth involvement of the World Bank with some tirty-five development projects whib have resulted in the involuntary relocation of about 250,000 people in Africa, it has proved possible to draw some lessons that may be more generally applicable to enviroxmental and settlement problems in Africa. Furthermore, the involvement of the Bank in enviroe ty ocused land management projects and in projects involving voluntary and involuntary resetdlement in Africa is likely to increase m the fuure. In October 1991, the World Bank, together with the Institte of Social Research at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda, organized a regional conference - the African Conference on Environment and Setdtment - which brought together policymakeus, planners, and practitioners concmred with the implementation of Bank- financed projects involving resettlement. This volume includes contibutons made to the conference by a number of disti ed, mostly Afic presenters. This volume also summe proposals which were made for fture action in tree main areas: first, preparing resetlement policy proposals based on Bank guidelin and on the lessons of experice, and discussing these proposals with African dcisionmakers in the context of policy refom; second, conducting additional research on identfied issues with support frm the international community; and third, establishiog a network of Aican and non-African professionals and institutions concerned with enviroment and setlement issues in Africa in order for research findings to feed back more rapidly into the policy dialogue. 1NTRODUCTION Cynthia C. Cook and Fncouis Fallou Africa's development crisis arises largely out of growing populton pres on limited naural resources in a conxt of low-level technology and ineffective instiutional support.' Sustinable agriculture implies the developmnt of inegrated farming systems and intensified production on the limited areas of luad with higb agricultual potential. It implies a sharp decline in the present rates of forest dearing and in the extension of agriclture onto ever more marginal lands. It also implies a significant incr in the productivity of the agricultual labor force. Today, the main coautaint on develt (defined as real growth in per capita incme) is Africa's high rate of popuation growth. This growth has producel a demographic profile that now makes it extremdy difficult for agricultral production to beep pace with expanding humann needs.2 However, soludons to Africa's population growth problem will take at least twenty yeas to beme efective. In the meantime, pressing human needs must be met at least in part by improving the spatial distibution of the popuation in relation to productive resources. A reduction in population pressure on resouraes in overutlized rural areas, which iS absolutely essential for susuined agricultural growth, depends partly on significant populton shifts, ether to underutilized rural areas or to urban areas.3 Furthemore, for hisorical and cultural reasons, popution pressue in Afi is presenty unevenly distributed in relation to the prodctive capacity of the land base. Africa's populato is bighly mobile, and contiug mobility is stil seen by many as a viable strategy for suriwval under conditions of increasing resource scarcity. Several types of mobility can be distnguished m Africa. First, there is the permanetly nomadic way of life characteristic of a decling part of the pastralist populon. Secondly, there are rural households whose farming systems and staegies involve peiodic, tmporary, but regula movemnts betwee dtfferet locations. Within this group one can distnguish tanshumant farai,g systems that involve seasonal displacmnt of herd accompanied by all or part of a farm fmily, and migrant labor strategies that mvolve travel to obtain off-farm employment, either in the rural sector or in te mban sector. Then there is the more or less permanent pattern of rural-urban migration associated with a partial shift out of agriultural production. All of the above are voluntry movements, which may or may not involve resettlement. Cynta C. Conk is Princwl Sociologist in the Division for Enviromently Susaible Development in Africa at e World Bank. I tis context. she wors on popution, setleumet and participation isses reiad to Dak projects and proams thrughout Sub-Saharan AfMa. Framob FJlb is the Senior Enviro_I Adviser in dhe World Danks Division for Eavironmenaf Sustaiabl Development in Afria. He is co-aduor of Cis and Opportany. a book about Nainl Enviome_a Actin Plans in Africa. 1 vInolumry Resealement In Africa There is also a significant amount of involuntay population movement in Afmca, which may or may not be followed by permanent resetement. Probably the most significant cause of forced population movement is war or prolonged bostilitiga between countries or between groups within countries; these have created large reh4ee populations that impose a severe economic burden on the hout countres and the world commuity. A second important cause of involunay rsettlent has been ireversible environmental degradation, most notably in fte Sabelin zone of Africa. Finally, some involuntary movements of people are gemerated by deveopmnt projects, when people are displaced in order that such projects may take place. Involuntary resettlemnt associated with Dank-financed projects in Africa ha affected a relatively small number of people compared to the numbers involvd in voluntary movements and population displacment due to Wars, ethnic strife, and ecological catastrophe.4 Nevertheless, because of the in-depth involvement of the Ban with these resetdement projects, it has prved possible to draw from this experifen some lessons that may be more generally applicable to environment and settlemet problems in Africa. Furtemore, the involvement of the Bank in envionally focused land managemen projects and in projects involving voluntary and involuntary resetement in Afica is likely to increase in the fture. Thus, it seems appropriate now to take stock of tie kmowledge gained from eriene and to identify the areas in which fiurhr work is needed. In October 1991, the World Bank, together with the letitt of Social Research at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda, organized a regonal confrene of policymakers, planers, and practitioners ocerned with the implemation of Bank- fiaced projects involving resetdement. The Afn C ee on Enviroment and Settlement brought together an impressive array of African exprience and pertise. The purposes of the conference were to share the lessons learned from past experience, to identify knowledge gaps that need to be filed through frther study, and to dewop a collaborative policy researh program leang to specific policy n am to be discussead wih high-level decisionmaers at a fure meeting. This volume inclde contrutions made to the conferen by a number of distinguished, mostly African, presenters. Eviroomem and Sefflemmnt The Cha_ue in AMea Thmee major dements characteribe theme of enviromn and settlement il Afica. First is the demographic explosion, the single most important factor determining the present condition and the future of the African continet. With an amnual growth of 3.1 percent, the populaton of this contient is incresing nearly twice as fast as anywhere else on this planet. This demographic explosion has no counpart in human history. From about 500 nilln ihabitants today, the population of Afica appears libkely to exceed one billion within twenty to twenty-five years and will rea 1.S billion around the year 2030. 2 hI ~~~~~~~AaaI I - I~~~ .3.3 ii liqi~J Iwolwmary Reselean in Africa will allow us to detmine the dynamics of these population movements and thus to limit their negaive impacts? Second: Should we allow migratory movemens to contimne freely without iervention, or on die contrary, should we intervene to shape and direc thea movements? Past experience shows that a laissez-faire approach often leads to environental degradaion, while, at the other extreme, governent-sponsored settlement schemes may minimize effects on the eniroment but cannot be implenented on a significant scale, nor are they replicable consideriqg thdr excessively high costs. Beween these two extremes, how can we define the best position, in other words the nimal amount of assistance in terms of infrastrucuire and services which will also minimize the social and environmental costs of setdement? Third: What is the opmal strategy for spatial development in a country where some areas are overpopulated and odters could accommodate additional people? In other words, what is the balance to be struck beween inestme in the first and the second areas? Fourth: If we beLieve that i atonal migration flows are necessayr, how can we failcitate agreement among goverments to pemit and encourage such flows? Should we be thinling about new forms of assistance to countries which are desined to receive significant numbers of migrnts? In order to address these general problems, we must first capitalize on our colective experience in some relatively well-documented projects involving involuntay r adement This was the primry objective of our confence. We must draw lessons from these urban and nrual development projects and we must examine the settlement and resettlement policies of the countries concmeed. Based on this expeience, we will then be able to address the broader issues, espcially in the context of future projects whose aim is to conserve the ain tropical forest and biodiversity reserves of Africa. We have already learned that biodiversity conservation and susainable development of natural resources raises important issues regarding the rights and obligations of indigenous peoples and local communites in reation to those of the state. Continuing envionmental degradation outside forest and wildlife reserves makes these reserves increasingly attracive to setlers. Past policies of neglect or mismanagement have often permitted or even encouraged spontameous settlement in such areas, cmetg situations that may need to be corrected if remaining biodiversity resources are to be preserved. The World Bank is now considering a new generation of envirnental m _iagemM projects focused on biodiversity protection and sustinable management of lnd and tropical forest resources. Compared to classical infrastructure projects, these new projects are likely to pose different resettement problems for which we will have to develop different methods and more suitable approaches. This will eventually enable 4 Introduction us to face th even greater problems of volutary migration and sponaneous settlement resulting from severe envi degradadon linked with demographic growth. OrgmzatOom of this Volume The first section of this volume provides an overview of resulment issues as seen in a global and regional context. In Chapter 1, Michael M. Cernea descrbes the relationship between developmet and resettlemen from a global pesctve. He points out that development projects requiring the displacement of people inevitably result in their impoverishment, unless specific atention is paid to their needs and they are actively involved in the process of project planng. A review of lessons learned from World Bank projects involving resetlement in Africa is provided in Chapter 2 by Cynthia C. Cook and Aleld Mukendi. Their review shows that, even with good intentions and an appropriate Bank policy framework, few projects have succeeded in promoting thc sustainable economic and social development of the resetted people. Constaits to successful implementation include nadonal polcies, institutional issues, land tenure problms, lack of local partcpion, and filure to anticp the social and environmal con s of resettlremt. The next section of the book provides insights into the involuntary resettkment process in nua areas as seen from the pauctitioner's point of view. In Chapter 3, Edward K. Murgu reports the findings of a survey of people displaced by the Kiambere Damn in Kenya. Comparing the welfa of resettlers to that of the host population, he finds that the resettr were both more disadvantaged to begin with, and less able to cope with the changes induced by the project. His study shows that cash compensation was inadequat to replace lost resources and that the displaced populaion never regained its standard of iving after resetdement. In Chapter 4, Mavuso Tshabalala ses forth the resetlement and coa maion activities undertaken through the Lesotho Highland Water Project, and describes plans to assist the affected populabion through a targeted mral development program. His study illustrates the importance of extensive pre-project planning and the building of institutional capacity to plan, execute and monitor resettlement programs. The following section provides examples of resealenr in urban areas under Bank-financed projects. In Chapter S, Louis Roger Manga gives detils of the Nylon urban upgrading project in Cameroon and its associated reslement program. Although lands were identfied well in advance to meet the needs of families displaced by urban upgrading, the bureaucrat processes imvolved in obtaing the release of that land and in transferring ownership to the resetded populton, as well as problems of access to credit, have slowed implation of the program. Francisco Pereira shares the experience of the Urban Rehabilitation Project in Maputo and Beira, Mozambique, in Chapter 6 of this volume. Decongestiig overcrowded and unsaniary buildings required the constuction of core bousing, "in-filling open spaces left within the urban periphery, and finding acceptible soutims for the population displaced by the core housing activity. 5 Ivlrwaary Rezeulmen in Africa The next section of the book is devoted to an analysis of the long-erm impacts of-resealtment in the case of projects financed by the World Bank more than twenty years ago, before it bad a resetlement policy. Indeed, as Michael Cernea pointed out at the conference, the Bank's resettlement policy owes a great deal to the work done by African and other researchers on the impac of these early projects. In Chapter 7, Christopher Magadza focuses on the environmtal impacts of the resetlement program undertan in comecton with the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River between Zambia and Zimbabwe.5 River valley culdvators had to move to unfamilia uplands areas where slopes and soil conditions made farming more difficult and more vulnerable to environentl risks. Fsbery and livestock potentials have been developed but these programs have brought Littlc benefit to the local people. The project has had a negative effect on the mntritional status of the people and has incrased health risks, without providing the necessary servies. Scientific study of the consequences of the project has not moved poli s to take remedial action. Martha A. Tamaldoe reports in Chapter 8 on the long-term impacts of resettlement in connection with the constucon of the Akosombo Dam in Ghana.e She stasses the disruptive effects that occur when govenments change their policy oientations during project implementation. Unanticipated social of the planned resetlement program led to significant changes in age sture, ethnic coposition, economic activities, and mechansms for conflict resolution in the new vllages. The introduction of m nized agriculture as part of the resettlment program may hawe acceleated environm degradation around the lake. Reductions in river flow encouraged the sprea of schistosoniasis below the dam, which recent migrants from this area have brought back into the resetdement villages. The Kainji Lake expience in Nigeria is described by J.S.O. Ayeni and his collaborators in Chapter 9.7 This resettement program is believed to have been a success, largdy because it was responsive to the social and cultural concerns of the people. A national park was created in conjunction with the lake, proviing unexpected additiona income for local residents. Inrigated famming i the drawdown zone has proved successfil. However, the creation of the lake had a negave im9pact on Fulani pastoralsts who were seasonal users of the grazing land. Although atempts were made to address this problem, increasing pressure on grazig land and growing conflicts between farmers and herders coninue to pose problems for local commuities. Fisheries have been successfiuly developed on the lake and have provied short-term benefits to local people. However, the downstem irrigation plans which were originally part of the water resouce devdopment project have not materialized. In Chapter 10, Gumnar Sorbo descie the long-range impacts of settlemen and resetement in Sudan relatg to rgation development in Kassala Province and the resetdement of Nubias from the Aswan High Dam area.' His research indicates that, wbile initia objecives in the area of agricultual production have not been susainbly achieved, the project did provide a basis for susainable sentlemet based on the development of non-farm naterprises and a more diversified pattern of agrculual 6 production than originally envisaged. He argues that settlement projects in the past have been overdesigned and too rigid in implnementation, thus missing many opporunities to take advantage of changing circumstances. African governments rarely possess the institutional capacity to manage such complex projects successfully. He recommends, therefore, that planners should focus more on the policy framework, providing suitable incentives for environmentally sound spontaneous setdement, rather than plannig investment programs for area development. The next to last section of the book presents some lessons learned from experience in Africa concerning volurtary novmno and the contrast between government-sponsored and spontaneous setlement programs. In Chapter 11, David Pulkol reports on the work of the Ranch Re r Board in Uganda which was resonsible for solving setdement problems in ranching areas after the close of Uganda's civil war. He identifies some of the key issues which need to be addressed by policymakers in attempting to setde and integrate pastoralists into the modem economy. Mark A. Marquardt of Makerere Institute of Social Research descries three settement issues related to the management of national parks and resrves in Uganda, in Chapter 12 of this volume. These issues include enclave expansion, spontaneous settlement and the degazeing of protected areas. He analyzes migration and settlement in terms of Opush" and "pull" factors, showing the importance of ug such factors for sustiable policy and resource management decisionmaking. Della McMillan, Thoms Painter and Thayer Scudder describe, in Chapter 13. the results of a recent study of settlement in the river valleys of West Africa that have been freed of river blindness through a pest control progm. The study found that government-sponsored programs were too cosdy and cumbersome to be successful on a large scale, while spontaneous settlements tend to plateau at low levels of productivity and to undertake activities in areas where they may not be environmentally sustainable. The authors advocate the adoption of an "assisted sponneous" approah to setdement, capitalizing on the initiative of settlers, and supporting and structuring their efforts by providing necessary inf and services. They focus on the importance of including host communities and seasonal resource users such as pastoralists in planning for sustinable resource use and management. They argue that secure tenure rights are an important element in sustaable settlement, and that such rights should be assigned based on local agreements, taking cusmary tenure systems as the startng point Jean-Marie Cour takes a more theoretical approach m Chapter 14. He reaes population projections for African countries to land area, showing that major international migrations will be necessary to amodate the expected population owth. Iltenal migrations are also occrring, both from isolated and poorly served ruWal areas to rural areas with good soils, markets and infrastruc , and from rural areas to urban areas. He argues that urbanization is the driving force of development in Sub-Saharan Africa, since urban production processes create consumer demand for agricultural goods and prduce inctives for farmers to invest in order to raise their incomes. Solving the problems of population redisibution and promotion of sustainable settlements in Africa will be the major development challenge of the coming decades. 7 volwtway Resettlement in Afrtica In the closing section (Chapter 15), Cynthia Cook sumanrizes the discussions held at the conference and the proposals which were made for fidure action. These actions fall into three main areas: first, preparing resetti menu policy proposals based on the Bank guidelines and on the lessons of experience, and discussing these proposals with African decisionmakers in the context of policy reform; second, conducting adoonal research on identified issues with support fron the international community; and third, networking among African professionals and institutions involved in the study of resettlement issues in order for research findings to feed back more rapidly into the policy dialogue. Participants at the conference warmly welcomed an offer by Makerere University's Institute of Social Research to spearhead this networking activity. Participants also asked the World Bank to take the initiative to ensure that the proposed program receives full support from the intenational donor comunuity. 8 Inarodact NOTES 1. World Bank. 1989. SubSaharan Africa: From CKsi to Sustinabl Growh. Washingon, D.C. 2. Cleaver, Kevin M., and Gotz A. Schreiber. 1993. 7he Ppulation, Agricultr and Enironment N aus in Su Sahar Africa. World Bank. Wahiton, D.C. 3. Cour, Jean-Marie. 1990. "Urban-Rural Linkages: Maroeconomic and Regional Implications." World Bank, Africa Technical Dqarte, In Division. Washington, D.C. 4. Russell, Sharon S., Karen Jacobson and William D. Stanley. 1990. hnenational Migration and DewvWmnt in Sub-Saharan Afria. World Bank DiscUSion Papes, Africa Technical Department Series, Nos. 101-102. These wthors note that there are an estmated 3 million inrational refugees and about 12 million internally displaced persons in Africa. S. This resettlemen experience is more fully documetd in Colson, Elizabeth. 1971. The Social Consequences of Resettlemen: Te Impact of the Kariba Resenlement Upon the Gwembe Tonga. Manchester: Manchester University Pres. 6. This experience is also documented, with a shorter dme horizon, in Chambers, Robe, ed. 1970. The Vola Resetmen Eperiewnc. London: Pil Mal Press. 7. This experience is more fully descnbed in Magobunje, A. L., ed. 1973. Kiji Lake Stdi. 2 vols. Ibadan: Nigeian Instiute of Social and Economic Research, ITniversity of Nigeria. 8. More background on this area is provided in Sorbo, Gunnar M. 1985. Teants and Nomads in Eastern Suda. Uppsala Scandinavian Institute of African Sudies. 9 CHAPT I AFRICAN POPULATION RESETTLEMENT IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT Michael M Cernea Population settlement and resettlement issues are linked to the core of dte current development agenda around the world, particulaly so in Africa. The purpose of this paper is to explain and discuss sevea basic common issues and vulnerabilities of population resettlement processes that occur worldwide, including Africa, and what the World Bank's experience and policy in addressing such involuntuy resetlment processes have been. The paper concludes with a brief overview of te resettlement agenda for the 1990s. lles _eat and Devdopet Both worldwide and in Africa, involuntay resetement processes caused by development projects are only a subset of much lrer issues: population movemcnts, ma3or changes in the allocation and use of land or water, industrization and urbanization and public sector intervention in development The challenge posed by reselement epitomizes the challenge of induced development embodying core questions about the role of the state and about development's goals, social acors, costs, and umas. Afiica is a continent as rich in natural resources as it is in people and histoxy. Unforuately, the spatial disriu on of its people and resoues do not always coincide. As Francois Falloux and Cynthia Cook have stated in their intod on to this volume, in Africa much of the impetus for population movements comes from efforts to match the people with the resources they need for sutece and growit The scale of human movement in Afiica can be awesome. A recent World Bank study esmatd tat the African contient conins some 35 million migns - fuily half of the world's totl.1 The same study also found no evidence to suggest that the volume of intmational migration will be substtlly reduced in the fiutre Spatial mobility is a cental feature of many African societies. For eaomple, estimates from Somalia, before the collapse of the stat and the civil waoes induced mass Ma.. IL C i th Senior Advior for Social Poliqy ad Sociobgy of dhe Wodd ank.He bas Iwi sever books and numeros snie on develpmt, socia chane populon resemus, nea rniato and the diffusion of novations. and is The edior of the volme haks Pop Fr So Klgical Vkas in Riwal Deweopmar (xford Uniersiy Press. 1991). 11 Involuntary Besetlement in Africa stavation, indicated that as much as 60 percent of the population was involved in one or another forn of transhumance.2 Warfare, famine, and natual ecological distress have all played their parts in forcing African populations to abandon their places and move. But so too have certain political or etnic repression, urbanization, industrialization, and energy development Our topic here is a specific type of resettlement: involwtary or forced resetdement, which is distinct from voluntary (spontaneous or assisted) settlement, as well as from migration. Involuntary resetdement shares with other forms of voluntary and spontaneous population movement general concerns about economic development, food security, and environmental management. It also differs from them in several significant ways. First, involuntary resettlement is itself never the primary objective of a project that causes displacement; it is the by-product of urban programs or of the constuction of dams, higbways, industrial estates, ports and so forth. Second, whereas other types of projects explicitly endeavor to increase agricultuWal productivity and people's incomes, forced resetment starts by taking away land, the main asset for family livelihood. Third, unless prperly addressed by the state, involuntary resettlement operations are certain to degenerate into processes of massive impoverishment and social disorganization.3 esettlement proceses in Africa, particularly the cument prcesses of involuntary displacement and relocation caused by vaious types of development projecs in Africa, should be seen in the conte of similar involuntary resettlements occurring elsewhere in the world, due to the same development-related causes. Table I- i shows some of the largest esetdlement operations outside Africa, caused by the constuction of major dams. Significanty, three of the largest countries in the world - India, China and Brazi - which are currely engaged in massive intialiation and eectrifiction programs, are precisely the countries with some of the biggest ongoing involuntary resetdement operations. In China, for instance, more than 10 milLion people were involuntarily resettled over a period of thirt years as a result of dam construction alone. In India, the aggregate numbers are of comparable magnitude - about 15.5 million people over the last four decades, includig displacement frm resenoirs, urban sites, thermal plants and mies.4 Two dams now under constuction on the Krishna River i Karnataka state - the Aimatti Dam and the Naapr Dam - will deprive some 240,000 people of either their homes, or their land, or of both The highly controversial Narmada Sardar Sarovar Dam, together with its network of downstream irrigation canals and roads, will affect the land and/or houses of approximately 220,000 people. There are also massive dam- induced reseme programs now being implemented in Argentina and Paraguay (Yacyreta) and other Lati American countries. 12 African Population Resettlement in a Global Context Table 1-1 Major Dams Outide Africa: Pop.atiod Displacement Dam | Country #ofPeople Already Built Samnenxia China 319,000 Dongpinghu China 278,000 Danjiangkou Cina 383,000 Srisailam India i001)00 Maqgla Pakistan 90,000 Cirata Indonesia 50,000 Sobradinho Brazil 60,000 Portile de Fier RomnanialYugoslavia 23,000 Assad Syria 60,000 Currently Under Construction Amatti India 160,000 Itaaica Bril 45,000 Tebri India 105,000 Narmada Sardar Sarovar India 220,000* Sbulwou China 70,000 Yacyta P entina and Paraguay 45,000 Under Design Tme Gorges China 0.9 - 1.2 mil. Gand_i_Sagar India 100,000 Kgabagh Pakistan 80,000 Kamali (C_isapani) Nepal 55,000 San Juan Tetelecngo Mexico 22,000 Xiaolangdi China 181,000 * ktn tose dsplaced by SC igdon cals nd red newks Sowa Thistable is based on da frm proct docmen nd puble seurces. Some of these pojects wer o- 6iaced by he Wodd Bank w os wee fnced from ee sorurces. both domestic and i_1enfioa. 13 hInvoltary Resettlement in Africa Resettlement also occurs on a large scale through voluntary resettlement programs, such as the transmigration program in Indonesia, or through mixed voluntawy and involuntaty resettlement progrms like the well-known Mahaweli program in Sri Lanka. Another interesting type of process is the massive internal migration in Colombia, a country which, during two decades of accelerated industialization, has gone from being 35 percent urban to being 35 percent rural. This massive rural-urban migration was the result of a complex set of factors and, in turn, had many beneficial influences; it has been accompanied by more than a doubling of ral per capita income in the country, a nearly 10 percent annual increase in gross national product, and a ten- year increase in life expectancy at birth. Worldwide, all these large-scale spontaneous ebbs and flows of population, together with direct or forced resettlement, are part and parcel of the development process, and pose major challenges to governments trying to promote strategies for economic growth and social change. Resettlement in Africa Tlhe African continent, in turn, is the scene of massive population resettlement processes of all types. Profoundly dramatic and painful are the involuntary displacements of people. However, Africa's most important forced displacenents are not those caused b-y development prograns, but those triggered by social and political causes such as wars and civil wars, or by ethnic, racial and/or religious persecutions, or by narl causes such as droughts and famines. These result in many millions of refugees - either "intemational refugees" who cross intemational borders to find protection, shelter and food in another country, or "intemal refigees" who still remain within the borders of their countries but have abandoned their houses and lands.5 Displaced populations are not only themselves deprived of normal livelihood and pushed to the limits of poverty and starvation, but represent an enormous burden on the host populations, thus compounding the magnitude of the displacement-triggered problems. They ofken lower the hosts' standards of living and tend rapidly to deplete the natural resources of the areas of refuge. Even when the causes of displacement disappear or subside, retum resetflement and reconstruction at the places of origin demands large resources from both the people and the state. Mozambique, for instance, faces now the daunting task of resettling some 5,000,000 people who became refugees during the recent civil war that ravaged the country. Before long, the collapse of the apartheid systan in South Africa will make possible the resettement of the many millions of black people who were displaced against their will to the so-called homelands; but desirable as such rsettement is, it will be far from easy or painless. In Africa, planned land settlement has been tried in countries as diverse as Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia and is now being carried out in some areas of Egypt.' While several of these schemes did in fact improve the well-being of participants, in general tenrs these efforts have fallen short of expectations. True, the expectations themselves may have been unrealistically high in many cases, given the resources available. Nonetheless, both tangible achievements and indisputable drawbacks to large planned settlement schemes exist, including their 14 African Population Reseltlement in a Global Context high cost, reliance on prolonged public sector intervention, and the constraints they have placed on the private initiative of resettlers. Yet such settlements have created new opportunities, have often met the motivations and immediate needs of many settlers, and not rarely have saved lives. Complex political, social and economic forces have been involved in such programs and, as Pankhurst argued in his excellent monograph on Ethiopian resettlement, the "stereotypes of resettlement as either purely induced by famine or enforced by Government are equally misleading simplifications."' More recent efforts to direct population movements have included investments targeted at infrastructure along agricultural frontiers. These aim to steer people toward suitable settlement areas while requiring less government intervention than planned settlement schemes. Typical examples of this approach are the settlement models being considered in the West African areas cleared of river blindness, as discussed by McMillan, Painter and Scudder in Chapter 14 of this volume. In turn, involuntary resettlement caused by government sponsored development programs has generated, and continues to generate, a distinct set of problems on the African continent Construction of major dams in Africa, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, has entailed population displacernents of large magnitude (see Table 1-2). It is seldom realized that displacements such as those caused by the Akosombo, Kossou or Kariba Dams have affected a much higher proportion of the respective country's population than the displacements caused by even the biggest dans in Asia - India or China include - vis-a-vis the total population of those countries. Thus, they have strained the state's resources and affected those African nations in a much more profound way, notwithstanding the benefits eventually yielded by those projects. The construction of such gigantic dams has slowed down in Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the aggregate number of projects causing displacements of a smaller scale has considerably increased. It is worth underscoring that social anthropology as a discipline owes a considerable part of its resettement knowledge to Africa's early experiences with displacements caused by high dams. The Volta resettlement from Ghana's Akosombo and Kpong Reservoirs, the resettlement of the Gwembe Tonga in Zambia at Kariba, or the relocation of the Egyptian Nubians froinm the Aswan Dam are the best known cases and alone have yielded a sizeable body of social science volumes and studies.' Social geographers and other social scientists have focused on the Niger River displacements.' hnportant lessons can be derived also from the displacement of the Tema fishermen to make room for the Tema port"0, from the urban relocation of the Yoruba in Lagos evacuated because of the slum clearance project in Cental Lagos", from the displacement of famners from the Tana River valley and the Manantali Reservoir"2, or from the adjustment to resettlement of the people in the Kainji Lake Basin, to which seveal Afiican scholars have dedicated multi-sided research.13 15 Involuntary Resettlement In Africa Table 1-2 Popultion Dlsplacement Aaodated with Major Dam in Africa Number of Dam Country People Akosombo Ghana 84,000 Aswan High Dam Egypt 100,000 Kainji Nigeria 50,000 Karba Zambia/Zimbabwe 56,000 Kossou Cote d'lvoire 85,000 Dadin Kowa Nigeria 26,000 Mantali Senegal 11,000 Km Nigeria 19,000 Sowrce: Based on rounded data from project documents and public sources. It is essential to keep the valuable lessons derived by these studies alive and to use them as prescriptions against repeating tragic mistakes again. The World Bank and Involhtay Resttlemat The World Bank's concem with involuntazy resettlement derives from the Bank's core function as a development institution. The goal is to help developing countries find the resources they need to improve their productive capacity. Whether through "investing in infastucture" or "redistribution with growth," through "poverty alleviation" or "sustainable development," the Bank has always held that the best way for poor people to get their fair share of the pie is to increase the size of the pie itself. Give people the tools, and their naturl and cultural abilities will make development a daily activity rather than a goal for the fuure. Hence, the vast majority of the resources that the Bank provides are intended to help countries initiate and successfully carry out projects that will increase income and improve living standards through capital investment. Building hydropower stations, irigating arid lands, improving urin transportation and supplying clean water to cities are all projects that provide developing countries with the levers for enhancing productive capacities and social services for their nations. But if these projects are necessary, desirable, and attainable instruments for development, we must recognize thut, like evezything else, they also involve trade-offs. There are financial trade-offs: the money committed to a large damn is money that 16 African Populahion Rsettlement in a Global Context cannot be spent on schools. There are technical trade-offs: roads that are easy to build are often the most difficult to maintain. And there are social trade-offs: the projects needed by a growing country must often displace people, at times large populations, from their homes and sources of livelihood. Forced resettlement should be the last path we choose, and all efforts must be made to avoid it. But we must also accept that there are times when resettlement is unavoidable. There are only so many places to build a dam or site a road; only so many ways to construct a sewage tratment plant without acquiring land that is already inhabited. In these situations, forced resetflement is a necessary consequence of our efforts to advance the common good. The issue that we must fiace is when, and under what conditions, involuntary resettlement should proceed. If the public interest requires the expropriation of land necessary for projects that will help meet basic human needs, what can we do to minimize the problems caused by displacement? To answer this question, we can begin to drw upon both Africa's and the World Bank's respective social research on the consequences of resettlement. Many research contributions suggest dtat resetlement is not going well in Africa or elsewhere. Increasingly we find that projects that benefit the majority confer all too few benefits on those people who, as one of my Indian colleagues has put it, "gave their today so ta we could have a better tomorrow." As far as Bank-financed projects are concerned, the major causes of dislocation are undoubtedly dams and the reservoirs they form. Since 1970, the Bank has provided dam financing to more than 100 countries and supported the construction of 400 large dams around the world. But dams are not the only cause of involuntay esettlement. t occurs in projects as diverse as widening a highway, expanding a port area, or even, as in one case in Mozambique, building a school. Table 1-3 shows involuntauy population displacement being present in more than 130 Bank-assisted projects, approved year-by-year, over a twelve year period (1980-1991). With about 2.25 million people to be displaced under Bank-assisted projects during that period alone, compulsory rsetflement is clearly no small problem. 17 Iuohauaay Rsetlemenr in 4frica Table 1-3 Populathi DIspboaemnet In Developmneut Projec FlOumeay Asutud by the World BDk Approved During FY - FY91* FY No. of Projects No. of Affebted People 80 6 150,820 81 I 1 122,020 82 7 47,252 83 181 13,950 84 13 232,810 85 10 159,545 86 9 354,915 87 14 160,140 88 15 215,013 89 16 327,353 90 16 124,458 91 9 180,070 Total 137 2,258,346 For the period FY8O-8S, this table refes only to two key seors - agicutue and hydropower, it does not include some projecs in the urb, mining, thermal and oter lending subsectos that also entailed compulsory rse'ienL The ovall numbers of affected people result, in some cases, from best mid-tem or finml assessments, which are considerably higher than the initial estimates made at project apprail stage. Within these ovall numbers, the sectoral and geographic distnbution of Bank- assised projects with resettlement is far fiom even. By geogrphic regio the lage majority of projects during this eight-yew period are in Asia (over 60 percent) followed by Afi (about 22 percent). By sector, the largest number of projects entailing resetlment approved by the World Bank over the last eight yews (FYK&93), as shown in Table 1-4, are in the urban and infasictue sectors. Yet it is the agriculual prjects (pmarily irrigtion dams) that have affcted the lret number of people A detiled list of Bank-assisted projects in Africa over the Fy8i-93 period is conined in Table 1-5. iS frcan Population Rnettlaent in a Global Cotanti Table 1-4 Popultbo Dsplaoemet by Sector In New Projects Approvw During FY86 - FY93 I| Number of Number of Sector eProjecs People Affected Agriculture (AGR) 16 728,633 Industry and 29 226,711 Eney ([EN) Ihnatructr (INU) 67 597,025 TOTAL 114* 1,552,369 Total includes one environment project and one education project The total number of active projects with ongoing implementtion of resetlement components during this pnod (FY86-93) was still higher, as some of these projects were appmved prior to FY86. Urban involuntary resetlement seems likely to grow even faster in the futumre World Bank and United Nations data shows tha worldwide urban growh rtes have eced, on aveaage, six pement per year. The number of peopl living in lwe cities has grown from 200 million in 1950, tD 850 milion today. By the year 2025 there will be more than two billion people living in large cities of more than one million inhaitants. bI cities such as Siao Paulo, Lagos, Douala, Rabat, Shanghai, and Mexico City, we can aleady swe tat massive investment in inrastucture and sanitaio is needed for basic mainace of living standrds. Such ubao investment wiUl inevitably ental fiuter lnd acquisition and involuntary displacement, thus keeping the issues of adequate resettement present on the development agenda." Thie Basc Goal: Avoiling Impoversbment To improve the handling of unavoidable resettlement operations, the Wodd Bank fonnulated an explicit social policy, originally issued in 1980.15 This policy explains the basic cnteria which every project that the Bank finances must meet. t define its fimdamental objective as restoring the income and livefihood of affected people and, if feasible, impoving them. The policy requires minimizing displacement whenever possible and establishes safeguards and entitlements for people who are displaced. It asks 19 hnolu,twry seaelement In Afrioa Table 1-5 World Bhak-Fln eed Projects Approved During FY31 - FY93 Entailog Iinvoutary Popubtio. Raeettle.ent in Africa County Sector FY Priect Nane Peole Affeced Msuninh j AGR 81 Gorgol Irrigation 3,000 Swaziiand M EN 81 Power M 300 Came wrm INU 83 First Urban Development 24,000 COl d'lvoire AGR 83 Fourth Rubber Producdon 1.300 Mdawi TWUI 83 LlongweaWter I and 7 1,000 Tunisia TWU 83 Urban Developme M 3,100 "eay| EN |84 Kinbere Hydro Power 7,000 Top MEN |84 Nangb HydroPow" | 12,000 Zaire EN |84 HRuiziHydro]Power | 15,000 EthioPia AGR 87 Fosy Plnaon 5.000 Develpmen_ geria TWU 87 Water Supply H 7004 Tunisia TWU 87 Urban Deveopment IV 1,300 daawi INU 88 Norern Transport Corridor | 3.000 Mozamb| PHR 88 Education and Manpower 300 CAR EEN 89 Mbli (Enery 1) 700 Careroon TWU 89 Secod Urban 8,000 Mozani,ique TWU 89 Urban Rehabilion 3.000 20 African Population Resettlemen in a Global Context Country Sector _IFY _ Projecame Affcted] C6te d'lvoire AGR 90 Forestry Sector 40,000 Ethiopia INU 90 Second Addis Ababa Upgrading 800 Ghna INU 90 Urban _i(Sec Ciies) J2400 Guinea INU 90 Second Urban 4.300 K _enya INU 90 Third Nairobi Water Supply 800 Madagascar AGR 90 Tana Plain Development 18,000 Nigeria TWU 90 Oyo State Urban Development 1.200 Rwand _ TWU 90 TrAsort Sector 1.600 Rwanda TWU 90 Urban stitutions 1,050 Uganda TWU _90 ,0Water Suppl n 1,000 Djibouti TWU 91 Urban Develpmt H Uganda | EN |91J HydroPowerm 1.700 Uganda | TWU __91 _ _n I S_ - Eypt MEN 92 Kurhmt Thermal Power S00 Lesotho TWU 92 Highlands Water Phase IA |8.O0 Mtalawi TWU 92 Local Govemment 2.000 Nigeria TWU 92 Multi-State Water I 4.000 Morocco TWU 93 Land Develpment for Low Income 14.000 I_______ ~Housing ___ Nigeria INU 93 Lagos Drainage and Sanition 400 * Most projects in ihis table are still under implemenation. Thc numbers of affected people ae eidher estma at appasl, or subsequently corrcledArpdted assessme, and teefic somc of thena c subjec to crtain approximation. The final numbas, at project completion. may be a bit higher or Iower fmn cue to case, but ge8eaf1y in the sam bnckei ABBREVIATIONS: AGR - cultural projects: IEN - enegy or industrial projects; INU - inamru or urban projecs; PHR - projects for education or helth; TWU - tnsport and water supply. 21 Involuntwy Resettlement in Africa Bank staff, and recommends to the planners of borrowing agencies, to consider the economic and cultural daracteristics of the people to be moved and how these affect their ability to cope in the new environment. Over the last twelve to fourteen years, every time that this policy has been applied to a new project it has led to inprovements in planning, resource allocation and execudon. Yet the application of this policy by both borrowers and the Bank has not been consistent and systematic in all projects, as will be discussed further. The major risk incumd in forced population displacement is impoverishment of people. In the final analysis, what we are talking about is not involuntary resettlement per se, but rather the ierative of preventing and avoiding the impoverishment of people. Many of those subjected to forced displacement for the sake of a development progrm are affected by poverty even before displacement, or are in a marginal economic siuaion. They have already been working hard to overcome poverty and to improve their incomes, health and sanitation. Then, suddenly, here comes a development program intended to bring benefits to many people (and indeed likely to generate such benefits), but which is so inadequately designed and unfairly implemented that it fails to protect a number of people it directly affects from a worsening of their situation. In fact, through carelessness, heavy-handedness and faulty resource allocation, such a program may tur displacement into a weapon that aggravates rather than alleviates poverty. The paradox is as blatant as it is unjust and unacceptable. The model below, highlighting the main processes through which impoverishment may occur, identifies key trends based on empirical data from many field reports and sudies. These processes are interlinked in a "poverty risk model."' * Landlessness v Joblessness * Homelessness * Marginalization * Food Insecurity * Loss of Access to Commons * Increased Morbidity and Mortality * Social Disarticulation Not every one of these processes necessarily occurs m each single displacement opeation. Nor do all affect at once every individual family. But taken together, they characterize the involuntary population resettlement operations that have failed. Therefore, this model is both a synthesis of past adverse experiences and (more importatly) a tool for improving planning in the futre. It grimly warns about the likely risks and pitfalls that must be avoided or mitigated by every means available. An experienced resettlement practitioner or researcher will instantly recognize these processes from his or her own field work. Thus, there is no need to further document them in detail here.' However, there is every possible need and reason to 22 AIJicm PopuWlaion Reseteranemt hI a Global Contex keep these risks in mind at ail tmes when resettlement is decided upon, pilmen or impiemented. Probun and Solutios The resetement qusion facing the Bank and country govranments i broater merely documentig what happens to displaced people. As an active age in the processes causing displacmt, it is far more important for the Bank to anlyze why resedement programs fail and to develop a strategy to avoid resettlement's bad effects. The responsibility for effecting adequate rsttlemret is vested in the state that itates it, and direcdy rests with the borrowing agencies. Social resarch has identfied the following as frequen departures from policy pidelines and chronic causes of the most comnon problems that recur in resettement operations: * Planming objecdves center on removing people from the site of the main project, and only marinally address reestablismet. * Estimates of the popuation to be displaced tend to undrount (sometimes deliberately, other times by poor ground meurements) the acual number of people whose lands and/or houses are condemed. * Government agencies tend to prepare settlement componn buriedly and supefcill. - Assistn to resetlers is typically confined to short-term rdief. * Res_etem cmponents are underfinaced. - The productive capacities and incomes of those displaced are not rstod within a reasonable tridon period. The reult is lastng impoverishment. * State resetdeament agences often lack explicit poLcies, norms, and guideli for reestablishing people productvely, and focus primaily on exrriaion. Without clearly stated gods and procedur, plannig fails. * Resettlers and hosts are not inrmed and consulted in time. Their organizatns are not invited to join in plamning, negotg and ecudon. * Development (or local) agencs charged with managin resetlement lack the staff sidlls and adqate org capacity. * "Second generation' enir e effects from resedement are not anticipated by preparation studies, affecting host populatimn as well. 23 Involunuby Resettlement In 4frica But if the Bank's experience shows that involuntary resettlement confronts bud problems and often fails to restore people to their previous levels of living, it also shows that these problems are not intractable once identified and responsibly addressed. Resettlement may be approached as an opportunity to develop and improve living standards, as well as a chance to trigger regional econmic growth. Treating resetdement as a mechanism only to get people out of the way of a project as quicldy as possible ha proved to be the cause of untold human misery. However, attting to convert unavoidable resettlement into a development opportunity is the way to mobilize the resources of the state, the donor agencies, the resettlers themselves and the host communities in relocation areas for sustainable development. These two distinct perspectives lead to differences in conceptualization, design and plans, financing and implementation of resettlement programs. Resetlement failures may stem as much from technical ignorance as from political indifference or lack of political will. The remainder of this chapter will review, with specific examples, five maino aspects: resettlement policies; baseline research; productive reestablishment; implementation of resettlement programs; and new issues on the involuntary resettlement agenda. PREST7AM r POLCES. In Africa, comnpulsory resettlement is carried out by government agecies largely in a policy vacuum. Certainly there do exist clear laws and guidelines to empower the state to take away land "needed for the public good." But sorely missing in most African counies are explicit policies and legal frameworks to compel relevant state agencies to effectively address the vital issues of livelihood restoration and productive reestablishment of those displaced.'8 The expropriation laws generally lay down rules for the type of compenon that must be paid for the cipropriated land. However, the nodon of "compensaton"-payment for land taken for public use - is a narrow concept that differs in substance from the more exacing principle that the state has the obligation to restore people's economic well-being and capacities as productive agents. This distncon between mere conation, on the one hand, and resetement on a productive basis, on the other hand, is a critical one, yet it is conspicuously absent from the policy literatre. The World Bane's resetdement policy has recently been revised and strengthened based both on our own experience with resettlement and the comments and improvements offered by our borrowers."9 Wetl prepared resetement plans based on timetables for carrying out activities, clear specification of who is expected to implement them, and a comprehensive budget that finances each actiity and indicates the source of the money, are required before the Bank will agree to appraise and approve a project loan. Moreover, the Bank strongly reommends that developing counties adopt policies and legal frameworks, adequate to their cirumst , which would regulate the unsatisfactory haphazard resettlement practices occurring not only under Bank-assisted projects but even more frequenly under domestic programs. Policy prnciples are never sufficent, however, and must obtain their flesh and blood thmugh a resettlement pln The heart of this plan is the "development package." 24 AfrJciv Population Resetlement in a Global Context This refers to the set of provisions that will reconstruct the productivity and social base of those relocated. The resetdement plan and the development packagc must be creativdy adapted to local circumstances. At the same time, they must also include firm, budgeted activities that will (a) prepare affected groups for transfer and prepare the receivin sites for the resettlers' arrival; (b) transport them to new sites; and (c) assist them further to integrate into their respective new communities. Implementation of the resettlement plan is part of the borrower's obligation under tie international contract between itself and the Bank for the whole project. The Bank will now decline to finance projects that cause displacement yet cannot meet its resettlement policy standards. I Em RESW ci. Anodter major problem is that many rcsettlement programs are planned without a good working knowledge of dte size and nature of the population to be displaced. For example, the appraisal report for the tri-national Ruzizi Hydroelectric project involving Zaire, Rwanda and Bumndi badly underestimated this nber, assuming initially that fewer than 200 people would be displaced by the project. In the end, as many as 15,000 people may have been affected in one way or another. A recent field study on displacement enailed by the Funtua Dam in Nigeria has demostrated that while local planners estimated that displacmet will affect only about some 100 people the real number of affected people will be close to 4,000!2 Jn 1983, roject feasibility studies assumed that fewer thm 1,000 people would be displaced by Kimbere Reservoir on the Tana River in Kenya; dtree years later, after the project tited, more accura studies revealed that displacement would affect more thbm 6,000 hibabitants. This is even more disessing in light of thc tact that prior experience with dam building in the Tana River's upper and lower basins, such as Kamburu, Gtanu, Masinga and others,22 had certainly alerted the planners to the issue of population dspacement. Ibadeuat baseline reseach backfires in many ways, and undemine what is caled the project's "quality at the entry point." The inquacy of pre-project field research on displacement goes beyond miscalions regarding how many people will be displaced; one penetrating study shows how poor understanding of local land tenure patterns created widespread opposition to Ghana's Akesonuo project's resetlement progranL23 Developing successful resettlement programs is a dificult task that simply canot be done wihut drawing on the skills of many professions. Afica is blessed with a log-standing ttadition of appLed social scince, in particular rural sociology and anhropology, that understands wel the socid issues of invohmlnary resettlement. Yet all too often social scientists are only involved in reporting on the outcome of resettement operations. rather than m desigg the resteme program from the ouset. Acrann local paes of land tenme, idefying community prefnces, laing who wants to be relocated with whom and who would welcome the chance to relocate away from neighbors and family - this is the xbread and butter" of useful applied social scince. It is obvious why such knowledge is needed for resettemnt. It is far better to spend a little more tme and money at an early stage to prepare a solid resettlement 25 Invowitary Resettlement hn Africa program than to "save' in the beginning, only to find that enormous sums must be allocated later to fix a faulty design that collapsed during implementatior A PRODUmE FaR RmEsIED GRoups. Because resettlement is too often viewed as a problem of getfting people out of the way of a project, there is a rerrent failure to think of ways to tap their productive potential at the new sites. For irrigation projects that aim to produce more intensive cultivation, the most effective resettlement solution is often to introduce the resettlers to the command area through a planned assistance program that helps them take advantage of the new productive potental of irrigated fields. This approach was successfully applied in the Gorgol Irrigadon Project in Mauritania. Another all-too-often neglected resource lies in the dam-based reservoir itsdf, which our experience shows has enormous inherent fisheries potendal. Fish are now a major product of Akosombo, Kariba, and Victoria Dams, among others. Traditionally, however, the development of reservoir fisheries has been left to Mother Nature, an expedient but also slow solution. Where fisheries based on scientific aquaculture have been planned prior to reservoir imp, the results have been spectacular. In Indonesia's Saguing reservoir, for exmmple, fish production through basket and capure fsberies, processing plants, and coopeative transport is so high that the current economic value of the fish harvest exceeds by a substantial margin the value of the harvest of the ricelands tat were flooded by the dam.2' IMPL3E_OToN. To be frank, there is Litde reason for us to be saisfied with the recent performance of resettement under many of the Bank-assisted projects in Africa. Both the Ruzizi Hydropower project (Zaire/Rwanda/Burundi) and KenWa's Kiambere project suffered major design shortcomings and execution falr, and were not consistent with the policy guideines. The AntaMnarivo Plain project in Madagascar, an urban redevelopment project that may eventully remove beween 15,000 and 18,000 people from their lands, or houses, or both, started without an adequate relocation plan. As might have been expected, it is Ow encounteing serious execution diffiulties in midds- When I visited the reservoir and relocation areas of the Nangbeto Dam in Togo, it appeared that the sites for the villagers to be relocated were not well selected, having neither sufficient land surroundig them, nor being adequately prepared to receive the relocatees. Some corrective measres were taE, but those were too litde too late. A few years after completion, an evaluation study' made clear that: (a) cultivable land per family had decreased to about half the amount before relocation; (b) some of the new villages were sited on uneven platforms, with poor drainage; (c) the core housing units were poody constucted with mud bricks. and soon stared to collapse; and (d) the water supply and saniation facilities for the villagers were totally inadequate. Moreover, when some of the farmer went to the authorities topr and demand better conditions, they were arested and imprisoned. This was in total disregard of their enitleme, as well as of the iernational legal agreement between the Bank and the country for this project. 26 African Populaflon Resetlement in a Globd Context Implementation is, of course, the bottom line for resettlement programs. What makes for good implementation? And how do we kmow that a progrm is successful? These are not easy questions to address, but they can be answered. First, as discussed above, implementation of a resettement program can go no further than the limits set for it by the policy guidelines; therefore, improving domestic policies is a pragmatic, not abstract, imperative. Second, a resetaement organiaion must be staffed with people who have social as well as techical skills. There are social scientists who are professionally trained to deal with settlement and resettlement. Third, engsurng that resettlement organiztions have the capacity and commnt to establish a major field presence is a key element in resettlement success. In this regard, it is crcial that the resetdement units have the resources and the autonomy needed to carry out their mission. We must not find at the last minute that the truck itended for tranwsporting resettlers to their new housing has been commandeered to haul cement! And last but not least, thrghout the resetdement process there must be a way for the resettlers themselves to make their voices heard. Increasingly, this is the case. But developing beter communication and more participatory planing processes has proved to be a very weak point in resettement. The Bank's policy refers repeatedly to the need to use local organiations among both host and resettler populations. Bank policy also insists that people should be moved in socially approprate groups, helping resetdters sustain and perpetuate local organimzational and cultural newoks, and involving locally recognzed commnity leaders in decisionmaing. Project planners mlst learn about these groups and how they can be identified. In communities where the ablity to activate credit from a kinsman enables a newly married couple to start a small business, where having a grandmother take care of the children allows a mother to manage the store, or where the entire village manages the gr g lands together, stable social relationships are the pr-conditions for economic viability. A true picre of communy life must be generated through social science research, and resettlement sttegies must stme topr or recosru group structures as a social support for increasming the ecomic viaility of post-relocation arrangements. NEw ISSmEm ON E RESEIITE T AG A In addition to im g the standards of various ongomg imvoluntary resettlement operations, one must be aware of the new issues and concerns that are coming up in this difficult domain of developmeot work in Africa. First, it appears that the overal need for canying out involuntary displacements and relocation is not likely to subside; on the contray, it is likely to increase in many African countries. I we take as a possile indicator the nunber of projects proposed by varis African govanments for future World Bank assistmee up to 1997 (projects already in various stages of preparation), the increase, compared to the recent past, is significant. Confirming recet trends, the rise will be more pronounced in the urban than in the agricultul areas - specifically in urban instur projects such as road widening, water supply and sanitation In the longer run, the activation of Africa's buge 27 Inoluntwa Resettlement in Afrpa but yet unused potential for irrigated agriclture will entail a rise of involuntary relocation processes in mrual areas as well. Further, a 'new" variety of resettlement appearing on the development agenda is the involuntay resettlement of people out of forests and national parks in Africa. As state-driven efforts for protecting tropical forests, establishing new parks and biosphere reserves, or preventing deforestation are increasing, and result in large-scale government programs (some co-financed by external donors), forest agencies in many countries tend to take an overly simplistic approach and to pursue the forced displacement of communities, some of which have traditionally made a living in the forests. Complex social and legal issues are involved in these situation, such as: customary rights of long- term forest inhabitants; ilegal encroachment; population growth around and inside forests; lack of alternative income sources for many forest dweUers; and genuine conservation imperatives combined with inadequate problem-solving approaches of forest agencies. One major example of such complexities is the ongoing Bank-assisted Forestry Sector project in C6te d'Ivoire. The local forestry agency initially proposed a program which might have required the displacement of more than 100,000 people. Such a displacement would have been to a great extent unwarranted and, in fact, likely to be ineffective and backfire. This proposal was very considerably reduced as a result of Bank intervention to enforce its policy guidelines, and the project approach has been substantiaUy modified. Similarly, in other African countries, it will be increasingly mportant to monitor forthcommig forestry related prgrams for their displacement implications and to develop altemative stategies. Another issue, closely related to the impacts of reservoir projects, has been forcefuUy raised by researchers focusing on the downstream impacts of dams on rivers whose annual floods have been long incorporated in local farming systems. For instance, studies on the Senegal River below the Manantali Dam26 have pointed out that the mination of the annal flood would der much of the dowmtm production options, reduce food production, impoverish many farmers and degrade the envirment. The studies l an operating regine for the dam that would incorporate controlled water releases for artificial floods, with trde-offs acceptable for irrigation and power generation. Extending such a regime of multipurpose water management to other rivers where it may be found adequate would gready increase the flood plain's capacity to sustain a dense human population and thus help pardally solve some problems created by upstream displcmn. As in the recent past, however, development-caused displacement in Africa will in the near future be only a part of the muh broader process of resetting the large group of refugees involuntarily displaced by civil wars or ethnic and religious persecution. Since often different agencies deal with different kinds of resettlement, and people's coping strategies tend to differ as well, it is important to undestand both the similarities and differences betwee these situations and deliberately attempt to cross-exchange iproved policy approahes and prcal experiences in addressing the lasting and painful problems of resetdement. 28 African Populawion Reallemew in a Global Context DM Cmeums To sum up the main points above, let me say, fint, that resetdeme is and remain, at times an unavoidable side effect of necesry development progrn. While resettlement ha amped many development project in the pmt, its incidence will surely incrase in the future, as the ned for infastructre projects that cause displacement continues to rise and the alternatives diminish. Second, resettlement operations in the past have suffered from deficiencies of policy, organization, implemention and resources. There is a need for urgent action on all of these fronts. The World Bank is prepared to assist counties that seek to remedy the deficiencies. Third, there are certn fundamental goals and procedures that must be taken into account during the development of any resetement operon. For the Bank, these sadards are codified in its policy on involuntary resettlement. This policy distills dte Bank's own lessons learned from resettlement programs around the world, and lays down pricles and stndards for the projects dtat the Bank assists. By the same toklen, the Bank will decine to finance projects that cannot meet its policy requirements. Fourth, the Bank is prepared to work w:th its borrowers on developing resettlement policies and operational tools. Nobody has found the pefect solution to the esettement dilemma. But let us help meet this challenge by providig more opporties for skilled professionas who have been working with tese problems around the world to share teir expces and lean frm one another. 29 Involuntary Resettlement in Africa NOTES 1. Russell, S., K. Jacobsen, and W.D. Stanley. 1990. InternatdonalMigrationand Development in Sub-Sahaa Africa. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 2. JESS. 1990. Jubba Enviroumental and Socil Studis. Final Report. U.S. Agency for Intemational Development. Washington, D.C. 3. Cernea, Midcael M. 1990. 'Poverty Risks from Population Resetlement" in Water and Resources Development. Development Discussion Paper No. 355. Harvard Insdtute for Intemational Development. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 4. Fernandes, W., J.C. Das, S. Rao. 1989. "Diplacement and Rehabilitadon: An Estimate of Extent and Projects." In FernaDdes, W. and E. Ganguly Thulcral, eds., Development, Displacement and Reilitation. New Delhi: Indian Social Isitute. 5. Cernea, Michael M. 1993. "Disaster-Related Refugee Flows and Development- Cawsed Population Displacemnt." In Anthrpological Approaches to Invowlnty Resettleent: Policy, Practice, and Zheory. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 6. Dieci, Paolo and Claudio Viezzoli, ods. 1992. Resetemet and Rul Developmet in Ediopia. Socal and Economic Research, Training and Techical Assistance in the Beles VaUey. Mian, Italy: Franco Angeli s.r.l. 7. Pankhurst, Alula. 1992. Resedtt ad Fanine in Ethiopia. The Villagers' Eerience. Manchester/New Yorlc Manchester University Press. 8. Adu-Aryee, Victor. 1991. "Akosonibo and Kpong Resettlement: Were the LssoM Learned?" In Michael M. Cernea and Scott E. Guggenheim, eds. 1993. Anthropological Approaches to Involunary Resettlement: Policy, Pracice, and Theory. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; See also, Chambers, Robert, ed. 1970. The Volta Resetlement Experience. London: Pail Mall Press; Colson, Elizabeth. 1971. The Socal Consequences of Resdtent: The Impact of the Karba Resettement Upon the Gwenbe Tonga. Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press; Fahim, Hussein M. 1981. Das, People and Development. New York/Oxford: Pergamon Press. Fabm, Hussein M. 1983. Egyptian Nubians: Rscment and Years of Coping. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press; Ferea, Robert. 1973. Nubians in Egypt. Austin, T. University of Texas Press; Geiser, Peter. 1986. The Egyptian Nubian. A Stuy in Socdal Symbiosis. Cairo, Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press; Salem- Mudock, Muneera. 1989. Arabs and Nubians in New Hafa. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Ptess; Scudder, rnayer. 1973. "The Human Ecology of Bi; Projects: River Basin Development and Resettlement." Annul ReWiew of Anthropology. Palo Alto. 30 Afican Population Rsettlement in a Global Context 9. Grove, A. T., ed. 1985. The NMger and Its Neighbours. Environmental History and Hydrobiology, Humnm Use and Heah aards of the Major West African Rivers. Rotterdan/Boston: A.A. Balkema; see also Adam, W. M. 1992. Wasting the Rain: Rivers, People and Planning in Africa. Minneapolis/London: University of Minmesota Press. 10. Ahuteflo, G. W. et al. 1966. Tema Manhean: A Study of Resetlment. Planning Research Studies No. 3. Accra, Ghna: Ghana Universides Press. 11. Achunine, Basil Obi. 1992. "Urban Relocation: Policy and Practice Evaluation of Relocation Programmes in Nigeria." Paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Evaluation of Experience with Relocation Activities. IHS, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Februay 12-15. 12. See paper by Mburugu, Edward K. in this volume; see also Odinga, R.S. (ed.). 1979. -An African Dan. Ecological Survey of the Kamburu/Gtaru Hydro-electric Dam Area.' Ecological Bulletins, No. 29. Published by: Swedish Natual Sciene Research Council, Stockholm. 13. Oyedipe, F.P.A. 1983. Adjustment to Resettlement: A study of the resettled peopls in the aRji Lake Basin. Ibadan, Nigeria: University Press Limited; Imerbore, A.M.A. and O.S. Adegoke, eds. 1975. The Ecology of Lake Kainji: The Transition from River to Lake. Be Ife, Nigera: le Ife University Press. 14. Cemea, Michael M. 1989. Metropolitan Development and Compulsory Popwpadon Reaion: Policy Isses and Project Expeences. World Bank Reprint Series No. 452. Washington, D.C. 15. Cernea, Michael M. 1988. hzvolwwwy Resetalment in Development Projects: Policy Guideines in Bank-Fnanced Prjimcts. World Bank Technical Par No. 80. Washington, D.C. 16. Cemnea, Michael M. 1990. op cit. 17. For a more detailed presentation of these processes, see Cernea, Michael M. 1990, ibid. 18. Okidi, C.O. 1993. "Policy and Legal Framework on Development-Driven Involuntary Resettlement in African Countries- (draft). School of Environmental Studies, Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya, processed. 19. World Bank. 1990. involuntary Resettlement." Operational Directve 4.30. Washington, D.C. For an update on recent developments, see Cernea, Michael M. 1993. 'Anthropological Research and Policy Development for PopulationResettlement." In Anhropological Approaches to Involntry Resettlement: Policy, Practice, and Theory. Bouder, Colorado: Westview Press (Forthcoming, 1993). 31 nvoluntary Reseltlement In 4frica 20. Tamaldoc, Martha A. 1993. Repo on World Ba* Missions on Raese _t Review at Fuu Dam Ngeria. Aprl. Procesed. 21. Mbumu , Edward K. 1988. 'A Resetdement Survey in the Kiambere Hydroeectric Power Project.' Preliminary report, processed. March. 22. Ondingo, op. cit. 23. Adu-Aryce, op. ct. 24. Soearwoto, 0. 1989. Dewelopment ofAquacudture and Fsherfes Activiisfor Rsetldement of Famuies from the Sagulig and Carata Reservoirs. Find Report. Insetu of Ecology, Padjadjarn University. 25. Michard, J.-L., Kolawole S. Adam and M. Aziabl6. 1992. "Le Racseme des Populaions Affectdes par la Contuction du Barage de Nangbeto: les pour le future barrage d'Adjarala" Report prepared for CEDRAT Developrent, processed. 26. Horowitz, Michael M. and Salem-Murdock, Munera 1991. Senegal River Basi Monitoring Activity: Synthes Report. Bingamton, NY: Instiute for Development Anthropology; Horowitz, Micbael M. and funeera Salem Murdock. 1993. -Development-Induced Food Insocurity in tie Middle Senegal ValWy." Geournl 30.2. 32 CHAP= 2 INVOLUNTARY RESEl LEMENT IN BANK-FINANCED PROJECTS: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA Cyndmia C. Cook and Aleki Mukendi This chapter focuses on the lessons to be learned from World Bank experience with involuntary resettlement in development projects in Africa. Based on a review of Bank reports and other literature and a desk review of material in World Bank files, it attempts to explore the effects of such resettlenent on the displaced population and the environmental consequences of such displacement. While this review covers only a small part of the problems associated with population growth and human setlement in Africa, it is intended to help identify situational factors likely to facilitate the success of new settlements, and policy issues that need to be addressed when plannig for involuntary resettlement. Back4ground The issues of population movement and settlement in Africa are of continuing concern to development planners and project designers, since development policies and projects are ncessarily based on assumptions concening the size and distribution of the target population over space and time. Early attewpa to promote rmal development in Africa relied heavily on support for planned rural settlements with sufficient population to support the introduction of intensified agriculture and social services, accompanied by government policies to promote population concentration through a range of positive and negative incentives. Experince with such projects demonstated that they were often ill- amuned to the realities of African soial organization and economic and environmental conditions, and showed that govermment-led settlement projects can be both costly and counterproductive.! Itemational development organizations have now begun to pay serious attention to the resettlement issue, especialy in connection with large dams.2 Recent reviews of experience with resettlement conclude that there is much scope for policy action and project design to mitigate the negative impacts of resetdement programs and to create developnental opporunities for the participants. In the past, reatively few World Bank-fianced development projects in Africa bave identified resetlement as an issue of iWortance. This does not mean that projects have not involved resettlement, but rather that the resettlement issue often has not been Abld MKkesad is an ijenunionu economist at CoBlik in Denver, Colrado. He is co-editor of Deserfication Crol and Renewable Resurce Management an the Saheho and Sudanian Zones f West Africa. 33 Inwoluntary Resetkment in ofrica identifled by Bank and borrower staff, and th hus not been directly addressed in project planning. Of course, many of the Bank-financed projects in Africa, such as health and education projects, agricultural research and extension, and adjustent lending programs, do not cause population displacement and thus do not raie resettlement issues. However, post-project evaluations and reviews of project experience indite that resettement needs are not always well identified in the plaming stage and that resetdement requirements are frequently underesdmated when planning does occur. Inadequate advance planing for project-related resettlement leads to problems in project implenientation as well as unfortunate project outcomes, both in terms of the consequences for the displaced people themselves and in terms of the economic and enviromental consequences for the country as a whole. The importance of resettlement planning in development projects and progran for Africa appears likely to increase in the future. This is true for a number of reasons. First, the amount of avaDable and suitable land for development investment is limited and may actually be decreasing due to processes of environmental degradation. There are few if any lands that are truly unoccupied, and those which may meet this criterion are likely to be reserved as wildlands and biodiversity reserves to meet the needs of future human populations. Rapid population growth combined with limited access to land means that agriculture must be intensified in the most productive areas and that urban centers are likely to ac ae an cer-increasing share of the total population. In this situation, not only dams and reservoirs, to meet growing needs for energy, irrigation, and domwstic water supply, but also industries, in re, and urban development projects are likely to involve major population displacemnt. Furtermore, Bank policies and borrower proposals increasingly take account of local needs and priorities and attempt to ensure the equitable distribution of project benefits. Under more decentaihzed and democratic govemmets in Africa, greater attention should be paid to meeting the needs of people displaced by projects. Lastly, the growing concern for envmental sustainability dicates that the consequences of population displacement be adequately considered in project design and that projects include plans to mitigate the negativ environmental effects associated with resettlement. Edstory of Bak Involvement In the history of Bank involvement with projects causing involuntary resettlement in Africa, three phases can be ientified: (1) involuntary resetdement occurring as a consequence of large-scale infrastructure projects during the 1950s and 1960s, with litde effort being made by donors and governments to address resettlement issues; (2) a reduction in the number of new large-scale infrstruc projects in response to the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, with a crresponding reduction in the scale of involuntary resettement, coupled with greaer, though still inadequate, attention by governments and donors to resettement issues; and (3) a rise in projects requiring 34 InVOItarY Rsectlmet in Bw*-Fbwced Projctc resettlement in the 1990s resultiog fom population growth, eaviromntal degradation, and urbanization in Africa, and linked with the design of prograus to enhance the participation of project-affected peopl in resetdement planing and imple ion Resettlement in Bank-fmanced projects in Africa first became an issue when the Bank became involved in financing major hydropower projects such as the Kanba Dam in Zambia and Zinbabwe, the Akosombo Dam in Ghana_ and the Kainji Dam in Nigeria. Thes projects involved significant displacement of people (an estimated 67,000 at Kaniba, 84,000 at Akosombo, and estimates ranging from 44,000 to 100,000 at Kainji). However, at this stage the Bank regaded project-related resettlement as the borrower's problem and did not take any action to amist the affected people. Independent research on the resetement programs associated with these projects identified a nber of problems, including iequate advance planng, inappropriately designed housing, inadeque provision to meet food needs, conflicts with host populations, lack of access to productive resources, serious health problems, social disruption, loss of cornidence in local political systems, and development of a "dependency' syndrome. Many of these problems can be traced to these projects' failure to involve the affected people in Planning for resettlement. Awarienss of the problems that could be caused by poorly planned resettlement progrms led the Bank to adopt a formal resetement policy in 1980. This policy defined basic principles to guide Bank staff and borrowers, outlined procedur for preparing, apprising and supervising relocation schemes, and specifed conditions that should be met by Bank borrowers and agencies responsible for resettlement. However, this policy was only sporadically implemented during the early 1980s, as shown by a Bank-wide reviw conducted in 1986.4 Some lessons from this early experience were incorporated in Bank techical guidelies published in 1988! A revised version of the Bank's policy was issued in June 1990 and is available to the public.' Experience with resettlement in the Africa region was first reviewed in July I988.7 This review covered projects approved since 1980, whiCh were thaerfore subject to the Bank's resettlement policy. It found that only seven of approximately 600 projects under supervision, or about 1 percent, were known to involve resettlement. A review of the projects in preparation, however, indicated that the number of projects involving resetlement was liklay to incrase, to about twenty-five projects by 1990. Projects involving resettlement were found in all sectors of Bank lending. Power projects and inffastructme projects (water, uban and transport) accouted for the largest mnmbers, but some agriculture and social sector projects were also found to involve resetlement. The numbers of households imvolved in ongoing resettlement progrms ranged from 35 to 2,500, and the total number of persons to be resetded in all projects was estimated at about 50,000, based on appraisal estmates. This review was updated in Septeber 1990.' The results reflected improved peoma by Bank staff and borrowers in identifying when resettemen progams were needed and in implementing Bank guidelines for the design of such programs. This review found that 20 of the approximately 700 projects under supervision in 1990, or 35 Involwntay Rasetlemnmt in Africa about 3 percent, had resettlement components, and that some 87,500 people could be involved. Thus, resettlement needs had grown, but not as fast as anticipated. Several large projects that would have involved substantial resettlement had been significantly delayed, if not altogether abandoned, in part because of growing concern for the project- aFfected population. Other projects had been redesigned to eliminate or minimize the need for resetaement. The impact of the new Bank requirens for e ni assessment of projects appears to be mixed.' On one hand, environmental assessments in some cas have revealed a need for resettlement when this had not been previously cgnized by Bank and borrower staff. Thus, it can be expected that increasing attention to enviromnental assessment will bring increasing recognition of resettlement needs and increasing numbers of projects with resettlement components. On the other hand, environmental assessments have in some cases helped to show how projecs could be sited or designed to avoid resettlement. Also, the need to comply with extensive environmental conditions, including resettlement requirements, is encouraging some borrowers to change their approach to sector policy (for example, focusing on improving energy efficiency rather than constructing new hydropower projects). .,hooogy Through a comparative analysis of the experience with involuntary resettlement under recent World Bn-financed projects in Africa, this review seeks to (a) assess the effectiveness of various approaches in ensuring the welfare of the project affected populaton and in controlling resetdement-related environmenal degradation; (b) identifv the policy and procedural issues involved; and (c) identfy knowledge gaps to be filed tough further study. The ultimate goal of this effort is to improve the design and ilementation of resetaement operations in Africa. This paper is intended to provide a basis for further discussion among policymakers and projectplannrs in Africa, leading to an agreed agenda for policy chnge, improved project design and implementation criteria, and fiurtier research on issues related to enviromnent and settlement. The study is based on a review of experience with twelve recently completed projects and projects under supervision, with resettlenim conponents sufficiendy advanced in implementaion so that judgements can be made on their developmen effectiveness. It covers six recently completed projects (Ethiopia Amibara Irrigation, Burkina Faso Urban Development, Liberia Monrovia Urban Development, Nigeria Bauchi Urban Development, Maritnia Gorgol Noir Irrigation, and Cameroon First Urban). These projects were reviewed on the basis of data available in Project Completion Reports and Projec Performance Audit Reports. It also includes six projects stll under supervision (Ethiopia Forestry, Mali Urban U, Kenya Kmbere Hydropower, Malawi Northern Transport Corridor, Togo/Benin Nangbeo Hydropower, and Zire/BurundilRwanda Ruzizi II Regional Hydroelectric Pawer). These projects were reviewed on the basis of data in the project files and supervision reports.'° 36 Involunwy Resettlement in Bank-Fince Projects The study has three major limitadons. First, the data base may be insufficient to generate meaningful propositions about the problem at hand. Secondly, only a few projects provide the time horizons necessary to compare the before and after relocation periods. Finally, since the study did not include field visits or interviews with project beneficiaries, it does not provide a direct measurement of the effects of resettement policy on the people involved. The twelve case studies assessed the consequences of resettlement in Bank- financed projects in Africa by looking at resettlement as a process. We were inersted in dermining when resettlement is recognized as a project-related issue, when and how govermets attempt to deal with it, when external pressure appears rnportant, and what happens when remedial action is necessary. We were also interested in determining possible trade-offs and tensions between resettlement and other development goals. Resettlement problems may stem from either a policy or an implementation failure. However, the key to a successful resetdement operation may also lie outside the realm of resettlement policy or planning. For example, a department in charge of creating or implementing resettlement policy may have a great deal of responsibility, but not much authority in political spheres, for a host of unrelated reasons. Study Idig The first thing we leamed from this review was that it would be irmossible to evalae the impacts of resettlement, either on the affected population or on the physical enviromen, based on quantatvefield data and quanti analytic tedniques. In many of the cases studied, resettlement was not identified as an issue until wel into project implementation, and pre-project baseline data cannot be accurately r cted. In other cases where adequate baseline studies were conducted during project preparation, either no provision was made for monitoring and evaluation of impacts on the project affected population (much less on the physical envi ), or else, in a few cases, funds intended for monitoring and evaluatton were diverted to other project purposes during implementation. There seems to be a reluctance on the part of project authorities to support research that might tend to show the project as failing to achieve its objectives, or as having unanticipated negative extemal effects. Implementing agencies for projects involving resettlement are well- placed to monitor the imnmdiae effects of the project on the affected population, but are not generally well-equipped to conduct broader impact evaluations such as would be needed to study the longer-term relationships between changing settlement patterns, effects on the host population, and effects on the physical evionment. Important con information and assistance in conducting the analysis may be required from other agencies, includg ministries of planning, enviromnent, health and social welfare, or local research institutions or umnversities. The most successful projects in terms of establishing a solid data base were those that utilized local consultants or cooperating agencies, rather than the implementing agency itself, to carry out monitoring and evaluation. 37 Invowitay Rasettlement in Africa The second thing we leanned b that project-affected populatons are systemacally underesdmated. Planners tend to estinate the project affected popultion hin terms of the nunbers of structures that will be destoyed or damaged, applying an average number of persons per household to these structures. This leads to underestimaton for the following reasons, among others: * Affcted peopl Inlue both homeowners ad home ccupants. Often these are not the same people; especially in urban areas, occupants may be renters, and in rural areas, they may be employees or sharecroppers. While homeowners are entided to compensation, the people affected by the loss of these homes often are not so entidtled. Nevertheless they are entided under Bank policy to share in project benefits, and must be considered in resettlement planning. * Persons witkh a caim to compensaton may not acually live in the project area. Ofken many absent relatives will have legitimate claims in an area to be acquired. Such claims become even more complicated in areas where ctomry land tenure systems overlap with ttling procedures under civil law. * Faiin that will xAt lose thdr homs may neverheless lose an Wnetu pa= of Wir lad assets. Ein some cases, this may force them to move since heyw can no longer sustain thenselves on their remaining land. This type of impact can be significant in projects such as shallow reservoirs, road widening or construction of tranission line corridors, especially in densely -opWated rurai areas. * Affected peopk include seasonal asers of the lAd resore, who may not maintain homes in the area. The most obvious case is that of nomadic ptoralists who depend on access to rivers for dry season water and grazing. It is frequently alleged that people voluntarily migrate to areas targeted for development in the hope of benefitting from resettlement. This claim may be advanced as an excus for postponing the involvement of the project-affected population in planing as long as possible. The consequences of this policy, however, can be the opposite of what is inteDe. Information, often iaurt, may leak out, raising fears and leading to irrational actions by the people, while a favored few speclators position themselves to profit from the expected land transfer. In contast, early information provicded to the project-affected population enables them to participate in resettlement planning and to make rational choices from among the options open to them. In addition, early inventory of the resident population and their assets, combined with public notice that land is to be acquired and a freeze on land improvements and transfers, has the best chance of limitng the nunber of people eligible for compensation to those genuinely affected by the project, and thus helps to minimize subsequent resetdement costs. 38 Involuary Resettement in Bank-Rnanced Projects The next thing we learned from this review was that project impkmentation was most successful where governments entered into dialogue with the affected population at an early stage in project design. Examples of projects that illustrate this point are the Gorgol Noir Irrigation Project in Mauritania and the Nangbeto Hydroeectric Project in Togo and Benin. In contrast, where implementing agencies failed to properly idestify the affected population and plan with them to meet dtir needs, serious problems arose during project implementation. Examples of this type of project include the Kiambere Hydroelectric Project in Kenya and the Ruzizi U Hydroelectric Project in Zaire. A fourth lesson concerning successful resettlement implemenation is that cooperation is neededfrom many agencies. Such cooperation can only be accomplished with strong leadership from the project-implementing agency, combined with early involvement of other agencies in resettlement plaming. A related lesson from the African experience is that line agencies (such as power authorities) may have difficulty in imposing resetlement plans on other line agencies; local or district authorities may more effectively play this coordinating role. in the African context, one can hardly overstate the importance of polical will for the successful implementation of resettlement programs. Project planners working within the context of supportive national policies aimed at pro ing the wefare of the poor (as, for example, in Cameroon) have a much greater chaie of success than those working in a context where the needs of the poor are not considered important (as, for eample, in Burkina Faso under an earlier regime). Without stmng poLitical will, well- itentioned project designs are easily distorted to serve other purposes during implementation, as haened in the Bauchi Urban Development Project in Nigeria. Political commitment is also important in dealing with ethnic conflicts and customary land ights, especially as theyn may affect future relations between resettled and host populations (see, for example, the Amibara Irrigation Project in Ethiopia). With respect to resetdement impacts on the physical environment, the record so far provides little direct evidence. Indirectly, one may infer that projects ihid faiked to plan for resettlement probably caused more negative enironental impacts resulting from unplanned resettlement than would otherwise have been the case. This is certany true in rural areas where people's options are limited to resettlement within a traditional teritory that has already been reduced by the project, as in the Kiambere case. Overgrazing of rangeland and shortened fallow cycles on farmland, leading to land degradaion, erosion, and reduced productivity, are the inevitable consequences of such rapid increases in population density on restricted areas of land. On the other hand, where densities are low and the movement of people is relatively unconstrained, dispersed resettlement of individual households may have less of an environmental impact than a masive program of resettlement at a single site. In urban areas, it is particularly difficult to document the results of unplanmed resettlement, as the occupants of low-income areas tend to be transient and to come from a variety of ethnic bckgrunds. Hence, they are less likely to move as a group to a new location. What we do know is that displaed people are likely to try to stay close to their 39 Inwoluntary Resettlement in Africa place of employment and to maintain their social networks in the city as much as possible. Unless specific provision is made to meet their needs, one may assume that displaced urban residents will place additional pressure on the existing housing stock, resulting in crowded and possibly unsanitary living conditions. or will construct their own precarious structures on whatever land may be available, including steep slopes, road rights-of-way, and drainage channels, to the detriment of the urban environment. The evidence from planned resettlement programs indicates that proper planning, especially participatory planning, can mitigate the enviromnental impacts of resettlement and enhance living conditions for the project residents. Planning that does not take into account the needs and desires of the population may result in inappropriate housing design, lack of adequate woodfuel and water resources, and environmental pollution. In rural areas, proper analysis of soils and draina,e at the resettlement site is essential, as well as consultation with the host population concerning sustainable land management practices. Particular attention needs to be paid to trees, water, and wildlife resources at the resettlement site, and to the rules under which these resources may be exploited by the relocated population. An important issue in the sustainability of resettlement programs in rural areas is the choice of appropriate production technologies that will enable the resettled population to exploit its new environment in a sound and sustainable way. These technologies nmst be 'appropriate' both to the skills and knowledge of the people who are expected to use them and to the environmental conditions in which they will be practiced. Thus, it is not realistic to expect that dryland pastoralists will rapidly and successfully convert to a production system based on irrigated agriculture. However, if element of their traditional system, for example, livestock, can be retained in their new setting, there is a chance that sustainable production patterns will evolve over time out of a combination of the old and the new. Pocy Issues The conventional view of the resetdement process starts with planning, continues through the move and reinstallation at the resettlement site, adaptation to the new enviromnent, incorporation of the resettled population into the host population, and ends with economic and social development. Although the available infonnation is fragmentary and incomplete, the cases examined highlight major difficulties in achieving the ultimate objective of resettlement: the sustainable economic and social development of the resetded people. In only three of the twelve projects reviewed can the resettlement component be considered a success. While the projects reviewed vary in size, nature, sectors, policy environments, and ecological impacts, many of the facts about resetdement implementation remain rmarkably similar. The cases demonstrate the importance of both adequate planning and adequate monitoring of resetlement components, for remedial actions are extremely costly and not always possible. Where the need for resettlement has been identified early in project 40 Invowlary Raseuteent in Bapk-Rnanced Projects preparation, resettlement plans have been prepared in consultation with local authorities and community groups, and governments have supported the impl-entaton of these plans through a positive policy and institutional context, resetldement componet. have on occasion been cared out successfuUy. I ontrast, projects which fail to recognc the need for dealing with resettlement until tey have reached the implementation ste are likely to encounter problems. RECorNn7ON OF RESErTIIE NEEDS. A common failing in the projects exmined was an inadequate assessment of resettlement needs by borrowers and Bank staff at the preparadon and appraisa stages. In several of the cases reviewed, no resettlement plan at all was prepared by the borrower; rather, the government simply provided assurnces that it would take the necessary steps to secure land rights or resettc occupants or both. In the Malawi project, the Bank was not directly involved in the preparation and review of resettlement plans, relying on a co-financier to appraise the resettlement component. The Ethiopian government agreed at negotiations to prepare relocation plans for families affected by the forestry project, but this conmnitment rmais unfulffilled five years after appraisal. In some cases, the Bank failed to implement its own policy. The Kianbere Hydroelectric Project was processed without any query being raised about the project's compliance with the Bank's resettlement policy, which had been isued some years earier. No resetdement plan was prepared by the borrower either before or afker appraisal. Thus, when resettlement problems becae an issue, the Bank had to rely on the implementing agency to take remedial action, although previous Bank missions had established the fact that the agency was not equipped instittionally, legally, financially or technically to develop a resettlement program. In the Zaire case, the Bank did not request that the govement submit a resettlement plan because project staff believed. erroneosly, that only a smali part of the proect area population would be affected. Part of the impmenation problem can be explained by the fact that Bank resettement policy is often at variance with that of govenments. In the cases of Togo, Benm, and Cameroon, govemment resettlement policy coincided with the Baek's own policy, while in Kenya and Zaire, Bank guidelines went furer than the government was prepared to go. The resulting friction was bound to make project implementation more difficult. Gov.TNmE REspO mwy. Policymakers in the countries concmed were less responsive to needs for resettlement than one might have hoped. The uncertainties and long delays in seeing the benefits from a positive resettlement policy may explain at least partially the reluance of goverments to embark on such progrm. Governments may fear that a full resetement program will overtax the country's administratve capacity and become a burden on already limited resources. In addition, project planners find it difficult to justi(y benefits for the project-affected population in a situation where the economic prospects are worsening for the country as a whole. The issue is one of equtable disibution of benefits from development investments, an issue to which 41 Involuntary Raettlmei bi Africa policymake in Africa are not always as coiitted as they might be. As with other policy issues, poliical commitment at the highest level is essential. NsmTIuoNAL S. Even though some issues must be addressed in teras of the specific institutional and policy context of each project, administrative structure and pcity play an importat pat in project success. Although the cases reviewed provide no diret evidence for the hypothesis that a specized resettlement unit is needed, they suggest that, all else being equal, the lower the number of agencies involved, the smoother will be the implementation of a resettlement proam. When resetdtlnent coonents cut across deparmental, and even country, boundaries, they are likely to affect mmrmus constituencies. This inceases the possibility of encountering pressure points and costs become higher. The Malawi Northem Corridor Project, involving resettlement in Tanzaia in order to implement a program benefiting anotier country is an exteme case in point. Successful implementation of a resetlement program calls for effectve coordinion between tie agency in charge of resettlement and the other agencies involved, such as planing, health, ecaion, public works, agricultur, and rural affairs. The Gol Noir project in Mauritania and the Nangbeto project in Togo and Benin iustae cases where cooperation has worked effectively to ensure services to the reseled pWDUation. In contast, the implemg agency was unable to mobilize needed suppot from other agencis or local authorities in the Kiambere case. Failure to recognize and support the capacity of cmmunty groWs to implement project components also contrte to project failure in Liberia, whereas nongovemmental organiatiOnS (NGOs) made an important contribution to project success in Cameroon. L4AV TmwE. Land ter remains a major problem in the design and implementation of reselementcomponents in Afi. There is a key distinctionbetween privte ownesip of property (the right to exclusive use) and possession of property (ocuation with right to use)."t Legal compenation rWe iem generally apply to owners rather than possesso. Since possessors will be dispossessed by a project involving resettlement, Bank policy calls for mitatg measures to ensure that these individuals are not, on balance, negaiey affected by the project. Bank policy does not distinguish between those wbo occupy land 'rightfully,' for instance, as owners, and hose who occupy it withiut legal sanction. In many African states, much or all of the land is legally owned by the government This makes it relatively easy for governcms to allocate public lands for project purposes without fully addressing the needs of current occupants or people with traditonal rigbts to use the land. However, customary law and administratve practice in most countries also recognize traditional rights to allocate and control the use of common ("tribal') lands. The people who possess, occupy, and use such lands may or ma- not be the owners, and their rights and obligations are detemined not only by the official legal system but also by customary rles and practices. Customary law is generaly quite clear that copensation must be paid for loss of income flows as well as 42 Involuntary Raes_uee in B k-Rnanced Projects assets. Persons who occupy public land in acoordance with customary law may nevertheless be seen as "squaters" from the legal point of view. The situaion is further complicated in urb areas wher traditonal landholders may have invested in the constructdon of renal bousing. Often such housing contins many more families than the number of residential units would suggest. Tenants in such rental units have little protection in the case of reettlement, while absentee landowners may reap benefits without incurring any real costs. Since most urban areas in Africa do not have up-to-ate cadastres or fimuctioniu systems for the recording and transfer of land tides, difficulties and delays can be expected in projects for which local authorities are required to provide urban land free of encmbrances, as illustrated in the Mali and Cameroon cases. PoP WR PA PAON. The experience with community participation in planning for resettlement is most encouraging. The involvenent of local people in resettlement plannin was a key element in project success in Maurtania, Nangbeto (Togo/Benin), axn, to a lesser extent, in Camewn. In Ethiopia, the role played by peasant associations and other stakeholders in the policy process, that is, urban dweller associations and famers affected by the project, was especially significant. Resettlement sites were chosen by the goverment in consultation with the concerned village associations. The govemment appointed a commnity development officer to establish a dialogue with peasant and urban dweller associations regarding plans for their relocation and participation in the project. However, these positve moves did not take place until popular resistance to the project (and pressure from the Bank) forced the goverment to take remedial action. Beu of the limited nature of the data, it is not possible to establish a firm correlaion between local paricipation and success of the resettlement operations reviewed here. However, there is an emerging consensus in both social science and development policy that information on projects should be shared with affected people and commity grups at the eariest stage of project identification, and that the active paticipation of beneficiaries is necessary whoughou the subsequent stages of planning, design, implemention, and evaluation, in order for settlement projects to become truly sustainable. A 1985 Bank study of land settlement suggested that "a major cotntbution to sustainability came fom the developmen of grassroots ognins, whereby project beneficiaries gdually assumed increasing resonsibilities for project activities." The study identified the c i of successful grassroots organizations as having "decision-ma1kig input into project activities, a high degree of autonomy and self- reliance, a measure of beneficiary control over management ... and the coninued alig_nent of the project activities with the needs of beneficiaries."'i SocIL A ENV OME L vPAs. Perhaps the least understood feature of the resettlement process is its dynamic nature. Durmg and after dam construcion, for example, outsiders may seek to take advantage of the newly-created comnercial and social opportunties by moving into the area. The flux of new arivals places heavy burdens on local resources and may overwhelm existing social facilities. For example, 43 hwvoltary Reuemen In Africa in Ruzizi, the afrival of project staff and construction crews, combined with expropriation of land, radically changed production and employment patterns in the affected commnity. MAlo, because of the "boom town" suation, an increase in the price of basic commodities is likely to ensue, with negative consequences for familia who do not have howuehold members employed by the project. If compensation for lost assets is long delayed, the costs of land and building materials may climb well beyond the compenation values. Unless careful thought is given to the enironmental consequences of population concentration at resettlement sites, they may only become new centers of enviromental degradation. Rapid population increases place considerable stress on fuelwood supplies, which may diminish rapidly. In the absence of adequate water supply and sanitation, water pollution and health problems are likely to ensue. Agricultural production patterns must be harmonized with those of the host population and the canying capacity of the physical enviromnent. Planning for the provision of economic and social services must take into account the needs of the host population as well as the resettled population, in order to minimize conflicts and create a common intest in the success of the resettlemen program. The resettlement policy context is determined by the constituencies affected by policy and the metods used to reconcile difrences between constituencies. The nature and number of vesd interests, as well as the methods used to resolve their differences, vary from one project and one country to another. The umuber of affected parties and the extent to whih they are adversely affected may be rdlected in the political costs of reetement, and perhaps, in its chance of success. This review has identified a number of policy issues related to the successful implementation of a project involving resettlement. Some of these issues are addressed by Dank policies and guidelines, based on the lessons of experience. Where governments are not in agreement with these policies and guidines, however, it has proved difficult, if not impossible, to implement resettement components with sadsfactory results. There is clearly a need for further policy dialogue, as well as improved planning and implemetation, in order to have successful and sustainable projects involving resettlement in the future. The lessons of resettlement experience, however, extend well beyond the limits of projects involving resettlement. They are pertinent to the design of future land settlement projects, to the handling of spontaus rual movements and of escalating uran growth, and to the management of temporary or pman refigee populations following outbreals of warfare or natual disasters. They are fimdamental to the future in a continent where land is increasingly less available and where the rate of growth in food production is unable to keep up with the rate of growth in population. Sustinable development in Africa in the future will depend upon major population movements, 44 Ihwvuntary aettlemnt in Bank-Fnanced Projects whether vohuny or involuntay, to achieve a better bale between population denity and naurl resource e wmets. It will require people of different cultural backgrounds to reach agremnt for the joint managmn t of natual reources and to adopt new technologis for more sustible production to meet growing hmn neds in both urban and rural area. In order for these fundamtl changes to take place, it will be ncessary for governmen: (1) to recognize the need for change; (2) to assume responibility for its design and implementation and for ensuing an equitable distnbution of the benefits; (3) to streamline institution sad to develop aministuve capacity for the managenelt of change procees; (4) to address issues of land tenure and the relationship of civil to customay law in land nt; (5) to promote popular participation in decisionnidig as wel1 as in the design and implementation of projects; and (6) to evauate and mitigate the social and envirow.nr l impacts associated with the selected development antegies. The difficulty of acconmplishing these objectives, especially in Arica, should not be estmaed. In all of these areas, ltssons can be leared from the experence with project-related resettement. We do not yet have the answers, but at least we shld be able to ask the righ questions. 45 hwluntary Resetlemen in Arica NOTES 1. World Bank. 1985. The Expeiee of the World Bank with Gwrwment- Sponsored Land Setlem. Operatons Evalation Deparmen Report no. 5625. Washington, D.C.; World Bank. 1987. World Bank EPerence wi Rwl DevelopImt 1965-1986. Operations Evaluation Depatmen Report no. 683. Wahington, D.C. 2. See, for example, Butcher, David. 1971. An Organitonal Manual for Rasettlement. Rome: Food and Agricalture Organization.; also, Cemea, Michael M. 1988. Involwnary Resetement in Devlopment Projects: Polkty Guidei in World- Bnk Fnanced Projects, World Bank Technical Paper No. 80. Wahin, D. C.; Escudero, Carlos R. 1988. Involntary Resettmen in Dk*-Assis,td Projects: An Inrdwon to Legal Isse. World Bank Lega Departnct. Wasington, D.C. 3. Butcher, David. 1988. "The Ilmct of Dam Consuction on People: Impact and Tradeoffs of Hydropower Dams on Sustaiable Developm in the Tropics and Sub- Tropics." Unpublished report, sponsored by dte Center for Integratd Development/IUCN/ODA.; Cenea, Michael M. 1991. 'hnvohntury Resettlement: Social Resea-ch. Pocy and PFlring." In Michael M. Cemea, ed., Putg People First: Soiological Variables in Rural Devdopmen. 2nd edition. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univerity Press. 4. AgicOultur sDep 1986. voluntary Rsettm in Bank-Assisted Projects." Unpublishd paper. World Ban. Washgt, D.C. 5. Cea, 1988, op.cit. 6. World Bank. 1990. "Ivolur Resettlement." -Opaonal Directiv 4.30. Washington, D.C. 7. Cook, Cynthia. 1988. "Aftica Region FY 88 Resetldement Review. Unpublished paper. World Bank, Evroment Divison, Technical Departmt, Africa Region. Washington, D.C. 8. Cook, Cynthia and AUeld Muknli. 1990. "Africa Region FY 90 Resettment lRview." Unpublished report. World Bank, Environment Division, Tecmical Depam t, Africa Region. Washingt, D.C. 9. World Bank Opeationl Directive 4.00, Anex A. 1989. "Ei Assessme." (October) Washon, D.C.; This has bee replaced by World Bank Operatonal Directive 4.01. 1990. "Environmental Assessment." (October) Wangton, D.C. 46 Invwowifut Raesdeuat In Ban-Financed Prejects 10. Thi put of dc anmlys Is based on a review of project file data carried out by Aleki Mubendi, World Bank consultant. 11. Eacudero, C. 1988. op.cit. 12. Operadon Evaluation Departuet. 198.. op.cit. 47 CHAFIwR 3 DISLOCATION OF SETTLED COMMUNITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: THE CASE OF KIAMBERE HIYDROELECTRIC PROJECT EdArd K. Mburugu In Africa, perhaps more than in any other region, a person's idendty is dosely tied to both land and culture. Cultural homogeneity, which includes strong elemnts of clan and lineage organization among Africans, tends to be found in geographical areas with varying degrees of agro-ecological potential. The social struces of rural communities in Africa constitute what can be termed "culture areas" in which social organization is conditioned by the resources of the physical environment. Given this sociogeographical settig, units of social organizaton such u the family, lineage, clan, tribe, or ethnic group are also territorial units. Such terriral units along with their ecological endowments are viewed as permanent dements in the lives of individual families and communities. These families and communities also identify the land with their generations of ancestors and as the place where fuure generations will live. Through the folldore relating to their ecological niche, people have learned to preserve and protect certain cultural artfacts such as burial gmmds, and certain elements in the habitat such as 'sacred' forests, grazing areas, shrublands and "haumted" hills. Thus, besides the social, culturl, and economic basis of identity with the ancestal land, there are strong aesthedc, senimental and religious reasons for people to desire to remain in their place of birth. For this reason, nrual developments that have the effect of dislocating people from their famiHiar enviromet should be avoided, or planed with the utmost care. Indeed, 'it would be a mistae to underestimate the disruptive effcs of dislocation even in projects where the size of the population affected is relatively small."' Developnent-Related Problms in Afria Development projects in rual areas that have the effect of dislocating people can take a variety of foms, including creation of dams for hydropower or irrigation, aonextion of land for urban development, highway constucon, and creation of runhands, often owned by state corporations. In particular, projects that create man-made lakes often Edward K Mburgu is Associat Proessor of Sociology at the Uuivesity of Nairobi He has caried out basic and applied reseach on devepm pmrogmams m the contuit of social and cuurat sysem. Prossor Mburugu is co-author of frican Pmcuwives on Deweopme. 49 Inwluntary Rsettlemem in Aftiac necessitate displacement of many families, and in some case, whole communities. In Africa, the creation of dms for hydropower has often had an adverse effect on the economic basis through which conmmnities sustan sound family life. The effect has been to remove people from their familiar and predictable enviroments in which the clan and family reladtionship carries out hmportant socia and economic obligations. These lost benefits have not successfully been replaced in the resettlement areas. A myriad of problems was experienced by some 336,000 persons who were forcibly moved in creating Lakes Nasser (Egypt), Kariba (Zanbia), Volta (Ghana), and Kainji (Nigeria). Among the problems experienced were inadequate land availability in resettlement areas, disruption of valued family relations, decline in farm production, deterioration in housing conditions, and increase in the incidence of water-borne diseases and malaria. Hardly any resettlement scheme has avoided cultural disruption and some form of social alienation. It is a sad observation that these resettlements have proceeded in total disregard of the wishes of the people to be resettled. This has led to a lack of concern for people's welfare, reflected in a failure to restore agricultural and other employment opportunities, failure to maintain and promote education and health care, and failure to retain social and caltural identity. It has been common to place displaced people in social settings where their culture and lifestyle conflict with the values of host communities and therefore generate lonpsnding emity between them.3 Even in the rare cases where plamied resettlement has been relatively effective, the "physiological, psychological, and sociocltural stress associated with displacement implies that some people, especially the aged, will never come to terms with their new homes. For them, the transiton period ends only with death."4 For nearly all goverme in Aica, beief in the benefits of technial progress cannot be compromised by the wishes and needs of a "few' resettlers that might "sacnfice" the adcievement of greater national goals. The bias favoring technical progress hrough projects that displace people is so stong that resettement issues are seen as mnor side-effects, ofte falling under the rubric of "enviromental effcts." Rarely does it appear in govemment circles that 'by its very nature, resettlement is a sociocultural/economic process that happens first to people, rather dtan to their physical environment.-s There is a general failure to recognize that retement disorgizes entire human communities and breaks up long established networks, destroys productive assets, causes severe envirnental effects and the loss of valuable resources," besides being associated with "increased stress (psychological and sociocultural), and heightened morbidity and mortlity rates."' It has been observed that the "love of birthplace, no malter how inhospitable it may seem to strangers, is quite possibly a universal characteristic."7 In addition to the sentmental atachment to the place of birth, resettement almost always results in the loss of valuable agricultural land and along with it, the loss of communty wisdom that revolves around a productio system within a familiar and predictable habitat. 50 Kanbere Hydoelclric Project Kenym Experience i Iuvduntry Resltle .t Involunary resettlement and related problems are not new phenomen in Kenya, given that ethnic conmnunides (especially the Kikuyus) were displaced en mnsse by the colonial settlers from what came to be kown as the "White Highlands" in the high potentl agricultural areas of Central and Rift Valley provinces. This forced move from the land became a rallying cry for the war of independence in the early 1950s. The post-colonial period was marked by two forms of resettement, one voluntay and the odher involuntary. The voluntary form was charaterized by resettlement of landless people and squatters into settlement schemes in the former "White Highlands" and in spandy populated areas of Coast Province. Involuntary resettlement affected famuilies and conmnunities where land was acquired to develop irrigation schemes and dams for hydroelectric power. In creating dams for hydropower, relatively few people were affected except in the recent case of the Kiambere project, where a larger rnber of families was displaced. hdeed, only 1,000 families were displaced from the areas now flooded by Masinga and Kamburu Dams, the two largest dams in Kenya.8 At Kiambere, an estimated 737 households with a population of 6,500 people were displaed. Consistent with the policy in Kenya, the displaced people were given cash coensation to enable them to buy land and resettle in the surrounding area, or in any other place of their choice. Resettlement Policy in Kenya The policy on resettlement in Kenya provides that when ihe government acques privately owned land, the owners will be compensated in cash for all inmovable assets on the land. The government further provides services such as roads, water, schools, health centers, security, and so on, in the areas where displaced people resette. This is as far as the policy goes. The policy makes three major assumpto which are not based on facts. Frst, it assumes that land of equivalent agro-ecological potential is always available in areas which are socially and culturally acceptable to the resetters. Second, it assumes that cash compensation for land acquired by govermment represents the exsting market value of the land as of the dme of payment. However, this has rarely been the case, as the market value of land in Kenya has been considerably higher than the cash compenbation paid for land taken by government, especially in nul area. Third, it assumes that resettlers will act wisely and use their cash compensation to buy new land. Rarely do all the displaced people use cash cmpensation to invest in new land. In the case of Kiambere, only 14 pement of those compensated used the money to buy new land. Given the impractical nature of these assunmtions, there is a need to develop a more comprehensive resettlement policy in Kenya. 51 Involunary Rcsettlement in Africa lanmbere Hydreectric Projet md Related R Kianbere Hydroelectric Project, located about 110 kilonetrs northeast of Nairobi, was marled out for construction after a preliminary survey in 1983. The survey covered areas such as geology, soil and drainage patterns, vegetation cover, and economic activities. Conspicuously missing in the survey were the sociocultural issues that would have related to involuntary resetdement when Kiambere residents were still in the project area. These issues were ignored despite the existence of a World Bank policy governing the social issues to be resolved as a precondidon for Bank-financed projects.' No attention was paid tL this policy until 1986, by which time the loan documents with the Bank had already been signed. Since the inundation of the dam area was scheduled for October 1987, there was still time to take some remedial action on resettlement issues, although resident relocation was already virtually complete. It was then agreed that a resettlement survey be taken, although it would have been preferable if the survey could have been made before the dam area was vacated. The survey evaluated the productive base and income of the households in the resetlement areas that had been compensated for displacement from the Kiambere project area. This was done in order to assess the extent to which resetters were able to match the living standards they had prior to relocation, or even whether they had made improvements in their standard of living. Remttiuent Survey Fnding To do this, a comparative study of resettlers and non-resettlers was made in the areas to which the displaced fmuilies had moved. The resettlers were made up of two ethnic groups, namely the Mbere and the Kamba. Each of the groups moved to areas where keliow ethnic members were residing, with Mbere resettlers moving to Embu district and the Kamba to Kitui district. The findigs of the survey point to a sad story of hardship in the process of setling down after families were displaced fom the project area. Compared with te non-resettlers in their new areas, the resetders fared rather badly on all counts. In the first pla, cash compensation was too inadequate to enable resetders to buy equivalent land in the outlying areas and thereby reactivate the farm life they were used to in the project area. In addition, the social and demographic characteristics of the resetders did ot faciitate adjustment in the new areas or enhance their income earning opportuities. For example, while the average age of resettlers was forty-eight years, it was forty-four years among the non-resettlers. Among the resetders, only 34 percent of household beads had any form of schooling, while 51 percent of the non-resettler heads had some schooling. It was also noted that only 22 percent of the resetders had access to wage work in agriaclture, while 46 percent of the non-resetders had this opportunity. In addition, the resettlers had a larger child dependency burden than the non-resetters. The _nber of sheep and goats, the common livestock in the area, possessed by non-resettlers was more than twice the number owned by resetlers (eighty and thirty-five respectively). 52 Kiambere Hydroelectric Project It may be worth underlining some important aspects of the resettlement process in order to show that in all of them, the resettlers' life worsened. The important aspects to consider are sources of income, adequacy of cash compensation, land pressure in resettlement areas, and access to valued resources and facilities. SouRCES OF INCOmE. When the resettlers were living in the project area, they were earning more money than the non-resettlers from the sale of agricultural produce, largely because their plots were more extensive and they could, therefore, practice shifting cultivation with greater flexibility in order to restore soil fertility. Other sources of income included the sale of livestock and livestock products, and involvement in non- farm activities such as trading, charcoal burning, and wage employment. Indeed the average annual income accruing from agricultural produce alone was Kshs. 15,893 among the resettlers before the project, while non-resettlers averaged Kshs. 11,755. However, the move from the project area became a leap backward into poverty since income from agriculture declined to a mere Kshs. 1,775. This translates as a loss of 89 percent of the income the resettlers were getting from agriculture in the project area. The major factor in the decline of agricultural production was the much smaller faim plots in the new area relative to the large plots the resettlers possessed in the project area. It may also reflect poor soil quality in the new area relative to the project area. ADEQUACy OF CAS COmPEAON. The money the resettlers were paid for loss of their land in the project area could not buy equivalent land elsewhere. They were compensated at Kshs. 700 per acre when the market value in the general area was Kshs. 2,000. The few who bought land could afford only an average of 6 hectares in the new area compared with the average of 13 hectares they possessed in their former place. Obviously, the sharp reduction in the size of plots is indicative not only of high land values, but also of the inadequacy of the compensation payments to buy land in the face of other competing demands for the use of the money. These demands included payment of school fees, payment of debts, fiancial assistance to relatives, and purchase of livestock, among other things. Surprisingly, only a tiny minority of the resettlers (10 percent in Embu and 18 percent in Kitui) spent their money to buy land. As noted above, part of the reason they did not buy land was the recurrent expenditure they had to meet. Also, a significant number of the resettlers spent their money on bridewealth, either marrying for the first time or marrying additional wives. Others spent the money to clear old debts incurred through marriage. Still others spent the money to buy household items or to build improved houses. It should be noted, however, that the money the resettlers received could not be entirely accounted for by the expenses they incurred. Had they saved money for use in buymg land later? It was doubtfil they sill had the money, despite statemens from some of them to the effect that they were "saving for speculative purposes" to buy cheap land whenever and wherever it became available in the general area. More likely they had wasted the money. 53 Involmtary Resettlement in Africa I AV PRESSUE IN RESET17EE1 AREAS. Resettlers did not move far from the project area, covering a distance of 14.4 kilometers on the average. It seems that they sought to relocate in places where they would have ready access to friends and relations who could help them in adverse social and economic situations. It was noted, for example, that the average number of friends increased from 3.8 in the project area to 4.8 in the new area. The fact that the fust four of the resettler's friends had been known for at least seven years, in both the old and the new areas, suggested that the resettlers were either seeking to relocate where their friends were already settled, or decided to move together with their friends to the same area, or both. The resettlers also moved to areas where they enjoyed the presence of a larger nmber of relatives than was the case in the project area. Given the smaller plot sizes in the new areas, these moves increased population density and exerted pressure on the limited land resources for boti humans and animals. The tendency for displaced people to seek close contacts with people they know and trust is standabe, given the social and economic challenge of surviving in these marginally productive areas. Close proximity to, and mutual dependence on, relatives and friends would help to alleviate these problems. ACCESS m vALuED RESOURCES. Tle natural resources most valued by people in this area are pasur for livestock, fuelwood, water, and trees for building and fencing. A number of resettlers expressed conern over their inability to secure these resources as easily as they used to secure them in the project area. In particular, the availability of pasture and firewood posed problems in the new area. A number of resettlers who wer relocated near the project buffer zone could no longer utilize trees or pasture in the prohibited area. Around them was a goverment reserve consisting of forested hills, but the resetders were not permitted to collect firewood or to graze their livestock in this area either. Many resetters felt that they were not living as comfortably as they did in the project area. The most common complaint revolved around the issue of water availability. Resetters were well aware that they were close to water sources when they lived in the project area, but in the new area they had to spend most of their time fetching water. There were cases of some resettlers covering distances of more than eight kIlometers to get to water points, spending almost the entire day on this activity. Some other facilities that are important to a well-functioning community were not easily accessible to the resettlers. These facilities included schools, shops, roads, and markets. For each of these facilities, the non-resettlers had an advantage over the resetters in terns of accessibility. For example, the resettlers travelled an average of 10 kilometers to reach the nearest shop and 16.5 kilometers to reach the nearest market, while the non-resettlers travelled 6 kilometers and 11 ldlometers respectively. These observations lead to the conclusion that the resettlers had nothing to show as a positive gain arising from displacement from their land in the project area. 54 Kiambere Hydroelectric Project Lessons to be Leared from the Ki} bere Exprience The Kiambere Resettlement Survey raises some serious social and political issues that should be considered and resolved in order to improve the planning and implementation of resettlement in future Kenyan development projects. These issues include (a) reviewing existing government laws relating to displacement and land compensation; (b) ensuring the availability of land to resettle displaced persons; (c) involving resettlers in making decisions on resettlement issues; and (d) devising ways of handling the host population. REVIEW OF EXImSNG LAWS ON RESEMLMT. The existing laws and regulations governing acquisition and compensation of land in Kenya need to be revised, as they were made in 1968 when conditions affecting population and land use were radically different from what they are today. In the first place, the population of Kenya in 1968 was only 10 million with a density of seventeen persons per square kilometer, whereas the estimated population of 23 million today has a density of thirty-nine persons per square kilometer. Thus, in only twenty-three years Kenya's population has increased by more than 120 percent. Along with the population increase, the land tenure situaton has changed considerably, from a near total area of trusdand in 1968 to less da 40 percent of he land remaining as trustland. The remaining trustlands are found in the less habitable arid and semi-arid areas. Furthermore, land that is communaily owned (by lineages or clans) is rapidly giving way to individual ownership, implying that displaced persons may not be easily absorbed by their relatives who have privatized the land. ENSURPNG THAT IJND IS MADE AVAL4BAE FOR DISP4ACED PERSOMNS. It has been noted that in the Kiambere case, only a minority of the displaced people used their compensation money to buy land. This suggests dtat most displaced persons would not be inclined to buy land when compensated through cash payment. Cash compensation in agriculturally-oriented coutries like Kenya results in impovenshing many families, especially when irresponsible heads of household fail to buy land to resettle their families. The dissatisfactions expressed by the resettlers may have been pardy due to the fact that they were not further assisted (beyond cash compensation) in deciding where to resetle. At least three methods of acquiring land for resettlement could have been used, none of which would have entailed resettlers receiving cash compensation to buy land for themselves. The first method involves resettlers who would prefer to look for land in the areas where they want to resete and then have the government make the necessary payment. These resetlers will know the value of the land they want to buy, including the amownt of money the govermnent would be willing to pay for compation. Resettlers should be informed that the government will not approve the purchase of land that is smaller than their former plots, unless it is determCne that such land has an equivalent or greater carrying capacity. 55 Involary Reseueneeni in Africa The second method would involve the government as the negotiator for land purchased on behalf of resettlers who cannot or will not look for their own land, or fail to get the land they want after making an effort. It may be necessary to advertise for offers, detailing the size and location of plots desired. Potential sellers would indicate the prices at which they would be selling such plots, detailing the nature of assets in those plots, including any improvements they may have made. After carrying out the necessary assessmnent, the goverrnent would then decide whether to buy the land. It may tum out that some of the sellers would under-price or over-price their land. In such cases, fair prices should be ensured by the government, especially to sellers who may under-price their land. The third method of acquiring land could be in the form of a settlement scheme to which resettlers could be moved en masse. This is likely to be the least favorable method, since it will largely involve resettlers who will be unable to secure land in the areas they want. Establishment of viable settlement schemes will require inftascture development in the form of roads, water supply, health and school facilities, and so on. Once land has been obtained for the resettlers, cash compensation should take the form of supplemental assistance to enable resettlers to buy capital inputs (such as fanr implements and fertilizers) for their new land and to meet recurrent household expenditures for a specified period of time. Recurrent expenditures can include school fees and uniforms for children, health-related expenses related to travel and medical treatment in hospitals, household ewpenses on items such as salt, sugar, milk, soap, cirugs and other simple medications, and casual labor-all of which require ready cash. NVOLVING RESE7ZERS IN DEaSIONS ON RESET7AENT ISSUES. The resettlement process should be an enabling process that eventually leaves the resettlers in control of their situation in a new environment. This sense of control and independence should be imparted to resettlers early in the resettlement cycle. Thus, resettlers should be fully informed about resettlement procedures and should also fully participate in all decisions. Their views on compensation procedures must be sought and they should also be asked to indicate any aspects that have been neglected in resettlement planning. Resettlers should be given enough time to consult among themselves and with their leaders on all these matters, in order to come up with informed decisions. Available resettlement areas should be suggested to them and their views sought on whether or not they would opt to settle in those areas. DEVISNG WAYS OF HANDLG THE HOST POPUTON. Consideration of the host population in the receiving area has rarely been a matter of major concem in past resettlement programs. However, conflict and strained relations can easily result from competition between hosts and resettlers for the use of common, but scarce, resources such as water points and grazing areas. Resettlers also bring with then children who have to be accommodated in the available schools, no matter how limited in number these schools might be. Provision of social services to resettlers in the areas of health, training, and employment might also lead to conflicts, depending on the characteristics of the resettler population. Resettlers could be viewed as undesirable competitors for the 56 _K,mbere Hydroelecric Project few non-fam activities much a8 opatdng nma" traport, runing small retail shops, or hawking household wares, fuelwood or charcoal. Since it is rare that implementin agcies find "empty lands" on which to resettle displaced families, "the risks are that population density in receiving areas will increase suddenly to levels above the crrying capacity of the land and the natual resources available to both hosts and incomers on a sustinable basis. "so Differential treatment in favor of resettlers through the provision of better houses and relocation allowances may arouse feelings of jealousy and generte stained relations between incomers and hosts. It is therefore necessary to accord both groups equal treatment, as far as this is practicable. especially in the provision of common services such as education, water, healdth, and road improvement. Such treatent will not only reduce the potential for social conflict, but will also encourage the hosts to perceive the resettlers as having brought long-lasting benefits to the community. 57 nvolwkty Resettkment in Africa NOTES 1. Cemea, Michael M. 1988. In au_y Rsekmet In Development Projects: Polcy Guiddines in World Bank-Rnanced Projects. World Bank Technical Paper No. 80. Washington, D.C. 2. Rubin, Neville, and William M. Warren, eds. 1968. Dans in Africa: An Interdisciplinary Study of Man-Made Lake in Africa. London: Frank Cm. 3. Goldsmith, Edward and Nicholas Hildyard. 1984. The &cial and Exw*onmal Effects of Large Dams. 2 vols. Canelford, Cornwall: Wadebridge Ecological Centre. 4. Ackemnanm, W.C. 1973. "Summary and Romendation.' in W.C. Admnn, et al, eds., Man-Made Lakes: Thdr Problems and EWronmnal Effects. Monograph No. 17. Washington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union. 5. Cernea. M., op. cit. 6. Ibid. 7. Goldsmith and Hildyard, op. cit. S. Roggeri, Henri. 1985. Aflia Dams: Inmacts in the Environment: A Case Study of Five Man-Made Laks in Easten Afra. Nairobi: Environment Liaison Cente.; See also Gotabalei, N. 1980. "Masinga Dam: Toward Self-Sufficiency in Electricity in Kenya." News and Africa Repon. 9. Wodd Bank 1980. -Social Issues Associated wiih Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed Projects.' Operational Maul Statem 2.33. (February) Washington, D.C. 10. Cernea, op. cit. 58 CHAPIU 4 RESETTLENENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT ASPECTS OF THE LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT Mavuso Tshabalala The purpose of this chapter is to describe the resettlement and rual development activiies envisaged under tde environmental action plan for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). The chapter starts with a review of settlement paeS in Lesotho. The second section gives an overview of the project, background to enviromnental impact assessment within the project, and basic social and economic information about the project area. The third and fourth sections discuss the comensation and mral development programs of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA). The last secdon briefly reviews aspect of the implemenation of the resettlement program. Lesotho is characterized by mountious and rugged terrain. The elevation rise from 1,500 meters in the lowlands to 3,482 meters in the mountains. Eigy percent of the county Is mountaious. The mountais experience a hiher rainfaUl than the lowlands, and this region is the source of major rivers. For example, the Senqu (Orange) River orginates in Lesotho and more than 55 percent of its flow into the Adantic Ocean comes from Lesotho, although only 5 percent of the Senqu River catchment area is located in Lesotho. Lesotho is a land of 30,350 square kilometers with a 1986 population of 1.6 million and an annual growth rate of 2.6 percent.' Sevent percent of the population resides in the lowlands and 30 percent in the moumtains. Fouteen percent of the total popuation lives in urban areas, about half in the capital town of Maseru. The economy of Lesotho is dependent on agriculture and remittances from labor migrants to South Africa. There is very little indusial development, and water is the country's main nalux resource. Lesotho's settlement pattern has been determined by its traditional social structue and its physical envirm (topography, soils, and climate). These have been influenced by populadon chgs, contact with foreigners, and development of infrastructe. The traditional settlement pattern of Lesotho is characterized by dispeed, concentated villages, mainly located on spurs above valleys and on rough land near cropland. In the majority of cases, villages are separated from cropland. Individual Maw Tabald has twemy-five yeas of experence working whb and auong the rual populaion of Lesodio. He is curredy a socioogis with the Libo ghlands Watr Projcil 59 Involuntary Raettlent in Afica household heads have access to parcels of land, even though all land rights are formally vested in the king. Grazing land is intermixed with cropland, except in the higher mountain zones which are mainly used for summer grazing. All grazing land is comnwunal. Traditionally the village is the primary organizational base for management and control of community resources. The administrative authority for villages is the chieftainship, a hierarchical but highly decentralized institution of traditional tribal leaders whose funcdons include control and reguladon of the use of community or village resources. This involves allocation of residendal land and cropland to individual households, and control of the exploitation of other natural resources, including grazing. The levels of chieftainship correspond to groupings of villages into large administradve units. At the top of the chieftainship hierarchy is the king, followed by the principal and ward chiefs, area chiefs, and various levels of subordinate chiefs, down to the headmen in charge of individual villages. Parallel and closely linked to chieftainship is the central government. The central government is a highly centralized, hierarchical bureaucracy of professional civil servants that operates through ministries and departments. The functions of the central government are, among others, to provide services, to enact and enforce legislation and regulations, and to carry out national settlement planning. The headquarters of all central govenment ministries is Maseru. The next level of government is the district, then local government where most muinstries and deparmnts operate through representatives. The boundaries of (political) wards and (administrative) districts do not always coincide, but rather overlap. Over time, villages in Lesotho have increased in size and wnmber. The increase in size can be attributed to increasing population. However, the increase in number can be attributed to the chieftainship system of placemen. Traditionally every male child of a chief, depending on seniority, is allocated his own area of jurisdiction, in which to establish his own village with his own subjects. As the number of male children has increased with the chieftainship, more villages have been established. It can be observed that the size of the village is related to the seniority level of the resident chief; the more senior the chief, the larger the village and the area of jurisdiction. Contact with foreigners has influenced the settlement patterns in two ways. First, the colonial governmnt (later developed into the central governent) established reserves for administrative centers. These developed into trade and indusa centers, hence also employment centers and ceters of urban growth. They are now considered to be the primary regional centers for settlement planning. Second, missionaries established statons which became important centers for worship, education and health care. Some of the earlier mission stations have developed to a level where they are considered to be secondary centers for settlement planning. Lately, settlement plamiing is being influenced by the development of infructure, particularly roads. Villages served by the roads expand rapidly, 60 Lesotho Highlands Waler Project particularly those located at major intersections. These villages are now considered tertiary for settlement planning. Also, new villages are developing along the roads. Curmntly the growth of settlements in Lesotho is such that there is no spare land available to resettle people. Any expansion or development activities will infringe upon property or resources that belong to some indiviLjal or community. Lesotho Higlands Water Project The Lesotho Highlands Water Project is a scheme i.r storage and transfer of water and generation of hydroelectric power. The purposes of the project are to generate revenues by selling surplus water to the Republic of South Africa, to generate hydroelectric power to nmet energy demands in Lesotho, and to help develop the mountain regions. As the name "Highlands" implies, the greater part of the project will be implemented in the remote, inaccessible mountains of Lesotho. Project implementation will take place in three phases. In the current phase, a 180-meter high dam, Katse Dam, will be constructed on the Malibamnatso River (a tributary of the Senqu River) high in the mountains. The full supply level of the reservoir will be 2,060 meters above sea level and the reservoir will extend 45 kilometers upstream. Katse reservoir will provide storage for water from all the other dams in later phases. A 45-kilometer transfer tunnel will be constructed to connect the Katse Dam and a hydroelectric power station at 'Muela in the foothills. A tailpond will be constructed below the hydropower station. From the tailpond, a 30-kilometer delivery tunnel will be constructed in the lowlands to deliver water to the Republic of South Africa. Construction of the dam and tunnels strted in 1991 and is scheduled to be completed in 1996; construction of the hydropower station is scheduled to start in 1993 with completion in 1996. Because of the remoteness of the area, it was first necessary to improve the infrastrucmure to facilitate project implementation. Infrastructure activities included construction of a road network, construction townships, and power lines. Infrastructure construction started in 1987 and is scheduled to be completed in 1992. LHWP activities will have wide-ranging biological, physical, social, and economic impacts. The most significant direct impacts are reduction of land resources upon which the people depend for their livelihood, transport and communications barriers caused by the reservoir, relocation of some households and villages, improved access due to project roads, job opportunities in construction, and general development of the project area. It can be expected that the project impacts will increase competition for land, alter setlemnent patterns, and redistribute the local population. The potential impacts of LHWP on the local population and on the physical environment were recognized at an early stage of the project. The feasibility study of 1986 examined these potential impacts in some detail. The study showed that the communities and individuals in the project area would have to find a new economic base 61 Involwuary Resettlement in Africa for survival. The study made two important reconunendations. First, measures must be taken to minimize the negative impacts and to maximize the positive impacts of the project. Second, measures must be taken to maintain the living standards of the population affected by the project. These recommendations were legally incorporated in both the international treaty between the government of Lesotho (GOL) and the Republic of South Africa (RSA). and the order establishing the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, an executing agency for that part of the project which is in Lesotho. A specific treaty obligation is that: The Parties agree to take all reasonable measures to ensure that the implementation, operation and maintenance of the project are compatible with the protection of the existing quality of the environment and, in particular, shall pay due regard to the maintenance of the welfare of persons and communities immediately affected by the Project. (LHWP Treaty, 1986, Article 7, para. 18) An environment division was established within LHDA early in the implementation of the LHWP. The mandate of this division is to minimize the negative impacts and maximize the positive impacts of the project on the local population and the environment. As part of the detailed design for the first phase, the environment division commissioned and undertook a number of biological, physical, social, and economic studies. The purpose of these studies was to provide detailed information to be used in developing programs that will enable the local population and the envirownent to absorb the negative impacts and exploit the opportunities created by the project. These programs are the compensation plan, the rural development plan, and the natural enviromnent and heritage plan. These plans are interlinked and together they constitute the environmental action plan for the project. Throughout this environmental assessment process, a series of public meetings (pitsos) were held in the project areas to solicit the views and opinions of the people on possible mitigation programs. In order to have more public participation in the project, LHDA has also instituted various committees. Examples are the compensation advisory comnittee (see below, LHWP Compensation), the SDA management committee (see Resettlement in Phase IA), and the liaison conmmittee. The liaison committee is composed of representatives of various government ministries, parastatal organizations, and nongovenent organizations. The duties of this committee include coordinating LHDA activities with those of other sectors and facilitating implementation of LHDA activities. Table 5-1 gives a summary of the social and economic information about the project areas. LHDA conducted the first socioeconomic census in 1988. While project activities will also have impacts in other areas, the focus of the census and subsequent studies is on Katse local catchment (influence area of Katse Dam), and 'Muela (influence area of the hydropower station). A local catchment is defined as the area draining 62 Lesotho Highlands Water ProJect laterally into the reservoir, excluding the area upstream at the top end of the reservoir. As Table 5-1 shows, the project areas are fully settled with different traditional local administrative authorities. As in the rest of Lesotho, a substantial proportion of households has members, mainly males, working in South Africa. About one-fourth of the households are headed by females who are widowed and old. The economy is mixed, with migrant remittances providing the main source of cash income, and agriculture as the principal source of subsistence for a majority of households. LHWP Compensation From the start, it was realized that the project would affect both Individual and community property. In line with the requirements of the treaty and the order, it was necessary to find a means of compensation. This was critical because, at the time, there was no adequate compensation legislation in Lesotho regarding acquisidon of property for public purposes. The first step in the design of the compensation program was therefore the development of appropriate compensation legislation. To this end, LHDA, with government assistance, established a consultative advisory group on land acquisition and compensation. This group included senior LHDA and goverrnent officers and principal chiefs. Members of the group were: Enviromnent Division Manager (LHDA - Chairman) Social Development Officer (LHDA - Secretary) Public Relations Manager (LHDA) Senior Rural Development Advisor (LHDA) Conservation Officer (LHDA) Attorney General (GOL, Law and Justice) Commissioner of Lands (GOL, Interior) Chief Lands Officer (GOL. Interior) Senior Physical Planner (GOL, Interior) Principal Chief of Matsieng (Chieftainship) Principal Chief of Kweneng (Chieftainship) This group held a series of private as well as public meetings in the project areas. In the first round of public meetings the group informed the public about the project, its impacts, and implications for the local population. Participants in these meetings were asked to consolidate their ideas about the means by which they would like to be compensated for the properties they would lose to the project. After an interval, the group returned to hold another round of public meetings. In these meetings the public was once more informed about the project and its impacts. This time the participants were asked to give their views on the means by which they would like to be compensated. Individual opinions ranged from cash payment in a lump sum to a pension fund, and from employment opportunities to payment in kind. In some cases there were written comments from the local chiefs. 63 Involuntary Resettlernent in Africa Another way to determine popular opinion on compensation was by means of a formal questionnaire. In the LHDA socioeconomic census of 1988, one question concerned the respondent's opinion on compensation for lost property. The highest proportion of respondents, 68 percent, said they preferred an annuity in kind. The advisory group further held several internal meetings to review and advise on the compensation policy. The policy was drafted and finalized by LHDA, and approved and gazetted by the government with certain amendments. From the compensation policy, LHDA drew out a set of compensation regulations which was also gazetted. The LHDA compensation policy and regulations form the first extensive legislation on the subject of compensation in Lesotho. Currently, these apply to LHWP activities only. This policy has served as a guide in formulating the compensation plan. The guiding principles of the compensation policy state that the project will replace directly, wherever feasible, those losses that individuals and communities suffer as a result of project activities and that all compensation will, as far as possible, be in kind. This decision was based on experience that cash payments leave the affected people worse off. It is therefore the responsibility of LHDA to identify all losses and those suffering the loss, to assess the replacement cost of each lost asset, and to find means of replacing the property. The plan provides direct compensation for: ARABLE LAxVD. Households that lose 1000 square meters (0.1 hectare) or more are given an equivalent amount of maize at a rate of 1000 kilograms per hectare per year to replace the lost harvest, for a period of fifteen years. The program started in 1988. Currently, LHDA is considering including pulses in order to improve the diet of thc affected individuals. For land less than 1000 square meters, and gardens, the affected households are given a single cash payment. This program began in 1989. OTHER PROPERTY, including houses, kraals, trees, fences, and any other improvements, is physically replaced by LHDA. In the case of houses, since 1988 LHDA has paid for new house construction. Replacement is based on the internal floor area of the house. The households secure alternative sites (allocated by the village chief, and usually only a few meters away from the structure to be replaced), choose the shape of the house they want (round or rectangular) and the roofing material (thatch or corrugated iron). For trees, LHDA purchases and gives five seedlings of a simnilar type for each tree affected; this program started in 1991 on a pilot basis. Fences are replaced with similar fencing material. LHDA pays for the cost of labor to reconstruct kraals using the original materials (stones), and any other costs associated with the inconvenience suffered. GRAz&NG LuND AN RANGE RESOURCES. As these are communal property, LHDA will compensate the affected communities by providing fodder for a period of five years at the rate of 560 kilograms per hectare per year. The distribution of fodder among families in the village will be decided by local grazing associations. 64 Lesaotho Highlands Water Project BusrNESS AND GOVERNMENT PROPEY are compensated by cash payment bued on the replacement value of the property. Valuation is commonly done by the government valuer, and property owners have the right to nominate their own valuers. An additional goodwill payment is made for loss of business. As part of its public awareness programs. LHDA staff, together with the consultative advisory group, held meetings to inform the public about the approved version of the compensation policy and regulations. Besides these public mectings, radio programs were broadcast and pamphlets, written in Sesotho and oudining the compensation policy, were produced and distributed to the public in the project areas. Projected property acquisition by LHDA presently includes 1,010 hectares of arable land, 3,308 hectares of grazing land, 34 hectares of woodlands, 189 houses, 3 government premises, 3 business properties, 528 fruit trees and 1928 other trees. The projected total compensation budget to 1996 is maloti 24.1 million (about US$9.3 million) in 1989 prices. Rural Devdopmt Direct compensation for loss of income and assets as described above is short-term and specific to affected households. However, the impacts of LHWP go beyond individual households and will be long-term in nature. Long-term compensation will be provided in the form of rural development programs designed to enable the affected conmunities to regain their ewonmic productivity. The concept of compensation with development has been recently advanced by the World Bank, in response to the realization that unless specific measures aimed at developing and diversifying their economies on a sustainable basis are implemented, impacted communities are often left worse off than they were at the time of disturbance. In the case of Lesotho, this requirmt is critical as the impacted comununities have primarily rural, land-based economies at present. The amount of available land will be reduced and the project infrastructure will create more pressure on the remaining resources. Without any access to additional land, the only option is to implement a diversified rural development program that includes training in economic enterprises as well as improved agriculture and other technologies. LHDA's rural development progra incude: PRODUCTION. The aim is to increase productivity of the remaining land resources by intensifying extension programs and supply of inputs. Specific programs include crops and fodder production, horticulture, range and livestock management, community forestry, and fisheries. The livestock program is interesting in that it provides for reducing the livestock population (and hence pressure on grazng land) while increasing productivity. Based on Ministry of Agriculture experience, LHDA is proposing a 65 Invowunitay Resiment In Africa livestock exchange in which owners are given two good quality stock in exchange for duree poor quality stock. DMoGUE Am RwNG. The aim is to involve people in the identification, planning, and implementation of suitable projects. Specific programs include: (a) land use planmng with the people, in which commWunities, through their leaders, will be helped to develop land use classificadons for their areas and suitable production patterns for each land class; (b) a rural training program to provide individuals with skills such as literacy and numeracy, business and entrepreneural developnnt and handicrafts, so that they can diversify their income away from traditional agriculture; (c) income generation outside Katse and 'Muela areas involving a one-time transfer of capital to individuals losing property outside the main working areas of LHWP. Participants will be encouraged to identify and implement a project that suits individual circumstances and localities. INFR4=ucIm. The aim is to improve the availability of services to the communities. Specific programs include rural electrification, rumral roads, cross-reservoir transport, water supply and sanitation, and settlement planning. There is also a special program of community construction, targeted at the areas adjacent to the main structures or widtin the working areas that will bear the highest impact from construction activities. These are: Ha Mensel, adjacent to the dam and construction towship; Ha Lejone, adjacent to the tunnel contactor's site establishment and a gateway to the project area; and Botha Bothe township, developed by LHDA for construction workers in the northern working sites. Special efforts will be made to provide proper inftctue to accommodate the expected 'boom town' growth, and to provide the needed social services in these areas. TouRIsm DEVFIOPMAEN. This program is conceived to take advantage of the touism potential of the project. Areas will be reserved and developed for tourism purposes, which will also generate local employment. This program is being developed with the conservation program and visitor information center program of the natural enviromnment and heritage plan. Some of these rural development programs will be implemented directly by LHDA; others will be implemented through govenment departments, parastatals, and private contractors. The nrual development program has been late in starting, but is schedled to commence in 1992. The projected total budget for the rural development programs up to the year 2001 is maloti 124 million ($47.9 million) in 1989 prices. R _tdemeut is Phase IA Project resettlement activities are linked to both the compensation and mral development plans. In the compensation plan, a household that loses residential property to the project is compensated directly. The ural development plan provides for land use planning, including the location and development of villages, and for reconstruction of the local economy. 66 Lesogko Hlghklud Water Project As part of the compenadon package, resettlement in Phae IA is comparaively small. A nujority of dhe households to be resled are those that are affected by infra ue activities. In most cues they have been relocated in the same village and in lomo cases in the same yard. Recent information on the rdocation of villages indicates that ondy four village wUi have to be relocated. All of these villages have less than ten households each. Only one village is actually located below the full supply lcvd of the reservoir; the otwr three are located too close to the full supply level on steep slopes. In all cases, their relocation will involve movement within the suna jurisdiction and under tie same headman. Current projections show that a total of 189 houses involving 60 households will have to be replaced. Households or insttutiom tha are relocated to new sites must negotiate with the local land allocation audtority. LHDA assists wbere needed. So far, no nujor problems have been encountered. Only one owner of a business complex has opted to go out of business because he cowd not find a suitble location for doing business. The greater part of the resetdement progrm falls within the rural development package. Implementation of this packge depends on legisation enacted by the central government and the availability of funds to develop the istrture. None of the rral development programs has started yet, although much of the planning is complete. As part of plang the consuction aspects of LHWP, environmenl considerations such as settlement planning, were taken into consideration. Common engemerng practice locates constction camps at each worksite, and there are nine worksites in the project area. However, for social and envromental reasons LHDA decidd to reduce the number of construction camps and to locate them in areas that could more easily absorb the expected impacts. It was also decided that the design of these consction camps should blend with the future development of the affected communities. The most notable exmple is Botha Bothe township, which seves five main worksites for tumnel and power plant construction. As part of implentng the settement planning program, LHDA has formed a selected development area committee in parmehip with the local land allocation committ of villages adjacent to the dam site. In this partnership LHDA advises and makes plans for expansion of adjacent villages. These plans take into account formal settlements, infrmal settements, business area development, and development of infrastructure, including roads, water supply and sanitation. Although much plaming has been done to control resettlement, the public response to the project has exceeded the planing forecasts. The project has indeed brought new opportmities. For instance, people from outside the project area have established new businesses and sought employmt in the project area. This has led to an influm of new residents who have influenced local settlement pattern in various ways. preneurs in the fomal sector have negotiated with local land allocation autorties for residential and business sites. The classic example is one village where 67 Invowlutary Raelameu in Afria eighteen shops have been esblished in twelve months, with more on the way. Entrepreneurs in the infonral sector have rented space from local residents to erec "shacks." Job seekers rent houses. Renting of houses around the major worksites is a "mountain innovation." Tenants pay for sleeping space, not for a house. It is thus common to find up to six unrelatd people of diffnt sexes in a single house. In some cases, tenants have rented stables as houses. AU these lead to overcrowding within the village and inside the houses. Conclusions The approach to planning for the environmental and social impacts of the Lesodio Highlands Water Project described in this chapter iDustrates bow legal provisions, combined with good environmental management, can provide the basis for design of effective mitigation programs. Direct c ion for lost income and assets provides immediate comfort and confidence to recipients, and allows for the detailed design and implementation of rurl development program aimed at long-term, sustainable compensation. This chapter has attempted to show the physical, social, institutional, fiancial. and economic constraints specific to Lesotho that influence the planning and mplementation of mitigation progams. However, public response may make most of the plans obsolete. Currently, the influx of population into the project area has become a bureaucatic headache, and it may cause local frustration if the plans are not implemented soon. The reason for this influ of population may be found in the fact that two indepedent institutions are responsible for land man agemnt, the decentralized taditonal chieftainship and the centrlized state government. Nevertheless, it is hoped tht the adopted approach will prove to be appropriate and beneficial to the communities hat have suffered losses due to the impletion of the first phase of the project, and that the lessons leamed during this phase will be usefil for the planing of futnre phases. 68 Lesotdw Highlands Water Project Table 5-I Soda and Economic Dat of Pha IA Areas of Lesodio Hijghlan Water Project Area Variable Katse Local 'Muela Catchment Number of villages 121 12 Number of senior chiefs 21 1 Total population 18111 2219 Defacto populadon (%) 89 91 Population without fonnal 50 40 education (%) Number of households 3357 409 Average household size 5.4 5.4 Female-headed households (%) 24.9 26.2 Households with at least one 25.9 39.4 member working in RSA _ _ Households with at least one 12.5 2.7 member working elsewhere in Lesotho Male household heads 26.9 33.6 away at work (%) l Female household heads away 4.4 5.6 at work (%) Households with Lvestock 73.4 64 Households with arable land 86.5 91.7 Households reporting agriculture 72.6 60.9 as principal source of subsistence Source: 1988 socioeconomic census, LHDA. 69 Involumary Resettlement in Africa REFERENCES Bureau of Statistics. 1986. aional Popultion Census (1986). Maseru, Lesotho. Cemea, Michael M. 1988. Involhuary Resealemem in Development Projects: Policy Guidelines in World Bank-Financed Projects. World Bank Technical Paper No. 80. Washingwn, D.C. Deparunent of Lands Surveys and Physical Planning. 1989. National Setlement Policy: Working Papers. Maseru. Environment Division. 1990. "Phase IA Compensation Plan." Maseru: Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA). Environment Division. 1990. "Natural Environment and Heritage Plan." Masem: LHDA. Environment Division. 1990. "Rural Development Plan." Maseru: LHDA. Macdonald, Lahmeyer and Olivier Shand Consortia. 1986. Lesotho Highlands Water Project Feasibilty Study. Supporting Report C, "Environental and Social Inpacts in Lesotho." Maseru. Tshabalala, Mavuso. 1989. aPopulation Distrbution within Local Catchments of Phase IA Reservoirs: Katse and 'Muela." Maseru: LHDA. Tshabalala, Mavuso, and S. D. Tumer. 1989. "1988 Socioeconomic Census of the Lesotho Highland Water Project: Phase IA Areas." Volume I. Maseru: LHDA. Tsbabalala, Mavuso, and Jonata Jenness. 1989. "Impeded Access Study on Malibamats'o and Bokong Rivers: Phase I Report." Maseru: LHDA. NOTE 1. Bureau of Statistics 1986. National Population Census (1986). Maseru. 70 CHAFFER 5 RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PEOPLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NYLON URBAN UPGRADING PROJECT IN DOUALA, CAMEROON Loids Roger Manga Project Nylon is the largest operation ever undertaken in Africa for the restructuring and improvement of an urban spontaneous settlement. The project concerns some 700 hectares of land which today houses more than 250,000 p-ople, in addition to a zone of 500 hectares allocated for partial resettlement to reduce congestion in the project area. nitiated by the Government of Canieroon with assistance from the World Bank and the Swiss Confederation, Project Nylon has now been underway for ten years. The planned basic infrastructure is now largely in place. Community services including a major marketplace, health centers, schools, and social centers have been constructed. The rehousing of many of the people who were displaced by the project has been acco-plished on the developed parts of the resettlement sites. A pilot neighborhood of 60 hectares - one of the twelve action zones included in the project - has been completely restructured. Considering the extreme density of housing in the project area, the difficulties of the almost contiumally flooded and swampy site, and the former exclusion of Nylon from the urban development process, the problems of population displacement take on extraordinary dimensions when it comes to the construction of infrastructure and the regularization of land tenure. In fact, the task was to resette nearly 8,000 families, or around 45,000 people, without causing a social crisis. Over the ten years of implementation of Project Nylon, the handling of household displacement and resettlemt has evolved together with the development of legal and regulatory texts on the subject. These changes have noved in the direction of a more hmane treatment of the displaced people. Project Nylon HisTORY. What has become known as the "Nylon zone" of Douala is a vast peripheral area of spontaneous settlement, located about 5 kdlometers from the city center. To the south, it backs onto the Douala-Yaounde highway; to the north, it joins the new industrial zone; to the west it follows the airport road; and to the east, it is bounded by the futre 8-kilometer ringroad. Thus defined, the zone covers an area of 700 hectares and presently houses nearly 250,000 people - more than the third-largest city in the Leu Rogr Manp is an economi For the past ten yean, he has served as the Managing Director of the Urban and Rural Land Development Authority (MAETUR) of Caneroon. 71 Involhary Rsettlememn in Africa country. Since 1956 the zone has been declared unhealthy and unfit for construction. In 1959, the master plan for the city confirmed that no new construction should be undertaken there, since it was made up of permanently flooded swampy lowlands broken by a few low hills. However, from the late 1950s, people, particularly those who had been displaced from the nearby New-Bell neighborhood, began to occupy the site. Through hand labor they carried out major works to fill the regularly flooded areas, to build roads, and to dig drains. Despite these efforts, the floods continued, the road network remained insufficient, and the public areas became too small to serve the growing population. At the end of the 1960s. faced with increasing population pressure, the need for organized ¶ction became clear. The lack of potable water, the constant flooding, the lack of roads, and the general insecurity of the situation obliged the people to face the challenge together. Thus, in July 1971, the first local organization was created in Nylon, in the form of a resident committee which was charged with (a) reorganizing the area by subdividing it into sectors, blocks, and lots, with leaders for each; (b) planning area improvements based on the use of local labor to build roads, clear drains, and construct small bridges; (c) planning for the resettlement of people who would have to move in order for these works to be carried out; and (d) improving security by carrying out a census of the permanent inhabitants and mobilizing the population in groups by blocks and lots. Between 1971 and 1975 the area was given de faco recognition as part of the city. Water standpipes were installed, a real road was built, and administrative services began to be provided. In the 1980s, the government decided to integrate the "Nylon area," previously considered as marginal, into the fabric of the city, and to complement the efforts of the people by strengthening infrastructure and services in the area. At that time the site sheltered approximately 180,000 people. A feasibility study carried out by consultants Halcrow Fox led to the identification of the First Urban Development Project, whose principal component was the development and restructuring of the "Nylon area." Planned activities which were not completed in the course of this project were included in the Second Urban Development Project, financed by World Bank Loan 2999-CM. The responsibility for implementing Project Nylon was assigned to the Urban and Rural Land Development Authority (Mission d'Am6nagement et d'Equipement des Terrains Urbains et Ruraux - MAETUR), a parastatal attached to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. In 1981, MAETUR established a special unit for the project, called the Nylon Development and Restructuring Agency (Agence de R6structuration et d'Amnriagement de Nylon - ARAN). PROJECT OBJECIVES. The project was conceived as a pilot operation for the development and restructuring of urban areas of spontaneous settlement. The objectives of Project Nylon included upgrading the local infrastructure and services to acceptable levels, restucuring and regulanizing land tenure, and building an institutional base to 72 A!lon Urban Upgrading Projea carry out simnilar progruns in odher areas of Cameroon. The principles governing dtese objecives were (a) to maintain as many families u possible in the area; (b) rehouse dte displaced families; and (c) recover costs from the beneficiaries, in order to ensure fte replicability of the restructuring operation. PROJECr ComPoAEm. The projea is a complex operation, integrating: * Basic infrasuctre, including the construction of primary and secondary roads serving the twelve neighborhoods that constitute the 'Nylon area," and linking them to the urban road network in accordance with the Douala master plan. Other infrastructure elements consist of constructdon, cleaning, and reshaping of drains; and installation of primary water supply, electricity, and street lighting networks. * Neighborhood rehabilitation through the restucturing of a pilot neighborhood of 60 hectars, housing about 20,000 people. This consists of building secondary and tertiary roads and fooqtphs, providing electricity and water, and redefining plot boundaries in order to establish units of an acceptable shape and size in accordance with urban regulaions. This operation should later permit residents to obtain dtle to their land. D Development of the resettlement area. * Project support acdvides such as studies and consultancies, housing credit, building renovation, self-help housing assistance, support for construction enterprises and craftsmen, community projects, sav programs, and creation of financial mechanisms integrting the informal sector into the urban ecomy. * Technical assistance, supervision and monitoring of construction. * Rcurrent costs of the implemening agency. To facilitate the execution of the project, the government of Cameroon entered into technical and financial cooperion agreements in 1983 and 1989 with the World Bank and in 1984 and 1987 with Switzerland. AccoiJSNMs. Among the achievements of MAETUR-ARAN, we may note: * Basic infastrucure, including 13 kllometers of roads, fifteen water crossings, 10 kilometers of drains, and the partial completion of primary water and electricity networks. 73 Iu.wiumay Raealement in Africa * Complete resturing of a 60-hectare neighborhood. * Preparation for the restrucring of the other neighborhoods. * Demarcation of lots in resettlement areas (Dibom II: 923 lots; Ndogpassi Ill/i: 1,041 lots; Ndogpassi IIU2, lot 1 (400 plots) and lot 3 (1,100 plots)). * Construction of the Madagascar market (17,200 square meters, covered) with space for l,500 traders, as well as five other social infrastructures: Dibom II social center, Dibom II health center, Ndogpassi primary school, Biongue primary school, and Soboum health center. * Strengthening and expansion of the Nylon People's Savings Bank. * Planning and execution of communal work programs, including drain clearing and construction, and installation of culverts. Comnstruction assistance, such as providing help with administrative procedures (building permits, land titles), help with the design of model homes, and technical advice on renovation. To complete Project Nylon, however, more rmains to be accomplished. Roads serving four of the twelve neighborhoocj in the area must be built, drains must be recaihbrated and treated, primary networks for water and electricity set up, and inter- urban boulevards completed. Upgrading and redefinition of plots in eleven neigborhoods must take place. Social infrructure remains to be built, including schools, playgrounds, and community centers. In terms of resettling and acconmodating families by the Second Urban Project, development of the resettlement areas must contminu. Tretnt of Displaed Peopk NtMEPs DSPALCD. ARAN, the executing agency for the project, is responsible for resettling not only the people displaced from the Nylon area, but also for all those displaced by the infrastructureworks financed by the Second Urban Development Project in Douala. Four factors work together to cause popuion displacement: (a) acquisition of rights-of-way for the construction of roads and drains; (b) acquisition of land for resettlement areas; (c) acquisition of sites for social infiastructr; and (d) redefinition of plots in the restuctured zones, in accordance with the norms for size and shape. The number of displaced people is estimated to be 7,814 families, of which 6,814 will come from the Nylon area and about another 1,000 from other parts of the city. About 4,782 families have been displaced by basic inftructure (3,782 in Nylon and 1,000 elsewhere), 738 by social infrastructure, 425 in the resettlement areas, and 1,869 74 Alon Urbn Upgrading Projec as a result of restructuring (all in Nylon). Among these 7,814 fanilies, 3,700 have been effectively displaced by now, mainly due to the construction of basic infrastructure in the Nylon area. Housl OLD PRO. As is generaly the case in sponneous setlement areas, the large majority of Nylon residents are among the poorest people in the city. A baseline study of household inome in the area dsowed that 55 percent of tee families are below the poverty line, estimated at 40,000 FCFA per month (about US$160), while the proportion is only 25 percent for the city of Douala as a whole. Apart from the 40 percent of the population which has regular wage employment, the residents of Nylon have irregular income based on crsmanship and community businesses, when they are not actually unemployed. Lem ENR. The land tenue laws of Cameroon, set forth in the ordinances of 1974, define the lands under private property rights either as registered and titled lands or "freehold lands." Lands in the second category should have been declared immediately to the administration in order for titles to be issued. With the exception of some ten properties which had land tidtle, the Nylon area was occupied in an irregular fashion. The state did not consider the occupants as land owners. In addition, the area had been declared unfit for construction in 1906 under the Ge.man regime and later in 1959 by the "Dorian' plan. Thus the housing and other construction undertaken in Nylon was carried out in violation of the rules governing urban development. Finally, the quality of construction is generally poor and would not meet normal safety standards. Given the irreglar nature of land occupation, the substandard level of site mprovements, and the dilapidated and dangerous housing, the residents of the Nylon area had no legal right to compensation when their land was exproiatd for public purposes. PRINCIPLES FOR TM IRW.4T OF DISPLUCED PEOPL. The following principles have been applied in dealing with the 3,000 families displaced from Nylon so far: * The right to rehousing. Everyone displaced in the context of Project Nylon must be given a plot of land on which to build another home. * Rebousiog must be permanent. Consequently, the new site must have an acceptable level of services. At a min,mum, the level of service must be equal to the level which prevailed at the original site. * Cost recovery. In order to assure replicabiity, beneficiaries nmst make a financial contrution corresponding to the cost of site development, not including the cost of land acquisition, primary networks and social infrsrcre. RESEnZ.EMENT ARFAS. To resettle the families displaced from Nylon and the Second Urban Development Project, the state placed three sites at the disposition of 75 Involwary Rsettlement In Africa MAETUR-ARAN: Dibom II, Ndogpassi III, and Nkolbong. Dibom 1. Located at the southwestern corner of the Nylon zone, along the Douala-Yaounde highway, the Dibomn 1I resettlement area has an area of about 43 bece and includes 923 plots with an average area of 200 square meters. The plots are served by unpaved 8-meter wide roads on a 10-meter embankanent. Foundations are built of a compacted mixture of volcanic gravel and sandy clay, with drainage provided by concrete faced drains. Each plot is individually linked to the water supply network and has a septic tank which can be emptied. Dibom II also includes the following social infrastructure: a primary school with twenty-four classroomns, four water standpipes, street lighting, a health center, a social center, and a small market (still under construction). This housing development was baded over to the residents in 1984. Adopassi 11. The Ndogpassi area is located north of the Douala-Yaounde highway, and extends over 220 hectares. Because of its size, the development of this area was plarnnd in two phases. The first phase includes 1,041 plots with areas ranging fom 150 to 300 square meters. The level of service is slightly higher an that provided in Dibom II, since some roads will be fully paved. Social infrastructure that has already been built includes a primary school with twenty classrooms, a secondary school, and a commnity center. The second phase will include five areas of which two will be used for resettlement. This will provide approximately 1,500 plots which are now under development. Te number and variety of social inriastructures planned for Ndogpassi give it the status of a new city: four primary schools, three secondary schools, an administrative center, a sociocultural center, a market, and a sports complex. The development of Ndogpassi is part of a broader strategy intended to integrate the resettlement areas into lrger areas undergoing the normal processes of urbanization, corresponding to the average stanrd of the city of Douala. For this reason, in addition to the resettlement areas, significant amounts of land have been reserved for high-income housing, for public sevices, and for commercial activities. Jfklbong. Located about 10 kilometers along the highway towards Yaounde, the Nkolbong resettlement area extends over 236 hectares. Site improvenent works have not yet started there. The area will be linked to the city by the 10-kilometer ringroad and the eastern urban boulevard crossing the Ndogpassi resettlement area and the Nylon area. Site development operations include demarcation of about 4,000 plots and construction of facilities foreseen in the East Douala local master plan such as municipal adminision, post office, schools, hospital, various social services, and commercial activities. HouSEoLD CAPACi7Y FOR COSr RECovERY. In accordance with the project objectives, resettlement p',ots are made available at servicing cost. For an average plot with an area of 200 square meters, the price varies between 510,000 and 1,000.000 76 Nylon Urban Upgrading Proj ec FCFA (S2,000-$4,000). Since the purpose of the operation is to provide replacenent housing, the family must also absorb the cost of constructing a house. The minimum cost of an acceptable house is a little less than 2 million FCFA ($8,000). Furthennore, since the time allowed for moving from one site to the other is relatively short - three to six months, according to the law -- the displaced families are faced with a very large financial need. This need is even more difficult to meet given that the family receives no financial compensation for the structures it must leave behind at the old site. And finally, low levels of household income and the informal nature of economic activities mean that most families are not eligible for bank loans. SUPPORT MEASURES. A number of supporting measures have been included in the project to assist in the resettlement of displaced people, both in the legal acquisition of rights to plots and in the administrative procedures related to home building. These measures include credit, construction assistance, and administrative assistance. Credit. In selling the resettlement plots, the principle applied until now has been that payment must be made in full before plot development starts. The period of payment was initially fixed at four months, judged to be sufficient time for a family to obtain a loan from the Housing Bank of Cameroon. In view of the genuine difficulties of families in obtaining loans, however, the payment period has been extended to eighteen months. At the same time, purchasers have been permitted to start construction under specified conditions once more than half of the plot purchase price has been paid. The two principal factors hindering the mobilization of finds are the lack of available funds in the banking system and the ineligibility of displaced households for normal bank loans. In order to overcome these obstacles, the financing agreernents for Project Nylon included the establishment of a special line of credit for housing finance in the Housing Bank of Cameroon. Neighborhood conmmittees in Nylon promoted the development of informal savings and loan associations ("tontines habitat") at the local level. The project authority negotiated with the Housing Bank to provide credit on more flexible termns. Finally, studies were undertaken to identify intermediary structures that could provide linkages between the classical banking system and the informal sector. For example, the People's Savings Bank of Nylon, which is being revitalized, could guarantee loans made to individuals or to tontine groups. Construction assistance. ARAN provides interested persons with a range of designs and technical specifications for low-cost housing approved by the municipality of Douala. The designs are different combinations of completeness (from shell housing to a fully finished house), size (two to six rooms) and materials (ranging from wooden boards to cement blocks). The purchasers also receive technical assistance during construction from a team which is responsible for ensuring that buildings are correctly sited and that construction is properly carried out. The purchasers of lots in Dibom II and Ndogpassi were assisted by the nongovernmental organization Architectes sans Frontieres. In addition to this technical assistance, ARAN has carried out some site improvements direcdy, including 77 Involwary Resettlement in Africa the installation of septic tanks at Dibom II, and an experiment with prefabricated housing at Ndogpassi. Administrative assistance. To improve efficiency, administrative procedures relating to building permits, loan applications, and land titling are handled by the agency, which has a special relationship with the institutions concerned. RESULTS. After the first resetdement operation, among dhe results recorded by July 1990 were (a) 3,702 households displaced; (b) 2,063 resettlement plots made available; (c) 1,385 plots sold; (d) 1,042 plots fully developed; and (e) 90 plots with ongoing construction. In theory, the resettlement areas should have beL.. available before people were actually displaced by the project. In practice, this did not happen, resulting in a deficit of about 1,700 plots. This was due primarily to the initial design of the project, which separated the financing of the project works in Nylon from the financing of the restement areas. World Bank financing and government counterpart funds were earmarked for works in Nylon itself, while the government of Cameroon was fully responsible for the development of the resettlement areas. The economic crisis which prevented the state from meeting its commitments on time therefore had a more marked effect on the resettlement :omponent. With respect to housing credit, the initial assumptions of the project were too optmistic. The Cameroon Housing Bank was not able to provide the amount of funds needed. The People's Savings Bank of Nylon and the "tontines habitats" have not yet developed a significant financial capacity. In addition, the economic crisis also affected the incomes of the target population. Even excluding a number of families which deliberately chose other resetlement solutions, many families have had to adopt temporary solutions while waiting for permanent resettlement. In view of this somewhat dramatic situation, the govermment of Cameroon developed a new strategy in July 1990, aiming to provide a more satisfactory solution to the problems of displaced households, while taking into account the conditions of the new economic enviromnent. New Proposals PRvcaPnEs. The new approach to the resettlement of households displaced from the Nylon area and under the Second Urban Development Project is based on the following principles: All displaced households must be compensated. Compensation covers all property improvements, whether on privately owned land or national lands. 78 Nylon Urban Upgrading Project * All displaced households must have the opportunity to obtain a plot in a resettlement area if they wish. * Compensation payments and resettlement plots must be available before households are forced to leave their homes. * Resettlement costs must be paid by the beneficiaries. However, plot costs and methods of payment must be compatible with household income levels. NDOGPASSI OPERATIONS. Based on these principles, and in accordance with Bank policy stipulating that projects involving land acquisition must now include resettlement plans, financing for the resettlement of families displaced from Nylon and other parts of the city under the Second Urban Development Project has been included in the current Loan Agreement no. 2999-CM. This loan finances, among other things, the servicing of plots reserved for the urgent resettlement of 1,500 families, including 1,200 families displaced from Nylon which have not yet been resettled, and 300 families that will be displaced under the project. In order to expand the range of options, different levels of site servicing will be offered to purchasers. Minimal service will available to 23 percent of the lots, while 47 percent will have an intermediate service level, and 30 percent will be fully serviced. The shares of different plot types offered correspond to the distribution of household income levels. For the poorest households, plots have been reserved for which development costs will be subsidized by the state. Finally, the methods of payment and of site development have been made more flexible. Thus, plots can now be purchased over five years (sixLy monthly payments) by households which did not receive any compensation payment, and over three years (thirty-six monthly payments) by households which have received compensation. The minimunm payment before plot development can begin has been reduced to 20 percent of the purchase price, and even 10 percent in the case of the poorest households. Conclusion The success of resettlement programs for households displaced by urban projects depends on an understanding of the principal factors involved: * The relatively large number of faLmilies to be displaced. * The low levels of income and consequently the limited capacity of these households to contribute to project costs, as well as their ineligibility for conventional credit. 79 Involuntary Resettlement in Africa * The nature of urban occupation which does not generally give thern the status of landowners in the legal sense, and thus does not entitle them to compensation if they are displaced. * Project scheduling which must give priority to the preparation of resettlement areas in advance of displacement. The treatment of displaced people should not be considered a temporary act of charity. In fact, these people constitute an important part of the urban population, and should not be left in a marginal position. On the contrary, their rights as citizens of the city should be fully recognized. This means that they should be treated as beneficiaries of urban projects, in the same way as the people who are able to remain in the redeveloped areas. so CHAFFER 6 INVOLUNTARY RELOCATION IN URBAN AREAS OF MOZAMBIQUE Francisco Pereira Until independence in 1975, the cities of Mozanbique were built in the pattem of many African cities in the post-colonial period: a rncleus well- endowed with urban infrastructure and sound buildings where most of the colonialists lived, and shanty town on the periphery, lacking infrastructure and characterized by spontaneous growth, intended for the local population. The control of population growth in the urban centers, and in particular the occupation of the urbanized zone, was based on discrimination, with the objective of assuring a low density of population and a high quality of infrastructure and municipal services in that zone. After 1975, with hlt atural elimination of such barriers to access to the urbam centers, urban growth incLsed rapidly to more than 8 percent per year. There was a veritable race to the cities where the signs of change were most evident, where better employment opportunities could be found, and where people could benefit from a stronger economy. Insecurity created by prolonged and intenified warfare in the rural areas gready accelerated this trend, resulting in recent years in a steady increase in the uncontrolled migration of so-called displaced persons towards the cities. The city of Maputo, for example, which in 1975 had a population on the order of 400,000, today has around 2 million inhabitants. In just fifteen years, the city's population has increased by 500 percent without any major new investments in housing stock or urban infrastr . This growth was accompanied by a drastic reduction in the managemt capacity and control of municipal institutions, due to the massive exodus of foreign chnicians. This created the conditions for overcrowded occupation of the existng buildings and a growing spontaneous occupation of urban land. Today the city of Maputo does not have a single urban architect dealing with the problems of urban land use control. Such control can only be exercised indirectly through some techniques of physical planning. Nationalizaton mnd Along with this growing inbalance between the size of the urban populaion and the reduced management capacity of urban institutions, two political decisions taken in 1975 and in 1979 significantly affected urban development in Mozambique: nationlization of Fracko Pereir. a civi engneer. served as Genea! Direcwor or Roads and for Economy and Consucio in the Mnistry of Public Works in Mozanbique. He is curre Project Coordinator for dae housing component of an urban reabiitato project in Mozambique. 81 onaway Resttlement in frca the land, and nationalization of privately-owned buildings providing rental housing. These two measures provoked a total collapse of the private constuction industry which suddenly came under state control. Although this was not the intention, the state became the sole agent for planning and carrying out housing and infrstructure investments, with responsibility for the management of more thm 70,000 houses, all the urban and rural land in the country, and all of the construction and infrastructure enterprises. With nationalization, the state approved a land law affirming that urban land could be used for residential purposes free of charge, and a rent control law that established house rents in relation to the income of the occupants. For the management and maintenance of its large housing stock, the state created in 1977 an agency called the State Housing Administration (Administraiao do Parque Imobiliario do Estado - APIE) which still exists today. As a consequence of these two measures, the supply of nationalized land passed rapidly out of state contol and into the hands of individuals, since there was no restriction on demand for plots for housing construction. A simple written request sufficed to obtain a plot. Many of these plots allocated more than ten years ago still have no construction today because the owners only acquired them as a possible future source Of income. Given that rental charges were only determined on the basis of income, there was naurally a race to occupy the buildings with a high quality of construction. The ineitable consequence was that these buildings rapidly deteriorated due to nvercrowding, abuse and lack of maintnac. In Maputo, for example, more than 50 percent of the building elevators no longer work even in the upper class areas, and a survey of 2,000 buidings showed that many of them shelter four or five families in apartments intended for a single family. The Urban Rehbltatim Projet In this context the government of Mozambique, in 1987, soLicited a loan from the World Bank to carry out a program of urban reabilitation, witi the intention of slowing the accelerated decline of the pdncipal cities of the country. The progrm, which was given the name of the 'Urban Rehbilion Project" of Maputo and Beira (Projeto de Reabilitago Urbana - PRU), defined the following principal objectives: * Sutrngthening the techial and management capacity of local institutions. * Rehabilitation of housing and urban infrastcture * Intoduction of cost recovery mechansms rdated to state investments in urban development. 82 Inwoluntwy Relocadon In Urban Areas of Mozambiqe Included within the PRU areas of responsibility were water, drainage and sewage, roads and bridges, housing, garbage, employment generation, institution strengthening and training. The housing component of this project covers fdkeen sb-projects in three principal areas: (a) completion of apartment buildings started before independence, on which construction had been paralyzed for a long dme for lack of capital; (b) rehabilitation of degraded nationalized buildings, preceded by resettlement of the occupants in core houses constructed in suburban areas; and (c) basic urban infrtucture in the peri-urban parts of the cities, as a preliminary to starting up self-constucted housing programs. For the technical and financial management of tis component, considerin the weakness of the existing state institutions in this sector, a new unit was created in the Minustry of Construction and Water, called the Deatmen of Housing Unit for Management and Supervision of Housing Programs (Departameto de Habitaao Unidade de Gestio e Supervisao de Program. Habitacionais - HABITAR), which opeates through contactual arrangements with national and foreign technical specialists. HABITAR in turn created local agencies, called Project Coordination Units (UCP), relying on contracted technical assistae to assist them in project implmatio. For financi management, HABITAR selected through competitve bidding a joint venure of a local and a foreign firm. The housing component of the PRU began in 1989 and was expected to last over four years. Of the three sub-components, naturally the building rehabilitation program was the most complex, since it involved the resetdement of the inhabitants. The soduon was to provide temporary housing through the consuction of low-cost core houses in exsting neighborhoods. The core houses when completed will have 72 square meters of space, but in this phase have only 36 square meters divided into three rooms, a latrine and an outside ldtchen. All of the houses have electricity, with a light in each room and a stove comection. A water faucet is located outside each house. When the building rehabilitation is completed, new rents will be established, and the previous residents who wish to and are able to pay tesc rents will be able to move back into the building. As an altenative, they may stay in the core houses which can be acquired at subsidized prices and with access to credit. Naturally the previous conduct of the occupants and the condition of their apartmens prior to reabilitaton are factors which will be taken into account in the decision to authorize their return to the buildings. The selecdon of housing units to rehabilitate in the two cities was initially made based on data available to APIE. Subsequenly a survey of some 2,000 households was conducted, providing information on the type of occupation, the condiion of the housing units, and the opinions of fte inbabitants conceming the proposed move to core housing. The results of the survey showed that most people were able to move out durig the rehabilitation period, but only 60 percent made a definitive move into the available core housing. 83 Ihwoluntwy Raseaenent in Africa About 1,000 apartments were selected for rehbilitation, two-thirds in Maputo and the rest in Beira. Based on the survey data, it was projected that 380 core houses would be needed, 300 in Maputo and 80 in Beira. The rehabilitation program was designed to be canied out in cydes of six months to one year, depending on the habilitation work needed. During the rehabilitation period, all of the residents are moved into the core houses. At the comnpletion of each cycle, some of these people return to the rehabilitated building or to another state aparunent, and others choose to remain in the core housing. The choice is made in the first instance by the affected household and later agreed to by APIE. TMe Need for Relocation In order to make the proposed move more attaive, consuction of the core houses was to be integrated into existing neighborhoods. Thus it was necessary to start by moving out present residents who were living in the project zone without a concession. Although legally these families had no right to comensation, after long discussions between the representatives of the local institutions and the residents, it was agreed that, taking into account previous practice and the fact that these families had no other resources, the project would provide them a plot with a certficate of occupancy and a house approimately equal to what they had before. Any permnent housing materials were reused, such as doors and zinc roofing. Families who lived in reed houses, all which were in a very poor stae of repair, would have new houses after moving. About fifW families who occupied plots in the project zone wert moved in an operation that took about two months, including the time for construction of the new houses. The second rehousing operation took place between Febnuary and March of this yea. It concerned eighty families who lived in the fist apartment buildig to be rehabiiated, and who moved into core houses within two neighborhoods. Before moving, all the residents participated in several meetings where the reasons for the move were explained, together with the procedure, the design of the core houses, the possibility that they could purchase their new homes, and the time period within which the move would have to take place. Residents carried out the move themselves, after receiving a certain sum to cover the cost of trnspordng their household goods. This completed the first phase of the project, involving two types of involuntary resettlement: first, of the families living in the spaces where the core houses were constructed, and second, of the families living in the buildig to be rehabilitated. From this experience we can draw some conclusions and recommndations. Problem to be Addrssed by P_aes The first issue concerns th selection of buildings to be rehabiLtated. The more degraded te conditon of the building, the more likely it is that people will want to move to core haosing, but the more difficult and costly will be the rehabilitation works. A difficult 84 involuntary Relocation in Urban Areas of Mozambique but indispensable task is to reconcile these two aspects in order for the operation as a whole to be viable. The second issue is the design of the houses to be offered for the move, which must take into account the financial ability of the families to purchase them. Cost controls that were imposed in order to ensure that the houses could be purchased in the future by the residents had led to the selection of the least expensive design. This, in turn, led to some difficulties. In spite of the fact that the sanitation systems were not operational in the buildings that were to be rehabilitated, some of the residents complained that the core houses had latr s and outdoor kitchens rather than interior kitchens and bathrooms. The size of the houses also caused complaints since most occupants of state-owned housing live in relatively large houses at low rents. However, the fundamental issue is the existence since 1977 of a subsidized rental system, which gives no incentive for home ownership since the value of rent is always less than a monthly payment for a house purchase. A recent study showed that in order for the government to be able to guarantee the maintenance and renewal of the nationalized housing stock, the current value of rents for existing houses should be increased by eight to fifteen-fold, and by about forty times in the case of new construction. But if rents were increased to this level, 90 percent of the present residents in the urban centers would have to leave their homes for lack of the financial capacity to pay these rents. The third issue is linked to the relocation of famiies living within the limits of a project area, and the fact that no compensation legislation exists in Mozambique. Since land belongs to the state and there is virtually no local control over its occupation, rapidly growing spontaneous settlements are found everywhere. This means that each project must negotiate with the occupants of the land, even those without title, the conditions under which they will be willing to move. The present project, while establishing a minimum level of assistance for moving occupants without title, has also carried out a campaign to promote the concept of registering their occupancy with the local authorities. Conclusion A comprehensive assessment of the building rehabilitation program, including the resulting involuntary relocation of the residents, shows a very positive outcome from an economic point of view. The present conditions provided by the core houses and even by the new reed houses are considerably better than those provided by the evacuated buildings or by the existing reed houses. In both cases, an exceUent opportunity is provided to improve the housing itself, as well as giving the settlers title to the plot to which they were transferred. lTe unit cost of rehabilitation, based on a current contract for a building with twelve floors and three new elevators, averages less than US$150 per square meter. 85 Involunary Resealement in Africa Adding the cost of core housing, about $120 per square meter, the cost per square meter of these complementary investments represents about one-third of the unit cost of new construction at standards similar to those of the rehabilitated building. This calculation does not take into account the additional benefit resulting from the fact that the project has produced, in addition to the rehabilitated apartments, an equal number of new core houses. Given the viability of this program, a significant number of firms and institutions have approached HABITAR, expressing their willingness to finance rehabilitation costs, including the resettlement costs of the residents, in exchange for the right to rent the rehabilitated building with an option to buy. This prospect is encouraging for the future of the building rehabilitation program, which is fundamentally limited only by the availability of land within the city that is not already occupied by high density spontaneous settlements. These rehabilitation operations will also be accompanied by eventual changes in the core housing project. Notably, in the futre we will provide less space in the living room and bedrooms in order to include a baffroom and kitchen, which are the most complex aspects for the residents to carry out for themselves. Another issue related to relocation is the policy of subsidies for the purchase of low-cost housing. If the government is to provide incentives for this type of relocation, it will have to adjust the present value of house rents, which amount to less than ten centmos per square meter. As a consequence, any housing offered for purchase, however low in price, requires a monthly payment of more than this rent. In the case of the present project, even a mortgage with a paymen; schedule extending over twenty- five years would require a monthly payment equivalent to ten times the present rent, which is not feasible for the occupants. An important feature which was not adequately appreciated in the project was the need for publicity and dissemination of the project objectives through the means of social commnication, particularly since this was a new program. Thus, some elements of the local press were inclined to echo the complaints of the resetded inhabitants, rather than obtaining the view of the project authorities. The reason for this attitude is based on the fact that the state, having set up a nationalized property system of subsidized rents and free access to urban land, unintentionally separated the concepts of cost recovery and economic criteria from the analysis of housing policy. Thus, both the citizens and the public institutions continue to consider it an obligation of the state to resolve the people's housing problems regardless of cost, an issue which can be expected to contnue for some time. The political changes which are occurring in Mozambique, with the introduction of multiple parties and the market system, will certainly bring about profound changes in the conception and implementation of national housing policy. It is to be hoped that new economic actors will introduce a greater dynamism in the development of these programs. In the meantime, on the eve of the elections, one may note a certain 86 Involuntary Relocation in Urban Areas of Mozambique reluctance on the part of govenmnent to embark on such programs, which can be taken advantage of for electoral purposes, since they imply the resettlement of people in conditions different from those they have been used to enjoy. It seems, however, that no one doubts that this program constitutes an appropriate response to the continuing decline in the existing housing stock, as well as a possible way to provide better living conditions, at least in terms of sanitation, to the resettled people. g7 CHAP= 7 SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE CREATION OF LAKE KAREBA Christopher H. D. Magadza Lake Kariba lies on the Zanbezi River, bordered by Zambia on the north and Zimbabwe on the south. These two countries were once members of the ill-fated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, a polical configuation of the central African British colonies. The territories comprising the Federation were Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the protectorate of Nyasaland, now called, respectively, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. The Federation disintegrated in the early 1960s. In the historical part of this chapter, these countries will be referred to by their former colonial names. After the constituion of the Union of South Africa, of which the Soudtern Rhodesian white electorate declined to be a member, the British goverment decided to set up an administrative structur that would unite its remng cental African territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Northern Rhodesia then also contained a protctorae, Barotselan., which was inchlded in Northern Rhodesia. Consequently in the early 1950s the British govenment proposed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This polidcal and administrative structure was welcomed by the Southern Rhodesia electorate, in which at the time only white settlers had the vote, and by the white setter elements of both Northem Rhodesia and Nyasaland. However, the black majority of the the territories was not consulted as they were not enfranchised. Nevertheless, traditional leaders of Norten Rhodesia in particular nade representations to the British Crown to register their dissent on the proposed political merger. At the time of the proposed merger, Souther Rhodesia had the political status of self-goveming colony,* while both Nyasaland and Nordtern Rhodesia were closely linked with the British Crown. The tradidonal and political leaders of both terrtories saw the proposed merger as inevitably resultng in political domination by the Southem Rhodesia political system, which bore a very close resemblance to the South African apartheid system, conspicuous for its racial discrimination. Furthermore, the bladc people of the two northern territories saw the economic benefits as accrung mainly to Southen Rhodesia, to the detriment of their own economic and political prospects. The two major activities that wer to be the economic backbone of the Federation were to be the exploitation of Northem Rhodesia's vast copper resorces, and the white Chrisopr ED. Magadz is Diector of the Unierst of Zimbabwe Lake Karba Research Staon. He is an aqtc ewlgist who hs woked on tseise-fly and utrophican conlrol, fisheris and vegeton studies. Professor Magadz is a founder and former vice presiden of tie rcan Academy of Scinces. 89 InvOanary Rescalemet in afra settler dominated agriculture of Southern Rhodesia, baed on chap labor from Nyasland. The capital ins benefits from tis economic base would fmance scndary industrial developn in Sou Rhodesia. The Britishgovernment was convinced that under the technical leadership of the white seters in the region, the polidcal merger would result in economic complemenmarity between the dtee territories and create the necesy clinmte for economic and political development. Thus, much against the will of the black people of British cenral Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasalnd was instituted in 1952. Kaiba Hydroelectric Project In order to develop the region's indusrial potential, the federal govenm realized that it needed to develop the energ resources of the region. Hydroelectric power was the obvious answer, and a survey of the hydroelectric potential of the area was undetken. This survey idenfied the Kafiue Gorge on the Kafue River, a tributary of the Zambezi River, as a suitable site for developing hydroelectric power. Between the Kafue flood plain and the middle Zambezi Valley, the Kafie drops 400 meters in altitude over less thn 5 kIlomme of its length, makng this stretch of the river an ideal site for cascaded hydroelectric dams. However, since the Kafue River ws locatd in Northem Rhodesia, the white-dominated federal government was reluctant to invest in such a vital resource in a country that was bound eventually to come under a black govermet. Thus, an alternative site had to be found, one that woud both satis the technical requiremets of large hydroelectric power geneation and allay the apprehensions of the white Soutier Rhodesian sealers. Thus was bom the Kanba Hydroelectric Project, located on the Zanbezi River, which formed the boundary betwen Northem Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. To manage ot construction and operatin of the project, an internadonal company, the Ctral Afican Power Corporation (CAPCO), was formed. This company was owned in equal shares by the paricipating counties, but the bulk of the compay's physical assets were located in Southem Rhodesia. Thus, at the breakup of the Federation, CAPCO found itself owned by two mutually hostle counties, independent Zambia with a black popular governmnt, and a racially tom Rhodesia, besieged by an escalating lation war. Ihe Gwmbe Valley and lbs eople The area that would be inundated by the projec was known as the Gwembe Valley. This valley lies in a semi-arid zone, largely due to its low elevation. It has a mean rainfall of 600 nili metes, mainly confind to the months of November to March, high evapotranspiration, and a te_mp e range of 30 to 32 degrees C. During the warm season, daily tempeaures in excess of 40 degrees C. are not uncommon. For most of the year, ev oi n exceeds pr pitatio. 90 Sodal hWIacs of die Creawi of Lake Kariba The inabitants of the Gwembe Vdlcy are the Tongp people. Their life- style has been described by Colson and Scudder.' Briefly, they are a people who were cut off from the rest of the world, due to the difficulty of access to their remote area. They are a people who have migratd from the south of the contnent and are closely related to the Sotho. Their history is shrouded in mystery, but it is surmised tat they pentated deeply into this othewise inopitable habitat in order to escape the slave taude, whose ravages were winescd by David Livingstone on his travels in the area. Traditionally, when a young Tongs woma reaches puberty she has her font teth ramoved, an operation that renders her somewhat less autractive to the conventional eye. Perhaps this was another Tongp mdhod of avoiding slave traders. The Tonga cultivated garde. on the fertile flood plain, where they were capable of raising more than one crop a year. They kept no livestock, relymg on the abundant wildlife in the valley for their protein. The main crop grown was millt, consisting of varieties which could survive in a low nfall regime. The Gwembe Valley, like other low-lying tropi areas, had endemic diseases like malaria, sleping sickness, and filarial elephantiases. These diseases are transmitted by mosquio and tsetse fly. It is not known how prevalent these diseases were among tie Tonga people prior to the Kariba Dam project, but by present standards, malaria must have wacued for a high death toil. This disease accoumts for the greatest pecentage of admission rates at the Kanrba hospital. The degree of genetic isolation of the Tonga people prior to the building of the dam can perhaps be indicatd by a curious three-toed condition among some of them, a condition that is said to have arisen due to inbreeding. Imcts of the Kaiba Project At the dme of cosrcto of te Kariba Dam. notions of envrmental impact assessment were only beginning to dvelp in the industrialized countries and did not play a significant part in project design and execution in developing counries. Unlike the high dam at Aswan, wbose future lake bed contained cultualy valuable remains of ancient settlements, the Gwembe Valley appeared to have nothing of value to save. Consequently there was little pre-project investgaon into the life and culture of the Tonga people. Apart from transforming the Gwembe Vally into the vast Lake Kaniba, there appeared to be no ecological concemn that would warrat a pre-project ecological survey of the area. It was andciphat the lake would have a major impact in creaing a fisberies resource, but no pre-project study of the fisbhies potential was attepted either. In retopec it is doubtfdl whetier the techmical manpower or the tehology for doing so existed at the time. Howevr, some preparatio was made for the fishery by learing certai areas of tres prior to imdation. It was enviaged that in ese cleared areas, trawling would be the principal metod of fishig, a notion that assumed the emergence of trawlable stocks. A freezing plant was buflt at Sinazongwe on the Zanbian shore to process anticipated large fish catches. 91 Involwntary Resettmt in Africa In summary, there was no nironmental impact asessment program as such for the Lake Kanba project. Rdocation of the Teomp People Prior to the inndation of the Gwembe Valley, the Gwembe Tonga lived as a single social group, occupying both sides of the Zamnezi River, leading a life of mixed hunting and gateing and cropping. Because of the prevalence of the tsetse fly, they were not pastoral. At the time of construction of the Kanba Dam, the Gwembe Tonga population was estimated at 86,000 people. Of these, 55,000 lived in Zambia, while the Tonp residing in Zimbabwe numbered about 31,000. Although archaeological records inicate that the Gwembe Valley has been selted since the Achelian (Stone) Age, the origin of the present inhabitants is still unclear. Their oral history, as told by living elders, associates them with the Nguni tnrbes of Southern Africa. This tradidon of heir prehistory also tells of raids by slave traders, as well as by the Ndebele people who now occupy the southwester part of Zimbabwe. These raids drove the Tongas deeper into the refge of the valley, where they lived in isoation from odter plateau people. Detailed studies of the life and culture of the Tonga were done by Colson and Scudder both before and after resettlement.2 Like the division of Geramy by the Berlin Wall, the imndation of the valley divided the Toga uito two separated political popations. In the earlier stages of the separation there was limited visiing across the lake by family members, but afker the breakup of the Federation and the ensuig hoslities in Rhodesia the separati becme complete. Unfortuately, the territorial governmens of Norhemn and Southern Rhodesia, n anticipating the politl disingration of the Federation, did not think to give the Tonga people a chance to choose the side of the lake on which they would like to setde so that closely related family groUps could remain intact. In the planming phase of the Kariba projet, little thought was given to educating the Tonga about the conse that this engineering feat would have for their futre. They could not comprehend that man coud change nature; that the rhythm of the Zambezi River which had puncumed their lives for generations would cease; that the mighty Zambezi, guarded by their river god Nyaminyami, would diser, to be replaced by a vast man-made sea; that man would challenge natural powers and tame the fury of the Zambezi at Kariba Gorge; that they would have to leave their traditional homelands forever, abandoning their ancestral spirits and their forefahs' graves, now drowned by the 'pale men." Consequently, when the wates began to nse, the Tonga were incredulous. Some tadtional leaders refused to give up their homes and move to higher ground. In Souher Rhodesia they had to be moved by force. On the Northern Rhodesia side some preparations had been made to relocate the Tonga in an orderly fashion. Here famies 92 Social Impacts of the Creadon of Lake Kariba were moved into homes provided by the government. Training facilities for fishermen were provided at Sinazngwe to train the Tonga to exploit the fishery opporunities provided by the lake. Furthermore, a pilot irrigation scheme was set up at Malima. However, neither of these facilities was managed by local personnel, and at the departure of the expatriate staff. they collapsed. COSz OF IWJNG. One of the results of the relocation of the Tonga people was that they were suddenly thrust into a cowmercial enviromt, although they had previously been treated as a non-commercially minded people. Due to crop failures and other exigencies, they had to buy food and other basic commodities in an environment that had little income generating capacity. The irony of the situation is that although this is the most impoverished part of Zimbabwe, the prices demanded by local traders made the area the most expensive in which to live. In 1989 the cost of living in the Omay area was about 100 percent higher than in Harare. HEWN. Two factors affect the general health of the people of the Za mezi Valley. The long neglect of the area by colonial adminstrators meant that such services as health and education were Little developed, and then only by voluntary groups such as missionaries. Endemic diseases continued to exact a high toil among a people with limited access to mndical care. The second factor was that the urban center of Kariba town and the fishing villages that developed along the shore became centers of prostitution, and consequently the frequency of semally tansmitted diseases (STDs) increased. Data from Kaniba hospital show that endemic malaria and STDs are by far the most significant causes of morbidiy. Malnutrition among children is also quite common, in spite of the fact that the lake now boasts a Z$140 million fishin industry. Because of the high frequency of this condition, the Kariba District hospial has had to mount a special nutrition progam. AGCUR. In the valiey the Tonga had evolved an agricultural strategy that gave them a unuber of options in coping with thdir food needs. Using both the seasonal rain and the flood pattem of the Zambezi River, they were able to raise crops throughout the years, cultivating mainly the flood plain alluvial soils. At the inundation of the valley they were translocated to seni-arid lands with a high risk of crop failure. The Tonga then becme a food deficit people. Furermore the presece of the tsetse fly made it impossible for them to rear livestock. There were indications of widespread famine in the early days of the resettlement. At the completion of the construction, some urban centers had developed on the lake shore. The location of these centers was detmined by the access routes to the lake shore. A lucrative fishery developed, as well as a thriving tourst industry. However, since these deveopments were centered on the towns, they were of little benefit to the Tonga whose resettlement areas were remote from the new urban centers. The Tonga therefrc condied to be a food deficit, underdeveloped people. In an atempt to enhance food production in the resetldement areas by enabling 93 Involuntary Resettlemm in Africa the Tonga to rear cattle for draft power, an internationally financed project to eradicate the tsetse fly has been mounted. The immediate result of the project has been to open a once remote area to resetdement by other land-hungry tribes. This new onslaught into the valley has now unleashed important environmental land use problems, including large-scale deforestation, soil erosion, and siltation. The tsetse eradication program has also resulted in the buildup of pesticides in the lake. Data collected by the University Lake Kianba Research Station show high concentrations of DDT in fish-eating birds. Samples of mothers' milk from Kariba have contained levels well beyond the World Health Organization permissible limits. The objective of the tsetse eradication program is to enable the peasant communities to expand subsistence farning, a land use strategy which may not be sustainable. FISERIES. While Zambia had a traditional ardsanal fishery based on its inland lakes and rivers, Zimbabwe had no such natura resource and therefore lacked an artisanal fishing traditon. Southern Rhodesia began an extensive program of water resource development in the early 1950s by building dams for agriculture and potable water supply. These man-made water bodies offered a potential for European sport anging, and consequently facilities were established to breed bass and trout to stock these lakes. Thus, when Lake Kanba was built, Zambia had a traditional fishery infrastructure for catching, processing, marketng, and distnbution of fish to low-income consumeri, while Zimbabwe did not. The industry which eventually developed on the Zimbabwe side of the lake was initially based on a capital intensive, monopolistic pattern, with a very small number of companies holding large fishing concessions. In the initial stages of the industry, the only local people participating in fishing on Lake Kariba on the Zimbabwean side were the displaced Tonga. Due to the remoteness and inaccessibility of their fishing camps, they could not market their produce and had to rely on white fish traders to collect their dried fish, often on a barter exchange basis for food and other essential commodities. L4ND USE OFHONS. The management of peasant agriculture in the Zambezi Valley is problematic. It is clear that current agricultural practices are not sustainable,3 and the question of whether the valley should be tilled at all is now being examined. If it is eventually accepted that the Zambezi Valley should not be farned. this will raise the questdon of how the indigenous communities can find an alternative form of livelihood that does not involve cultivadon. Altbough the Zambezi Valley around Lake Kanba is a rain deficit area, it has other natural resources of considerable economic importance. Its breathtaking wildlife are matched nowhere else in Africa. The valley is one of the few remaining regions with appreciable timber resources, while in the rest of the surrounding region such resources are either exhausted or rapidly dwindling. It also bas mineral resources, particularly coal reserves, which will be needed to meet ever increasing demands in the woodfuel- impoverished Southern Africa of the future. Wildlife enthusiasts have often made unsubstantiated claims that wildlife can be more productive than domestic animals. Such claims are questionable when production 94 Social Impacts of the Craadon of Lake Kariba is computed in terms of carcass value. However, if wildlife is exploited for its trophy value, then indeed it can match domestic animals in revenue generation. Since the Zambezi Valley currently generates hundreds of thousands of dollars in wildlife-based tourism, it seems logical that the people of the valley could earn higher revenues by utilizing their wildlife, rather than persisting in destructive land use practices. Such a strategy would also naturally conserve the wildlife resource of the area. Current land use has resulted in increasing conflict between wildlife and local inhabitants. Realizing its economic potential, some local authorities have formed trust funds for wildlife utilization. However, one sociological problem that still needs to be solved is to find a method of disbursing revenue from a communally owned assel such that individual benefit can be realized. The current method of using such revenue is the provision of communal facilities such as schools, clinics, and roads. Individual poverty is not addressed. Project Evaluation The Kariba case study illustrates a number of poignant facts. It was built to rob one country of its mineral wealth to benefit another country, as well as Western and South African investors. Such cynicism was unavoidable in the context of the politics of that era. Settler images of the African as a creature who lived outside the aspirations of Westem economic values, a being quite indifferent to the notion of self-advancement and hence unmotivated by profit incentives, were very much in vogue. It was further held that any attempts to lift the African from this complacency would constitute an unbearable shock to the social fabric. Consequently, native commissioners of those days actively discouraged any monetarization of African values. In this view, the only accommodation needed for the displaced Tonga was to find them land where they would continue to exist unperturbed by Western civilization, simply because of lack of physical access to it. This naive view partly accounts for the plight of the Tonga displaced from Lake Kariba. A more significant problem, however, was the complete lack of understanding of the trauma that involuntary resettlement would create in that circumstance. Little was it realized then that such an experience would constitute an irreversible departure from previous norms. Involuntary resettlement brings about a departure from known and tested ecological norms for natural resource use; it alters long established social norms by placing the displaced persons in new and alien social environments with new taboos and unfamiliar traditions; it uproots people from stable economic traditions with the vistas of unfamiliar markets and commodities. It places the resettled persons on a long path of evolving and adapting to conditions in the new environment, the full impact of which only gradually unfolds over a very long period. The planning and management of Kariba lacked any of these insights on account of both its political and historical setting. It was conceived in the era when engineers reigned supreme and scholars of the social sciences commanded low esteem among the "developers' of the middle twentieth century, often being viewed with suspicion as 95 Invluntary Resettlement in Africa "leftist agitators." What lessons have been learnd, if any? The World Bank has recently released a policy document on resettlement.4 This is a significant development, but until the leaders of developing countries in which such projects are undertaken recognize the impacts on resettled people, scientific observations are of little effect. The recent acquiescence of the government of Zambia to large-scale land acquisition by a multinational company, resulting in more displaceent of a people who had finally begun to cope with thcir new environment, is an oversight of some considerable dimensions. The insistence of the Zimbabwe administrators to develop the Zimbabwean side of the middle Zambezi on traditional rainfed cropping systems, with the ecological consequences that will be unleashed, is also a cause for some concern. This illustrates another regrettable situation in which scientific research seemns unable to influence the development process. There are ample data to suggest that the development strategies currently being pursued by civil administrators wilM lead to hardships in the long run.5 Such information, even when brought to the attention of developers, appears to have little influence, while donor agency projects take pride of place in the decisionmaking process. There is an urgent need now for developers and scientists of both natual and human affairs to meet on a conmon platform where they can share the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide African development into the twenty-first centy without doing irreparable damage to the fragile environments which are the very sustenance of development. 96 Social Inpacts of the Creadon of Lake Kariba NOTES 1. Colson, Elizabeth. 1971. The Socal Consequences ofResettlement: The Impact of Kariba Resettkment upon the Gwmbe Tonga. Manchester, U.K.: Manster University Press.; Scudder, Thayer. 1962. The Ecology of the Gwembe Tonga. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press. 2. Scudder, Thayer, and Elizabeth Colson. 1971. 'The Kariba Dam Project: resettlement and local initiative." In R. Berard and K. Pelton, eds., Technological Innovadon and Cdtual Change. New York: MacMilan.; Colson, op. cit.; Scudder, Thayer. 1973. "The Human Ecology of Big Projects: River Basin Development and Resettlement." In B. Siegal, ad., Annual Review of Anthropology. Palo Alto, CA. 3. Magadza, C.H.D. 1986. 'Conflicts of resource use on the Lake Kanba evirons." Nature and Resources. Volume 4. October-December. 4. Cernea, Michael M. 1988. Involuay Resetlement in Development Projects: Polcy Guideines in World Bank-Fnand Pojects. World Bank Tecnical Paper No. 80. Washington, D.C. 5. Magadza, op. cit. 97 CHArm 8 LONG-TERM DiPACTS OF RESE1TLEMENT: THE AKOSOMBO DAM EXPERIENCE MarthaA. Ta cMae The involuntay relocation of pople must be seen as an organic and multidisciplinary process. It always takes place within a specific economic, social, cultual, and political contet. To have meaning and relevance, resetmet policies must be forunlated with these fctors in vie. Resettment in itself is a process of change, which is inherenty disruptive as wel as costructive. Therefore, resetdtent projecs should involve meaures to minimize dte social disintegration dtat is likely to occur. It is important to diss the impact of resettlm wherever it ocus, for there are lessons to be leared from reslement projects which are relevant to ingrated ural devIopmemt process. In this chapter, dth main policy guidelines and strategies adopted for the Akosomnbo Dam Resetdtement Scbeme will be disacssed, foilowed by an oudine of the implementation of the resettement policy and programs. Impacts of the varius programs on the resetders are identified, and lessons drawn for fute settement policy and plamnig. Akoombo Dn ePd. Tbe Volta River Project (VRP) at Akosonbo led to the formaon of a lke which covered a total area of 8,500 square kilometers or 4 percent of the total land area of Ghana. In a white paper on the VRP, dt govenment of Ghana established a goal of sitably n gthe pop on to be displaced by the project. This goal was decied on the adie of technical experts and plaes. However, this goal was later broadened in a stament by then-Prme Minister Dr. Kwame Nkunmah, into an undaking by govement "to ensure that no one was worse off as a result of the creation of the lake. The goal of aproiate compensatio was given legal backing in the Volta River Developnt Act (VRDA). A semi-aDnmous body, the Volta River Authority (VRA), was set up to be reponsible for developing the hydroelectric potential of the country and also for the resettlemet of the affcted people. The VRDA allowed compensation to be made in kind or in cash, at the option Marth i Taldoe is Asociu Profesor nd Head of tde Depamen of Hosing and Pbnnit Reseach, as well as Dean of the Facuty of Envronmenl and Devebopm Studis, at due Universiy of Science nd Techolo. Kumasi Ghana Professor Tamloe's prMy awea of teahing and research inst is in Ie sociology of daveMpmeaL 99 Invowlary Resealenent in Africa of the government. A preparatory report commissioned by the goverment in 1956 advocated a policy of outright acquisition of all rights in the area. Public facilities were to be replaced and private rights compensated in cash. Linited technical and financial assistance was to be provided to enable the affected people to resettle themselves. Construction of the dam did not start until 1962, due to protracted negotiations for financing the project. By this time the policy outlined above had become obsolete for several reasons. First, it was discovered that the cash compensation envisioned would be inadequate to enable the affected people to build their own replacement houses. Second, most of the property had not been valued to establish the basis of cash compensation, and the time needed for valuing the remaning property would be insufficient for valuers to detenmine the entidtlements of the affected people and to allow them to make their own arrangements before flooding. lhird, Ghanaians, including the affected people, expected dte Govemnaent to resetfle the people in better conditions than they had before. Fourth, it was found that suitable land for farming was limited. Thus, the traditional sysum of shifting cultivation had to be changed to a more intensive technique. Otherwise, the available farng land could not sustain the increased population.t These considerations led to the development of a new policy. Under this policy, the central government through VRA would undertake resettlement under improved conditions. To implement the new policy, three programs were developed: * An attempt was to be made to improve agriculture by providing access to land, by transfer of new technology with goverment assistance, and by commercializaion of firming. * Setments were to be regrouped in larger population units in order to more economically provide social and physical in re and services. * People were to be provided with improved living conditions through better housing than they had in their previous places. Tn other words, the whole resetdement exercise was seen as an opportunity to promote social change in the affected area. 100 7h,e Aksombo Dam Experience Human Settlements The fonnation of the lake affected 80,000 people in 740 villages scantered over an area of over 7,770 square kilometers.2 Six hundred of thse vilages had a population of less than 100 each. There was only one sizeable townsip, with a population of 4,000. The people came from nine different elhnic groups with varied cultural backgrounds and practices: Akwamu, Kwahu, AsJtc, Krobo, Brong, Buem-Akan, Ewe, Krachi, and Gonja. They were mainly subsistence farmrs living in thatch-roofed mud houses. Only 2 percent of them were riverine fishermen. For purposes of resettement planning, villages were regroped into fifty-two new settlments ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 in size. The size and location of the new villages and planning parameters such as house design and room density were detemined on the basis of comprehensive data analysis. Important criteia for site seection were soil conditions, healdth conditions, water supply, access to other communities, and linkage of the sites to towns and settlements of a higher order.' The size of settlements was determied by the agricultuWal progrm proposed and also by the number of people needed for the services to be provkded to funcdon economically. HOUSVG. Average plot sizes of 2,135 by 3,050 meters were recommended for housing, to allow for future expansion. Where possible, housing layouts were designed in such a way that the size and nmnber of wards would reflect the ways in which villages had been growuped for the settlements.4 Services provided included 82 school blocks, 46 markets, 146 public laies, 52 boreholes, 6 wells, and 162 wster standpipes. The policy with regard to housing was to provide the sites widt "nuclear" or "core" houses. These had concrete floors and aluminm roofing for two rooms and two porches; however, only one room was completed before allocation. It was planned that additional rooms and the two porches would be completed by the setders themselves with materials and technical aid provided on arrival at the new site. Materials were to be provided to the settlers who were to supply their own labor. Three basic housing types were designed. Two of these were detacbed dwellings on separate plots, and the other consisted of semi-detached units. Each entitled household was allocated a core house, no matter what the size and complexity of the household might be. Separate kitchen, bathroom, and storage areas were not provided. FARwN. The policy was to improve farming by giving each settler enough prepared land to sustain a satisfactory level of living. Initially, it was decided that each subsistence farmer should have a mmiumm of twelve acres under mechanized fanning. Tree crop farners were to have a minimum of five and a maxinmm of fifteen acres. Intensive livestock farmers were to have a minimum of three acres each, and pastoralists were to have a minium of thirty acres.5 These initial target figures were reduced by half during implementation, but even so, less than a third of the reduced acreage could be cleared before the arrival of the settlers. 101 Inwulwuary Raeuemm in Africa The farming progra failed for several reasons. New technological inputs for cultivation did not arrive on time. Then, when the machinery arrived, dtere were problems with maintenance and efficient use. Finally, the implementation strucure began to disintegrate with the transfer of key committed agricultural officers. FhwMff. In planning resettlement, no fishery program was prepared because it was thought that the traditional fishermen would devdop this by themselves. This lack of consideradon for development of the fishing industry proved later to be a mistake (sue below, Economic Impacts). Long Term Impac of Rh When Nkrumah's government was overthrown in 1966, the government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) was not in favor of large-scale, state-run resettlement farms based on mass organizadon of farmers.' The NLW was more interested in small-cale, peasant agriculture. Thus, the policy of mechanized agriculture was replaced by the provision of subsistence plots for the settler families. Responsibility for the agricultural program was banded over to the Ministry of Agriculture, which proved unequal to the .---K and subsequently abandoned the setters. The result was a withdrwal of institutional support for the agricultural program. While the Busia regime was committed to rural development, this was seen as a strategy designed to improve dte socioeconomic life of a specific group of people, namely the rural poor, mainly by organizing the poor themselves. The approach to mral development pursued by Busia did not assign any special role to resettlement. Nothing substantial was achieved under Busia's goverment before his overthrow. Although subsequent govrnments were concened with growing rural-urban disparities in national development, no practical attempts were made to reverse this tend. The changes in poRicies and development strategies by various governments towards resettlement affected the development of the resettlement towns by creating an atmosphere of uncertanty both for the resettlers and for those charged with managing the affairs of the resettlement program. SocIOCULTuRAL nPr. Programs designed to improve the living conditions of the resetded populaton were not always culturally sensitive. For example, the settlers were to be compensated with a new type of standardized housing which replaced their former structures of mud and thatch. A 1979-80 survey covering about 40 percent of the over 12,000 houses constructed showed that 27.5 percent of the surveyed houses were still in the same state as they were at the time of evacuation.' A subsequent survey conducted at Mpamu and Mem Chemfe showed that 23 percent still remained incomplete and 42 percent were not occupied.' At Mpamu only 2 percent of the core houses had been completed and extended. Surveys conducted at Danyigba and Vakpo in 1981 showed that after fifteen years of resettlement, only 34 percent of the houses in these two settlements had been completed." 102 The Akosombo Dam Experice One of the major problems in housing was overcrowding, not only in physical terns but also in terms of role density.'" For example, in some societies in the Volta Basin, the wives of polygamists take turns in using one room, so that one may sleep outdoors while it is the turn of the other wife to sleep with the husband. A menstruating woman must not enter a room containing a fetish or medicine; thus, a woman in this state has to find a sleeping place elsewhere. Also, the inability of the resettlers to complete the core houses affected their ability to be a hospitable 'landlord," considered to be a valued role, to any visitors. The policy to increase the size of settlements by regrouping villages led to an increase in social scale or increase in social density and volume, in the Durkheimian sense. In other words, there was an increase in "the number of people in relation and the intensity of those relations."" This means that one behaves among a much larger, less familiar and critical audience than in the pre-resettlement villages. Women complain about gossip and mockery from people of other villages, and major domestic quarrels are heard throughout the towns. hme regrouping of villages affected social cohesion in some cases. In Mpamu, for instance, there are problems of conflict of authority, allegiance, and inter-ethnic relationships.12 The problems of integration, cooperative decisiomnaking and action still persist."3 For example, new machinery that should have been installed on the basis of communal action remains idle. This social stress stems from the early days of resettlement when there was an intra-tnbal conflict between the Twi-speaking Kwahu peoples of Apaaso and Dukumabg over the status and roles of different hierarchies of traditional authority. Dukmnang has a paramount chief who is senior to the sub-chief of Apaaso. This has brought a conflict of authority and allegiance. In recent times, the younger generation has also begun to support and at times to fan the conflicts.14 Even religion has not been able to ameliorate the situation. Cooperative irrigated vegetable farming has suffered and still suffers some setbacks in membership because the cooperative was initiated by Roman Catholics.'5 While the aim of resettlement was to enable the development of social cohesion and nationalism (in the spirit of "unity in diversity"), the villages which were grouped into new units find it difficult to develop a community spirit devoid of conflicts of interest. In some of the setdement towns, the ethnic composition of the settlement has changed. For instance, in Amankwaakrom, ethnic Kwahus were at first in the majority. Today, Ewes (Battors and Tongus) make up 39 percent of all households, the strongest ethnic group in town. while the Kwahus form only 21 percent. The main reason for this change is migration. Kwahu compounds in the pre-resettlement villages tended to be larger than Ewe houses. The Ewes, therefore, found it easier to adapt to the "core houses." Consequently, the Kwahus were more inclined to migrate than the Ewes. Also, Ewes formed the strongest ethnic group among the people who migrated to the town at a later stage. Probably a considerable number of Kwahu households were replaced by Ewe immigrants."6 103 Involuaiy Resetlement in Africa ECOLOGICAL CANGES. Most of the resettlement sites were chosen because the environment presented an ideal setting for the farming activities of the people as they existed in their previous settlements. The forest was almost virgin, the climate was cool and the soils were fertile. Most of the areas had very good rainfall with two seasonal peaks. By early 1970, however, the climatic conditions had changed. A few years after resettlement, rainfall began to decline until there were no longer two rainy seasons. Instead, there was one short rainy season and a long dry season. Wind speeds became stronger and temperatures rose, leading to the drying up of the once perennial rivers in some of the settlements. These ecological changes affected flora and fauna. Typical trees such as silk cotton, wawa, odum, and palm trees began to disappear. Now neem trees and other shrubs are noticeable. Previously, there was a great variety of large game species such as deer and antelope, but now only rats, grasscutters and guinea fowls can be found.'" Several reasons have been advanced for this destruction of the ecology. Among them is the argument that the lake itself was responsible for this destruction. The situation was facilitated by the VRA's clearing of all the vegetation for mechanized agriculture at the time of resettlement. These enviromnental changes led to the loss of soil cover, soil erosion, and destruction of agricultural land, drastically affecting crop yields. HEAI7I PROBLEmS DOWNSTRLM. With the construction of the dam, there were changes in the flow of the Volta River below the dam. Aquatic weeds and snails proliferated as a result of the slow flow of the river. These changes had adverse effects on the riparan communities in the area.'8 There has been an increase in the incidence of schistosomiasis, both urinary and intestinal types, associated with aquatic weeds and snail intermediate hosts. The locs of seasonal flooding and the drying up of the creeks have led to the loss of agricultural lands and important fishing grounds. These changes have affected the socioeconomic life of the people who migrated to the Volta Lake area, spreading schistosomiasis along the Volta Basin. EcoNoMic MPACAS. The farming program put in place to benefit the resettled people failed for a number of reasons: * Land acquisition arrangements should have been worked out before the arrival of the resettlers. * There was no systematic plnning for the program. Resources of labor, equipment, and financing required were not available. * The whole program was too ambitious to be executed within the two years available to the VRA. * Assumptions made about the time required for the resettlers to learn the new farming practices were, to say the least, unrealistic.59 104 71e ,Ikosao Don EKyeriewa 7he policy of mecanzd cleing of mlnwdB near die setlemens led to the destruction of the tosil, dt depriving e settes of Iheir economic base. Also, the raditonl practies of hilfing culIvation and crop roaon as praticed in their prevou settlemut were no long possible. This mnt intensive cultvation of the availble land for muy yas witout shing, klai to the deuction of soil nutrie. Coupled with these cotains wre te edological chniges descrned above. Since the amunt of lnd alcated to eac idividual ws so small, it becae appat that a naninfll living could not be susid in the settlements. MxKaImwS . Reponse lo the failure of agric a production due to climatic changes ad poor organtion sad a process of migion in the basin. For instance. in the resettlement town of Amte, the popuation in 1964, soon after evation, was 4,067. In 1980 it was 1,813. Ths fiue increased to 2,320 in 1988, when the expected poato in 1988 should have been 17,4980. Typically, younger fimily mebers left tow nd their ging preots bded. Those who were left behind to cultivate the land facd severe drought lading to the failure of their crops. As a result, people had to trael to bater fish for food crops. The firt massive exodus of setles came a few years after resettlement.' The second phase was dt of reoccuato after 1970. The Volta Basin was reoccupied by peopk fom differet pus of Gbm who were atcted by the fishing potenial of the lae d later by the fetile ladB in the Afinm Pans. It was not appreciad that the cash returns from the fish catch under Ghanaian condiions would. be atractive. On the contrary, the urns were high and the fish catch frn the Ide rapidy exceeded 20,000 metric tons. As a result. many traditional fishermn who had abaDoned fishing and gone to work elsewhere returnd to their traditional activit. These icuded skilled tdemen and teachers. One study located 950 vilages moy newly estabished, along the sbores of the lake- The popuation of the ishig communities was estmated to be 60,000 people." In recent tms, Mpamu ad Anmatesetlemem towns have benefited from in- migration. In Mpam, 23 percent of survey respondents were migrants w%ho were nor among the origuml resetl. In Ahe, immigrants accous for 54 percent of total households. Most of thee were fiheme who were atracted by the fishery potentmial of the Volta Lakbe ITh abundae of fish has also provided work (fish smoking and drving) for wme in the affected aea. However, creek fishing in the lower Volta has sutfered. althoug th tDwns and vilages of this area have had a wave of prosperity due to the fact that people who migrated from te area to the lakeshore fishing villages spent some of dteir sving in dkeir home towns. htRmIGr AG1cbnLWE. The maJor tesponse to the ecological changes. especialy in the Afam eslem tea, has been the shift to drawdown irrigated frming. Drawdown agriutr refem to hnaing along dte littoral zone of the lake 105 Invowary Resettlemr in rca which is seasonally indated and becomes exposed as the waters recede in the dry season. Moisture is retained in the soil after inumdadon, which helps to produce crop yields much higher than those of the upland areas.2' This type of agriculture was first started on an individual basis. When the idea caught on, people petitioned the VRA for licenses to occupy drawdown land. These lands were used mainly for tomato cultivation. The land was prepared in October and November and tomato seedlings planted in Decanber. Harvesting was carried out before the lake started rising after the first rains. Studies show that the yields have been encouraging. However, drawdown farming is not popular with every farmer in the resettlement towns. For itnce, in Amankwaakrmn, due to the inland location of the town, this form of agriculture is not popular and only 35 percent of the farmers are engaged in drawdown farming. Using traditional hoes and cutlasses, farmers grow beans, rice, pepper and tomatoes for market. Atempts to make the best of the situation in the resettlement towns have spawned my interest groups, notably cooperative orgamizations. For excample, urrnTy 80 percent of the fiaming households at Mpamu belong to a cooperative organization for Irrigated agriculture.' Techbical ages iWmosed by drawdown agriculture have also begum to make an impact on the people of Mpamu in social as weil as economic terms. There are new patterns of cropping, mechanization, and increasing use of improved seeds and chemicals. Income levels are higer than in the last two decades. At Mpamu, over the past six or sewn years, local employment has expanded and residents have received subsuntial cash income. It has been esimated that over 57 percent of the fannmers earn 50,000 cedis per year from tomatoes alone, and 38 pement earn over 70,000 cedis per year-27 At Amanw m income levels ar higher than in Amate and Mpanu. In early 1987, a household budget survey showed that the average annual household income was 37,000 cedis.28 In 1988, men in Anuakwaakrom had an average annual income of 147,000 cedis while women had 16,500 cedis. The differential level of income between the sexes may be due to the multiple roles of women and the type of fanning they are egaged in. Couir=s _d Reomddo Changes in policies, as a result of increasing or decreasing aspirations on the part of policymakers and plane, are not condcive to the effective implementation of resettlement programs. Such changes are likely to affect the development of the new settlements. Local pressures very often lead to the implementation of policies which in the long run prove inimical to the interests of the resettlers and the larger society. For instance, the govewnment policy to provide better facilities than what the 106 The Akosombo Dam E&perinece resettlers had before created a problem of meeting the operation and mainteiance costs of the services. Efforts to get the local administion of the distict councils and utility agencies to take over the operation and nuintnance of the services failed. The reason appears to be that the princpal services provided in the resettlemet towns were undoubtedly superior to those provided in simar nrual non-resettlement villages and towns of the districts. The local authorities do not collect enough from the setders to meet running and maintenance costs, as the servcs tend to create a heavy financial burden. In execudng programs, time is of the essence. Most of the initial problems encountered were the result of lack of adequate dime for planning and implementation of resettlement programs. In the Volta resettlement scheme, activities were poorly scheduled. Resettlement activities started after dam site prepartions began, allowing insufficient time to undertake the necessary research and to relate it to effective development planning. After twenty-five yeas of resetdemt, dtere is still a lot of human suffering in the resettlement towns. The traumatic experence seems to have deprived some of the reseters of the ability to plan their own future. While in some settements the mood is now different from that of the last two decades, when the mood was one of despondency, there is still an attitude of dependency. Some resettlers do not take a gloomy view of the future, but expect the goverment to make a commitment to helping them plan their future. Three specific re ons may be made: 1. There is a need to broaden the feasibility studies carried out in planning for resettlement. Adequate research should cover both immedi and long-erm effects. Surveys and baseline studies relevant to local development should be carried out. Studies which can be expected to increase control of the physical, sociocultural, psychological and biotic environment are needed. In the case of the Volta resettlement experience, too much was atempted by the plannm on the basis of insfficien data on local conditions. The ecological and climactic changes were unforeseen as there was insufficient data to make such an assessmet. 2. A high-levd coordinag body consisting of representatives from government, sector agencies, researchers and scientists, local people, and the dam authority is essential. In the case of the Akosanbo Dam resettlement, the organization set up to plan and execute the program was known as the "working party.' The working party did not have full control over the departmental heads who had the responsibility to implement various parts of the program. 3. It is necessary for all development agencies to have a proper perspective on die possible impacts of the project. A typical example of neglecting to consider potential impacts is the failure to develop a fisheries programme and to anticipate migration processes in planning for resettlement in the Volta Basin. 107 InwAwntary Resettlement in Africa In conclusion, it appears that in the amse of the Akosonibo Dam resettlement, planes overemphasized the national interest of the Volta River Project, as against the local interests of the resetders. The Akmombo Dam resettlement scheme has highlighted far-reading hunan problems and challenges. One may note in particular the dilemma of retaining a relatively stable social structure under pressure from the affected people thermselves, who see in resettlement an opportunity for progress and development, defined in terms of the introduction of Western-style innovations. A corollary is the dilemnua of promoting sustainable development without creatng a dependency syndrome on the part of the resetders. Often these are impossible tasks to perform successfully. Since resetlement is inherently disruptive, perhaps the best solution is to seek altematives which can avoid institutionalized resettlement altogether. 108 The Akosombo Dam EWeriene NOTES 1. Chambers, Robert, ed. 1970. The Volta Resettlement Experience: proceedings of a symposium held at the University of Scence and Technology, Kunwsi, March 21 to 27, 1965. London: Pall Mall Press. 2. ibid. 3. Kalitsi, E.A.K. 1970. "The Organization of Resettlement." In Chambers, ibid. 4. Huszar, Laszlo. 1970. "Resettlement Planning." In Chambers, ibid. 5. Nicholas, M.S.O. 1970. "Resetlement Agriculture." In Chambers, ibid. 6. Killick, T. 1978. Development Economics in Action: A Study of Econonmc Policies in Ghana. London: Heineman. 7. Thomi, Walter. 1981. Long Term Development Problems in Resettlement. Bensheim: Kubel-Stiftung. 8. Diaw, K., and E. Schmidt-Kallert. 1990. Effects of Volta Lake Resettlement in Ghana - A Reappraisal After 25 Years. Kunde: Hamburg Institut fur Afrika. 9. Dagbui, D.H.M. 1981. "Dislocation and Relocation of Residential Land: An Apprasal of Volta River Resettlement Scheme with Special Reference to Danyigba and Vakpo Townships." B. Sc. Thesis. Department of Planning, Kumasi University of Science and Technology. 10. Lunsden. P. 1975. "Resettlement and Rehousing: Unintended Consequences among the Nchumurus." In J. Goody, ed., Changing Social Structure in Ghana. London: International African Institute. 11. Wilson, G. and M. 1945. Analysis of Social Change Based on Observations in Central Africa. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 12. Tamaldoe, M.A. 1970. "A Case Study of a Resettlement Town, New Mpamu." In Robert Chambers, ed., op. cit. 13. Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert, op. cit. 14. Ibid. 15. King, Sylvana R. 1988. "An Appraisal of Resettlement Schemes South of the Afram Plains." M. Sc. Thesis. Department of Planing, Kumasi University of Science and Technology. 109 Involuntary Resetlement in Africa 16. Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert, op. cit. 17. Tandoh, S.E. 1986. 'Climate Patterns and Changes of the West African Region." Report on Workshop on Combating the Effects of Drought and Desertification. Accra.; Timberlake, Lloyd. 1985. Africa in Crisis. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.; Brookman-Amissah. 1986. "Response of Ecosystems to Climatic Changes." Workshop on Combating the Effects of Desertification. (Mimeo). 18. Oko and Derban. 1989. "Health Impact Assessment." In Report on Institutional Capacities for Assessing Impacts and Tradeofft of Large Hydro-Dams: Case Study of Volta Hydro Power Project, GCana. Accra: Ministry of Fuel and Power. 19. Tamakloe, M.A. 1989. "Socio-Cultural Impact Assessment." In Report on Instional Capacities for Assessing Impacts and Trade Qs of Large Hydro-Dams. Accra: Ministry of Fuel and Power. 20. King, op. cit. 130. 21. Afriyie, E.K., and D.A.P. Butcher. 1980. "Socio-Economic Survey of the Volta Resetldement: Four Years After Evacuation" (Mimeo). Akosombo.; Thomi, op. cit. 22. Westaway, P. 1970. "Report on the Length of Shoreline of Volta Lake." Akosombo: Volta Lake Resetlement Programme. 23. Taylor, B. W. 1973. "People in a Rapidly Changing Environment: The first six years of Volta Lake.' In W.C. Ackerman, et al, eds. Man-Made Lakes: Their Problems and Envronmental Effects. Monograph no. 17. Washington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union. 24. Diaw and Schmid.-Kallert, op. cit. 25. Nkum, John. 1988. 'Socio-Economic Evaluation of Some Irrigation Projects on the South Banks of the Afram River in South Kwahu District." M. Sc. Thesis. Department of Planning, Kumasi University of Science and Technology. 26. King, op. cit. 27. Ibid. 28. Department of Planning. 1987. "Interim Report: A Development Plan for the Afram Plains." Kwahu District Study. Kumasi University of Science and Technology. SPRING Programme. 110 CHAPrEi 9 THE KAINJI LAKE EXPERIENCE IN NIGERIA J. S. 0. Ayeni, Wolf Roder, and J. 0. Ayanda The creation of Kainj i Lake and the consequent resettlenent of 44,000 people was the single largest project of Nigeria's first development plan (1962-68). Initiated by an Act of Parliament which set up the Niger Dams Authority to construct and operate a hydropower dam on the Niger River, it was seen as a cornerstone of economic development. Of its total cost of 80 million pounds sterling, one-quarter was required for the resettlement effort. The primary purpose of the dam was to generate 960,000 kilowatts of electricity from twelve turbines of 80,000 kilowatts each to supply industrial, conmrcial, and domestic users. In addition to this, the dam was expected to achieve three other imnportant objectives: * To store water for flood control and for irrigation, thus allowing year round cropping to feed the increasing population of the country. * To improve navigation on the river by submerging obstacles such as rocks and rapids, thereby enabling barge traffic from the Niger Delta to Niamey in the Niger Republic. * To increase the catch of fish in the man-made lake enviromet. The dam was closed on August 2, 1968, to form a lake which is 135 kilometers long and 25 kdlometers across at its widest point. It has a surface area of 1,250 square kilometers, with a storage capacity of 15 billion cubic meters, of which 115.5billion are available for use.' The maximum drawdown for power generation is 10 meters, at which time about one-half of the reservoir bottom is exposed. JS.O. Ayeni is an ecologist who has been Director of the Kainji Lake Research Insiute (now the National Institute for Freshwater Fisheries Research) since 1986. Wolf Roder is a Professor Geography at the University of Cincinnati. His association with Kainji began in 1966 when he served as FAO socioeconomist on a team which studied the region before impoundm and resetdtement. In 1989-90. he r:nmed to Kainji to assess how people amund the lake had fared since the dam was closed. J.O. Ayanda is Assistant Chief Research Officer of Obafeni Awolowo University. where he heads the Socio-Economics and Extension Services programs. His research work focuses on the social and economic impact of dams on resetlded populations. 111 Involuntary Resettlement in Africa Kainji Lake is counted among the dozen largest man-made lakes on the African continent. The lake is located in an environment of guinea savanna woodland, with a mean annual rainfall of 1000 millimeters, divided into a rainy season and a dry season of equal lengths. The rainfall, and with it the vegetation, diminishes from south to north, so that Yelwa is somewhat drier with a shorter rainy season than New Bussa. To permiit formation of the lake, about 44,000 people were displaced and had to be resettled near its shore. With the exception of a few civil servants and traders, these were all peasant farmers, fishermen or nomadic pastoralists. The people were told to expect improved social and economic conditions from the dam after resettlement, although the specifics of these promises remained implied rather than spelled out. Expectations included better roads and water supplies, along with social services including schools and health centers. Unfortunately, of the four objectives enumerated above, only the last has been fully achieved. Only eight of the twelve turbines have been installed, so that no more than 760,000 kIlowatts can be generated. Initial estimates of river flow by British consultants proved to be over-opimistic. Experience has shown that actual flow makes it unlikely that the design capacity of the dam will ever be achieved. With the passage of ime, it also becomes increasingly difficult to obtain tubines of the necessary, and now outdated, design. Of the four major irrigation projects initiated by the Niger River Basin Development Authority, none has borne fruit. The largest, covering 20,000 hectares on the Kontagora River, has been abandoned. Two somewhat smaller projects of 5,000 hectares each continue under construction. The smallest scheme of 320 hectares is chiefly used by secondary farmers who have other jobs and pursue fanning as a supplementary activity. The limited success of the govermment projects is in striking conast to the modest success of small-scale irrigation efforts by farmers. Kainji Dam is provided with a locking chamber served by a 6-kilometer long access canal, capable of taking four barges of 5,000 tons each simultaneously. The 49- meter lift of this lock is said to be the highest in the world. River transportation by tow and barge, for which furtier canals, locks, and quays were provided upstream and downstream of the dam, never materialized. During the long construction period, transportation by road and rail became more important means of hauling goods and people. In truth, hardly any barges or other craft have been locked through Kainji Dam since its completion. One clear implication of these failures is that development projects should avoid over-ambitious planning without considemion of implementation delays and without securing adequate managerial resources. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the long-term impact of the dam on the social and economic well-being of the resettled people. 112 he AinWi Lake Experience in NAgeria KaiEi La m e The impoundment of the lake displaced 44,000 people living in 4,320 houses in 239 settlements. Through consolidation of some villages on a voluntary basis, 141 new settlements were formed with a slightly larger number of houses (4,517). Among the many studies devoted to examination of the results of resetement, Oyedipe's book stands out.2 References cited in this paper cn only represent a small sampling of the extsive literature concrned with the lake. Comprehensive access to this body of work may be found in the extensive bibliographies of Ibeun. Resettlement occurred under two successive policies. The first seventeen villages were merely compensated in cash, and then resettled themselves at indicated locations. Later, villages were compensated widi built houses and some cash for grain storage structures. Cml COMPENSATION. By 1963, there was an immediate need to move the people from Kainji Island and from the surounding construction area and saddle dam location. At the time, little was known about the people, and even their munbr were a mere estima. Cash compenaton and self-help moving was decided upon beause it was thought that the people were used to moving their villages and competent to build dteir taditional compounds. Consolidaton into eleven new vilages took place, and some piped water, schools and markes were provided. Without any evidence of a lake fotming, people were distufl of govment claims. Their reluctace to move from the river caLsed delays and manpower shortages whmen everyone needed to build a houe at the same time. The Resetlement Aulthi recognized that traditional mutual help among family and friends would be difut whe every fimily was engaged in constuction. REPLACEET HOUSING. The new policy called for the authority to construct basic sandclretbock houses in an architctura adaptation of three tditional styles. With villages erected in their new locations, the move took place in the last dry season befbe the lake began to rise in 1968. The actual move went smoothly and quidldy with the help of lorries and tractors to transport people, crops, and possessions. No village was caught in the rising lake waters, although there were the inevitable mixups and delays. Most villages were merely moved to the shore of the lake. Eigty-nine villages with a population of 22,576 moved as uDits without change. The other 150, with a population of 21,427, were consolidated into 52 new villages based on their own choices. The rnettlem of such diverse goups of people was an exercise of great comlexity and difficulty. All accounts have high praise for the bonesty and conscientiousness of the Resettlement Authority under the leadership of Alhaji Settm It was highly unlikely, however, that the mondfied aditional house designs of unfmil materials would be receivd with unmixed endtusiasm by everyone. Among their advantages, the new houses are permanent and fireproof. The asbestos or alumimi roofs are less subject to leaks than traditional thath However, the thermal propeties 113 nvoluntary Rettlaeme hn Africa of sandcrete make dhe houses mch hotter or colder thn traditional mud houses. The absence of granaries, smoke ovens, and mud beds initially involved the people in heavy construction demands. Windows, doors, and ventilation were criticized for being too small or too large and not being provided with dosures. People accepted their houses, however, and immediately set about modifying them to their liking by traditional mud construction. Desertions or abandomnents were few in number.4 Resettlenimpacts Three years after the move, Oyedipe drew a stratified sample of twenty villages and interviewed a random sample of thirty household beads in each village. As some villages comprised less than thirty compounds, his total sample included 513 households. He asked the resettlers to compare their new environment with their old villages, takdng into consideration houses, farmland, water supply, roads, and markets. His analysis indicates that two-thirds of the respondents felt dthy were better off; a quarter claimed not to perceive any difference; while four percent felt they were worse off than before. Some of the latter deserted their new compounds. Oyedipe came to the conclusion that the resettlement had been a reunding success. He foumd the truth of this conclusion reinforced after he had an opportunity to compare Kainji with the experience at Lakes Volta and Nasser.5 Among the many reasons advanced for dtis success, several appear the most important. Only minimum necesary pressure was used to ensure people would leave heir old homes. Havig agre to leave, no further demands were made to interfere with their social, economic, and cultural traditions. The new compounds became their absolute property, and no attempt was made to limit their use of modifications, even to the point of desertion or sale. In addition, some central sevices, water supply, market stes, and mosques were built in many villages. Today, a majority of the people have adjusted wdl and remain in the resetement houses. Most comunds bave been extensively m lified to cope with increasing extended family size and with education, which creates demands for a more urban lifestyle. With twenty years of tree growth shading what was once raw construction, the resettlement villages now appear Little difent from the adjacent non-resettlement villages. Although some of the old men express nostalgia for the island way of life, a new generation is growig up for whom the lake is the only environment they have imown and love. Severa scholars have advocated borrowing the expenence at Kainji as a guide for other resettlement schemes in Nigeria.! And indeed, the authorites have not remaind oblivious to research and experienc. The resettlem at Jebba Reservoir. 38 kllometers downstream from Kainji, was based on the existing model. In this case, as in others, even more acceptable houses were inroduced, based on standard Nigerian structures with cor steel ("zurA") roofs. 114 7he Kakuc Lake Experie in Mgerla Ecology and E nen The guinea savanna region of the Kainji Lake are is exploited for irrigation and dryland agriculture by peasart frmers. It is frthr used for livesock grazing both by sedentary farmers and by nomadic pastoralists. Artisal fisherfolk exploit all pars of tie lake environment, the inshore shallows and the deep water, the permnent and the drawdown swamps, and the tributaries. Many species, from :& - small clupeid sardines to the largest Niger perch, are taken. In the form of smoked, dried, and fresh products, they enter local and long distance trade channels to supply the large cities of the nation. With sections located to the east and west of the dam, Kainji Lake National Park is strongly associated with the lake. The present National Park was denmrcated as Borgu Game Reserve at the time constuction commencod. With impoundment, its boundaries were extended to the lake to take in the deltas of the Doro, Timo, and Menai streams. The park, dam, and lake form a tourist complex which attracts about 5,000 visitors annually. Our understandg of the flora and faun of the region derives impornly from research conducted in the park. One of the earliest ecological suveys of the park listed the fauna of the reserve and estimated their umbers in the west section of the park.7 Comparing these numbers to thosc collected by Ayeni in 1987, an unfortunate decline is evident in all species except kob.8 Elephants appear to have vanished entirely. The main cause of this decline is believed to be poaching by local people and outsiders. Over 130 bird species are resident in the area, especially along the shore line and in thc riverine forest.! Some of the bird life rpres paoarcdc migrants whose residene is confned to the dry season. There are a number of reptles located in the park, including crocodiles and moitor lizards. It has been observed that none of the African mammalian and bird species has been listed as part of the inernational genetic poot of domestcated species. A prkme candidate for such listing would be the many wild and domestic guinea fowl varieties of this area.'° A list of plant species in the park was produced in 1976, together with a detailed vegetation map." This work has since been exded to provide a list and guide to the common aquatic plans of the lake region.'2 Of greatest importance is Edcinochloa sagnina (burugu grass) which is widespread in the lake shallows. It has a protein content of 9 percent and provides indisensable dry season fodder for livestock. Tourism was never seen as an objective of the dam, but it has developed as an unforeseen bendicial impact. It generates revene for the park and provides a source of employment for the local people. However, future toursm prospects wil depend on carful conservation of park resources. The decline of wildlife must be halted by protection against poaching and disease. The native vegetation needs to be defended against gzing livestock and the felling of trees for firewood or cattle browse. What is specifically true of the national park can be more genealy appLed to the rest of the lake area, since the savanna environen extends throughout the region. 115 lnvolwtary Resetlement in Africa Ag&dctur Farming was and remains the major occupation of the inhabitants of the Kainji Lake area. The improvement of agriculture near the reservoir, in the drawdown area, and by reclaiming fadama land below the dam, was one of the project objectives. To this end, soil studies were carried out in the region." The two studies together found about 2,400 hecrares of irrigable lands located at various places above the 144.8 meter contour and below 152.5 meters. Since only between 330 and 450 hectares of irrigated gardens were lost to the lake, this may be regarded as an adequate supply.'4 In a separate study, the soils of the lake bottom were evaluated.'I This study found that land between the 137.7 meters and 144.8 meter contours comprising about 19,000 hectares could be suitable for intensive fanning. Land below 137.7 meters is exposed for too short a period to permit c:ultivation. A study of the general agricultural potenial of the area found the soils capable of supporting many different crops, from grains to vegetables to root crops, either famied by irrigation or in the drawdown area.' More recent studies have examined the yield response to fertilizer at differen contour levels." These studies show dtat the period during which the drawdown area is exposed is of major importance. At a high contour, the land becomes dry too soon, while at a low contour the rising lake water may force an early harvest, thereby curtailing yields. Thus there is an imperative need for fanrers to know the intentions of dam operators in terms of predicting the rise and fall of the lake waters. Before impoundment, peasant farmers practiced irrigated agriculture along the banis of the river during the dry season when the river was in flood." Small gardens relied on lifting water by hand in large calbashes or by shaduf. Among a variety of crops grown, onions stand out as the major cash crop shipped to all parts of the country. The lake flooded large areas of the alluvial bottom lands and islands which were the oriinal site of this activity. Because the lale did not rise to its highest level in the first year, the 1968-69 season saw no onion farming. By the following year, however, the fanners had re- established their irrigated gardens. About a third of the farmers engged in this kind of irrigation and the more serious among them were able to work an average of 0.2 bectares each." Onion yields were estimated at 12 tons per hectare. Over time, the use of petrol pumps became the most desired means of lifting water. Since these pumps command a higher lift and a larger field, they have all but replaced the traditional hand methods of irrigation. The most recent study of farming in the drawdown area indicates dtat this activity still relies mainly on the use of hoes and cutlasses. On the average, 0.9 hectares of land is used per fanner, and a large part of this land lies faBow or is used only for livestock grazing. This study suggested that only mcnion would provide the speed and dming needed to fuUly exploit this land for crop prcduction20 116 The Kainji Lake Experience in Nigeria Pastoralism Of all the people of the lake region, the nomadic Fulani pastoralists suffered perhaps the greatest loss of resources. A pre-resettlement survey reported that there would be a loss of 359 square kilometers of grazing land supporting some 100,000 head of cattle.2' It suggested three measures: (a) setting aside suitable grazing land for these cattle; (b) provision of camps for the transhumant Fulani; and (c) eventual establishment of new grazing lands in the vicinity of the lake to avoid cattle moving to the neighboring republics of Benin and Niger. Since the nomads owned neither land rights nor permanent homes in the lake area, they did not participate directly in the resettlement program. Many left the lake area at the time of impoundment in the course of their normal migrations to Benin and Niger. The response of the Niger Dams Authority, with the help of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and at a cost of 260,000 naira, centered on the establishment of grazing reserves near Bin Yauri and Yashikera. Earth dams or ponds were established at 8 to 10 kilometer intervals. The project met with oniy limited success because the grazing land was frequently burned too early in the dry season.1 In any case, the grazing reserves proved inadequate when a succession of dry years in the 1980s drove large numbers of Fulani herds towards the better watered south. The shores of the lake, the drawdown area, and the aquatic vegetation of burugu grass have become indispensable dry season grazing resources. They have attracted a large number of pastoralists into the area, more than doubling the livestock numbers. This increase in livestock numbers, together with the simultaneous need for more cropland by farmers, puts increasing pressure on grazing resources. There is evidence of range deterioration as a consequence of overgrazing. Bare patches of soil and an increase in termite hills may be observed. To feed their livestock, pastoralists may lop off branches of preferred trees for their browse. Early burning of the grass to encourage a flush of new growth exhausts the nitrogen content of the soil. No effective remedy for these problems is in sight at this time. The age-old conflict between farmer and herdsman continues in the region. Cattle are capable of inflicting considerable damage on crops, but are encouraged to graze the stubble after harvest with the fanmer obtaining the benefit of livestock droppings. Conflicts are exacerbated in the dry season, when the lake water and grazing attract large herds. At the same time, onion and vegetable production are in full swing, so that farmers have to constantly protect their gardens with vigilance and fencing. Sedentarization of the cattle herders has been proposed as one solutionm Fisheries The Niger River has been fished probably as long as there have been human settlements along its banks. Based on research conducted in 1966-67, Jenness vividly discussed the fishing and fishermen of the region34 He found only 500 full-time professional 117 hnvowloary Rascaement in Africa fishermen who migrated within the area with the seasons. Many of these originated from the upstream areas of Argungu and Birnin Kebbi. For the greater part of the farming population, fishing was a subsidiary occupation exercised during the low water season. Several types of fishing gear were used effectively, adapted for use by one or two men. They included hooking and baited lines, as well as seven kinds of fishtraps woven by hand from local grasses. Several different kinds of nets were used, and plant poisons were used in small pools. Fishermen also had a variety of harpoons and spears for large fish, manatee, hippopotamus, and crocodiles. The complement of gear has not changed in essentials since this study was done, although fishermen from the delta have introduced a large hinged liftnet, the atalla, for catching small clupeid sardines. What has changed is the distribution of equipment, as the open lake has made the use of cast nets and gillnets more effective. Over all, the artisanal fishermen are quite capable of exploiting the varied resources and enviroments of dte lake. At the tine of impoundment, all local boats were dugout canoes, abara. Small boats were constructed locally, while large abara were brought from the soutiern forests. These craft proved difficult to use on the lake. At the same time, large local trees were declining in number, and the dam did not permit passage of large abara from downstream. Research conducted at the Kainji Lake Research Institute provided leadership in the construction of small boats from planks, and in the establishment of local boatbuilding workshops. Today, a 6-meter boat is the standard craft, with larger plank boats, driven by outboard engines, serving as transporters. Estimates of total catch from dte nver before the lake are extremely haphazard, but have been given as 3,000 to 4,000 tons.25 A feasibility report for the project predicted that this would rise to 10,000 tons after pndent? Soon after closure, decaying vegetation fertilized the reservoir, followed by the expected increase in plankton and algal blooms. The consequent explosion of the fish population lasted only three to four years. Total catch in 1969 was estimated at 17,000 tons; in 1970, 28,600 tons; in 1971, 11,000 tons, and in 1972, 11,000 tons. After that, total catch estimates drifted downward to reach 4,500 tons by 1977, and the annual offtake is believed to have stabilized at that level. Overfishing may have contrbuted to the decline in the catch.' The evidence includes (a) a decline in catch per boat and per fisherman, (b) use of increasingly smaller gillnels to catch i=maure fish, (c) low productivity of the littoral zone, (d) high concentration of fishermen per unit of lake surface, and (e) rise in effort expended to catch a unit weight of fish. The rapid influx of fisherfolk which took place imnediately after dam closure confirms this picture. Most of the temporary fishing camps of the in- migrants have today become permanent villages with nud houses and zinc roofs. At the same time. there is no doubt that some changes in species composition and abundance must be ascribed to ecological causes rather than to fishing intensity?" In this situation, some conservation measums may pay significant dividends. Ita has advocated limiting the minimun mesh size to three inches, reducing the pressure by 118 7he Kinji Lake Experiene in Mgeria requiring licensing of fishermen or boats, and prohibidng the use of poisons.' With sound managemcnt, it is estimated that the lake could produce between 8,000 and 12,000 tons per year, which is in line with the pre-impoundment estimate. The National Institute for Freshwater Fisheries Research is engaged in intensive research on aquaculture in ponds and cages, and in fish breeding experiments. Yields of 6 kilograms per square meter to 21 kilogramns per square meter of tilapia grown in cages have been obtained by manipulating the stocking rate.' Such yields exceed a thousand-fold what can be obtained by gillnet fisheries. Aquaculture may prove to be the most effective technology for fully exploiting the resources of Kainji Lake. Lessons Lmed and Knowledge Needed 1. The original concept of the Kainji Dam with its diverse objectives was perhaps overambitious, involving a measure of political prestige rather than cool planning. With only eight of the twelve turbines finally installed, even the primary objective has not been achieved. There is a need for a comprehensive planning approach to development projects which will pay careful and continuous attention not only to the construction phase but also to long-term operation and its costs. In this context, it is worth nodng that a second dam has been built 38 kIlometers downstream of Kainji at Jebba. In turn, it has had unforunate impacts on two major Nigerian industries located downstream by curtiling their water supply. The Nigeria Sugar Company at Bacita has been unable to reach its design capacity of 50,000 tons of sugar from 7,500 hectares of land. Its operations have been confined to 5,600 hectares and a production of 35,000 tons annually. The Nigerian Paper Mill at Jebba found water levels failing below its pump intakes, and had to sbut down production temporarily, having suffered considerable damage, estimated at 15 million naira, to their equipen. Clearly, the lessons that could have been taught by the problems at Kainji have yet to be learned. 2. The plans for Kainji failed to provide specific proposals to achieve the expected irrigation benefits. Either these should have been omitted or the intentions, plans, and directives should have been clearly spelled out. It is only to be expected that after-the-fact government projects failed, while the modest success of the peasant irrigation farmers should be getting more support from the authorites. 3. Barge transport was prominent on the Niger River when Kainji Dam was in the planning stage. Its importance persuaded the planners to include lock chambers, quays, and landing steps in their design which were then constrcted at great cost without consideration for the changing national pattern of transport. The locks are not used, as no barge has locked through either dam. Had a timely planning process investigated the need for water transport in the light of road and rail alternatives, these costly mistakes might have been avoided. 119 Involuntary Rasettlement in Africa 4. A lack of fishery regulations has made it difficult to control the influx of migrant fishermen or to limit the use of various gear and methods of fishing. Fisheries law should be considered as one aspect of man-made lake development. 5. Despite the numerous ecological studies carried out in the Kainji Lake National Park, there has not been continuous implementation of the rnitigation measures recommended for the Kainji Basin area. We have a clear understanding of the pattern of habitat use and the intensity of vegetation consumption by wildlife and livestock species, but we lack the financial capacity for monitoring and enforcing the required legislative and fiscal measures. Tourism has been one valuable though unforeseen result of dam development. As one of the few viable reserves in West Africa, the Kainji Lake National Park may deserve the attention and support of the major international wildlife conservation organizations, such as the World Wildlife Fund and the Iternational Union of Conservation and Nature. 6. The resettlement scheme was a success because it aimed at replacement of lost villages, and left the people undisturbed in their social, economic, and cultural life. Resettlement and economic development are separate activities. Since the resettlement, additional wells, schools, and health centers have been built by government. Major new Larred roads have reached the west bank and the north end of the lake. Unfortunately, other roads provided by the resetdement scheme have been allowed to deteriorate through neglect of maintenance. There have been modest advances in m nion of irrigation and lake transport, in livestock nbers, in dug wells, and in education. Such advances are due to the initiative and hard work of the peasant farers and the artisanal fishermen themselves. Their progress and enlightenment needs to be supported with roads, communications, and health and education inhfastrucre. 7. The conflict between nomadic herders and farmers, and the possible solution tmrough sedentarization of the former, remains an open issue. There is much research yet to be done in this area. 8. At the time Kainji Dam was planned, little attention was paid to environmental impacts, and scientific knowledge of the region was in its infancy. Considering the problems that resulted from reservoir creation, it appears important to incorporate an environmental impact assessment process into planning activities in Nigeria. Environmental assessment may have the additional benefit of identifying areas of weakness and misplaced emphasis in the planning, constuction, and operational stages of a project. Even now, the magnitude of the effects of farming, grazing, and the concomitant use of chemicals such as fertilizers and herbicides, on the lake water, fisheries, and the soils of the Kainji Lake Basin, is very poorly understood and never subject to a thorough cost analysis. 9. There is a need for national fishery legislation to regulate and manage the fisheries in man-made and natural lakes in Nigeria. Laws to be enacted need to address 120 The Kainji Lke Erwelence in Mgeria the roles of aquaculture in cages, pes, enclosures and ponds as a part of fisheries. Only under a clear legal mandte can the mangement of a high and sustained yield be foreseen. 121 Jnvolutay Rasettement in Africa NOTES 1. Niger Dams Audhrity (NDA). 1970. "Kainji Hydroelectric Power Station." New Busn, Nigeria. 2. Oyedipe, F.P.A. 1983. Adjustnent to Resettlement: A std of the resetled peoples in the Kainji Lake Basin. Ibadan, Nigeria: University Press Ltd. 3. Ibetm, M.O. 1979. aWji Lake Basin, Nigeria: A Uuid-Disdplina,y Bibliogrqphy, 1957-1978. No. 4. New Bussa: Kainji Lake Research Institute Technical Report Series.; Ibeun, M.O. 1989. Two Decades of Kaii Lake Research: A Multi- Discipirpaay Bibliography 1968-1989. Tedmical Report No. 21. New Bussa: National Insttte for Freshwater Fisheries Research. 4. Oyedipe, op. ct. S. Oyedipe, F.P.A. 1987. "The reladve success of the Kainji Reettlement Scheme aswcoopared with that of Volta." Researchfor Deveopment Vol.3, No.2. lbadan: Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic Research: 41-54. 6. Oyedipe, 1987, op. cit.; Mills-Tettey, R. 1986. "Kai-i Lake Resettlement Housing Study: Preliminary Research Report." Dle-lfe, Nigeria. Jniversity of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University).; Ayanda, J.O. 1986. 'Economics of Food Crop (Maize and Sorghum) Programme: The case of drawdown areas of Kainji Lake." In Kainji Lake Resah stitute Anul Report: 146-153. 7. Child, G.S. 1974. 'Ecologist Survey of Borgu Game Reserve." Technical Report No. 4 (FI: SFINIR/24). Rome: Food and Agriculture Organiatio 8. Ayeni, I.S.O. 1992. "Review of Achievements of the Wildlife Progrmme in the Kainji Lake Research Institute, New Bussa.' In Proceedngs of Two Decades of Research on Lake Kaiiyi. 9. Ayeni,J.S.O. 1980. "ManagementproblemsoftheKainjiLakeNationalPark." *fican Journal of Ecology Vol. 18: 97-1 1 1. 10. Ayeni, J.S.O., 1980, op. at. 11. Geerling, C. 1976. "1:50,000 Vegetaton Map of Borgu Game Reserve." Forest Deparme Working r)ocument. Rome: Food and Agriculture O tio 12. Obot, E.A., and J.S.O. Ayeni. 1987. A Handbook of Common Aquatic Pln of dse Kainji Lake Basin, Nigeria. New Bussa, Nigeria: SAOLOG Printng Production. 122 7he aqinji Lakb Eprience n Nigema 13. Klinkenberg, K. 1965. "Report on Reconnaissanc Soil Survey of part of Borgu Division, llorin Province. Soil Surle Bu n. Zaria, Nigeria: Instiute of Agricultuual Research, Ahmadu Bello University.; Vallet, J. 1967. "Recon Soil Survey of an area near Yelwa and Birnin Yauri. Sokoto Province, Nortmern Nigeria." Soil Survey Buletn. Zaria, Nigeria: Institute of Agriculural Research, Abmadu Bello University. 14. Roder, W. 1970. "The Irrigadon Farmers of the Kainji Lake Region, Nigeria." Rome: Food and Agriculure Organization. 15. Siderus, W. 1974. "Kainji Lake Drawdown Area." Report prepared for the Kainji Lake Research Project. Rome: Food and Agriculte Organization. 16. Kaul, S.N. 1965. "Agricultural Potential." Report prepared for the Government of Nigeria. Rome: Food and Agriclture Organization. 17. Anmgo, G.O. 1977. -Nitrogen ferdlizer requirements of upland rice in te Kainji Lake drawdown area." Paper presented at the Anmial Conference of the Agriculural Society of Nigeria. Zaria, Nigeria: Ahmadu Belio University.; Amaugo, G.O. 1977. "Agriculturl utiization of ieervoir drawdown areas - the Kainji Lake drawdown." intaxional Cofernc on Kai Lake and River Bar Devdqpmentan Africa. Ibadan, Nigeria: nternational Institute of Tropical Agriculture (ITA). 18. Roder, W., op. cit. 19. Amnigo, G.O. 1977. "Problems and prospects of irigated agriculture in the Kainji Lake Basim." Itawaonal Conference on Kiinji Lake and Rivr Basin Development in Africa. Ibadan, Nigeria: IITA. 20. Ayanda, .O., op. cit. 21. Negedu. A.L. 1973. -The Inproblems of resettement in Kainji Lake Basin." In Mabogunje, ed., KRi.i: A Nigerian Man-Made Lake. Volume 2. Ibadan, Nigeria: Nigerian Instiute of Social and Economic Research (NISER). 22. Afolayan, T.A. 1977. "Methods of assessing the effect of burning and grazing on different vegetation conmmnities in savanna woodland." Switzerland Jownad of Forest Vol. 128, No. 2: 92-104. 23. Oyedipe, F.P.A. 1977. "Iionalization of semi-sedentrzato The Hausaji Fulani Nomads at Kainji Revisited." In Procedings of the Conference on the Aftermath of the Drought. (April) Kano: Federal Department of Water Reurces and the Centre for Social Economic Research, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria. 24. Jenness, J. 1973. "Fishing and fishermen of the Kainji Like Basin." In Mabogunje, ed., op. cit. 25. Iid 123 Involuntary Restlement in Africa 26. Daget, J., and E.O. Bayagbona. 1961. Nger Dams Project. Vol.6, par. 8. "Fiheries.' The Hague and London: NEDECO and Balfour Beatty. 27. Ita, E.O. 1979. "Some perspecvs in reservoir fishery management and development: The Kainji experience.' In Proceedings of Intmnatonal Conferece on aiji Lake and River Barins in fica. Volume 2: 266-277. 28. Lelek, A. 1972. 'Fish populations of Kainji Lake: Trends in their development and udlizion." (Fl: SF/NIR/24) Rome: Food and Agricultu Organiztion.; Lelek, A. 1973. "Sequence of changes in fish population of the new tropical man-made lake, Nigeria, West Africa." Archives of Hydrobioogy Vol. 71, No. 3: 381-420; Ita, E.O. 1981. 'African Reservoir Fishery Synthesis: A model framework for data coliection and analysis.' Consultancy Report. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organizaion. 29. Ita, 1981. op. cit. 30. Otubusin. Personal commication. 124 CHAFER 10 ENVIRONMENT AND SETTLEMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN: SOME MAJOR POLICY ISSUES Gunnar M. Serbo Most observers seem to agree that African resettlement projects have not generally been successful, and that efforts have often fallen short of expectations by a considerable margin. Studies carried out by the World Bank and by individual researchers reveal a number of common shortcomings that recur in resettlement operations. These are problems of policy, organization, implementation, and resources, and most of them have been addressed in contributions to this volume. Based on lessons drawn from past experience, the World Bank has adopted a formal resettlement policy which defines the basic principles, procedures and conditions applying to relocation schemes. Particularly in terms of safeguarding the interests and participation of local populations, the Bank guidelines appear to be excellent. As the importance of resettlement planning in development programs for Africa appears likely to increase, government and development agencies will need to pay more serious attention to policy action and project design to mitigate negative impacts of such programs and to create developmental opportunities for the participants. While such efforts are indeed important, there is an urgent need for a more broad-based approach to managing large-scale population movanents in many parts of the African continent. One major problem with most resettlement projects is that they have to be based on integrated and coordinated efforts. They tend to be quite expensive, and have to be large and complete to begin with. In other words, learning, flexibility, and opportunistic adaptation - precisely the qualities needed when the chances of getting it right the first time are snall - are likely to be ruled out. In addition, in order to be successful, resettlemnent projects presuppose that someone is in a position to manage them. The ability of African governments and their agencies to undertake integrated programs of this kind clearly varies, but is often quite limited. In many countries, administrative capabilities are exceedingly scarce and govermiental structures too fragile and ineffective to serve as instuments of development.' The existence of such problems does not mean that involuntary resettlement programs should not generally be implemented, nor does it mean that Bank guidelines Gunmar IL Serbe is the Director of the Center for Development Studies, University of Bergen, Sweden. He is the author of numerous publications and reports on irrigated agricultural resetement. pastoralism and development anthropology. His work has focused on the Sudan. Kenya and Sri Lanka. 125 Involuntary Reseatlement in Africa should not be adhered to. There is bound to be an overall rise in projects causing resettlement. This rise will be most pronounced in urban infrastructure projects, and a great number of projects will be in Africa. Despite such developments, involuntary resettlement will continue to affect a relatively small number of people compared with the numbers involved in voluntary movements and population displacement due to wars, ethnic strife or ecological deterioration. Such large-scale ebbs and flows of population pose major challenges to governments trying to develop strategies for economic growth and social change. Given the current growth and mobility of Africa's population and the problems following from the spatial distnbution of the population in relation to productive resources, there is an urgent need to explore and identify alternatives to very demanding resettlement operations. Such alternatives are likely to be environentally focused land management programs based on the need for planners to facilitate development rather than to superimpose preconceived programs on settler populations. The case of Kassala Province in eastern Sudan embodies some of the central concerns planners should be taking into account. Kasaa Provhice Area Description Kassala Province is situated in the easten region of the Sudan between the Eritrean Hills in the east and the Blue Nile in the west, covering an area of more than 120,000 squae kilometers. The most characteristic feature of this land-locked province is the extensive flat clay plains, which comprise one of the world's largest areas of black cotton soils. Despite the apparent uniformity, a relatively large variety of vegetation and land uses is found. This is due to the considerable climatic variations and the rivers which flow into the province. The climate is hot and tropical, semi-desert in the north (with average amual rainll less dtan 150 milimeters) and wet monsoon in the south (with average annual rainfall more than 800 millimeters). In 1988, the estimated population of Kassala Province was 2.7 million, of whom approximately 700,000 were refugees, most from Ethiopia. The estimated increase per year over the period 197"888 was about 5.6 percent due to natural increases, migration and the influx of refugees. Land Use Before the colonial era, pastorl nomadism was the dominant way of life in the province. In specific areas favorable to permanent human settlement, land was also used for rainfed, small-scale subsistence cultivation. Land use changed rapidly during the late colonial era and after indeendence in 1956. This led to sharp competition for land and the emergence of an economy with a dual nature, traditional as wel as modern. This period was ctiz by the i asing degree of diversity, spatial expansion and the intesity of land use that became manifest in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. 126 Enuronnm and Seulement in Eastern Sudan Today, over 60 percent of the active population is engaged in agriculture. Rainfed fanning occupies over 90 percent of the agricultural area, while the rest is allocated for irrigation farms. There is a declining subsistence-orieted type of rainfed farming which still supports a larger proportion of the population than the expanding large-scale mechanized rainfed farming practiced on private schemes and state farms. Main rainfed crops are sorghum, sesame and sunflower; principal irrigated crops are cotton, groundnuts, wheat and sorghum. Livestock production is an integral part of the activities of almost everyone in the area. The Butana plain, which covers about one-third of the total area of the province, is traditionally considered one of the best pasture areas in the Sudan. It is believed that the total livestock population, despite recent losses during the 1984-85 drought, is twice as high as in the early 1950s. While such estimates remain uncertain, they still indicate the continued importance of livestock rearing in Kassala Province. Expansion of Agriculkre Since the early 1960s, there has been a steady expansion of large-scale irrigated and rand faming in the province. Whereas the expansion of irrgated agriculture has been through public investment, the greater part of the growth in raifed mechanized fanning has been through private investment. Despite the apparent wish of the goverment to ontrol land rights and limit holding size, much of this developmen has been unauthorized. Today, mechanized rainfed farming occupies more than 20 percent of the surface of the province. Land is leased from the goverment of Sudan at a nominal rent. While start-up costs are high, cheap crdit has been available and labor costs are low, workers being recruited from as far away as western and southern Sudan on a seasonal basis. A system of crop rotation with fallow is prescribed, but mandatory fallow periods are generally not respected and sorghum nonoropping is widely practiced. As a result, yields tend to drop sharply after a few years, a problem traditionally 'solved' by farmers expanding onto new, vacant plots. The expansion of mechanized fanning has had a far-reaching impact on pastoral nomads. It has reduced grazing areas, particularly wet season pasture, disrupted nomadic routes of migration, and blocked access to watering points originally intended to serve pastoralists. Atempts have been made in south Kassala to regulate grazing activities and control the expansion of mechanized farming, particularly through the enactment of a regional law to enforce a grazing line and demarcate nomadic routes, but the political lobby of the farmers has so far proved formidable. Currendy, schemes are being established even in the heart of the Butana rangelands, and during the height of the dry season, pastoral households have to pay exorbitant prices for grazing their herds on schemes after harvest. 127 Involuntary Resettlement in Africa With the abolition of the systemn of native admninistration in 1971, there has been no credible institution capable of articulating and pursuing the interests of pastoralists in interaction with government institutions. Many new groups have entered the area, and there is increasing nomadic competition over watering points and pasture lands. The shortage of water has led to considerable digging of private wells among well-off pastoralists and merchants. An increasing number of pastoralists also resort to purchasing agricultural residues in mechanized farms. The consequent rise in the cash requirements of pastoral production threatens to deplete the herds of small pastoralists. The conditions under which the majority of pastoralists in the area live are quite severe, and there are also clear signs of environmental deterioration. On the other hand, intensified commercialization of livestock production has also offered opportunities, both to better-off pastoralists as well as merchants and settled farmers. In their hands, pastoral activity is being steadily transformed into a full-fledged capitalist form of production pursued on the basis of wage herding and increasingly commercialized inputs of animals, fodder and water. The main strategy of these groups is to settle and invest in hand-dug wells to secure water for their animals and to fall back on agricultural residues in rainfed mechanized schemes for fodder.2 The irrigated schemes also play an important part in developments within the province. The New Halfa Scheme was established in 1964 to serve not only as a settement area for local nomads but also for the resettlement of about 50,000 Nubians forced from nordtern Sudan by the construction of the High Damn at Aswan. Since its establishment, New Halfa tenants have been struggling to cope with low yields and low revenues, due to factors such as insufficient irrigation water, lack of machinery, fuel and spare parts, a distorted disincentive pattern, and rising production costs. As a result, tlhe majority of tenants combine agriculture with other sources of income, whereas others leave their tenancies for fellow tenants or share-croppers to cultivate, thus making it possible for some tenants to expand their own holdings.3 For tenant farmers with a nomadic background, the establishment of the New Halfa Scheme has resulted in a new type of transhumance. Animals spend the wet season and part of the dry season on the Butana and are driven back to the scheme for crop remains and other grazing during the height of the dry season. This alternative use of range pastures and scheme grazing land has affected herd size and herd composition. Although reliable figures do not exist, it seems clear that the scheme has contributed to an increase in animal numbers and a tendency to breed sheep, goats and cattle, rather than camels which are not accepted inside the scheme by nanagement. Because tenants can maintain their consumption level with agricultural income in times of shortage rather than by slaughtering and consuming their herds. tenant households seem to be less sensitive to ecological pressure than nomadic households. As a consequence, there has been a deterioration of the conditions in the rangelands caused 128 Eimnment wad Setlemet In Eastern Sudan by changing pattes of land use and the wider access to lands formerly retined by particular groups of pastoralists for their own exclusive use. A recently published report, "Enironmetal Profile of Kasala Province," portrays the siution as quite alarming as far as cultivated lands and rangelands are concerned. Erosion is a serious problem and constitutes a real danger to the susainability of the use of lands for grazing as well as cultivation.4 Given the fact that the region is commonly regarded as one of dte most productive areas in the Sudan, holds a population of neuly 3 million and presendy plays a crucial role both in terms of food production and in terms of national earnings from major export crops, a decline in production and sustainability of present economic activities will have serious con ces beyond the boundaries of the province. One particularly womsome aspect is the excessive urban migration which has taken place over a short period of time. This process, triggered not by urban economic development, but by rral poverty, accelmaes the deterioration of the environment in the vicinity of the towns. It also creates enormous urban problems since present services and iauure do not meet the needs of the people. The interconnections which exist between developmets within agriculture, pastoralism and urban centers do not by temselves represent a new development. As in odter parts of the Sudan, groups have typicaly had to survive by operating social and economic networks which often ross ecological zones and help link them toether. Building and maintainig such linis whin the community, and then outward to neighboring societies and across ecological zomes, gives strength to the fabric of rural life. Survival during periods of adversity can depend on the extent and flexibility of such linges.5 Combining pastoralism with cultivation is also traditionally a common pracice in the provine. One type of reltionship or linkage between cultivation and livestock producon deserv special mention. Successful farmers often invest surplus in livestock in order to maximize security and gmwth. The fact that livestock, especially catte, are so highly valued as an investment all over Africa makes this the most typical form of integation of livestock into agricultural enterprises. These developments have put an incrasing strain on the relatively successf ecological adjustmens between frming and pastoral societies. New trends in land use and the organiztion of linkages between livestock and cultivation have consequenty developed. New categories of population have also entered the area, largely because of preses and strains foUowing fom the expansion of agricultural schemes elsewhere in centrl-eastem Sudan. 129 Involuntary Resetlement eI Africa In ecological terms, there has clearly been increasing linkages between local ecosystems so as to create lrger, more inclusive systems. Within these systems, localized variables with localized feedback loops become increasingly hooked into complex chains of linage going through networks of varying scale, and only having feedback inputs into the locality after having been internmdiated by many external symstem. This implies tht decisionmaking is not as localized as it was before. A multitude of decisions with impact on resources is taken in total or partial ignorance of that impact, or in spite of knowledge that damage somewhere is severe. Such interactions between different levels deserve attention because of their importance for planning, interventions and policy trade-offs. Implications for DeNdopt a Change The changes which have taken place in Kassala Province have a number of implications for efforts aimed at fmding an effective portfolio of external interventions. First, interventions are likely to affect systems of interaction which mediate efforts far beyond the immediate goals of the interventions thmselves. Measures directed towards one specific locality, group or production system may produce undesirable consequences elsewhere as impacts are trar.planted or transferred to units in different niches and over larger regions. Second, any strategy for change, on any level, must recognize that there are different perceptions of the problems as well as different groups having vested interests in different courses of development. From the point of view of international aid agencies, there is of course a fine line to be drawn between intrusion into polidcs and informed assessment. But the tendency is often to go nowhere near the line and remain as isolated as possible.' This is a mitake, not just because it prevents us from discovering bias which may occur in govemment spending and services, as well as in the underlying power stmuture, but also because there will normally be policy trade-offs to be made between different groups, areas and levels. For example, government cash crop development policies aimed at improving national food security may threaten local evironmental sustainability and access to food by pushing food crops onto ecologically marginal land. Simply put, in any given case, there will normally be scope for policy interventions at more than one level. Informed planning decisions or recommendations can only be made on the basis of considerable knowledge concerning such interactions and possible trade-offs. Third, we must also accept the notion of a development process that is open to contructive intervention at certain points of leverage. The problem is to know what can be changed and to know whether such chages would be improvements. Generally, a cautious strategy to agricultual and pastoral development is to ask if interventions can be formulated which build upon the best aspects of exising systems, rather than impose wholesale alterations upon them. The main task may not necessarily be to initiate a lot of change in the region, but rather to guide ongoing change. 130 EnWronmena and Seulem In Easmrn Sda Entry Pdnts for Int1wntm In detemining posible entry points for Intervention, a key factor is whedter or not the process of developmet can be s8tered in such a way tat technical and institutional capacitics cn get aead of popution and naral constraints. Our exisdng knowledge Indicates that mechanized rainfed agriculture has already made a major contribution to Sudan's self-sufficiency in sorghun and holds the key to future development in Kassala Province. During 1991-92, the total production of sorghum is estimated to be close to 4 million meric tons, of which 60 percent derives from the mechanized rainfed ser and 30 percent from the irrigated sector. The price paid for this uccess has been the ecological deterioration of vast eas of savanna woodland and the exhaustion of soils over luge are. It was hoped that the expasion of agriculture into new reas would lead to a more widespread distribution of the rwal populaton and the development of a new modern system of permanent agricutural seulement to replace the old system of shifting cultivation. This has not been achieved. In fact, a small nuber of absentee lessees - by 1985, some 40 percent of the cropped tainand in the Sudan, was controlled by some 4,000 investors - have domied the rainland farming sector. Their intrests have been in quick profits, not in the preservation cf land productivity, sound ecological practices, or equitable development. As a result, rotations have been ignored and the regulaions requiring that at least 25 percent of land be left fallow at any one time have been ignored. The ephemeral interests of investors and their managers have prevented a coherent patern of new villages in the new cropping areas. Becaue the team working a farm does not live there all the time, they may simply move to a new area if results are poor.7 Rainfed mechanized frming is clearly an area in need of urgent interventions, yet there is a major dilemma in formulating a new strategy. On the one hand, because of the country's rapidly grwing urban population, Sudan desperately needs the grain suppled by the large nechanzed schemes. On the other, the conditions which are atractive for the indiidual mechanized farners have undesirable long-term vronmental consequences. Trey also contribute to people moving out of their original adaptations and ito rapidly growmg cities and towns. In supporting a policy which atmpts to secure increasing grain supplies for a rapidly growing urban population through the promotion of large nehanized schemes, the opportumity to reduce imigration to towns by a more labor-intensive production system is lost.8 The nc of nechanized famning has been in marked contrast to the neglect of traditional agriculture. While it is evident that the returns to invested resources are consistently high in the traditional sector despite the low intensity mode of production, bias in government spending and servics has coninued to favor the irrigated and the mechanized rainfed sectors. Population movements and settlement paterns are, to a large exent, detmined by such policies.' As far as Kassala Province is concerned, given the current political and 131 Involwauy Resealemeat lI Africa administrative constraints on ny policies which may lead to a major redistribution of lands, there would seem to be at leat three major area which deserve particular attention: * The enforcement of a reduction of the intensity of cultivation by legthening of fallow periods. * support and deveopment of tradilional rainfed farming systems. * Comprehensive land use planing, backed by sanctions, to safeguard the interests of traditional fanners and pastoralists. There are also several current trends that are worthy of support. Because all suitable land within the province is already occupied, and therefore further expansion into new lands is no longer possible in parts of the province, there is a tendency to abandon speculative land management for a type of cultivation that favors attamnt to the land. Environmentally, this is a positive development and may prove to be an important incentive towards yield-increasing practices and technologies rather than expanded cultivation as the main source of growth. Another trend among an increasing number of mechanized farmers is to invest in livestock, using agricultural resides and crop remains as feed. Crtain this more positive linkage between cultivation and livestock rearing may also increase interest in soil maintenance and conservation. Regarding livestock production, there is a clear need to reinstall a framework of pastoral land tenure in the area. In so doing, there has been a tendency to propose the wholesale revival of past aments concerning grazing lines, water policies, grazing agreem, and so forth. However, present producers face a new set of opportnities a ;i constraints as developing trends and changes become established practices. One _nple is the establishment of private water jornts which also restricts access to grazwz, since dry season grazg is only communal for those who have access to water. Another example is the current land policy which favors scbeme owners and prevents the emergence of local agrem ts on the right to utilize natural resources. Given the environmental feaures and constraints of Kassala Province, particularly the seasonal fluctations in the supply of water and forage, the two basic inputs to pastoral production, nomadism represents an efficient and viable pattern of resource utilization. Over the last few decades, however, new forms of land use emerged and expanded at the cost of clearing vast areas of land formerly considered grazing areas. As a result, while there is increasing commercialization and the emergence of large economic units, there are also i ed pastoralist whose viability is being undermined and who are leaving the pastoral system in fairly large numbers. Again, the issue is not just protecting a weak majority of livestock and agricultural producers against a minority of commcal enterprises. At present, none of the productive acdvities takes place within an instittional framework whic may ensure dteir contimued productivity 132 Environment and Seuttement in Eastern Sudan and sustainability. In view of the current problems, an important step would be to maintain as much as possible the spatial scale of exploitation. As Salah El-Shazali has argued,'0 this would require a comprehensive strategy consisting of several elements: * Introduction of land adjudication systems safeguarding pastoral interests. * Rehabilitation of defunct water points. * Reopening of nomadic routes or grazing corridors currently blocked by unauthorized mechanized schemes. * Enforcement of grazing lines beyond which mechanized farming is not to be undertaken. * Establishment of a water policy whereby water provision is related to grazing resources and managed so as to assure range productivity and sustenance. * Establishment of a proper institutional and administrative framework which would make it possible to protect pastoral interests and enforce sustainable land use. Any new policy frmework must also take note of the dramatic changes that have taken place in the livestock sector, particularly regarding the new linkages with irrigated and rainfed mechanized schemes. If proper measures can be introduced and enforced on the mechanized schemes, it may be possible to develop new relations of symbiosis rather than competition between animal husbandry and cultivation. Combined with the utilization of agricultmal residues and serious efforts to establish workable arrangements for land use and land adjudication, it appears possible to halt the current trends and establish productive and sustainable agro-pastoral systems of production in Kassala Province. Only with a reform of tenurial practice and land use will then be any chance of averting major ecological degradation, continued destitution of farmcis and pastoralists, and excessive rural-urban migration in the province. Bold measures need to be taken, including (a) reform of customary land tenure, (b) introduction of improved practices in resource management, (c) a program of laud demarcation and allocation, (d) controlled development of new settlements by the provision of water supply, and (e) introduction of procedures for range management. While successful implementation of programs such as these will depend on popular support, it will also depend on creating a framework that allows cultivators and stock-keepers most affected by rural development planning to begin to exert influence over institutions which now appear to dtm as remote and occasionally hostile. By the 133 Involunary Rasetlement in Africa same token, one must aim at making institudons responsive to the need for sustained rural development at a dtme when pressures of man and nature are conspiring to convert large parts of Kassala Province into a land of wind-blown soil and inmpoverished humanity. No Place for Projects? Technological and managerial packages should not necessarily be a nation's first concern when deciding how to establish and maintain productive and sustainable systems of production and settement patterns in a given area. To a large extent, the kind of thinking I have presented in this paper is policy-oriented. It is also based on the notion of a development process that is open to construcdve interventions only at certain points of leverage. This does not mean that local interventions should not be encouraged as long as they are embedded in a progressive development policy which allows the interventions to be effective. In fact, the cultural and economic heterogeneity of the cental-eastern Sudan requires that we try to identify localized opportunities for desired development. Despite the fact that we are dealing with large, open systems, connected into the wider global system at many levels, it makes sense to start out on a modest and small scale. That is, as long as the overall systems perspective is not lost and we are able to trace the unintended consequences of interventions within the larger region. Agencies involved in this work should remain flexible, adaptive and opportnistic. If an approach evolves and lives up to its promise, resources and credibility will flow to it. If it does not, then the enterprise can be quiedy abandoned, the only losses being the small amounts of resources and credibility that will, by then, have been committed to it. 134 EnWronmt and Settlemnt in Eastern Sua NOTES 1. South Commission. 1990. The Challenge to the South. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. 2. Salah El-Din EI-Shazali Ibrahimn. 1989. "South Kassala Nomadic Survey." Sudan: CARE. 3. Sorbo, Gunnar M. 1985. Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan. Uppsala: Scandinavian ntitute for African Studies. 4. DHV Consultants. 1989. Enuronmental Profile of Kassala Province. Amersfoort, Netherlands: DHV. 5. Anderson, D.M. and D.H. Johnson. 1988. The Ecology of SurWival: Case Studies from Northeast African History. London: Lester Crook. 6. Howell, J. 1977. Administration and nual development planning: a Sudanese cse. Agriculural Administration (4). Essex: Elsevier Applied Science: 99-120. 7. Davies, H.R.J. 1991. "Development programmes in non-irrigated rainland areas.' In G.M. Craig, ad., lhe Agriculture of the Sudan. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. 8. Haaland, G. 1990. Aid and sustainable development in a dual economy. Forum for utviklingsstudier. Vol. 1. Oslo: Norwegian Istitute of Irtenational Affairs: 105- 126. 9. World Bank. 1983. Sudan: Export Development Study - Main Report. Report No. 4263 - SU. Washington. D.C. 10. Salah El-Din E-Shazali Ibrahim, op. ct. 135 CHAP= 11 RESETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION OF PASTORALISTS IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY: RANCH RESTRUCTURING IN UGANDA David Pulkol Settling and integrating pastoralists into national economies is an urgent challenge in Africa today. Throughout the continent's drylands, a net decline in productivity is taking place, accompanied by an accelerated inpoverishment of pastoralists in these areas.' It is within this context that the problems of resource scarcity and increasing competition in Africa's rangelands have drawn, since the last decade, growing attention among governments, donors and academics.2 A variety of factors - droughts and famines in the 1980s, regional conflicts, local social tensions based on land use conflicts, perceived enironmental dgradation and desertification, low-level agricultural production and in some areas an acute lack of any kind of food security, a general decline in the socioeconomic welfare of livestock keepers, and the apparent failure of development programs fnded in the previous two decades - have all combined to force the problems of African pastoralists onto the agenda of internadonal institutions.3 These pastoralist cris should be viewed as the result of complex interactive processes btween new land tenure changes and old resource management practices among pastoralists in arid and semi-arid lands. On the one hand, these crises reveal the historical roots of the land question; on the other, they point to how government interventions have disrupted the traditional management of pastoral resources without providing pastoralists with the appropriate skills and necessary infrastructure they need to balance the utilization of their ever-shrinking mateial base with its regeneraion and sustainability. The limits of the traditional solutions which African pastoralists continue to apply in a changing environment, along with the failure to adopt new production pracdces, are responsible for the ever-worsening pastoralist crises. In paralle with the increasing degradaton of the range resource has been a steady rise in the numbers of persons which the range has to sustain. In the case of southwestern Uganda, population growth has resulted in a migration of displaced cultivators from highly populated districts into the semi-arid zones. In addition, there is an internal natural population increase of pastoralists with limited opportunities for out- migradon.4 This intenal increase, along with the influx of displaced culdvators, has triggered a process in which the pastoralists are being pushed into ever more marginal parts of the rangelands. Migrants and local elites have worsened the problem by land David PIol is a development economist who has studied groundwar resources management, human reseleent, land tenure and resource management in and areas. He is curremty Dept Minister of Education and Sports. Uganda. and Chairman of the Ranches Restnring Board. 137 lnvowary Rsdtlent in Africa grabbing and fencing off huge trcts of the best portions of the rangelands for comnmecial ranching and dryland cultivation. The expanion of wildlife protected areas like Lake Mburo National Park and Katonga Game Reserve hs caused fiurder displacement of pastoralists. Inevitably, this shift frm cmmunal grazing to individual commercial ranches and other competing economic activities has served to increasc pressure on the remaining communally accessible gazing lands. Since Africa's rangelands are capable of accommodating diverse economic activities such as grain production, game reserves, ranches and other uses considered to provide higher monetary retums, these lands have become contested territories in recent years. Pressed with the need to accommodate these competing economic acdvities in order to satisfy new national demands, governms in Africa have gazetted some of the rangelands as game reserves or forest reserves and have leased others to individual crop farmers or ranchers. In this contest for access to the range resource, the nomadic pastoralists have, in most cases, been left out. This is mainly because government plamers and donor agencies consider pastoralism a backward form of acdvity, incapable of yielding animal products of a quality and quantity adequate to meet the ever-rising domestic food demands and exports. Such low yields deived from traditional production systems of nomadic pastoralism was idendfied by the Uganda government in the 1950s and early 1960s as consttuting a serious problem requiring intmrention. _AtabUdment of Ranhing Sch_n Mm Baldia Expeime The problem of Bahia pastoralists and liveck development in the southwest corridor was compounded by govemnment policy, which emphasized establishment of commercial ranches to replace traditional livestock husbandry. Driven by the need to reduce importation of milk and meat products, the Uganda govment in the late 1950s and early 1960s borrowed vast fmancial resorces from the U.S. Agency for Intational Developent to eradicate tsetse infestaion and develop commercial ranches in the lands that were traditionally roamed by the Bahima pastoralists. After eradication of the tsetse, this land was soon gazetted as game and forest reserves, leased to individual fiamers, or demarcated into blocks of 5 square miles each which were then allocated to "progressive farmers' as commercial ranches. These ranches were heavily subsidized by the govermnent in order to promote the beef industry in Uganda. Under this policy, a total area of about 248,400 hectares was fenced off and allocated to 207 ranchers. The Bahma pastoralist, whose ancestors had for years past lived on and managed these range resources, were eventually displaced. The resident pastoralists were marginalized since they could not fulfill the criteria for land selection which requred them to know how to read and write, to have experience in running a bank account, and to have background in a successful business operation. Worse still. they were not educated on the effects of establishing such ranching schemes on their traditional grazng grounds. Even the advertisements in national newspapers, publisWed in English, remained inaccessible to these pastoral people, who could not therefore tender their applications in order to benea from the establishment of ranching schemes. 138 Ranch Re5mwtaurng in Uganda These marginalized pastoral peoples, left without alternative grzing grounds, inevitably bem landless, and yet they held huge livestock herds. For years they have had to fend for themselves by "squatting" with their herds in Lake Mburo National Park, adjacent forest reserves, private leaseholds, and on the newly established governmt- sponsored ranches under conditions dictated by individual ranchers or their managers. In order to be allowed to graze his anmals on a given ranch, a squatter had to pay to the newly arrived rancher one cow or bull for every ten cows or bulls in his herd. Arangements for use of water facilities by 'squaters' had to be negotiated and paid for separately. By mid-1990, some squatters had to pay between 400,000 and 500,000 Uganda shillings (equal at the time to US$1000-$1250) to the rancher or his manager, in order to water their animals in one of the available valley tanks. These payments are required regardless of whether such valley tanks were provided by the government under the subsidy schemes or were the traditional water sources constructed using communal labor in the pre-colonial and colonial time by the Bahima or their Chwezi ancestors. Even then, such water facilides had to be shared with odter subscribing pastoralists. In cases where the specified valley tanks dried up before the end of a given year and the situation necessitated use of the tanks where the rancher watered his animals, the squatters had to negodate an enirely different arangement. In the event of the death of a squatter or his relatives, the squatter had to pay for a small piece of land for his burial.5 In certain cases they were not allowed to bury their dead on the ranch even if they had the money. This exploitation, which worsened from the 1970s to the 1980s, xacerbated the alredy-existing mutual hatred and suspicion between the ranchers supported by the state and the pastoralist squatters. The S9Uge for Lad Am Rights Most squatter families supported the armed stumggle of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) agast the Obote II and Okello regnes. Their children actively participated alongside other patriotic Ugandans in the guerilla war of the 1980s which evenally overthrew these regimes in January 1986. On its ascent to power, the NRM govenment issued a proclamation telling sqers to stop paying dues to the ranchers, since these dues were illegal under the original tems and conditions of ranch occupancy. Goverment also promised to find a defintve solution to the rancher-squatter conflicts. Under Legal Notice no. 5, 1988, a Commission of Inquiry was established under the chairmanship of Professor Mugerwa, Dean of the Faculty of Vetrinary Medicine at Makerere University, with a mandate to inquire into the setting up, managm and operations of the 207 govement-sponsored ranches. The commission made two major recommendaions to effect reforms and improve ranch efficiency. First, the commission recommended that the govermment repossess fifty-three ranches totalling 63,600 hectares of land which had not been developed by the original 139 hwwlurary Resettlemen In Africa allocatees. All the squatters in the five rnching schemes of Ankole, Masaka, Singo, Buruli and Bunyoro were to be resettled on these undeveloped ranches. Second, the commission urged that all the remaining ranches should be used and developed by the original allocatees. These recomniendations generated differences of opinion among policymakers. Somne agreed with the reconmendations, while others maintained that the 5 square mile average size of ranches was too large to be managed efficiently. They argued that since some small and medium-sized farms in the country had performed much better than large ranches, all 207 of the government-sponsored ranches should be scaled down to manageable size in order to allocate the rest of the remaining land to the squatter pastoral families. As the ranchers' lobby was powerful within govermment, no action was taken frmm 1989 to the second half of 1990. On the ground, tensions between squatters and ranchers increased as ranchers became uncooperative and denied the squatters use of water facilities. The squatters, on the other hand, sought to gain access by force to the enclosed pasture and water facilities. These tensions exploded into open conflict in August 1990. The squatter uprising and subsequent heavy loss of property and displacement of ranchers drew governent attention. The issue of resettlement of pastoralist squatters and their integration into the modem economy was referred to parliament, which recommended the establishment of a Ranch Restructuring Board (RRB). The RRB was charged with scaling down the ranches to sizes of between 1 and 3 square miles with resettling all landless pastoral families. Besides subdividing ranches and setding the squatters, RRB was also mandated to study and recommend a long-term policy regarding the management and development of livestock resources in Uganda. Sta teies of te Rh Rs g Board On taking office in October 1990, the RRB embarked on a rapid appraisal of the five government-sponsored ranching schemes. A three phased implementation straty was conceived, and a detailed work program drawn up, mapping out critical activities for succesful ranch restrucuning? Phase I focsed on short-term activities aimed at rapidly creating stable conditions for the eventual ranch subdivision and orderly resetdement. Activities undertaken during this phase were aimed at calming down the violent confrontation between ranchers and squatters, streamlining security arrangements in order to stamp out catte thefts, road ambushes and armed robberies, strenghiening veterinary services in order to control disease outbreaks, and integrating local political and administrative leaders with representatives of squatters and ranchers on Ranch Working Commttees for the purpose of solving day-to-day problems in their areas. In addition. during Phase I, RRB undertook a thorough study of the condition of each ranch in order to generate data that would enable the board to make conclusive decisions and develop criteria to guide the subdivision and reallocation of ranches to squatter and rancher families. Finally, during this phase, RRB organized seminars and public meetings to 140 Ranch Restructing in Uganda spread awareness of modem aninal health care and production practices among squatters. This was done to facilitate their eventual integration into sedentary livestock farming.' During Phase 11, all activities related to decisionmaking and demarcation, subdivision, allocation, and setdtement of the subdivided ranches will be undertaken. Identification and valuation of all items and infrastructure to be compensated will be carried out by govermnent valuers. Other activities include reconmendation to the Uganda Land Conmission (ULC) and eventual granting of fresh leases and tide deeds to all those who benefit from the ranch restructuring exercise, and assistance in the formation and registration of cooperatives and new limited companies to assist former squatters to adopt modem livestock husbandry practices based on commercial production strategies. In Phase 111, the final report will be prepared and submitted to government. The reporting process will be characterized by a series of board meetings aimed at pulling together tite various threads of public opinion and taking stock of decisions and actions undertaken during the pmcess of ranch restructuring. Insights gleaned from RRB's experience, coupled with a critical evaluation of past and present government policies and their varying effects on production strategies among Ugandan livestock farmers (such as input supply, marketing, range mangment practices, water provision, utilization and maintenance of infrastructr facilities) will provide the basis for long-range policy recomnendations to shape future govemment interventions in the livestock sector. Throughout the three phases outlined above, a number of critical activities will continue. These include (a) the stremlining and consolidation of security a e ; (b) the rehabilitation, equipping and strengthening of veterinary services; (c) excavation and construction of water harvestng facilities; (d) education and awareness-building seminars; and (e) support of grassroots collaborative working committees. Members of the board have identified these activities as the necessary supports for successful ranch restructuring. Their consolidation throughout the im phases will guarantee the long-term sustainability of the ranch restructuring benefits. The RRB members are therefore committed to handing over at the end of their assignment not only the subdivided and settled ranches, but also dependable security, veterinary and integrated politico-administrative systems within the areas covered by the ranches. Such self-sustaining systems should, in the short, medium and long term, contribute to an increased socioeconomic development in the arid southwestem areas of Uganda. Integration of Pastoralists into the National Economy Earlier government policies in Uganda emphasized the need to support the development of a few progressive ranchers with the hope that the benefits from these government- supported and privately owned commercial ranches would triclde down and enhance the welfare of a majority of the people in the country. Unfortunately, as recent research 141 Involwuary Resettlement in Africa indicates, such trickle-down effects in the ranching industry were not realized. Even during 1978, when ranching schemes in Uganda were at their highest level of productivity, only 5 percent of the total livestock population in Uganda was owned by government or private ranchers, while 95 percent of the livestock population was still in the traditional subsector. In addition, whereas both government and private ranches contributed 18 percent of the national beef supply, 82 percent of the supply came from the traditional subsector. And yet this traditional subsector has been marginalized by government. In the case of the Bahima pastoralists, access to productive range resources such as land and water has long been denied. The traditional subsector has sustained the Uganda livestock industry for quite a long time. Given their ability to withstand the hazards of economic decline, and the fact that the majority of livestock producers is still in the traditional subsector, it is good economics for government to integrate these traditional livestock keepers into the mainstream national economy. It is therefore not only the pursuit of social justice and political stability that has motivated the NRM government to assist pastoralists to settle down in a sedentary life style, but also sound economic policy. The experience of the Ranch Restructuring Board in southwestern Uganda, demonstates that mere settlement of squatter pastoralists, if not accompanied by a continuous effort to change their resource management practices from traditional to modern methods adapted to their shrinking material base, will not only lead to the failure of ranch restructuring, but will generate even greater social, economic and environmental problems in the future. Integrating pastoralists into the mainstream national economy requires a deliberate effort to equip the pastoralists with the necessary skills, knowledge, and attitudes in order to be able to balance the utilization of their pastoral resources with the need for regeneration and sustenance. Key Areas for Intervento Integratil!g pastoralists into the mod.rn economy, requires undertaking scientific inquiry ii-' key issues in the livestock ser;tor. Such an inquiry can enable us to map out appropriate intervention prograzms vhich can shift the traditional livestock keepers from their current conservative prac.tices to more progressive methods of animal husbandry. PRODUCTION PRAC7cS. Traditional pastoralist production values centered around the color, physique and numbers of their aninsals. There is a need to examine the extent to which current pressures related to iunited land availability have induced livestock producers to change their production strategies away from these traditions and towards factors such as milk yields, calving rates, and productive as against unproductive animals. in addition, it is important to determine which social and economic incentives are needed to cause the Bahima pastoralists to change their traditional, non-cost-effective strategies and becoxi'e interested in adopting modem methods of managing limited range resources so as to ensure their sustainability. 142 Ranch Ratructuring in Uganda MARKETING. There is a need to study the adequacy of existing public and private marketing arrangements for livestock products at the national, regional, and grassroots levels. There is also a need to examine pricing policies and to find ways of encouraging pastoralists to take advantage of market opportunities created by attractive prices. Furthernore, in order to assess the perceived and actual importance of the market to individual pastoralists, it is necessary to understand their other economic uses of livestock, the relative importance of social obligations met through animal charges (marriage, social gifts), the role of other income sources in the family, and the importance of cash in the household economy. INPUT SUPPLY. It is important also to assess the access of pastoralists to critical inputs, such as acaracide, in the ranching industry. A critical analysis of supply and demand factors and the use and abuse of livestock inputs in the Uganda setting, is very inportant in order to map out appropriate government interventions that would make it easier for the majority of traditional livestock keepers to afford and use these inputs. INvESTME. There is also a need to assess investment levels in the Ugandan livestock industry in general, and to examine current and past bank lending policies and procedures, in order to discover areas where improvement can be mnade. MANAGEMENT. An examination of current and emerging management practices would lead to an identification of areas for improvement and negative management practices to be discouraged. VETER4RY sERcEs. It is necessary to assess the content and mode of current veterinary extension services in Uganda, and to detennine their scope in terms of service coverage and success, in various aspects such as disease control, production, marketing advice, and research. This assessment can indicate which sort of extension service would best benefit the newly subdivided ranches and the resettled pastoralists and help them in playing a leading role in the animal industry of Uganda. EDUCATION AAD AWARMESS BUILDING. There is a need to understand the knowledge, attitudes and practices of the traditional pastoralists in order to facilitate the programs aimed at creating and spreading awareness of modern livestock rearing practices. Conclusion The resettlement of nomadic pastoralists in southwestern Uganda in particular, and in Africa in general, means a radical change from traditional past ways of life to the present. This complete change in lifestyle is made necessary because of shrinking enviromnental resources. A deliberate effort is required on the part of governmmet to inculcate in the pastoralists appropriate attitudes, knowledge and skills which will enable them not only 143 Involuntary Resetlement in Africa to survive in the new situation but to function in a way that is beneficial to themselves and the whole economy. A policy that aims at merely resettling the nomadic pastoralists without changing their attitudes and practices to suit the changed circumstances is not only doomed to failure, but may even breed more serious problems in the future. The case of the Bahima pastoralists shows that resettling people of one culture into another is a complicated business requiring scientific research and local adaptation of ideas. Many elementary mistakes will otherwise be made. We should also bear in mind that in the course of solving one problem today, care must be exercised so that a bigger problem is not created for the future. 144 Ranch Retructuring In Uganda NOTES 1. Bovin, M., and L. Manger, eds. 1990. Adaptive Strategis in African Arid Lands. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. See also UNEP. 1984. General Assessment of Progress in Implementaton of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertafication 197884. Nairobi, Kenya. 2. For general references on the subject, see, for example, Galaty, John G., et al, eds. 1980. The Future of Pastoral Peoples. Proceedings of a Conference held in Nairobi, Kenya, 4-8 August. IDRC; Bennet, J.W., et al. 1986. Land Tenure and Livestock Development in Subsaharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development.; Kituyi, Mukisha. 1990. Becoming Kenyans: Socio-econonuc Transformation of the Pastoral Masai. Nairobi: ACTS Press. 3. Kituyi, Mukisha, and Naomi Kipuri. 1991. Changing PastoralLand Tenure and Resource Management in Eastern Africa: A Research Agenda. Nairobi. 4. Bourgeot, A. 1981 "Nomadic Pastoral Society and the Market: The Penetation of the Sahel by Commercial Relations. In, Galaty and Salman, eds., Change and Developnment in Nomaudic and Pastoral Societies. Leiden: E.J. Brill; Campbell, D. 1981. "Land Use Competition at the Margins of the Rangelands: An Issue in Development Strategies for Semi-Arid Areas. In Nocliffe and Pinfold, eds., Planning Africa's Development. London: Croon Helm; GiHles and Gefu. 1990. "Nomads, Rachers and the State." In Galaty and Johnson, ibid.; Haaland, C., "Aid and Sustainable Development in a Dual Economy," Forum for Utvilingsstudier No. 1, 1990; Hjoit, A., *Environment and Security of Dryland Herders in Eastern Africa" in Hjoit and Salil, eds., 1989; Lane, C. 1990. "Barabaig Natural Resource Management: Sustainable Land Use Under Threat of Destruction." UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 12. 5. Data from Ranch Restructung Board files. 6. Uganda Gazette. October 13, 1990. 7. Govermnent of Uganda. 1991. "Ranch Restructuring Board Inerim Report." (June) Kampala. 8. "RRB Phase One Evaluation Report." September 1991; see also Bunoti, C.W. 1991. "Progress Report on Singo, Buruli and Bunyoro Ranching Schemes." (June) Kampala.; Rwamubanda, E.R. 1991. "Progress Report on Ankole, Kabula and Masaka Ranching Schemes." (March) Kampala. 145 CHAP= 12 SETTLEMNTW AND RESETILEMENT: EXPERIENCE FROM UGANDA'S NATIONAL PARKS AND RESERVES Mark A. Marquardt In Uganda, intemal population movements have arisen from a number of factors related to the country's economic seting: the exisece of agricultural land of high potential but ;ow population density; settlement on land cleared of tsese infestation; forced or induced movement of people out of areas of high population densities; the development of agricultural plantations requiring labor and outgrower schemes; and the settlement of displaced people resulting from civil unrest. All have been factors in the planned resettlement of various popuations in recen history.' However, when considering the problem of resettlement, one should also consider the spontanous uncontrolled movement of people to find new homelands, which has boen and continues to be the most common response to rising population densides in the Uganda setting. One result of this spoaneous unwntrolled populaionmovement which is caused by the growing land pressure in traditional agricultual zones has been an increasing incidence of encroa t into wminally protected areas. These include national parks, game reserves, and forest reserves. This encroachment has taken two distinct forms. The first, by families who had traditionally settled in areas around these reserves and merely expanded their farming opeats into dtem. The second, by families who have moved their farming opeations from area of severe land shortage into the reserves, which they viewed as unoccupied and apparny available land. A number of factors in recent Uganda history have allowed this settlement within protected areas to take place. The objective of this chapter is to review the current situation in Uganda with respect to spontaneous settlement on lands surrounding and within protected areas, and to present the policy options open to the government. The chapter also includes case studies ilustating three types of settlement: (1) enclaves within protected areas; (2) ncrachment into protected areas; and (3) planned resettlement of people into protected areas. Each of these types of setdement offers altenative policy strategies for the government to pursue. Mk A. Mrqudt is assct Research Scienist wih he land Tenre Centr, Uiveasy of Wisconsin- Madison. USA. and Senior Researcer at Mrre Instute of Social Reseach, Makee Univesity. Kampala, Uganda. He ha done extensive research on bad tem issues in Botwana. Swaziland. Somalia and Uganda. 147 Involuntary Rsettlement In Africa Lad Tenure In Upada Land tenure may be defined as the institutional (social, political, and economic) arrangements through which individuals and commnanities gain access to the productive capabilities of land. Land tenurc literature often speaks of a 'bundle' of rights held by individuals in relation to access and utilization of land resources. These rights include, but are not restricted to, such things as the right to sell, mortgage, and bequeath land, cut trees, bury the dead, and construct homes. This bundle can be broken up, divided, and passed on to others. Some rights within the bundle are held by individuals, some by groups, and others by political entities.2 For any tenure system, each of the rights in the bundle will have at least three dimensions: people, timc, and space. No one ever holds land in a totally exclusive way. Other individuals and the community always have rights that impinge to some degree on land use. Thus the land rights of the individual are limited by those rights which are retained by the state and the community. A person may be unable to use land because the rights of access to that land are sanctioned by the local community. In a customary tenure system, for example, access to land is deternined by membership in the group which sets allocation and reallocation procedures, inhrittance rights, and so forth. Land records are maintained as part of the oral tradition of the group. In the Western context, access to land is determined through a more formal tide structure with written doumentation of ownership rights. Similarly. rights may vary over time. Rights of land use may be seen as permanent, held by the individual and his progeny, or of a more limited nature, as in shifting cultivation systems or with leased or borrowed land. Individual peceptions of this time factor relate directly to the sense of secrity of tenue over land holdings and influence possible investment decisions. Finally, land rights have a spatial natu. The use of land is resticted by some definition of boundaries. The degree to which these boundaries are fixed is to a certain extent determined by the level of land pressure and the need to indicate where one's property rigbts end and another's begins. This spatial question is of obvious concern where areas of different land use meet in intensive farming areas and the "unused" lands of conservation areas. Individuals never have exclusive rights to land. The state at the very least retains the rights of taxation, eminent domai, control over land use, and reversion. The state's rights with respect to conservation areas fall under the rights of land use control and minent domain. The exercise of eminent domain generally implies a recognition of claims to compensation for lost land use rights. Traditionally, this c sation can take the form of alternative land rather than the cash payments characteristic of a more market-oriented society. The 1975 Land Reform Decree vested all lands in Uganda in the central govnent. Prior to the decree, land was held through custmary tenure arang ts, 148 Uganda's NAbdonal Parks and Reserves freehold tenure, and, in central Uganda, through mailo ownership or mailo tenancies.3 Individuals who wished to formalize their land rights after 1975 did so through the acquisition of state leasehold rights. However, the land reform decree has had little effect on the majority of landholders. In most areas of the country, particularly non- mailo areas, customary tenure relations continue to exist with little interference by the state or outsiders. Uganda's Nadonal Parks and Reserves Uganda's national parks, game reserves, and forest reserves cover more than 1.2 million hectares, or about 16 percent of the total land area of Uganda. All of these protected areas have suffered to varying degrees from encroachment by settlers in recent years. Wildlife in Uganda is managed by the Uganda National Parks, a parastatal run by a board of trustees, and the Game Department, which falls under the Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife, and Antiquities, and iv responsible for managing game reserves, controlled hunting areas, and game sanctuaries. The National Park Act was passed by the protectorate administration in 1952. The two national parks established at that dtme (Queen Elizabeth and Murchison Falls) were created from previously existing game reserves, with additional territory incorporated into the park lands at the time of their gazettement. People were generally absent in the areas encompassed by these game reserves, as they had been depopulated by the protectorate administration in efforts to deal with the infestation of the tsetse and resultant incidence of sleeping sickness.4 The area presenty containing Lake Mburo National Park likewise had been heavily infested with the tsetse, resulting in an outmigration of the human population. That area was first administeed as a controlled hunting area and later as a game reserve, before being declared a national park in 1982.5 The abundance of wildlife provided Uganda with a major source of income from tourism through the 1960s. At that time tourism was the third largest source of foreign exchange earnings, after coffee and cotton. The slaughter of wildlife which began during Idi Amin's rule and continued following the invasion of Tanzanian forces to oust the Anin government, along with the insecurity of the ensuing years until the present National Resistance Movement govermnent came to power, has left Uganda with only a fraction of its previously vast wildlife population. While hunting using traditional means (bows and arrows, spears, and snares) had only a limited impact, the more recent slaughter using heavy guns and automatic weapons had a devastating effect on wildlife. The depopulation of animal life has emptied large areas of national parks and game reserves, giving the impression of large tracts of unused land. Considerable wildlife also exists in forest reserves, which are managed by the Forestry Department, falling under the Ministry of Water, Energy, Minerals, and Environmental Protection. Central forest reserves were established by the colonial administrtion as a result of agreements with the rulers of the Uganda kingdoms (Buganda Agreement 1900, Toro Agreement 1900, and Ankole Agreement 1901). All 149 Inwoluntary Resettlement In Africa lands in other parts of the protectorate were declared crown lands, and forest reserves were gazetted from these lands as and when necessary.' Prior to the early 1970s, forest reserves were well-managed, balancing economic use with the conservation of wildlife and mainteac of biological diversity. Settlement in forest reserves was pernitted under the Forest Act of 1964, provided that the appropriate permits were obtained and the pennit holder adhered to the conditions of the permit. Since the early 1970s, forest rescarces have been depleted at a rapid rate, both on privately held land and within gazetted forest reserves. This has resulted from a number of causes, including unregulated commercial exploitation of timber resources, the growing demand for fuelwood not only for heating and cooldng but also for small scale manufacturing and a growing number of brick kiLns, the encroachment of human settlement and agriculture into formerly forested areas and forest reserves, and, to a limited extent, state-sponsored forest clearing schemes to limit cover for guerrilla activities. Population pressures in some parts of the country, particularly the southwest, and recent civil disorders in other areas, led to a movement of settlers from these areas into the forest reserves. This spontaneous movement was supported by government policies in the mid-1970s which advocated 'double production" and 'freedom to settle anywhere," and appeared to provide goverment sanction for setlement in protected areas. The Forestry Departmen, understad and underfumded, much as the Game Department, was unable to control illegal setlement and exploitation of the forest resources. Destruction of the resources the reserves were supposed to protect, whether wildlife or forests, created an opportuniq for the settlement of people into the reserves. Settler ncroachment on the nation's game and forest reserves has been extensive. The enmcrachment of settlement on the national parks in recent years has generally been more limited. That which has taken place has often resulted from the expansion of enclaves wihin the parks or from government policies which excised park lands and redrew park boundaries. Endlave Expa_sior The Ca of Queen Elzabeth Park Fishg Vmages Within Queen Eliabeth National Park are found Lake Edward and Lake George, connected by the 32-kilometer Kazinga Channel. These lakes and the channel contain one of the highest fish biornasses to be found in the world. When the park was gazetted in 1952, a mber of fishing villages were incorporated within the park boundaries. In some cases, these villages were permitd to continue to exist on park land. In other cases, the fishing villages were established as village enclaves on non-park land, yet completely surrounded by the park.7 The original usanding regarding the villages sited on park lands was that vifage members were only allowed to fish and to collect dead wood from the park to meet their fuelwood requfiements. Livestock was not permitted within the park As the 150 Uganda's National Parks and Reserves population of the villages expanded, park authorities saw a need to clearly demarcate the boundaries of the villages. However, these boundary demarcations were not maintained. There was never any attempt to formalize the tenure rights of people in these villages. Thus, the people have continued to live on park land with little security of tenure other than the understanding of land rights prior to the gazelting of the park. The enclave villages present a somewhat different situation. As they are not located on park land, the park authorities have no direct control over village activities except where they have an impact upon the park. Katwe village, for example, has a long history of settlement tied to the salt extraction industry and related trade in salt from one of the crater lakes within the enclave. In addition to the salt extraction industry, there is a large fish landing in the village and a substantial fishing industry. In recent years, the fishing industry has provided a major source of income for the people, while most other income earning opportunities have declined. While the Fisheries Department has tried to regulate the number of fishing licenses on the lakes, and thus indirectly to limit the number of people living in the villages and using the esource, the relatively high financial returns from fishing have led to increasing illegal fishing activities and a growing population in the villages. A growing population in both types of villages obviously puts greater dem;ands on the resources of the park. These demands include fuelwood for cooking and drying fish, small plots of land for cultivation, increasing numbers of livestock, and basic social services such as schools and clinics, which then serve as a further incentive for others to settle in the area. Population increases also bring an increase in the poaching of wildlife within the park. At the same time, people do suffer some negative effects from the park, including predadon on livestock and attacks on people by wildlife. Several options are open to the govermnent with respect to this type of settlement within park boundaries. If people are to remain in the fishing villages, alternative sources of fuelwood have to be found in order to prevent the present indiscriminate harvesting of wood from the park. Options could include community forestry projects, utilization of non-wood energy sources, and concessionary cutting of wood in the park from areas where severe acacia encroacbment has occurred following the destruction of the elephant herd. Mechanisms need to be put in place to regulate the mmnbers of fishing licenses granted and the number of fishing boats allowed on the lake. Village boundaries must be clearly demarcated, indicating to the villagers as well as to the park authorities the limits of settlement. Access roads to the villages need to be improved to facilitate movement of fish to market (the potential for marketing fresh fish would eliminate some fuelwood needs), as well as to permit the flow of foodstuffs into the villages, thereby reducing the need for growing vegetables and keeping livestock. If people are to be removed from the fihing villages, other issues must be addressed. The fishing industry is a major source of income for people in the area and revenue for the local authorities. There is evidence to suggest that some of the people fishing in the lake come from great distances, fish for a nunber of years to save money, and then return to their home areas. Relocation of the people means finding altenative 151 Invowuntary Resettlement in Africa income generating opportunities, wage employment, or agricultural land. While many of the fishermen may have access to some agricultural land, this land provides at best a subsistence income. Resettling fishermen on additional agricultural land implies that such land can be secured elsewhere. Spontaneous Settlement: The Case of Iibale Corridor ad Forest Reserves The Kibale Forest Corridor Game Reserve was established to provide a corridor for wildlife, mainly elephants, moving from Queen Elizabeth Park to the Kibale Forest Reserve. It also provides a buffer zone for the northern part of the park. The forest reserve itself contains one of the highest concentrations of primates in the world. Settlement into the reserve began in the late 1950s and continued into the early 1980s. The settlers were primarily Bakiga people moving out of the severely overpopulated districts of Kabale, Kisoro, and Rukungiri. Severe land shortages, combined with inheritance rules that subdivide family land among all of the sons, led to a high level of land fragmentation and increasingly sub-economic plots in the areas of origin.' These "push" factors were complemented by 'pull" factors which encouraged settlement onto the lands of the corridor. The district on the western side of the reserves had been an area of Bakiga in-migration since the mid-1940s as a result of government- sponsored resettlement schemes designed to alleviate land and population pressures. The m-igrants hoped to take advantage of employment opportunities associated witi the development of tea plantations around Fort Portal. As the resetdement schemes filled up, newcomers and second generation settlers were forced to look for land outside the settlement schemes. The game reserve was seen by local chiefs as land available for allocation, and they began setding newcomers on that land. The natural grassland vegetation of the corridor has fertile soils, which provided a further incentive for settlement in the reserve. A growing population in the corridor served as a magnet for firther migration. Land was thus made available to newcomers widxtut diminishing the land base of earlier settlers. At the same time, the new settlers provided a buffer between the earlier settlers and the remaining reserve with its predatory wildlife.' Throughout this period, little opposition to settlement was raised by the Game Department, while the Forestry Departnent began raising objections to settlement as it began to spill over into the forest reserve. Since 1972 the Forestry Department has continued to press for removal of people settling in the forest reserve. Settlements in the two adjacent areas differ not only in terms of length of settlement, but also in terms of settler perceptions concerning their security of tenure. Levels of permanent investment in housing and agriculture are lower on land holdings in the forest reserve. Individuals who have setded in the forest reserve appear to recognize the tenuousness of their setdement rights. They have retained land rights elsewhere and have only expanded their farning operations into the forest reserve. Requiring that they move out of the reserve back to their original holdings may be a 152 Ugand's Afadonal Pars and Raserves feasible policy option for this group. However, those who have settled in the game reserve would be more difficult to resettle elsewhere, having come from areas of excess population, rather than from the surrounding areas, and having no land to which they may return. Forcing them out of the game reserve would only create the problem of finding adequate land for settlement in another aea. Degetting Protected Areas: The Cm of Lake Mburo Rel Scheme The area around Lake Mburo was declared a game reserve in 1964 at the request of the Ankole local government. People then living within the reserve boundaries were allowed to stay. Tsetse eradication and bush clearing had taken place in the two previous years, in preparation for rnch development north of the reserve.'0 Two years after the reserve was declared, a ranch was created within the reserve boundaries. Additional ranches were created within the reserve in subsequet years. By 1981 the position of game in the reserve had become desperate, due to the pressure of farners and herdsmen using the good pasture and water holes. In 1982 the area was declared a national park. This resulted in the forced removal of more than 6,000 farmers who had developed extensive fanns averaging over 2 hectares each, and more than 40,000 catde. No compensation was paid, although it was due to those who occupied the land legally by virtue of having been there before the game reserve was created. When the government was overthrown in 1985, the local residents took their revenge, destroying park facilities and reoccupying the area. In addition to those who had been forced out in 1982. other people came to take advantage of apparently free land and uncertainty over claims. Pressure on the park lands increased further when people who had been living on the ranches were forced to settle elsewhere. In 1986 a task force established to look into these problems recommended that about 60 percent of the park be degazetted for the settlement of people who had claims in the area prior to the declaration of a national park. Additionally, land was made available for the resettlement of people from the Lowero Triangle and Bugerere, who had been displaced in the recent wars. The resettlement community was allocated 30 square miles of the 150 square miles degazetted from the park. The degazting of park land to provide land for settlement raises a number of issues. First, it reflects the goverment's inability to find *vacant* land for resettement. Secondly, it reduces the amount of public land devoted to conservation activities. Reallocating such lands for settlement provides only short-term relief to population pressures. The land evenually runs out. In the case of the Lalce Mbro resettlement scheme, the people resetted are traditionally cattle herders. While their herds had been destroyed dunng the war, their ability to adapt to sedentary agricultural production systems on marginal lands is questionable. Management decisions must now be made relating to the rebuilding of their herds. Fmnally, the land idendfied for the resettement scheme had previously been 153 Involwuly Reseulemet in Aftica settled. When the area was designated for resetlement, the earlier landholders were forced to give up their cms and move elsewhere. Factors 1nfluencin Setlemet _d Rhlument Factors influencing population resetdement are often discussed in terns of "push" and "pull" factors. 'Push' factors are reasons associated with people leaving their earlier place of residence. In recent years, Uganda's growing mral population has been faced with an increasing shortage of land for subsistence agriculture. While subdivision of holdings ensures that some land is available to succeeding generations, these holdings are increasingly becoming sub-economic. Traditional fallow periods have been shortened or eliminated as homesteads try to maximize production on decreasing land areas, leading to a decline in soil fertility and a resulting decline in agricultural productivity. There is some evidence that the Land Reform Decree of 1975 had an adverse effect on the secrity of tenure in some cusmary areas. Individuals who were able to secure state leases have been able to push peasants off the land which they were using, wth little recourse other than some claim for compensation." The need for these disenfranhised peasants to find new land may also have contributed to encroachment on the reserve areas. Odter factors such as disease and civil unrest can also lead to voluntary relocation. Such relocation may be seen initially by all involved as less permanent than the resetamnt related to seektng new economic opportuities. "Pull" factors, on the other hand, are related to the reasons people choose to setle in one area rather than another. In spontnos agricultural settlement, major factors are the avaiability of land and the abit to estabish tenure rights to dhat land. Tribal affiliations, negotiatio with local authorities, the presence of pioneer settlers who are friends or relatives, and acceptance of outsiders by the indigenous population, are all factors influencing the decisiomang process. Nonagriulural or supplemental employment opportunities in an area may also encourage population movements. Each of these factors played a role in the resettlement of people into thL conservation areas of Uganda in the past two decades. Coupled with the breakdown of central government authority was a breakdown of the administrative stucture of institutions responsible for managin the national parks, game reserves, and forest reserves, and a central govenment attitude which did not see conservation areas as productive. As this position became known, the spontanes resettlement of people from overcrowded areas was bound to take place. Pol A The question facing the govermet at this point in tm is how to deal with these setdements, nDOw that a sense of order has been restored and the administrative stuctures are regaming the ability to manage the land under their authority. The government faces 154 Uganda's Natonal Parks and Raserves three main policy options: resettlement, repatriation, or incorporation into the reserves. Each of these options has costs and benefits which must be addressed as the policy is developed. RESEnLEMEN. Resettlement implies the ability of government to find alternative land on which to settle people. Such "vacant' land is increasingly harder to find. Historically, resettlement schemes relied on goverment to take over large estats, subdivide them, and allocae land to new settlers; to reallocate state or parastatal farms for settlement; to change existing land use practices, as in irrigation schemes, Incorporating the existing setders into new agricultural production systems; or to settle people onto unallocated state land which in theory had no pre-existing settlement, although often pastoralist or hunter-gatherer groups were already using these land resources. The design of such resettlement programs involves costs, not only to acquire land for resetflement and to compensate individuals presendy using the land who will not be part of the resettlement scheme, but also to compensate settlers for the costs of moving from their present homes. The latter costs may be addressed through the provision of alernative land and income eaming opportunities within the resettement scheme. Basic planning issues must also be addressed if a resettlement scheme is to be a long-term success. McMillan has identified a number of these issues:'2 * The administrative and financial management of the resettlement program must be coordinated throuh the exisig network of regional social services located near the setdement. * Economic sustainability requires market proximity. Remote schmes icrease infrstructe and trawsport costs. * Shemes must be environmentaUlly sustainable with sound natural resource management. Reproduction of low-resource agricultmal systems can become environentally destructive at higher population densities. "Vacant" land may be vacant because it is marginal. Planned resettlement onto such land may have disastrous results. * Care must be taken to include the host communities as beneficiaries in the resettlement scheme. Where the interests of indigenous households are overridden in the establishment of a setdement scheme, this often alienates new settlers from the region and limits setter access to markets. REoAIoN. Repatriation implies the ability of government to move people back to their places of orgin. The viability of this option depends upon the "push" and "pull" factors that led to the settlement in the first place. If limited or declning economic opportunities in the area of origin was a major factor influencing resettlement, forcing people to return to that area would have little chance of success. As people move 155 Involuntay Resettlent in Africa out of an overcrowded area, they are unlikely to be able to retain land rights in that area. The likely outcome of a govermnent policy of repatriation will be that people move into other areas of new settlement, simplv reproducing the problem elsewhere. Anohr outc'me may be that people move out of agriculture into urban areas seekcing alternative, nonagricultural economic opportunities which may or may not exist for them. On the other hand, if the resettlement occrred as a result of a progran to expand existing viable agricultural enterprises outside of the reserves, the government may be in a position to reassert its authority over reserve lands with minimal economic consequences for the settlers. Indeed, the study of Kibale Forest Reserve shows that encroachers from the surrounding area knew that land rights in the reserve area were tenuous and had simply attempted to take advantage of the breakdown in administrative control over the reserve to acquire additional land. NcORPoRA1IoN. Incorporation of settlements into the reserves recognizes the govermnent's inability to resettle or repatriate encroaching populations. While it may be seen as a capitulation to reality and as a possible incentive to furter encr ment, it also reflects the limited options open to goverment. What may be'desirable from a park or reserve manageme stadpoint, may be imprctical from an economic, political, or social equity standpoint. There is a growing body of literature and experience addressing the need to incorporate populations surrounding reserves into the management of these reserves. Previously, reserves were established with little or no consultation with people living in and around the protected area, with litde or no compensation for lost lands, and with little or no compensation for the continuing costs of having the protected area nearby.'3 Failue to address these issues obviously played a role in the resettlement of people into the reserves when central authority broke down in the country. People saw an oppormty to reclaim land or to contnue the destruction of naual resources in the hopes that later government conservation policy would have little justification since nothing would be left to conserve. The balance between the costs and benefits of conservation varies considerably between the local, national, and international levels of society. The costs, in terms of alienated land, restrictions on resource use, and damage to life and property, are mainly caried by rural populations, particularly those at the interface between settlement and conservation areas. The political and finanial costs of administering conservation programs are carried mainly by national goverments. The benefits of national prestige are enjoyed mainly by national governmets, as are, currently, most of the revenues fom the use of wildlife resources. The rural sector which carres much of the costs derives few benefits.14 Incorporation of settlement into the reserves will only be bemdicial if there is some mehanism to enable the popuadon to capture a part of the benefit streams flowing from the reserves. U neighboring populadons are able to receive direct benefits from the reserve, then it becomes in their best interest to preserve the resource which the reserve 156 Uganda's National Parks and Reserves is designed to protect. Thus land use strategies must be designed around attainable conservation objectives which minimize conflicts of interest. A realistic approach to conservation recognizes the need to identify valid objectives, to reduce conflicts between short-term individual interests and long-term conunnal intemts, and to balance the costs and benefits equitably between different sectors of the local, national, and intational comunities. Condiulon The case studies described in this chapter illustrate a variety of settlement situations. Prior to formulating govenment policy with respect to such settlements, it is essential to understand the factors that led to the settlement in the first place and to be aware of the history of the settlement process. In Uganda. people have settled in the reserves for three fundamental reasons. First, to reclaim land which was lost as the reserves were created. Second, to relocate into vacant, seemingly undaimed land. And third, to expand their land from areas outside the reserves. Such settlement may have been encouraged by the breakdown of cetal govermment authority, by the inability of local authorities to control population movements, and by official incenitives to alleviate land pressures in surrounding or distant areas. Three main options are open to government policymakers: resetdement, repatiation, or inrporation into the reserve. Policy choices must be based on a case by case analysis of the "push' and "pull" factors involved. Since different factors have played a role in each selement situatin, settlers may have different perceptions concerni their tenure rights, and settlement may have taken place over different time peiods. The analysis should also show whether those 'push' and "pull" factors are still i cxistence. A clear understading of the factors leading to resettlement in protected areas wiil help to determine the success or failure of whatever policy is chosen. 157 lnvolwnta,y Resettlement in Africa NOTES 1. Illingworth, Susan. 1964. "Resettlement Schemes in Uganda: A Case Study in Agricultural Development." M. Sc. Thesis. Department of Geography, Nottingham University.; Makerre Institute of Social Research and Land Tenure Center. 1989. "Settlement in Forest Reserves, Game Reserves and National Parks in Uganda: A Study of Social. Economic, and Tenure Factors Affecting Land Use and Deforestation." (July) Madison, WI: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 2. Bruce, John W. 1986. Land Tenure Issaes in Project Design and Strategiesfor Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Madison, WI: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 3. The Uganda Agreement of 1900 divided land within the protectorate between the Kabaka (the ruler of the Buganda) on one hand, and the Uganda Administaton on the other. The agreement set aside 9,000 square miles as Crown or public land, while 8,000 square miles were divided amonng the Kabaka, his chiefs and other landholders. The unit of nmsurement of this land was the square mile, hence the name 'mailo." The mailo land tenure system was in many respects unique in Africa, providing as it did thousands of square miles of land registered and granted to Africans rather dan Europeans. The system remained in force for over seventy years, untfl the 1975 Land Reform Decree abolished all freehold titles, whether of mailo or public land. For more information, see Barnes, Grenville, et al. 1986. Comnby Proiles of Land Tenure: Arica 1986. (April) Madison, WI: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 4. United Nations Environment Programme. 1988. "Strategic Resource Planning in Uganda." Volume 2. "Wildlife and Protected Areas." Nairobi: UNEP. 5. Ibid. 6. United Nations Enviroment Progranmme, op. cit. Volume 3, "Forests." 7. UNEP, op. cit., Volume 2.; Olivier, Robert. 1990. The Queen Elizabeth Nadonal Park Management Plan. Rome: Uganda Institute of Ecology and Agriconsulting SpA. 8. MISR and Land Tenure Center, op. cit.; Drennon, Chrisdne M. 1990. "Agriciltural Encmt in Two of Ugandaes Forest and Game Reserves." Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis. University of Wisconsin-Madison. 9. Kabera, John Baptist. 1983. "Land Settlement in Uganda: A Comparative Study of Rural Migrations from Kigezi and Bugisu." Unpublished Ph.D. diserstation. Maker University. 10. UNEP, op. dt., Volume 2. 158 Uganda's Nafional Parks and Reserws 11. Kasfir, Ndson. 1988. 'Land and Ptasats in Western Uganda: Bushenyi and Mbarara Districts." In Holger B. Hansen and Michael Twaddle, eds., Uganda Now: Betwen Decay and Development. Athens, OH: Ohio Universit. Press. 12. McMillan, Della. 1986. "Governmme Assisted Land Settenut: Status and Potential in African Low-Resource Agriculture." U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. (December) Washingwon, D.C. 13. Bruce, op. cit.; Brown, Michael, and Alex Singer, eds. 1990. Buffer Zone Management in Afica. Report of a Workshop held at Mweya Lodge, Queen Elizabeth National Park, Uganda. (October); Land Tenure Center. 1991. "Workshop on Tenure and Management of Natural Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa." (February) Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin-Madison. 14. Bell, R.H.V. 1987. "Conservation with a Human Face: Conflict and Reconciliation in Africa Land Use Planning." In D. Anderson and R. Grove, eds., Conservation in Africa: People, Policies, and Practie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 79-101. 159 CHAIU 13 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGE:S AND ISSUES FOR LAND SETILEMENT IN WEST AFRICA Della McMiwan, Thomas Painter, and 7hayer Scudder A major parasitic disease in the tropics, onchocerciasis (river blindness) has gravely handicapped both human health and socioeconomic development in the river valleys of West Africa. According to the World Health Organization, in the mid-1970s some 10 million people living in the endemic area were infected, and at least 100,000 were blind or had eyesight that was seriously impaired.' The affected areas were not only a last frontier, but they contained some of the most fertile lands available for development. The Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) was launched in 1974 to bring the disease under control. OCP is executed by the World Health Organization (WHO), and carefully monitored by a Committee of Sponsoring Agencies (CSA), which includes WHO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), fth Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Bank. By 1990, twenty-nine donors were financing OCP in eleven West African countries. At that time, OCP was entering its fourth and final phase, during which ongoing surveillance and control activities will be gradually handed over to the participating countries. OCP had two major goals. The first was to break the transmission cycle of the disease through aerial application of larvicides to waters where the carrier (a snall fly of the genus Simlm) breeds. The secomd was to facilitate the socioeconomic development of the river valleys once the disease had been brought under control. The achievement of this second objective was eted to take place through massive population movement into these previously sparsely populated but potentially highly productive areas. Della MdMillan is a Reseacb Affiliate of the Department of Anihropology and Center for African Studies at the University of Florida. She is currendy working as a consulant for the World Bank and for die Vector Bioogy Control Projeca of the U.S. Agency for uenaiional Development. Thou= AL Fainter is dth Regional Manager for West Afnica for CARE/USA. For the past twenty years, he has done extensive resarch in Africa on rual development, naturn resource management. household economy. migration, AIDS and education. Thayer Scudder is Profesr of Anthropology at the California Institute of Technology and one of three diecos of the Instituc for Development Anthropology. For the past thirty-six yeas. his special research topics have the ipact of river basin developnent on local populations, the seilesent of new lands and rural devebpment. 161 Involunary Raeealment In Afrca As often happens, the highly successful disease control program received far more attention than did planning for the sustainable development of the aeas where the diseae was being controlled. Moreover, durinS the late 1970s a major policy decision cut back environmental monitoring of the impacts of the program to focus only on the impacts of larvicide on the aquatic environment. Rates of imnigradon into the area were already accelerating and no provision was made to monitor the environmental consequences of this change. As for policy formulation and development praning, within the CSA only UNDP provided a small mount of seed capital during the first ten years of the program. Donor neglect of the socioeconomic component of OCP continued until the mid- 1980s, when the Committee of Sponsoring Agencies decided to initiate a series of socioeconomic studies. The first was a geographical assessment of natual resource capabilities in the affected areas, curied out by Hunting Technical Services (U.K.) and Organisation et Environnement (Franc). The second, funded by UNDP and executed by the World Bank, was a Land Settlement Review, carried out by the Institute of Development Anthropology (USA). The IDA team began its assessment in 1988 and submitted a set of seven final reports to the Bank in July 1990. Worldng in close association with host country colleagues and institutions, the team carried out field work in four countries (Buridna Faso, Ghana, Mali, and Togo) to assess experiences with spontaneous and government- sponsored land settlement in the affected areas. Four of the seven final reports relate to hose countries. A fifth describes a less intensive survey of land settlement experiences in the other seven OCP countries, including a brief description of envionmiental impacts where such data were available. The remaining reports are a Summary Report and an Executive Summary of fh and recommendationS.2 Part of IDA's task was to famiiarize the eleven OCP countries, the CSA, and the donors with the global experience relatng to land settlement in the tropics and subtopics, and with the relevance of that experience to the West African river basins which were the subject of the study. Global data ilustrate the dynamics of the settlement process and expose a wide range of critical issues that should be addressed to increase the chances for scessfl development.3 Success was defined in terms of envirnently sustainable increases in production; rising living standards for the various types of settlers, for the host population, and for pastoralists; and potential for significant spread effects, at a financial cost that could be borne by the OCP countries. Resulting from this broad approach to settlement experience, the Final Report recommended a set of low-cost devdopment strategies that could be applied in each of the eleven countries, with modifications as needed to bring them into line with national policies and distinctive national features. In this chapter, we describe the development potential of land settlement in the OCP countries, and outline some of the study's most importnt fdigs. 162 Land Saletenit in West Afria Te Potdtl of Lmd S-eane Policyimakers and planners have seriously underestimated the longer-ern development potential of wel-planed and well-iuplmented land slement programs. This underetimion of the potential is pardy bued on the poor initial returns found for a large majority of land settlement projects after a few years of implementation. For examnple, in a 1978 Issues Paper on land settlement, the World Bank concluded that three to five years after the start of inqlementation, economic rates of return were at least SO percent below appraisal estimates.4 A later review of land settlement projects conducted by the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department cuae to a more posidve conclusion. Projects focused on land setdement generally had satisfactory rates of return, fulfilled a range of other development criteria, and had major multiplier effects. A second reason for undrestimating the potential of land settlement is planners' poor understanding of the settlement process. During the initial years, settlers must behave conservatively, as they try first to regain food security while familiarizing themselves with a new environent, new neighbors, and new govemment officials. It is unrealistic to expect them to achieve rapid increases in productivity during this setting- in phase. Once food security is achieved, however, setder households in West Africa as elsewhere rapidly become risk-takers capable of significant economic and social change. Provided the opporunities are there - and this is where government policy and planning are vital - a majority of settlers can become more development-oriented than their neighbors or than they theslves were before resettlement. Study Finig The development strategies ed in the Land Settlemen Review reflect three prmses relatng to rural devdepment. The first is that the agriculral and nonagricultural sectors are closely linked. More specifically, it is the rising disposable income of small-scale rural produers that drives development forward dunng its early stages. The second premise is that land settlement poses similar problems and opportmities tiroughout the tropics and subtropics, which elicit similar responses both from settlers and from host populdations. The third premise is that the major resource involved in rural devdopment is the people concerned. Consequnly, project design should pay much doser attention to people's needs and desires, planning to facilitate development rather than to superimpose preconceived programs on settler populations. While crop agriculture is an essential starting point, settlers around the world prefer. and strive for, more diversified production systems. Setders are initially corcened with ensuring dthir short-term food security. As this objective is achieved, they start to invest in more valuable cash crops, in livestock, and in additional land, followed by investmen in education of children (for nonfarm employment) and in a range of small-scale commercial activities. Settlers may fail to achieve their goals for reasons beyond their control, such as isolation from markets and unfavorable national policies. The importance of such contais shows why the 163 Invowutary Resetlement In Africa development of settement areas requires hvorable national development policies and the assistance of govermnent services as well as of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In addition to economic viability, special attention must also be paid to the social viability of settlement areas. Constr. nts that must be overcome include isolatiouj, lack of amenities and social services, an, nflict with the host population and other traditional resource users. All of these interfere with the formation of viable rural communities. Assuming a favorable national policy conte.t for agriculture and rural development in general, the study recommended: * Focusing on rainfed rather tan irrigation-based land settlement. * Promodtng diversified production systems at the household and community levels, rather than a narrow emphasis on farming systems. * Assisting spontaneous settlement rather than planning government- sponsored settlement programs. X Developing the less-isolated areas preferred by sponuteous settlers, as opposed to renote areas with poor access to roads, services, and markets. - Using line ministries to plan and deliver services, rather than specialized settlement agencies. - Active involvement of local organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). With respect to the enviromental aspects of land settlement programs, the study recommended that govermment and NGO assistance should emphasize policies that would encourage settlers and pastoralists to establish roots in the area, including security of land temnre or specified use rights, together with access to water and other natural resources, health care, schools, and markets. The promotion of diversified production systems should incorporate host populations and pastoralists as well as settler households, and should provide economic opportunities for wives, children, and other dependents as well as for household heads. Within settlement areas, natural resource management strategies should be dveloped as early as possible, based on active involvement by the major local interest groups in resource mapping and zoning for different land uses. Can The Development Potetial of Lad Setlement Be Realzed? The longer-term development potential of land settlement can be realized only if appropriate policies and plans are implemented. During a September 1990 seminar in Ouagadougou where the findings of this study were presented to representatives of ten 164 Land Settlement in West Africa of the eleven OCP countries, prolonged discussion of several of its conclusions showed that significant differences of opinion still exist among African policymakers. These were especially clear with respect to the recommendation that future emphasis be placed on areas with better access to major markets and services, as opposed to the more isolated areas that govrnments would like to develop with donor funding. Other areas of concern included the recommendations that customary systems of land tenure should be the starting point for providing security of tenure, and that pastoralists using the same resources on a seasonal basis should be integrated into the projects along with host communities and settler households. In contrast, the representatives present strongly backed a study recommendation to establish an international socioeconomic development unit based in West Africa to assist OCP countries with planning (including planner training), monitoring, and evaluation. Donor representatives present at the meeting were, however, relatively cool to the idea. Participants broadly agreed to the recommended preference for assisted spontaneous settlement, as well as to most other conclusions of the study. Need to Emphasize Assisted Spontaneous Settlement The IDA team rejected primary emphasis on either spontaneous settlement or govermnent-sponsored settlement as inappropriate for the OCP countries. Dominant throughout the ttopics in terms of settler numbers, spontaneous settlement - in whi_h households move in their own initatve to areas where they perceive opportunmities for improved welfare - tends to be characterized by low productivity that is not environmentally sustainable, and to be associated with few spread effects. Government- sponsored settlement involves a relatively small number of households at high cost, and has a relatively low success rate. Instead of sponuteous settlement or government-sponsored settlement, we advocated assisted spontaneous settlement, combined in some circumstances with government-sponsored settement where people are forced to move involuntarily, as for example by a dam project. Assisted spontaneous settlement capitalizes on the initiative of settlers who have the enterprise to move on their own. Its goal is to achieve productive and environmentally sustainable communities that combine spontaneous settlers with the indigenous communities and pastoralists already present, by guiding spontaneous settlers into appropriate areas, and by extending a range of services. While guided setlement is less expensive than govenmment-sponsored settlement, no type of planned settlement is inexpensive, because planners rmust deal with problem-prone areas that lack infrasuctumre, especially roads, water supply, and market centers. As for combining government-assisted spontaneous settlement with government- sponsored settlement, the Land Settlement Review recommended two models. The first incorporates surrounding communities into pre-existing government-sponsored settlements, as is currently ocurring in Burkina Faso.' The second, seldom encountered in real life, advocates combining from the start a "core" of sponsored settlers with a 165 Involuntary Resettlement in Africa larger population that includes hosts, government-assisted spontaneous settlers, and pastoralists. We would not recommend this second option as a stand-alone" project, but rather as a means for increasing the benefits of large-scale national projects by incorporating a broader land settlement component. Examples include the construction of dams in areas of low population density (where the core of sponsored settlers is made up of those who must relocate from the reservoir basin), the establishment of forest reserves and national parks, and the integration of irrigation projects involving sponsored settlers into a wider area of rainfed agriculture. Combining govertnent-sponsored and government-assisted spontaneous settlement has a number of attractive features. For example, in planning for a core of sponsored settler households, government has the opportunity to create or expand markets and service centers that can serve not only the sponsored settlers but the larger population in the surrounding area as well. Because sponsored settlement allows a greater degree of government control, a core of sponsored settlers also provides the opportunity to introduce sustainable production systems that can subsequently be extended to the surrounding population. Need for Intnaonal Assistance Regardless of type, the implementation of land settlement takes time. As with vector contmro, governments and donor institutions must commit funds over fifteen to twenty years. Land setdement as a development intervention concems setder households which must evolve through a sequence of stages in relatively isolated, problem-prone areas. A special type of knowledge and planning is needed. The Land Settlement Review emnphasized the need for "an appropriately funded, staffed, and located international institution ... to facilitate dissemination of information on lessons leamed that relate to planning, inmlementing, monitoring, and evaluating the development of OCP areas." Without such an insttution, donors and national governments will approach land settlement piecemeal. Not only will this jeopardize the implementation of successful development programs, it will also place at risk the river basins themselves, as vector control alone facilitates spontaneous settlement with attendant risks of environmental degradation. While project implementaltion is clearly a national finction, the international socioeconomic development institution might be a small planning, training and infonnation-disseminating unit that could provide assistance to country planning ministries and to national onchocerciasis committees. To be effective, this unit should have a clear mandate and support from the OCP countries and the CSA for an active, outreaching mode of operation. It would initiate contacts with national planning ministries and national onchocerciasis comniittees in order to keep in focus OCP-related socioeconomic development issues and lessons learned from past and ongoing programs, as well as providing assistance to national and regional bodies on request. 166 Land Seudment in Wet Africa Selection of Setdemeut Areas The Lund Settlement Review reconmends that "Government strategies ... should emphasize the less-isolated areas that settlers prefer, as opposed to remote areas with poor access to markets and services--the exception being where isolated areas contain resources (such as water and forests) that require protection, or are the focal point for other development programs (such as dam construction)." This was the most controversial recommendation among our African colleagues. It was based on a number of empirical research findings. First, spontaneous settlers show a definite preference for less-isolated areas. Second, the most successful settlements are those located close to such capitals as Ouagadougou and Bamako, or to major regional centers. Third, financial costs rise significantly with the degree of isolation of an area. As the exception in the recommendation indicates, the Land Settlement Review did not suggest that only the less-isolated areas be developed. More emphasis could have been placed, however, on the circumstances under which more-isolated areas might be selected. For exnample, in some countries spomaneous settlers are rapidly filling up the less-isolated areas. In these countries, govermnents should select and develop appropriate areas in advance of the wave of settlement. The increasing pressure on pastoral peoples warrants careful consideration of setting aside and developing appropriate areas of low population density for their use, areas that are apt to be quite isolated. Because of the costs involved, however, and the difficulty of finding donors willing to commit funds for extended time periods, such areas must be carefully selected and limited in number. Land Tetue Recommendation number ten in the Land Settlement Review is that customary temire sysms as opposed to state or private ownership of land, should be the starting point for providing security of tenure to hosts, settlers, and pastoralists in OCP areas. Given the need for settlers and pastoralists to live with host populations that clain customary temnre over the local resource base, including land, and given the frequent abuses that have followed from state ownership of land or legislation establishing individual ownership.' we believe that there is no option but to use customary tenure systems as the starting point. Ideally, control of tenure should be eventually handed over to legally mandated commnity land management associations, as described below. Addhional Areas of Coneem The successful control of river blindness has indeed given the landlocked Sudano-Sahelian regions of West Africa some additional breathing space to address the difficult task of intensifying their traditional cropping, livestock, and forestry systems.8 Sooner or later, however, this breathing space will vanish. Time is already runmning out in some countries. In twenty or thirty years we are likely to see a saturation of river basins in the OCP countries, similar to what is already occurring in Burkina Faso. When this 167 Involuntary Resettlement in Africa occurs, not only will the national governments have fewer options, but these options will be more expensive. Three areas that need immediate coordinated donor attention are: 1. Reinforcement of local land management institutions. 2. Projects to elicit the active participation of pastoralists in sound natural resource managemnent at the community level. 3. Development of income-arning opportunities related to renewable forest products. LocAL LND MANMGEMENT lNSI7oTIU70h. Donors should support local institutions that provide leadership in sound natural resource management. Local people are more likely to support sound resource management if they see some tangible short-term benefit from this participation. National policies to reinforce their land tenure rights, or programs that raise rural incomes and living standards, might provide these benefits. The village land management (Gestion/amEnagement des Terroirs Villageois - GTV) approach, which is currently being tried in the Sahelian states of West Africa, may provide innovative techniques for more effective local-level management of natural resources in the Sahelian zone of the OCP region, and may prove useful for the coastal OCP countries as well. The success of these village land management associations requires (a) strong national support for the land management committee's legal status; (b) committed participation by the indigenous hosts as well as immigrants; and (c) strengthened sectoral funding to develop and maintain education, health, water, and rural road projects in the participating villages. The first two requirements are generally considered to be within the scope of the existing village land managernent projects. The third is not, but it is just as critical to good natural resource management. Without targeted investment in infrastructure and government services, village leaders will not be able to convince either settlers or hosts that some tangible benefit will result from their willingness, for instance, to forego the extra income that could be earned from abusive wood cutting, or to invest land and labor in soil erosion control programs or spare cash in agricultural equipment and fertilizer. The OCP river basins especially, because of their historic lack of settlemnt. have few access roads, basic health services, or schools. For the same reason, these areas are often distant from administive and market centers and do not benefit from NGO services and programs. While the GTV approach is still experimental, it promises to increase local awareness of the relationship between natural resource management and sustainable agropastoral production in the OCP areas, and to enable local authorities to manage productive resources on the basis of wider community interests. 168 Land Sealement in Weat Africa Experience with the GTV approach in the Sahelian OCP countries of Burkdna Faso, Mali, and Niger reveals several issues that must be addressed before community- based institutions for resource nmangement can be successful, and before elanents of the GTV approach can be considered for use in other OCP countries.' First, the model of natural resource magmnt embedded in the GTV approach is that of sedenutay village communities. In practice, however, and throughout the OCP countries, patterns of resource use among mobile pastoralist populations differ considerably from those of sedentary farinng populations. These contrasting, and increasingly conflicting, indigenous modes of resource use must be considered in promoting local-level resource management. Second, the model places undue stress on the appropriated land unit (terroir) as a site used by settler and host households for generating the real income they need for their livelihoods. Planners seeking more effective natual resource management through local-level institutions nmst be aware that people in OCP settlement areas may be reluctant to invest labor and capital in natural resource management when they have access to altemative, perhaps less risky, though often more distant, investment options. Interregional and international migrations link the village comnunity with other areas offering such options. Third, governments in the OCP countries must transfer power to the local level institutions that are being promoted for natural resource nmnagemnt. In all OCP countries, governments claim land ownership of last resort, and thus they have final authority over how land is allocated and used. Unless this arrangement is changed, that is, until governments formally empower local institutions to make decisions about access to and use of natural resources, we cannot expect a great deal of local-level commitment to these institions. To date, and despite lengthy discussions about decentalization in West Africa, governments in the OCP countries are hedging when it comes to effectively transferring power to the comnmity level for purposes of natural resource managment. It is necessary to monitor progress of govenments in the OCP region in addressing such issues, and to examine the factors that contribute to or detract from success among local-level instiions in managing natural resources for agropastoral production. As there are so few examples of formally constituted village land management progrms, research horizons should be widened to examine other types of community-based organizations that are associated with the implementation of environmentally sustainable systems or components of such systems. PAR7TaPA7WoN OF PAsroAUjszS. Livestock is - and is likely to remain - the princial means of investment for farmers in the OCP areas. Moreover, livestock mamnre is an essential component of intensive crop production. The amount of labor required to keep large animals on-farm generally forces farmers to board their animals with professional herders. Pastoralists have long been one of the main groups who have used the OCP river valleys, both as part of dteir seasonal migration paterns and as passageways to coastal country markets. Lage areas of the Sahelian and Sudano- SaheLian regions of West Africa are belter suited for grazing than for setled agriculture, 169 Involuntwy ReseulemN in Africa while the high incidence of tryp is in the forest zones creates a natural market the for pastoralist livestock products. Intensification of Africa's pastoral production systems has remained one of the great 'black holes" of agricultural development research. Neverheless, Africa's pastoral production systems have been able to survive without major incident beyond a steady decline in their role in export earnings.'0 Now even their survival is threatened, in part because of increased setdement resulting from successful onchocerciasis control. Since the late 1960s, the northward drift of sedentary agricultural production systems has esadated the pressure on pastoral resources in the lower rainfall areas of the Sahelian OCP countries. One result has been a steady shift southward in the pattern of pastoralist transhumancy and permanent residence. This southward migration is runing into direct conflict with the agricultura migras moving to the same areas for many of the same reasons. The peaceful iotegration of farmers and herders throughout the OCP river basins is sttng to break down. We believe that the breakdown of these basic social systems is far more serious than the failure of development interventions. The principal indicator of growing competition for river basin land is a steady increase in the level of pastoralist- agriculturalist conflict. In some comtries, local-level conflic have been escaled by the need to seek scpegoats for worsening economic conditions. About two years ago, Ghana enacted a national law that expelled 'alien" pastoralists from her territory. During the same period, several isolated attacks on Fulani villages in northern Cote d'Ivoire caused many pastoralists to flee across the border into Burkina Faso's souther river basins. In the last six months, violent killings have takea place on the Mali-Burkina Faso border, and several hundred migrating animals (but not their herders) were slaughtered on the Benin- Burlina Faso border. These incidents are but pale shades of things to come unless West rican governmens are helped to devdop better progams and policies to integrate pastoralists in the process of national developmt. The need for better programs to work with pastoralists - in ways that elicit the active participation of the pastoralists themselves - applies to Africa as a whole. One could argue, however, that OCP is both a cause and a possible solution to the problem. The sparsely populated river basins have long provided an "escape hatch" for pastoralists pushed out of other lands by the stedy expansion of settled farming. Because of the successful control of river blindness, these river basins are now being occupied, some very actively. If these settlement trends continue, it will be increasingly difficult for the landlocked Sabelian countries to export their pastoralist "problems" to the south. The clash that can be observed in the OCP river basins of norhern Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and southen Burkina Faso, and along the Mali-Burkina Faso border, will have enornous enviromental consuences. One possible solution involves the delineation of large agropastoral zones that will be reserved exclusively for intensive herding. At the present time, the settlement density 170 Land Settlement In West Africa in many of the OCP river basins is still low enough that it would be possible to reserve large tracts of land for this purpose with only minimal involuntary relocation of settled farmers. So far, however, only a fraction of the agropastoral zones originally planned for the OCP river basins has actually been created. Those that were created have often been left unfinished. Little investment has been made in the health and education services and the rural roads that would make the zones agreeable places to live. Almost no attempt has been made to equip the pastoralist land management associations with the necessary literacy or accounting skills to manage the zones. In most cases, the pastoralists' legal title to land in the agropastoral zones has also remained unclear. These four domains: boundary delineation, legal title, local institutional development, and reinforcing sector investments should receive priority for donor funding. There is also a strong need to monitor and evaluate existing programs, especially the few successful projects that have already been implemented in the valleys. RENEWABLE FORES7RY RESOURcES. A high percentage of West Africa's remaining natural forest cover and protected forest and wildlife areas is located in the OCP river basins. These areas have been saved by their historic isolation. Land use planning for the valleys must therefore include natural resource planning to preserve some portion of the remaining forest cover and wildlife. Past experience with classified forests shows that the simple delineation of boundaries around protected forests does not protect them from illegal cutting and grazing. Without the active participation of the local population in boundary nforcement, national gover_nents must rely on an expensive, dense network of extension agents or rangers to enforce their zoning rles. Few West African countries have the financial resources to support this sort of direct regulation. Govermnent planning that gives local populations a vested economic interest in the management and protection of wildlife and forests is more likely to be successful. Several donors and govermnents have already started experimental programs to develop income opportnities from renewable forest resources in the OCP river basins. These renewable resources include honey, charcoal, firewo d, and shea nut or karite butter. Several of these projects have been quite successful in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The genius of the concept is that it creates a group of people with a vested economic interest in preserving the natural forest cover. The same model can be used to control illegal cutting, grazing, and fanning in the classin-ed forests. In contrast to the village land management comnittees and agropastoral zones. in this case a number of highly successful projects follow the same general program model. Donor support for local-level research will therefore be less necessary here than in the other two priority areas. Interventions neee to focus on (a) incorporating income from forestry resources into a wider production system at household and community levels, since income from forest products alone is seldom sufficient to provide an adequate economic return to users; (b) expanding the managed forest model to embrace other large areas of contiguous forest; and (c) developing an appropriate body of 171 Invouway RaseUleent in Africa supportive tax and subsidy policies that will make these locally managed forestry projects profitable. Conludons Today, new lands settlement is proceeding rapidly in Burkina Faso. Within the near future, large areas of Togo's most accessible river basins with good potential for crop production will undoubtedly be settled. The same can be said for Mali. By 1995, a mere twenty years after onchocerciasis control starte, the options open to West Africa's agropastoralists will be dramatically different. If current population trends continue, the time line will be longer in some of the less densely settled OCP countries. Ultimately, however, here too the natural forests will be cut down through shifting cultivation, the only way for extensive farming to be sustainable. Warning signals were issued for Burkina Faso in a series of environmental and economic impact studies as early as 1973. What has transpired in Burkina Faso has exceeded any expectation at that dme. Although the rates of settlement have been much slower in other countries, they are likely to increase over the next twenty years. The current downtun in the economies of the Guinea Coast countries and changing patterns of interregional migration are likely to speed up, rather than slow down, these setdement trends. The research reported in this chapter provides ample evidence that new land settlenent in the OCP river basins can galvanize a wider process of dynamic regional econormic growth and development. To accomplish this, however, requires assistance. Such assistance includes government progrms to provide the roads, water points, and services that make susinable land management also profitable. In addition, three priority areas need to be addressed now: local institutions for land management, pastoralism, and forestry. The environmental and social costs of inaction in this case will be especially high. 172 Land Settlement in West Africa NOTES I . World Health Organization. 1985. Dix Annees de Lutte contre l 'Onchocercose en Afrique de l 'Ouest. Bilan des Activit6s du Programme de Lutte contre l'Onchocercosc dans la R6gion du Bassin de la Volta de 1974 a 1984. Geneva: Onchocerciasis Control Programme. 2. These reports are available as IDA Working Papers Nos. 63 through 69. All published July 1990, in Binghamton, New York by the Institute for Development Anthropology. They include: (1) McMillan, Della, Jean-Baptiste Nana, and Kimseyinga Savadogo. Land Settlement Review - Cowntry Case Study: Burkina Faso.; (2) Akwabi- Ameyaw, Kofi. Lad Settlement Rewew - Country Case Study: Ghana.; (3) Painter, Thomas. Land Settlement Revew - Country Case Study: Togo.; (4) Koenig, Dolores. Land Settlement Review - Country Case Study: Mali.; (5) Buursirnk, John, and Thomas Painter. Land Settlement Review: A Review of Settlement Experiences in Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.; (6) McMillan, Della, Thomas Painter, and Thayer Scudder. Land Settlement Revew - Final Report.; and (7) McMillan, Della, Thomas Painter, and Thayer Scudder. Land Settlement ReWiew - Executive Summwry. In addition to hanking the authors of the above reports, we wish to give special thanks to David W. Brokensha who directed the IDA Land Settement Review until handing over direction to the thre of us in November 1989. 3. Scudder, Thayer. 1984. The Development Potential of New Lands Settlement in the Tropics and Subtropics: A Global State-f-the-Art Evaluaion with Specdfic Emphasis on Policy Implications. USAID Program Evaluation DiscLssion Paper No. 21. Washington. D. C.: U.S. Agency for Intemational Development.; See also Scudder, Thayer. 1985. 'A Sociological Framework for the Analysis of New Lands Settlement." In Michael M. Cernea, ed., Puting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development. New York: Oxford University Press. 4. Goering, T. J. 1978. Agricultural Land Settlement. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 5. World Bank. 1985. The Experience of the World Bank with Govemment- SponsoredLand Settlement. Operations Evaluation Department Report No. 5625. (May) Washington, D.C. 6. See McMillan, Nana, and Savadogo, op. ct. 7. Horowitz, Michael M. 1989. "Victims of Development." In Development Anthropology Network Vol. 7, No. 2: 1-8. 8. Berg, E. J., J. Bisilliat, M. Burer, H. Graetz, R. Melville, V. Volyvan, J. Park, R. C. Sawadogo, H. Sederlof, and K. van der Meer. 1978. "Onchocerciasis Control Programme: OCP Economic Review Mission." Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 173 Involwuary Resetlement in Africa 9. Painter, Thomas. 1991. "Approaches to Improving the Use of Natural Resources for Agriculture in Sahelian West Africa: A Sociological Analysis of the Amenagement/Gestion des Terroirs Villageois Approach and Its hIplications for Non- Governmental Organizations." (Febuary) New York: CARE International. 10. McCabe, J. Terrence. 1991. "Livestock Development, Policy Issues, and Anthropology in East Africa." In Della McMillan, ed., Andhropology and Food Policy: Human Dinensions of Food Policy in Afnca and Lin America. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press. 174 CHAFE 14 POPULATION TRENDS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA Jean-Marie Coar The objective of this paper is to show that, over the long term, the capacity of Sub-Saharan Africa to find a sustained and sustainable path to economic development depends to a considerable degree on the conditions under which the necessary population redistribution takes place. The pace of that redistnbution will be imposed by the rapid rate of populadon growth within the region. In this long-term perpective, we are mainly concerned with the major trends of settlement on the African continent, the net migratory flows (between countries, between natural regions, and between rural and urban areas) which determine such settlement, and the structual changes in the African economies which should result. We will draw from this some conclusions in terms of country development strategies and the appropriate forms of intervention for their external partners. Over the long term, it is clearly the demographic explosion and its geopolitical, economic, social, and envental consequences, which constitutes the most important event in the contemporary history of the African continent. In 1930, the population of Africa was about 130 million people. Today it exceeds 500 million. Even if significant and rapid progress is made in ferdlity management, we know that the population of Africa will exceed a billion in twenty to twenty-five years, and that a figure of 1.5 billion will undoubtedly be altained around the year 2030. In a single cenotury, in other words over the course of four to five generations, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa will have increased more than tenfold. Today, Sub-Saharan Africa is in the central phase of its demographic transition. This is the time when the rates of growth and of strumcual change are the highest, and where the resulting imbalances are the most marked. Despite some hesitation here and there, most African countries are now convinced that population growth must be brought under control. Let us assume that everything is done to ensure that the overall population growth rate of Sub-Saharan Africa is lowered as fast as possible, so that the limit of a billion people is not reached until after 2010 (but surely before 2020), and that the billion and a half mark is not reached until after 2030 (but probably not later than 2060). Based on the plausible hypothesis that, in this not so distant fuure, Africa will not become a 'nighmr" and Africans will sdll be surviving, three simple questions Jean-Marie Com is a civil engineer and senior economist in die Africa Technical Department of the Wodd Bank. He is presently seconded by the Bank to the OECD in Paris to manage dte West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study. 175 Involuntary Resettlement in Africa concerning the future of the region suggest themselves. The first question which comes to mind is, "Where will these billion Africans be living in the year 2010 or 2020?" The second question that should be asked is, "What will provide the economic basis for the survival and the satisfaction of basic needs for the African families of the year 2010 or 2020?" Finally, the third inevitable question relates to the accumulation of capital represented by the tenfold increase of the African population in less than a century: "How will the necessary investment in human settlements be financed?" Flrst Question: Where WMI the Africas Uve? Before addressing questions relating to the distribution of this population among the countries of Africa and between urban and rural environments, let us begin by recalling the magnitude of past trends and the prospects for population growth in Africa in relation to the rest of the world. AFRICAN POPUUJION AD WORLD POPULTION. Today, Sub-Saharan Africa contains 10 percent of the world's population, compared to 7 percent in 1950. This proportion will reach 13 perent in 2010, 17 percent in 2030, and should reach 20 percent around the middle of the next century. But more interesting information for decisiomnakers concerns the changing contribution of Africa to the pattern of world population growth. While in 1950 Africa represented only 8 percent of the world's population growth increment, in 1990 it represented 18 percent, and will reach 30 percent in 2010, 35 percent in 2030, and close to 50 percent over the longer run. Let us remember these ratios. They will help us to understand the magnitude of the need for infrastucture investments, in order for people to spread out and settle sustainably on the Africaa continent. They will also help us to understand why net resource transfers are and will continue to be ever-more necessary to make sure that such settlement is carried out under acceptable human conditions. D7BuTON BETwEENcoEw sADI.rAWTJoNAL mGraTIoN. A qick look at the maps showing natural resource development potential in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that a tenfold increase in population necessarily implies significant shifts in the spatial distribution of the population. If. in 1990, the population of Africa was distributed as it was in 1930, the situation would be unbearable in some parts of the continent (Great Lakes countries, Sahel region) and the continent would be, on the whole, nmch poorer than it is now. If this were the case, C6te d'Ivoire would still be a small country of 5 to 6 million people today, instead of 12 million, and would be considerably less densely populated than Rwanda. Inten.,tional nigrations in Sub-Saharan Africa are not well-known because they are most often carried out in a clandestine manner, and people prefer not to know about them. But, after the fact, one is forced to acknowledge their importance. Although part of the migratory flows represents people who have been forcibly displaced or who are fleeing areas of conflict, these international migrations are essentially based on economic motives, and the long-term consequences of these flows are logical and predictable. 176 Popukaton 7rds and Economic Growh in Sub-Sharan Afrlca C6te d'lvoire is the most important country for immigration in Sub-Sahn Africa. Since independence, it has received more than 3 million migrants, mainly coming from the Sahel. This country is, after Australia, the second country on the planet in the number of immigrants per inhabitant. It has accepted three times as many inumigrants per resident as the United States and Canada, and fourteen times as many as France. Some twelve other Sub-Saharan African countries appear to have received net positive flows of migrants, although the data are not well known. The main ones are the Republic of South Africa, Zaire, Uganda, and Senegal. Ghana has ceased since the early 1960s to be a receiving country. The total number of immigrants installed since independence represents between 5 percent and 10 percent of the total population of the receiving countries Inunigrants may even be in the majority in some border regions, such as in north and south Kivu in Zaire. Country demographic projections, prepared by the countries themselves and by international institutions, always assume zero net migration or flows tending rapidly toward zero. This is the easiest assumption to make, but it is often the least realistic, and the least courageous, not to say the most damaging, from a political point of view. Such assumptions lend support to a ewelopment strategy which, if it were followed, would create unmanageable situations. Let us consider, for example, the long-term demographic projections prepared by the World Bank (1990 edition), which are based on migratory flows tending towards zero in the year 2000. Gabon and Rwanda are assigned future populations of 6 million and 61 million respectively, corresponding to an average density of 23 persons per square kilometer in the former, and 2,400 persons per square kilometer in the latter, or seven tnes the present density of Belgium! Rwanda, of course, is an essentially rural hill country, without villages, where each household lives on its own holding. These projections would lead us to assume an average future farm size of 600 square nfters (0.06 hectares). Obviously there will never be 61 million people in Rwanda, nor 67 million in Niger. The reproductive behavior of households will change long before these thresholds are reached, and the African population will be redeployed across the continent. But in this case. where will the people of Rwanda, or Niger, or Malawi be found? Which countries will take them in, and what developmeut strategies will have to be adopted in the countnies of origin and destination? What investments will be needed, and how will they be financed? What are the costs and bmefits of these migratory flows? These questions cannot be avoided forever on the grounds that they are politically sensitive. Experience shows that by refusing to ask such questions, we mn a major risk of making an incorrect diagnosis of the situation, making inappropriate investment choices, and more fundlamentally, choosing the wrong development strategy. Let us return to the example of C6te d'Ivoire, immigration country par exceUlece, at least until the present economic crisis. Many of the criticisms commonly 177 Involuntary Resettlement In Africa made of the development model followed for several decades now by C8te d'lvoire are based on certain supposedly undesirable consequences of its policies of internal mobility and free imunigration. But we often ignore the long-term advanages of these policies, which are the counterparts of these supposedly undesirable effects. A systematic analysis of the costs and benefits of these policies shows, in fact, that at the regional level, these policies have had and continue to have a net positive economic effect. Clearly, the social, economic, and environmental problems of the Sahel would be much worse if all the coastal countries of West Africa had closed their doors to immigration, as Ghana and Guinea have done. Let us then give serious thought to the dangers of encouraging countries like C6te d'lvoire to slow down internal and external migration in order to re- establish their own economic equilibrium. INThRNAL MIGRA77ONs. Intemational migrations are only one aspect of the profound changes affecting the settlement process in African countries. Generally, people are moving from the savanna into the forest, from the high plateaus to the valleys recently freed from onchocerciasis and trypanosomiasis, from isolated areas into areas better served by infrastructure, and of course, from rural areas to towns and cities. However, internal mobility varies a great deal from one country to another: quite low in Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Burundi, and Rwanda; high in Burldna Faso and Kenya; and extremely high in Cote d'lvoire. It is noteworthy that the countries which have most restricted internal mobility generally show the least satisfactory ecoromic performance. But it is just as surprising to note that these themes are so rarely treated in economic reports, nor are they taken into account in the design of stabilizadon and sructural adjustmerit policies. URBANzJAIoN. One of the most visible manifestations of the redistribution of the African population is the phenomenon of urbanization. Between 1930 and 1980, the urban population of Sub-Saharan Africa increased fifteen-fold, while the rural population grew by 220 percent, and the average share of urban population in each country increased from 6 percent to 30 percent. It is likely that the total urban population will quadruple once again between 1980 and 2010. While the rural population will continue to increase, Sub-Saharan Africa's urban population will exceed 50 percent of the total sometime before 2010 (see Tables 15-1 to 15-3). Is such an urban explosion really likely to happen? This is a complex question, but the answer is unquestionably affirmative. Let us first consider the population dynamics of settlement on a continental scale, and then consider the long-term prospects for economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sustained and sustainable growth is inconceivable vithout such urbanization, which must be the principal engine of economic development. Urbanization The Driving Force of Population Redistribution in Mrica The history of our planet shows that the can be no substantial flows of internal or international migration without a sustained urbanization process, and we have seen that 178 Population 7ends and Economic Growth 9 S-Saharan Aftica such international migrations are indispensable to the long-term equilibrium of the continent. As in most of the settled and developed countries today, inter-regional migrations in Sub-Saharan Africa are driven by urban development, even if they result in the colonization of rural areas. In the former Belgian Congo, as in Caneroon and Cote d'lvoire today, the famling frontier and the development of plantation agriculture followed and still follow the networks created by urban places and infrastructure links. The colonization of rural areas is often undertaken by urban agents, acting as promoters or intennediaries. Similarly, if one excludes the population movements resulting from war and other conflicts, international migrations almost always flow from the countries with the lowest rates of urban development to the most urbanized and those with the highest rates of urban growth. In contrast to commonly accepted ideas, the process of urbanization in Sub- Saharan Africa does not produce overgrown megalopolises drainig the surrounding regions of thdir resources. Urban growth is relatively balanced between capital cities, secondary cities, and economically viable small towns. The number of urban centers with more than 100,000 inhitants inesed from 12 in 1930 to 32 in 1950 and 173 in 1980, and will reach 600 in the year 2010. Over the same time period, the total number of urban centers, increasing from 250 to 8,000, will have increased hirty-two times (see Table 15-4). And even if urbanization does proceed at the rapid pace indicated by this table, the total rural population wil condnue to increase for more than half a centuy (see Tablks 15-5 and 15-6). Considering te present demographic and geopolitical context of Sub-Saharan Africa, the recomendations to slow the growth of capital cities and to deconcentrate some of their activities are, with few exceptions, unjustified. Scond QluestincE How Will Tihe HoseD_ols Live and What Wl the National Econmnes of Sub-Sahar Afica Look like Thirty Years From Now? The preceding discussion, showing that the spatial redistribution of popuion is necessary from the point of view of natural resource management and en l protecdon, and that urban centers are the driving force structuring settlement patterns and land use, is interesting in a long-term perspective. But African decisionmakers and their exteral partmers cannot be satisfied with this analysis. We must also show that this population redistnbution, which will ultimately be required, is economically efficient today, and is in fact a necessary condidon for sustained and sustinable economic development. We turn now to a review of a few major economic effects of population redistribution, with specidal attention to its principal element, the urbanizaion process. These effects relate to the division of labor, the emergence of a market economy, the growth of productivity aud incomes in nual areas as well as in urban areas, and the 179 Involutary Resetlement in Afrtica development of human resources. The effects of population dynamics on capital acctmulation will be discussed in the response to the third question. URANrZA TION ISA NECESSARY CONDITON OF INOME GROW IN RURAL AREAS AND OF AGRICULIMRAL NwICTON. This argument is well-known. By establishing a division of labor, creating a consumer demand for rural products such as food, fuel, construction materials, and offering new models for consumption, new products and new services, urbanization provides incentives for rural households to sell more so as to be able to buy more. By raising expectations, urbanization reduces the perceived risks of inv-sttnent and thus facilitates the growth of rural production and productivity. At the same time it accelerates the monetarization of the rural economy and facilitates the circulation of cash, which then promotes resource mobilizadon in other forms. Despite the losses that may be incurred at a national level in terms of net inportation of food products, the correlation between food production per farmer and the ratio of total population to rural population is very clear. The demand for food created by non-food-producing consumers provides incentives for growth in food production by armners, rather than the presence of a food surplus being the driving force behind urbanization. A study of rural-urban exchanges shows that, in an average size country, internal trade in goods and services between urban and rul areas is at least as important as extenal trade, and that rural-urban trade tends to become the main source of income for the rural population. For example, in a country where the rate of urbanization is 30 percent and where the urban population is growing twice as fast as the national average, each farmer has a potal market for food products growing at 4 percent per year over the long term. There are few counties whose export markets offer such promising prospects for growth. Agricultural intensification requires high growth in the use of inputs, which farmers can only buy if their gross cash incomes are regularly increasing. A Rwandan farmer, who can only allocate a few square meters to the cultivation of export crops, purchases just 10 percent of the inputs bought by a farmer in C6te d'Ivoire, but spends the same proportion of gross cash income. The Ivoirian farmer has access over the long term to an expanding regional market, and thus has a good chance to gain a growing cash income. In contrast, the Rwandan fmer, even if much more sldlled and harder working, is likely to be increasingly less able to meet the costs of intensification, however necessary this may be in this overpopulated rural country in which it is practically impossible to increase the cultivated area. In the long term, the engine of growth in agricultural productivity and rual incomes is, and will be ever-more, the regional-urban market. Agriculture by itself is not likely to be the engine of sound and sustainable economic growth in Sub-Sabaran Africa. It would be more accurate to say that this engine is the monetarized regional demand (over and above subsistence) to which the different sectors of the economy must be mobilized to respond. 180 Populadon Trends and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa This demand-driven growth model has worked more or less well up to now, despite the effects of climate change, the insufficient infrastructure, the competition of imports and food aid, and the numerous attempts that have been made to hold it back by all sorts of restrictive measures, including constraints on personal mobility as well as constraints on trade. Can this model continue to function at least as well as it has done in the past, if not better? On the institutional side, structural adjustment policies have, at least in principle, reduced distortions and re-established a favorable environment for economic growth. As for the technical ability of farmers to respond to demand, it is clear that considerable reserves of productivity (in terms of production per farmer) are available to African farmers. In forest areas, for example, surplus root crops and plantains are only harvested if there is a market for these crops. Finally, the p 'ysical capacity of the soils and other natural resources on the African continent can support a net agricultural production many times greater than present levels, if appropriate technologies are adopted and necessary investnents made. There is no reason to be particularly worried, if the rural-urban division of labor is allowed to develop naturally and gross agricultural incomes increase as a result. The main risks seem to be related to the dynamism of urban economies (effects of stabilization measures on household demand), and to the capacity of governments to ensure an enabling enviromnent in both physical tenns (providing effective environmental protection) and policy terms (removing constraints to personal mobility and the fimctioning of regional markets). The best ways in which a country can serve its farmers are (a) to ensure that they have urban clients with purchasing power; (b) to facilitate the urban-rural division of labor and internal mobility; (c) to facilitate access to national and regional markets by providing the necessary infrastructure; and (d) to make sure that cities have something attractive to offer in exchange for their food supply, for it is the growth of felt needs (based on the urban consumption model) and the corresponding cash requirements of rural families that determines the supply of agricultural products and the growth of rural incomes. URUANZA7ON IS, MORE GENERAUY, A NECESSARY CONDMON FOR lYlE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARKET ECONOMY. Urbanization is also one of the enines of development for regional markes and real intra-African trade (including unregistered exchanges). These appear to be growing at 7 percent per year on the average. This is one reason why border areas often develop and become urbanized faster than the country as a whole, despite the notorious and deliberate neglect by goverments of infrastructure investments in such regions. nernal markets and regional markets in Sub-Saharan Africa are thus playing a growing role in the economy, to which not enough auention has been paid. It would certainly be illusory and dangerous to think that Africa could regain high rates of economic growth without recovering its external markets. But it would be equally 181 Involuntary Resettlement in Africa dangerous to neglect these internal markets, or to consider them as simnply the result of export expansion. The development of African markets should become one of the major themes of economic policy in this decade. The dynamics of these markets depend to a great extent on the dynamics of population movement and settlement on the continent. URANION PROMOTES INCRSED LOR PRODUCTIVTYAN SUSTAI XE URN ECONOMY. To understand what is taking place within the rapidly growing cities of Africa, we must take population dynamics explicitly into account by resorting to the so- called demo-economic models. These models are very useful in understanding how the continuous process of urbanization contributes to increasing the productivity of migrants. These also reveal why, except for crisis periods, the continuous arrival of these migrants who make up the majority of the urban poor, does not impoverish the urban economy, but rather the reverse. Individuals who decide freely to leave their village, located in a rural area relatively isolated from the market, and who find themselves in the urban informal sector, soon see their income needs (including subsistence) double, and their cash requirements quadruple. To meet these expanded needs, they first draw on their savings and on those of their relatives. They may also, for a while, be able to count on community solidarity to provide free lodging, loans, and gifts made with an expectation of return. However, sooner or later, they will be obliged to increase their income and dths their productivity in order to survive, or else return to their village. A similar phenomenon occurs in connection with fte "migration" of urban people between different social categories, which also corresponds to new perceptions of basic needs. The process of urbanization tus appears to be the principle engine of growth and diversification in the need for private expenditure. The average total expenditure per person is in fact on the order of two to three times higher in urban areas than in rural areas, and cash expenditures are three or four times higher in urban areas. Expenditures made by new migrants provide income for other urban dwellers, especially for earlier migrants. Though the propensity to import is higher in urban than rural areas, urban private expenditure basically supports the purchase of local goods and services, produced by the urban and rural economy. One person may consct and rent out an extra room to provide lodging for a recent immigrant, while another will sell food products at a price that includes urban services such as cooking. Thus, despite the important role of transfers, it is the growth in household expenditure requiremnts which fuels enterprise creation and increases in production and productivity, with consequent growth in the incomes of urban households. The creation of an informal sector micro-eterprise is more likely to occur in the urban setting than in the rural one. The productivity of labor in this urban micr- enterprise is higher than in a rural micro-enterprise of similar type because the city offers a sufficienty large market, facilitates access to raw materials and services, provides a competitive environment, and because the perception of needs by urban people is more pressing. Due to the higher productivity of labor in the different branches of economic 182 Populadon Trends and Economic Grow*h n SubSaaran Africa activity and the better allocation of labor between these branches, the average value added per person is on the order of two or three times greater in urban areas than in rural areas. For countries with urbanization rates around 30 percent, urban areas generally contribute more than half of total gross domestic product (GDP). Because of the urbanization process, 70 percent to 80 percent of the annual growth in GDP of countries is normally generated in urban areas. Three principal groups of activities account for a large share of the urban economy. The agro-alimentary complex, which largely corresponds to the function of "feeding the city," represents about 40 percent of total urban production. The complex of construction activity and public works, which corresponds to the function of "building and maintaining the city and its hinterland," accounts for 20 percent to 30 percent of urban production. Of course, the contribution of this complex depends very much on the rate of urban growth. Finally, the third complex corresponds to the function of "controlling and administering urban space and its hinterland' by urban agents, both public and private. This last conplex represents about 10 percent of all urban activity. By following transactions and cash flows through the various squares of the matrix of urban-rural social accounting for a county, one may capture the chain reaction set off by the arrival of new migrants and spread from one agent to the next throughout the economy. In particular, one may describe "the permaet path of urbanizaton" resulting from constant rates of runal-urban migration, and the "temporary paths" produced by abrupt changes in the rate of urban growth. The pmanent path of urbanizaton corresponds fairly well to the pattern of growth in Sub-Saharan African countries during the 1960s and the 1970s. This permanent path can induce, under certan conditions, a rate of economic growdh that exceeds the population growth rate. But this economic growth is turbulent and should not be confused with balanced growth. On the contay, urbanization results from a state of disquilibrium reflecting strong geographic and socioeconomic disparities, and it genrates profound strucal changes in the economy and social stucture of a country. Classical macreonomic models of the computable geneal equilibrium type (CGE) are hardly suitable to descnbe this sort of growth. It would be preferable to use demo- economic nodels which incorporate the behavior patterns of different categories of people. The temporary paths of urbanization, which chacteri periods of rapid growth or rapid decline in export earnings (for example, Nigeria or Cameroon during the period of rapid rise and fall in petroleum prices) are more difficult to descnrbe. These temporary paths have to be analyzed in comparison to the baseline provided by the perman path of urbanization. Thus, the presence of poor people in cities is not in itself an alarming fact, since the cities in counties still undergoing settlement are meant to attract migrants who will be poor in a statistical sense. An African city with no poor people would be an anomaly. What is much more important than the nunber of poor people is the speed with which 183 Invowluary Resettlement In Africa these 'new poor" are assimilated into the urban economy, and the variation of this speed of assimilation over time. The demo-economic model shows that acceerated migration rates increase tensions and augment the costs of assimilation, and that the sustained decrease of migration rates is very costly for the urban economy. Like bicycles, cities are more stable when they are in motion, and they find it difficult to move backwa&d. Diminished rural-urban migration brings in its wake disaster for the urban economy. Third Question: How Can the Necessary Setflement Investments Be Financed? Settlement of the people on the land implies investment costs that are generally treated as local expenditures, required to acconmmodate new people and their activities. More diffuse in the case of rural settlements, such social investments are more demanding, more complex, and more a - -1ult to postpone in urban areas, which are already accommodating more than t-' irds of the total population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. On average, these "local investments amount to between US$500 and US$1,000 per person settled. They constitute one of the principal forms of capital accumulation in Sub-Saharan Africa. In more than two-thirds of the cases, it is the private sector that builds the city and accumulates urban capital. But this private investnt cannot be made efficiently unless supporting public investments of land preparation and social infrastructure are carried out in time and are appropriately managed and maintained. The local investment needed for the growdh of human settlements, in proportion to the GDP produced by these human settlements, increases as the population growth rate increases. For example, a city with a growth rate of 10 percent must invest 28 percent of its GDP to accommodate new residents and their economic and social activities. To these growth-related investment expenditures nmst be added the costs of rehabilitating existing infrastructure and the cost of maining and managing human settlements. It is therefore perfectly clear that, with few exceptions, the growth of human settlements in Sub-Saharan African countries cannot be completely financed by savings achieved within these settlements themselves. Some net transfer of resources to these "growth poles' will be required. Only a part of these transfers may come from the rest of the country or the sub-region. Recourse to transfers from the rest of the world wilU be inevitable. Such net transfers will be even higher given the fact that the terms of trade are least favorable to countries that are sdll undergoing settlement processes. It would be unreasonable to expect that the prices of tropical products should be adjusted downwards to reflect a significant decline in the rates of intunal and intenational nigration in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since Sub-Saharan Africa wiU accommodate agrowing proportion of total population growth on the planet, fron 8 percent of the world total in 1960 to 15 percent today and 30 percent twenty years from now, we should not be 184 Population Trends and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa surprised to find that the share of Sub-Saharan Africa in the global pattern of resource transfers must continue to grow for several more decades. Just as private expenditure represents income to other economic actors, public expenditures for local investment and operating costs (the well-known "recurrent costs") constitute income for other agents, at least some of whom are urban citizens. We have already seen that the functions of "building the city' and "administering and controlling the area" account for 30 percent to 40 percent of the urban economy. Thus, it is not the local investment itself that presents a problem, but the capacity to anticipate and to program these expenditures, carry them out effectively, manage the capital assets created, and provide adequate financing. Since the needs for local investment and the corresponding needs for resource transfers are predictable and unavoidable, and since they constitute one of the engines of urban growth and consequently of rural growth, they should be evaluated objectively in advance. An effort should be made to ensure that the necessary resources will be available as needed over several generations. Planned resource transfers will also benefit the world economy dhough the expansion of fte global market for goods and services. Condusion: Toward a Long-Term Development Srategy for Afica Based on Support for Setlement and Region Developmnt Assuring an optimal settlement pattern with the accompanying constuction of the necessary housing and urban infrastrcture networks, is the greatest challenge of our times. Today, Sub-Saharan Africa is at the midpoint of the demographic transition through which it must pass, like it or not, over the course of a centuy. During this time the population will multiply by ten, its share of urban popuation will rise from 6 percent to more than 60 percent, and most people will have moved from local subsistence to participation in the market economy. This fundamena change is not taking place at the most propitious time in history. Many of the "traditional" local activities on which the urban economies of the developed countries were once based are today challenged by intense competition and destabilized by world markets and technological progress. Today, an intenational maufacturer can flood the market with shoes at prices with which no artisanal shoemaker can compete. But Sub-Saharan Africa has no choice. It cannot choose the pace of change, imposed by population growth, nor can it choose its terms of trade with world markets. These circumstances impose a rather heavy dependence on the rest of the world, reflecting the inevitable imbalances beween financial capacity and financial needs, between supply and demand for goods and services. It is in this conext of structural change linhd to the search for optimal settlement patterns that development strategies must be decided. The roles of migation and 185 lnwowuasy Resettlenme in Africa urbanization (not to speak of industrializadon, which is only one manifestadon of these flows) in the devdopment and organization of markets, and in resource mobilization, need to be understood in this context. By profiting from past experience and present studies, and with the help of their external partners, Sub-Saharan African countries should be able to sketch the broad outline of a strategy for settement, for infrastructure investment, and for long-term economic growth. This will be one of the objecdves of the National Long-Term Perspective Studies, which several countries have already started. Of course, these national studies must take into account the regional context, and particularly the phenomenon of international migration. Cote d'lvoire, a case which has been extensively cited, is only one of the fifteen receiving countries identified in the Long-Term Image of Africa sludy.1 The fate of the twenty-five sending countries and the long-tenr stability of all Sub-Saharan Africa depends upon what happens in these fifteen countries. This study envisages total migratory flows of about 40 million people over the period 1980-2010, of which two- thirds must be absorbed by a relatively small number of countries, including Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, and South Africa. Of course, other long-term perspectives on settlement pattems could be considered. But whatever macroeconomic assumptions are used, the zero migration hypothesis appears totaUlly unacceptable in the long term. Because both receiving and sending countries tend to ignore these migrations, or even in some cases try to stop them, regional and international organizations and donors have a special responsibility in this area. The process of population redistribution will necessarily be costly, in political, economic, and social terms. It will be even more costly if constrined or slowed by national policies or by the indirect effects of certain measures included in the stabilizadon or adjustmt progams imposed by emnomic circumstances. The preparation by regional organizations of their own long-term perspective studies addressing the themes of popuation and economic resource redistribution and regional investment requirem, could help each country take better account of the regional context n pPlaning its own national strategy. Regional studies could also help exnal partners to improve the targeting of their interventions and to redefine, if necessary, their aid conditionality, in order to facilitate regional mobility. On the basis of these national and regional studies, it will be possible to sketch out an indicative program for basic infrastructure and local investments needed to promote the expansion of human settlements, and to define the role of external assistance in carrying out this vast program of support for the settement of the continent. Considering only the needs for public investment in basic infrastructure and local investments in Sub-Saharan Africa, the cost of such a program in the year 2000 could amount to about US$20 billion per year for national and regional infratuct and about US$30 billion per year for local investments, or 15 percent of the total gross regional product (GRP). 186 PopudWton Trends and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa The effects which can be expected from this public invetment include the stimulation of private investment and the development of regional markets. These in turn would induce a long-term growth in GRP on the order of 5 percent per year, varying according to the country from half to twice as much of this regional average. As the demo-economic model shows, this growth in the GRP would correspond to a growth in value added per farmer and in rural per capita income of ribout 2 percent per year, and close to zero growth in the value added and per capita ancome of each of the social categories of urban residenti. This scenario represents the mininmm which must be achieved in order to maintain the necessary international and national mobility in Sub- Saharan Africa. Considering the other necessary public investments, the level of resources which can be mobilized at the local level, and the borrowing capacity of the countries of Sub- Saharan Africa, it is clear that at least 30 percent of the financing of this investment program must be provided by net transfers from the rest of the world. As much continuity as possible over the long term, regardless of variations in commodities prices for cocoa or copper, must be provided. Such an investment program should seek to maximize effects on local economies by foreseeing the needs for new enterprises to establish and equip themselves, the effects of public expenditures on incomes and household expenditures, and the effects on the revenues and responsibilities of local governments. Net transfers to the public sector of Sub-Saharan AfricaD countries could then be determined so as to minimize fluctuations in the rate at which these stnucural investments are put in place, rather than amplifying these fluctuations as appears to be the case today. In other words, the share of net external financing in public investment programs could be varied in inverse proportion to the volumne of available national resources. This development strategy, based on settlement issues, can only be devised if the countries of the region are willing to adopt a new form of indicative long-tern planning. This planning must be based on economic and financial considerations, as well as demo- economic and regional growth models. These countries must also redefine the roles assigned to their regional development authorities. In short, we must reinvent the planning of regional development by adapting it to today's context. Throughout this settlement phase, maximum efforts must be focused on the potential population-receiving counties and the regional and urban development poles. The inevitable disparities a1 infrastructure and levels of develop -ent between these centers and the rest of the country or the continent must be managed as well as possible without trying to eliminate them. These disparites in themselves provide incentives for changing settlement paterns, without which population growth would rapidly become unsustainable. Because the itegration of national economies is stil far from being accomplished, and the costs of transport and co icatons are still high, Sub-Saharan African countries still in the process of settlement often appear to be made up of "Basic 187 Inwoluntary Resetlement in Africa Economic Entities with High Volumes of Exchange and Services. " These BEEHIVES are unstable and undergoing rapid restmcurng, sepafated by relatively stable, predominany rural, interstitial spaces. Calling thee places BEEHIVES underlines the analogy between cities which colonize and exploit their hinterland and make it productive by circulating information, and bees which buzz about the countryside, trmnsporting pollen from flower to flower and collecting materials to make wax and honey. These BEEHIVES, which often occupy less than 10 percent of the territory, provide the origin and destination of more than 90 percent of the flows of people and freight, finance, and goods and services. This concept of BEEHIVES may help to define the national strategies of regional development and territorial administration and to organize the prgmi of investments around three main themes: (a) how to increase the efficiency of intemal operations in each of the BEEHIVES; (b) how to promote complementarities and exchanges between the different BEEHIVES and between these BEEHIVES and the rest of the world; and (c) how to manage the interstitial space, realizing that, in this more stable environment, the multiplier effect of policies and projects is likely to be relatively weak. In this perspective one could be tempted, when presenting traditional public investment program organized by sectors and sub-sectors, to add if not to substitute a regional or even an urban-centered presentation, based on BEEHIVES. 188 Popuadon 7eni, and Economic Growth in SubaSoharan Africa Table 15-1 Urban Populados (Mion abiXtats) and Share of Urba In Total Popuaton YEAR 1930 1950 1980 1990 2010 2030 URBAN POP IN SSA 8 21 117 200 So0 1000 URBAN POP IN THE 466 733 1792 2295 3795 5701 WORLD I SHARE OF SSA IN 0.017 0.029 0.065 0.087 0.132 0.175 WORLD URBAN POP URBAN SHARE i 0.062 0.118 0.301 0.375 0.532 0.669 SSA_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ URBlAN SHARE IN 0225 0.291 0.403 0.434 0.528 0.643 THE WORLD Table 15-2 Urba Poplaton Averape GCwth Rates PRIOD 30-S0 | 5080 80-90 90-2010 20I0>2030 SSA 4.94 .89 5 5.51 4.69 3.53 WORLD | 229[ 3.0M 2.501 2.55 2.06 Table 15-3 Annual _nrea of Urb Populaion (Mieu nhabita per Yea) YEAR 1930 1950 1980 1990 2010 2030 IN SSA 0.3 1.1 7.0 10.6 21.0 31.0 IN THE WORLD 7.5 22.0 43.2 57.6 89.6 95.2 SHARE OF SSA IN 0.037 0.050 0.163 0.184 0.234 0.326 WORLD INCREASE 189 Ivwluntar Reseanlme in Africa Table 15-4 Nuubr of Toewu InSb-Sabarmn Afrile YEAR 1930 1950 1990 2010 >1000000 0 1 12 70 INHABITANTS > 100000 12 32 173 600 INHAB ITANTS__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > 5000 NHBIrrTANTS 250 670 2900 0 TaN. 15-5 YEAR 1930 1950 1980 1990 2010 2030 SSA 122 157 272 334 456 495 WORlD 1601 1782 265s 2997 3396 3158 SHARE OF SSA 0.076 0.0U8 0.102 0.111 0.134 0.157 Tabk 15-6 Rural Poplaton Averag Growi Dat PERIOD 30-50 50-90 80-90 90-2010 2010-2030 SSA 1.27 1.85 2.07 1.57 0.41 WORLD 0.54 1.34 1.21 0.63 [0.36 190 Popudaon Trends ad Econowic Growh In Sub-Saharwa Africa NOTE 1. Une Imge d Long STerme de l'Afr (LTA). Study carried out in 1984 by the Europen Community and the Caine des Dip8t et ConsigMtins. This su* is prsented ir, the jaral *ica Contmoralne, No. 146, 1988. 191 CHAFrER 15 ENVIRONMENT AND SETTLEMENT ISSUES IN AFRICA: TOWARD A POLICY AGENDA Cynthia C. Cook This chapter summarizes the issues raisd in discussions during the conference, and the suggestions made by participants for addressing these issues. In conclusion, the proposed programn of action recommended by conferen participants to the intenational community is presented. Toward a Polcy Agtoda For us, Ibis conferece is both an end and a beginning. It is the end of the exploratory phase of our work on enviromnent and settlement issues in Africa, in which we sought to identify the main issues, to initiate collaboration with Africans working on this topic, and to esaablish an agenda for policy research leading to acdon in the futue. It is the beginning, we hope, of collaboradve action to promote this policy agenda, both by conductg research on issues where the answers are not yet clear, and by prepaing policy coendatons concerning those issues for which the evidence is already quite clear. The various papers presented at this conference, and the discussions which followed them, highlighted a number of policy issues. POPULA7ON. We have seen that the sheer numbers of people in Africa, while not presenty overwhelming in relaion to the productive capacity of the region's natual resource base, could become so in the future unless strong positive actions are taken to support the second-half of the demographic transition. These actions involve the enhancement of human welfare in general and the safeguarding of maternal and child health, and the education of women, in particular, together with proactive programs of fertility management. More importany in the short term, we have seen that population pressures on natural resources largely derive from the present spatial patterns of settlement, which in tum are driven by historical accident, by present production technologies, and by polidcal forces. It is important, therefore, that we should add to our concern about population growth an explicit concern with the issue of population distnrbution. More productive economies and a better life for an increasing number of Africans depend upon intensifying agricltural production in areas that are suitable for such expansion, reducing the pressure of cultivation on ecologically sensitive and economically less-productive areas (for farming) such as tropical forests and rangelands, and promoting 193 Involuntary Raealement in Africa economic exchanges between mral and urban areas through support for the development of more-balanced settlement pattems. This rises a nunber of issues relating to the appropriate role of government in providing incentives and an enabling policy enviroment to facilitate the development of such balanced settlemet patterns. PoVERT. Our concen with the effects of project-related involuntary resettlement stems from a basic concern that development projects should do no harm that they should not leave people worse off than they were before; and that particular care should be taken to ensure that people who are already among the less-advantaged part of the population should not be further disadvantaged by development projects. Discussion at the conference confirmed that this concem is widespread and applies not only to the victims of development itsdf, but also to the victims of poverty, violence, and environmental degradation wherever these are found in Africa. Goverments may have good intentions. but acrrent policies have accomplished relatively litde in the area of poverty alleviation for displaced people. Conference participants called for the Bank to lead the donor community in drafting and discussing a Charter of Human Rights for Displaced People in Africa, based on the principles embodied in the Bank's resetdement policy. PoLmcAL wAU. Conference participants frequently noted that goverment rhetoric expressing concern for displaced people is often not matched by the institutional and financial commitment needed to carty out programs that have been designed to protect and enhance their welfare. The problem is pardy one of visibility. People who are already on the margin of society are less likely than others to be organized, to be able to draw on local resources, and to be able to protect their interest through the normal political chamels. We have seen that in some of the cases discussed, affected people were able to express their concerns and influence the design of programs that eventually left them better off than before. In other cases, however, goverments failed to follow trough on promises or adhered rigidly to legal requirements often inherited from a colonial system. It was also pointed out that frequent changes in government policy can send confusing signals and paralyze ongoing programs. POPUUAR PARmPlON. A recirrent theme throughout the conference presentations and discussions was the importance of involving people in defining their own problems and finding appropriate solutons. This concern was not just a philosophical one, although the historical context of increasingly open political dialogue in Africa certainly provided a favorable environment for this discussion. Rather, the concern was practical, in the sense that much of what needs to be done has to be done by the people for themselves, because governments cannot be expected to do everything. Several participants referred to the need to make more use of "market" solutions, rather than to rely on monolithic govenment inerventions to solve problems. It is noteworthy that effective popular participation was a hallmark of those experiences which proved to be successful, while a lack of local control over decisionmaking often resulted in failure. The two themes of popular participation and political will are closely linked within a general framework covered by the concept of "good governance." Conference 194 Toiurd a Policy Agenda discussions stressed the significant roles of avflability of information and freedom of speech in enabling mningFd local participation in decisionmaing. Participants frequendy rerred to the concept of a civil society as one in which popular participation in decisionmaking would be not only possible but necessary. Finally, we have seen that participation by the affected people in designing and carrying out resettement progms - with spontaus settlement as the extrnem case - is a critical condition for sustainability. Participadon builds the self-onfidence and the skills needed for the successful transfer of respobility from govem nt to local communites. Even in the case of spontaneous settlement, particpation issues arise, as host comnities and other resource users have to be integted mn the decisionmakig process in order for sus ble paterns of natual resource management to be maintained. L4D 7ENuRE. Anodter recurr theme in the presenttions was the importance of undsding local land tenure issues in thc light of custmary rles and traditi