W P's _ O0 POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1800 Single-Equation Estimation An econometic methodology for estimating both the of the Equilibrium Real equilibrium real exchange Exchange Rate rate and the degree of exchange-rate misalignment. John Baffes Ibrahim A. Elbadawi Stephen A. O'Connell The World Bank Development Research Group August 1997 | POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1800 Summary findings Estimating the degree of exchange-rate misalignment A recent strand of the empirical literature exploits remains one of the most challenging empirical problems these observations to develop a single-equation approach in an open economy. The basic problem is that the value to estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate. of the real exchange rate is not observable. Drawing on that earlier work, Baffes, Elbadawi, and Standard theory tells us, however, that the equilibrium O'Connell outline an econometric methodology for real exchange rate is a function of observable estimating both the equilibrium real exchange rate and macroeconomic variables and that the actual real the degree of exchange-rate misalignment. exchange rate approaches the equilibrium rate over They illustrate the methodology using annual data time. from C6te d'lvoire and Burkina Faso. This paper - a product of the Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the determinants of the real exchange rate. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Pauline Kokila, room N5-030, telephone 202-473-3716, fax 202-522-3564, Internet address pkokila@worldbank.org. August 1997. (51 pages) The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center Single-Equation Estimation of the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate JOHN BAFFES IBRAHIM A. ELBADAWI STEPHEN A. O'CONNELL We are grateful to Chris Adam, Neil Ericsson, Philip Jefferson, and Luis Serven for helpful advice, to Peter Montiel for very thorough comments on an earlier draft, and to Ingrid Ivins for assistance with data. Larry Hinkle provided invaluable comments and advice throughout and constructed the counterfactual simulations for Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Contents 1. Introduction 2. The equilibrium real exchange rate 2.1 Rationing of foreign credit 2.2 The terms of trade and trade policy 2.3 Nominal rigidities and short-run dynamics 2.4 Real exchange rate misalignment 3. Estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate: introduction 3.1 Specifying an empirical model 3.2 Small samples, limited information, and the single-equation approach 3.3 Sustainable fundamentals and exogeneity requirements 3.4 Relationship to the PPP approach 4. The econometric methodology 4.1 Step 2: Estimation of 4.1.1 The I(1) case: cointegration 4.1.2 The I(1) case: estimation 4.1.3 The I(0) case: estimation 4.2 Step 3: Calculating the equilibrium real exchange rate 4.2.1 Sustainable fundamentals: time-series-based estimates 4.2.2 Sustainable fundamentals: counterfactual estimates 4.2.3 Estimating the degree of misalignment 5. Estimation results 5. 1 Unit root tests 5.2 Tests of cointegration: CMte d'Ivoire 5.3 Long-run parameters and adjustment speed: Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso 5.4 Short-run dynamics: CMte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso 5.5 The equilibrium real exchange rate and misalignment 6. Conclusions Endnotes References Appendix 1: Conditioning and weak exogeneity Appendix 2: Data description Appendix 3: Counterfactual simulations: CMte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso A3.l Time-series measures: TOT and LPFOR A3.2 Counterfactual simulations: RESGDP ii A3.3 Counterfactual simulations: ISHARE and OPEN 1 A3.4 Concluding caveat Figure 1: Internal and external balance Figure 2: Adjustment to an increase in rw (under a binding credit constraint) Figure 3: Variance ratio tests for CMte d'Ivoire Figure 4: Variance ration test for Burkina Faso iii 1. Introduction Estimating the degree of exchange rate misalignment remains one of the most challenging empirical problems in open-economy macroeconomics (Edwards (1989), Williamson (1994), Hinkle and others (1995)). A fundamental difficulty is that the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate is not observable. Standard theory tells us, however, that the equilibrium real exchange rate is a function of observable macroeconomic variables, and that the actual real exchange rate approaches the equilibrium rate over time (Edwards (1989), Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1993), Montiel (1997)). A recent strand of the empirical literature exploits these observations to develop a single- equation approach to estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate (Edwards (1989), Elbadawi and O'Connell (1990), Elbadawi (1994), Elbadawi and Soto (1994, 1995)). Drawing on this earlier work, we outline an econometric methodology for estimating both the equilibrium real exchange rate and the degree of misalignment and illustrate the methodology using annual data from CMte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. The procedure involves three steps. In the first step, the investigator examines the time- series characteristics of the real exchange rate and the fundamentals. This, in turn, determines the estimation technique to be used in the second step to uncover the parameters of the long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and its fundamentals. In the third step, the investigator uses the long-run parameters to calculate the equilibrium rate and the degree of misalignment under alternative assumptions regarding the sustainability of the fundamentals. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define the real exchange rate and derive the equilibrium relationship between the real exchange rate and macroeconomic "fundamentals" such as government spending patterns and the terms of trade. We present the comparative statics and discuss the sources of short-run misalignment and dynamic adjustment. Section 3 draws on the theory to develop a single-equation econometric model of the real exchange rate. In Section 4 we outline our methodology, and in Section 5 we apply the methodology to CMte d'lvoire and Burkina Faso. Section 6 concludes with an assessment of the practical value of the single-equation econometric approach to the equilibrium real exchange rate. 2. The Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate The concept of the real exchange rate (RER) that has been most heavily used in analyses of external adjustment by developing countries is the domestic relative price of traded to nontraded goods (e.g., Dornbusch (1984)):' RER_e_ EPT PN Although the foreign price of traded goods, PT*, is exogenous for a small country, the domestic price of nontraded goods is endogenous except over short periods of wage/price rigidity. The RER is therefore endogenous even under a predetermined nominal exchange rate. In this section we use a simplified model to illustrate the determination of the real exchange rate and derive an expression for its long-run equilibrium value. Since the relevant theory is well covered by Montiel, we use his model as a basis for the discussion (see also Edwards (1989) and Rodriguez (1994)). The literature defines the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate as the rate that prevails when the economy is in internal and external balance for sustainable values of policy and exogenous variables. Internal balance holds when the markets for labor and nontraded goods clear. This occurs when YN (e)=CN + gN= (1-O)ec + gN, YN < 0 (2) where yN is the supply of nontraded goods under full employment, c is total private spending (measured in traded goods), O is the share of this spending devoted to traded goods, and gN is government spending on nontraded goods. Equation 2 is shown as the schedule IB in Figure 1. Starting in a position of internal balance, a rise in private spending creates an excess demand for nontraded goods at the original real exchange rate. Restoration of equilibrium requires a real appreciation that switches supply towards nontraded goods and demand towards traded goods. A rise in government spending on nontraded goods shifts the IB schedule downwards. To define external balance, we begin with the current account surplus, which is given by f=b+z+rf =YT(e)-gT-(O+r)c+z+rf (3) wherefis total net foreign assets, b is the trade balance, z is net foreign aid received by the government, and r is the real yield on foreign assets, measured in traded goods. The trade balance is the difference between domestic production of traded goods, Yr and the sum of government (gT) and private spending on these goods. The equation is standard except for the term zw which 2 measures the transactions costs associated with private spending. In Montiel's model of optimizing households, these costs motivate the holding of domestic money, which would otherwise be dominated in rate of return by foreign assets.2 They are assumed to be incurred in the form of traded goods (at the rate rper unit of spending) and therefore appear as an outflow in the trade balance. External balance has been defined in various ways in the literature. The most useful approach for our purposes is that of Montiel (see also Khan and Lizondo (1987), Edwards (1989), and Rodriguez (1994)), who defines external balance as holding when the country's net creditor position in world financial markets has reached a steady state equilibrium. We can solve for the combinations of private spending and the real exchange rate that are consistent with this notion of external balance by holdingfat its steady-state level and setting the right-hand side of equation (3) to zero. This traces out a second relationship between the real exchange rate and private spending, labeled EB in Figure 1. Starting at any point on this schedule, a rise in private spending generates a current account deficit at the original real exchange rate. To restore external balance, the real exchange rate must depreciate, switching demand towards nontraded goods and supply towards traded goods. The equilibrium real exchange rate, e *, is given by the intersection of the IB and EB curves, which occurs at point I in the diagram. Setting the right-hand-side of equation (3) to zero and combining this with equation (2), we obtain e = e (g,g, r*f* + z, r*), el0, e3<0, e4>0. (4) where "*" superscripts denote steady-state values of endogenous variables. The signs of the partial derivatives in (4) are easily verified either graphically or algebraically using equations (2) and (3). Montiel solves for the steady-state service account r*f* by assuming that the country faces an upward-sloping supply curve of net external funds and that households optimize over an infinite horizon.3 Transactions costs per unit, r, are also endogenous; they depend on the ratio of money holdings to private spending and therefore on the nominal interest rate, which is the opportunity cost of holding domestic money. Since the nominal interest rate is tied down in the long run by the time preference rate and the domestic inflation rate, the final expression for the equilibrium real exchange rate in the Montiel model takes the form e = e(g9Ng'TZrW;rT), e] O,e2 > O,e3 0. (5) 3 where rw is the world real interest rate and )TT is the rate of inflation in the domestic price of traded goods.4 Note that the nominal exchange rate does not appear among the fundamentals in equation (5). This is because the underlying behavioral relationships are all homogenous of degree zero in nominal variables. A nominal devaluation therefore has at most a transitory effect on the real exchange rate. Equation (5) emphasizes that the real exchange rate consistent with internal and external balance is a function of a set of exogenous and policy variables. In practical applications, this relationship between e* and its macroeconomic "'fundamentals" differentiates the modern approach to equilibrium real exchange rates from the earlier PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) approach. Under PPP, the analyst would identify a reference period of internal and external balance and use the real exchange rate that prevailed during that period as an estimate of the equilibrium for other periods. Equation (5) implies that this is only legitimate if the fundamentals did not change between the reference and comparison periods. This criticism of the PPP approach is now widely accepted.5 The analysis underlying equation (5) can be readily modified to accommodate features that are important in particular applications. For our purposes, important extensions involve rationing of foreign credit, changes in the domestic relative price of traded goods, and short-run rigidities in domestic wages and prices. We discuss these extensions briefly in what follows. 2.1 Rationing offoreign credit Equation (6) is derived under the assumption that the country faces an upward-sloping supply curve of external loans. The current account and trade balance are therefore endogenously determined at each moment by the saving and portfolio decisions of households. An extreme version of this view, more relevant for countries without access to commercial international borrowing on the margin, is that the country faces a binding credit ceiling (or equivalently, a floor on its international net creditor position). In this case, the trade surplus becomes exogenous, both in the short run and in the long run, provided that the credit ceiling remains binding.6 Equation (4) then takes the simpler form e =e (9N ,gT,b,r*) e, O,e3 0. (6) In our empirical work below, we treat the trade surplus b = rf + z as one of the fundamentals, consistent with this interpretation. 4 2.2 The terms of trade and trade policy The domestic relative price of exports and imports is given by PM 71 PM / + [''l (7) where 0 is the external terms of trade and 77 is a parameter summarizing the stance of domestic trade policy. If either i or q change over time, the analysis must be disaggregated to accommodate different real exchange rates for imports and exports. The equilibrium real exchange rates for imports and exports can then be written as functions of the set of fundamentals identified above, along with 0 and i1. Since the real exchange rate for tradables is itself a function of these two, it will depend on the same set of fundamentals, with elasticities depending on the relative weight (a) of imported goods in the tradables price index. Equation (6) then becomes e = e*(gNI, gb 0, 77 r*), el, e3, e , 0; e X ? (8) An improvement in the terms of trade increases national income measured in imported goods; this exerts a pure spending effect that raises the demand for all goods and appreciates the real exchange rate. This effect can be overcome by substitution effects on the demand and supply sides, leading to an overall real depreciation, but the spending effect has proved dominant in most empirical applications. A tightening of trade policy, appreciates the real exchange rate in the long run. 2.3 Nominal rigidities and short-run dynamics In Montiel's model, domestic wages and prices are perfectly flexible and internal balance prevails continuously. If we consider the case of a binding credit ceiling, so that the trade balance is exogenous, we conclude that as long as changes in the fundamentals are permanent, the actual real exchange rate never deviates from its long-run equilibrium. This is apparent from inspection of the internal and external balance schedules: with b tied down exogenously, e and c are free to adjust immediately to their new long-run equilibrium values when one of the fundamentals changes. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where we show the adjustment to an increase in the world real interest rate by a net debtor country facing a binding credit ceiling. The rise in rw increases the required trade surplus, shifting EB to the left (to EB') and depreciating the equilibrium real exchange rate. The 5 adjustment from point 1 to point 2 is immediate; with a predetermined path for the nominal exchange rate it takes place through a fall in domestic prices and wages. The binding credit constraint removes the model's only source of internal dynamics, so that the only possible sources of a divergence between the actual real exchange rate and its long-run equilibrium is a temporary change in one of the fundamentals. If domestic wages and prices are sticky in the short run, a second important source of internal dynamics comes from disequilibrium in the labor market and the market for nontraded goods. As long these markets eventually clear, the equilibrium real exchange rate is unaffected by the short-run nominal rigidity. But any shock that alters the equilibrium real exchange rate will now give rise to an adjustment process during which the actual real exchange rate will deviate from its new equilibrium. In Figure 2, sticky wages and prices prevent the real exchange rate from moving to point 2 in the short run, so that output and spending take the burden of the external adjustment. The short-run equilibrium is at point 3, where unemployment and inventory accumulation gradually push nominal wages and the prices of nontraded goods down relative to the prices of traded goods. The real exchange rate depreciates over time, bringing the economy to point 3 in the long run. The process illustrated in Figure 2 is often viewed as providing the primary role of nominal devaluation in macroeconomic adjustment (that of speeding an otherwise excessively slow and contractionary adjustment to an adverse external shock (Corden (1989)). An advantage of the econometric methodology below is that it does not require a structural specification of the short-run dynamics. The long-run equilibrium is consistent with a variety of sources and patterns of short-run dynamics, including price stickiness, costs of labor mobility, and other features not present in the model above. 2.4 Real exchange rate misalignment In the analysis below, we follow Edwards (1989) and Montiel in using the term "misalignment" to denote the gap between e and e *. Two important differences between this descriptive use of the term misalignment and its more normative use in most policy discussions must be emphasized. The first is illustrated by our discussion of nominal rigidities. Without such rigidities, deviations * between e and e are market-clearing responses to temporary movements in the fundamentals or to permanent movements that alter the long-run equilibrium level of net foreign assets. In these cases, 6 there is no obvious role for policy interventions designed to alter the path of the real exchange rate. The second difference stems from the observation that the real exchange rate may well be misaligned from a normative perspective even when the economic is in a steady-state equilibrium. Dollar (1993), for example, argues that African real exchange rates were systematically overvalued in the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of highly inward-looking trade regimes. In the theory developed here, the equilibrium real exchange rate is conditional on trade policies and other government interventions. Given these policy settings (whether socially optimal or not ) misalignment is necessarily a temporary phenomenon, generated by short-run macroeconomic forces that prevent an immediate movement to the long-run equilibrium. 3. Estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate The theory developed in the previous section delivers a steady-state, or long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and a set of macroeconomic "fundamentals." The equilibrium real exchange rate is then defined as the steady-state real exchange rate conditional on a vector of permanent values for the fundamentals. Given this structure, our task is to construct a time series for the equilibrium real exchange rate - within sample and potentially out of sample - using data on the actual real exchange rate and fundamentals. As a first step we assume that the long-run relationship delivered by theory is linear in simple transformations (e.g., logs) of the variables. Thus equation (5) becomes lneT = F, (9) where e * is the equilibrium real exchange rate, FP is the vector of permnanent values for the fundamentals. At a conceptual level, the task of estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate breaks into two pieces. The first is to estimate the vector ,f of long-run "parameters of interest"; the second is to choose a set of "permanent" values for the fundamentals appropriate to period t. 3.1 Specifying an empirical model Estimation of /3 requires the specification of an empirical model that is consistent with (9) but relates observable variables. We obtain such a model by translating into stochastic terms two straightforward and general features of the theory. The first is that equation (9) comes from a steady state relationship between actual values of the real exchange rate and fundamentals. To capture this 7 relationship we assume that the disturbance nt in the equation lne, = ', + n,, (10) has finite conditional variance and expected value zero at sufficiently distant horizons (i.e., the limit of E(nt+k11t[J) as k goes to infinity is 0).7 We will in fact impose the stronger condition that nt is a mean zero, stationary random variable. Note that equation (9) follows directly from (10) if Ine * and FP are interpreted as long-run conditional expectations of the relevant variables. The second general feature of the theory is that the steady state is dynamically stable.8 Shocks that cause the exchange rate to diverge from its (possibly new) equilibrium in the short run should produce eventual convergence to the relationship in (9) in the absence of new shocks (or equivalently, in conditional expectation). A specification that captures this notion while retaining consistency with both (9) and (10) is the general error-correction model P P Alne, =a(lnet,l -, '>F1 )+ E HujAlne,j + E yjAFt-j +v,, (11) j=I j=O where Ft = [gN g7, b, q,, rt]' is the vector of fundamentals, and vt iS an i.i.d., mean-zero, stationary random variable. Assuming that all variables are either stationary or I(1) (see below), equation (11) implies equation (10); and for a < 0, the corresponding long-run equilibrium is stable. Equation (11) embodies the central insight of the single-equation approach: that the equilibrium real exchange rate can be identified econometrically as that unobservedfunction of the fundamentals towards which the actual real exchange rate gravitates over time (Kaminsky (1988), Elbadawi (1994), Elbadawi and Soto (1994, 1995)). Note that in contrast to the long-run relationship, the short-run dynamics are not heavily restricted since (11) is a simple re- parameterization of the unrestricted pth-order autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) representation of lnet, p p Ine, = a*Ine,j + ±iF, +v,, (12) j=1 j=0 under the stability restriction j= 1,pu < I and the assumption that the real exchange rate enters the long-run relationship.9 For different parameter values, the unrestricted error-correction 8 representation (11) encompasses a wide variety of commonly used dynamic models (Hendry, Pagan and Sargan (1984), Ericsson, Campos and Tran (1991)). This flexibility is an advantage, because although the dynamic structure of any particular theoretical model may place restrictions on the parameters in (9), these restrictions will depend on the nature of nominal and real rigidities, on whether households optimize or use rules of thumb, and on other model-dependent features that have little or no effect on the set of variables that enter the long-run equilibrium. With unrestricted dynamics, we allow the data maximum scope for determining their actual pattern, while retaining consistency with the long-run specification. Much of our econometric work will take place in versions of equation (11). It is straightforward to incorporate variables that in theory do not belong among the long-run fundamentals, but that may affect the short-run dynamics; an example is the nominal exchange rate. Denoting such variables by z, we would capture long-term effects by adding the term S'z inside the parentheses in (11) (allowing a test of the hypothesis 6 = 0) and short-term dynamics by adding 1j=o,pq7jAz1. to the right-hand side. Equation (11) can also accommodate an intercept or deterministic trend; and we can readily include dummy variables for potentially important exogenous events (e.g., the Sahel drought of the early 1980s). 3.2 Small samples, limited information and the single-equation approach A fundamental difficulty in estimating the parameters of equation (11) is that sample sizes are likely to be very small. This is partly because the historical reach of developing country data is typically limited, and partly because models of the type considered here call for national accounts and/or fiscal data that are available only annually. For C6te d'Ivoire, we have 29 annual observations, and for Burkina Faso, 24. A general implication of small sample size is that the statistical properties of estimators may be poor and that testing procedures are likely to have low power. Existing Monte Carlo evidence can in some cases help discriminate between alternative choices of estimator, but we will often have to make informal judgments about robustness to sample size. On the positive side, the shocks to developing country data often appear to have high variance, thereby generating substantial variation over time; and temporal length of sample has the same effect when the real exchange rate and its fundamentals are nonstationary. A relatively small sample may therefore contain substantial information, particularly regarding the long-run parameter space.10 9 A second and more definitive effect of small samples in our case is to limit the scope for systems-based estimation. The number of unknown parameters in the full joint autoregressive distribution of the real exchange rate and its fundamentals rises roughly geometrically with the number of fundamentals and the lag length. With 3 or 4 variables among the fundamentals and fewer than 30 observations, this "curse of dimensionality" tends rapidly to overwhelm any attempt to estimate the full joint distribution. We will see below that the dimensionality problem is somewhat alleviated if the variables are nonstationary and cointegrated (and only the long-run parameters are of direct interest), but that even here the small sample size exerts a serious limitation on systems estimation. Our analysis will therefore generally take place in a single-equation context, where we implicitly condition on the current values of at least a subset of the fundamnentals and the lagged values of all variables. Conditioning is at some potential cost, because efficient statistical inference regarding the parameters of interest - which may go beyond / to include the adjustment speed a and the short-run parameters Aj and , - generally requires analysis of the full joint distribution of In et, Ft and zt. As shown by Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983), however, fully efficient estimation and inference can take place conditional on the fundamentals if these variables are weakly exogenous for the parameters of interest. As outlined more fully in Appendix 1, weak exogeneity holds when the parameters of interest can be directly recovered from the distribution of the real exchange rate conditional on the fundamentals (and the past), and there are no cross-equation restrictions linking the parameters of this conditional model with those of the marginal model for the fundamentals. In this case the marginal distribution of the fundamentals holds no information of use to estimating the parameters of interest. Failure of weak exogeneity limits the scope for fully efficient conditional inference but may not undermine the ability to perform valid (though not fully efficient) inference in an essentially single-equation context; in the stationary case, for example, limited-information approaches like two-stage least squares are available subject to sufficient identifying restrictions."1 For Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, the "small country" assumption suggests that variables like the terms of trade and the foreign price level are determined outside the country.12 The same is true for the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate, since the CFA franc was pegged to the French franc at an unchanged parity throughout the sample; and the trade balance is in this category if borrowing constraints are exogenous and binding. Weak exogeneity seems a reasonable assumption 10 for these variables. Unfortunately, it is not guaranteed; if behavior is affected by conditional expectations of these variables, for example, forecast errors will be jointly determined with the real exchange rate, potentially violating weak exogeneity. Variables like government spending and the investment share may also be jointly determined with the contemporaneous real exchange rate. Weak exogeneity is testable, though generally at the cost of moving to systems estimation. Below we report some partial tests for the CMte d'lvoire case. 3.3 Sustainable fundamentals and exogeneity requirements If we begin with equation (10), the equilibrium real exchange rate in equation (9) has a natural interpretation as the limit of a k-period-ahead conditional forecast of the real exchange rate. This suggests two broadly alternative ways of tying down the permanent values of the fundamentals: the first is to use the sample information to generate long-run forecasts of the fundamentals conditional on information available in period t (or in some earlier period if t is out-of-sample); the second is to combine theory and a priori information into a counterfactual simulation for the fundamentals. These correspond closely to the use of a single equation for conditional forecasting and "policy analysis". We argue below that the investigator will generally want to consider both alternatives. Here we briefly comment on the relevant exogeneity requirements (see Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983)). The requirements for valid single-equation forecasting and simulation generally go beyond those for valid estimation and inference. When using conditional forecasts of the fundamentals, the implicit assumption is that there is no feedback from the real exchange rate to the fundamentals. The appropriate concept is strong exogeneity, which combines weak exogeneity with lack of Granger causality from the real exchange rate to the fundamentals. Given weak exogeneity, strong exogeneity can be readily tested by determining whether lagged values of the real exchange rate enter the marginal model for the fundamentals. When using counterfactual simulations of the fundamentals, the relevant issue is whether/f can be treated as a constant in the face of shifts in the marginal distribution of the fundamentals. The problem here is the Lucas critique of econometric policy analysis: the counterfactual exercise implicitly alters the joint distribution of the fundamentals and the real exchange rate, thereby invalidating the original parameter estimates unless the corresponding parameters are invariant to 11 the class of distributional shifts being considered. The appropriate concept in this case is super exogeneity which combines weak exogeneity with invariance of the parameters of interest to the class of distributional shifts under consideration. The invariance property is sensitive to the particular class of interventions under study and we will treat it as a maintained hypothesis rather than attempting formal testing. 13 3.4 Relationship to the PPP approach A hallmark of the PPP approach to equilibrium exchange rates was the choice of a single equilibrium rate for all periods, without reference to movements in the fundamentals. The standard theory-based criticism, as embodied in our theoretical model, was that notion of equilibrium delivers a relationship between the real exchange rate and the fundamentals, not a single value for the real exchange rate. Since the fundamentals are themselves time-varying, this criticism has often been summarized in the claim that the equilibrium real exchange rate should move over time. The above discussion suggests, however, that this way of stating the criticism misses the fundamental distinction between the PPP and econometric approaches. Consider the case in which the real exchange rate itself is stationary. Stationary variables have time-invariant means, implying that all movements away from the mean are ultimately temporary. In such a situation the best sample-based estimate of the equilibrium real exchange rate for any period is simply the sample mean. To put this another way, the quantity a3Ft in equation (10) is the difference between two stationary variables and is therefore stationary, so that while the individual fundamentals may have permanent movements (i.e., may be nonstationary), the relevantfinction of the fundamentals - in our case, the long-run forecast of a linear combination of these fundamentals - never moves permanently. When forecasted at successively distant horizons, 8YF,+k simply reverts to the mean of Inet.14 An equilibrium relationship between the real exchange rate and other macroeconomic variables is therefore consistent with a time-invariant equilibrium real exchange rate. The more fundamental distinction between the two approaches resides in their contrasting use of sample and a priori information. The PPP approach requires a set ofjudgments that are informed both by theory and data but that remain largely implicit and a priori from an econometric perspective. The econometric approach, in contrast, uses theory sparingly but powerfully to extract information about the equilibrium real exchange rate from the entire data sample. A priori 12 information becomes relevant when the analyst is interested in counterfactual simulations for the fundamentals, but such information is combined with the sample information (used to estimate the parameters) in a restricted and transparent manner. The econometric approach has clear advantages in reasonably large samples, where the high quality of the sample information should outweigh the loss of potentially sophisticated but implicit judgments central to the PPP approach. To give the PPP approach its due, however, we consider a problem that is peculiar to samples that are not necessarily small but are short in duration. We have just pointed out that in the stationary case, the sample mean provides a natural estimator of the long- run equilibrium real exchange rate. This implies, however, that the average misalignment within the sample is constrained to be zero. A similar though not identical outcome will tend to prevail in the nonstationary case: although the equilibrium rate itself is time-varying in this case, an important test of empirical success is that the equilibrium error is stationary. The resulting estimates of misalignment will then also tend to have a mean near zero if data-based forecasts for the fundamentals are used. In other words, the econometric methodology tends by construction - except when counterfactual simulations of the fundamentals are used - to deliver an average misalignment of zero within the sample. This is in strong contrast to the PPP approach which embodies no such restriction. In large samples, the restriction of a near-zero average misalignment is an unambiguous virtue, since it imposes the structure required to uncover the long-run parameters. But there may be severe problems in small samples, particularly if adjustment speeds are slow. Cote d'lvoire's real exchange rate, for example, is thought by some to have been substantially overvalued for much of the post-WWII period. Our methodology, when applied using data-based permanent values for the fundamentals, is essentially incapable of reproducing this finding. One response to this short-sample difficulty is to "re-base" the fitted equilibrium real exchange rates ex post by simply shifting their mean; this preserves their rates of change while altering the estimated degrees of misalignment. Despite its obvious appeal, however, rebasing has two important shortcomings. First, it leans very heavily on loosely structured a priori information, a feature of the PPP approach that the present approach is trying to avoid. Second, it embodies an implicit assumption of super-exogeneity with respect to potentially substantial and largely implicit interventions in the marginal distribution of the fundamentals. Our use of counterfactual simulations 13 for the individual fundamentals is a close cousin to the rebasing approach, but has the advantages of greater structure and transparency and, in particular, of exploiting the maintained super-exogeneity assumption more fully. Viewed in this light, the PPP approach can be reinterpreted not primarily as an assumption that the equilibrium rate is a constant, but rather as an assumption that when samples are short and super exogeneityfails, loosely structured a priori information (e.g., "the economy was in internal and external balance in 1985") is of greater value to the policy analyst than the information contained in the sample distribution of the real exchange rate and fundamentals, even when the latter is combined with structured a priori information about the fundamentals. 4. The econometric methodology Given the structure just outlined, we suggest a three-step procedure for estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate. Step 1 is to determine the order of integration of the individual data series. Macroeconomic data often appear to possess a stochastic trend that can be removed by differencing once. Such variables are integrated of order one, or I(l); they are nonstationary in levels and stationary after differencing. This pattern can readily be revealed using standard tests for the presence of a unit root. Other variables may prove stationary (I(0)) or trend-stationary (i.e., I(0) after removing a deterministic trend component). The appropriate unit root tests are well known; in our applications we use the Dickey-Fuller (DF), augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. Although there are concerns about the low power of the unit root tests against stationary alternatives, the ADF test appears to perform satisfactorily on this score even when (as in our case) the number of observations is small (Hamilton (1994)). We also supplement the unit root tests with variance ratio tests (Cochrane (1988)) that exploit the fact that the variances of conditional forecasts explode for nonstationary series and converge for stationary series as the forecast horizon grows. Steps 2 and 3 involve estimation of the long-run parameters and calculation of the equilibrium real exchange rate. Both steps are affected by the univariate time series properties of the data as revealed in step 1. In principle, the vector [In et, wt,J /may contain an arbitrary combination of I(0) and I(l) (or even I(2)) variables. The examples studied here, however, fall into two extreme cases: in C6te d'Ivoire, we find that all variables are I(1); in Burkina Faso, all variables are stationary in levels. We therefore restrict attention to these cases.'5 14 4.1 Step 2: Estimation of J When the variables are all I(l), as in CMte d'Ivoire, stationarity of the residual nt in equation (10) implies that the real exchange rate and its fundamentals are cointegrated (Granger (1981)). This property is extremely useful econometrically, and a massive literature has developed in the wake of Engle and Granger (1987). 4.1.1 The I(]) case: cointegration As shown by Johansen (1988), cointegration is a restriction on the reduced form or VAR representation of the joint distribution of the real exchange rate and its fundamentals. This reduced form can be written as p Ax,= Tx1, + ZAjAxi, +E, (13) j=1 where xt = [In et, Ft', zt']' is the nxl vector of variables and et is the vector of reduced-form innovations (see Appendix 1). If the number of linearly independent stationary combinations of the variables is r (0 I case is the structural error correction model" of Boswijk (1995) (discussed in Ericsson (1995)), which is obtained by premultiplying (14) by a square matrix and then imposing a set of restrictions. 18. Under these conditions case equation (11) and the unrestricted reduced forms (A3b) form a block- recursive system. 19. Engle and Granger (1987) demonstrated an equivalence between cointegration and error correction for nonstationary variables. In the nonstationary case, therefore, equation (10), which implies cointegration, also implies that the real exchange rate has a reduced-form error-correction representation, i.e., one that is similar to ( 11) but with contemporaneous values of the fundamentals excluded. It is this reduced-form error- correction equation that is estimated in the second step of the Engle-Granger method. 20. A failure of weak exogeneity, however, means small-sample bias and invalid inference regarding the long-run parameters. Recall also that the conditions for weak exogeneity with respect to short-run parameters are stronger. 21. The standard sufficient condition for consistency of OLS in the stationary case is that the right-hand side variables are predetermined, i.e., that the residual is uncorrelated with contemporaneous and lagged right-hand side variables. In equation (10) the condition is Cov(nt, xt_k) = Cov(nt, wt) = 0. In the stationary case, predeterminedness corresponds closely (but not exactly) to weak exogeneity (Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983), Monfort and Rabemanajara (1990)). 34 22. See Monfort and Rabemanajara (1990) for development of exogeneity concepts and tests in the stationary context. 23. Any set of cointegrated variables has a common trend representation; this could be the basis of a joint decomposition of the real exchange rate and fundamentals into a stochastic trend component and a stationary (moving average) component (see Banerjee, et al (1993)). The B-N approach approximates this by treating the variables one by one. 24. This ratio is defined as (J/k)var(Xt-XtIk)/Var(Xt-Xt l), where Xt is the variable of interest and k is the lag length (Cochrane, 1988). 25. We include the drought variable in the long-run relationship, on the grounds that it picks up a supply shock that is highly asymmetric between traded and nontraded goods. Unfortunately, the critical values of Dickey-Fuller tests and the many of the tests used in the Johansen procedure are sensitive to the exact specification of deterministic variables in the cointegrating relationship. We do not attempt the Monte Carlo simulations that would be required to establish critical values for our case. 26. We apply instrumental variables (IV) to the Bewley transform of equation (14), using the ADL variables as instruments. This gives numerically equivalent results to using OLS on the ADL representation. The advantage of the Bewley transform is that the long-run parameters and their standard errors can be read directly from the equation. See Banerjee, et al, pp. 55-64. 27. Although these results are encouraging, weak exogeneity may be a more serious problem than is indicated by our variable-by-variable tests. Using Johansen's system-based chi-squared test, we strongly reject joint weak exogeneity for the fundamentals taken together. 28. Note that this is not the same as the error-correction representation referred to in the Granger Representation Theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987). The latter is a reduced-form equation that omits contemporaneous changes of the fundamentals. 29. The calculation for C6te d'Ivoire relies on the second-stage ECM estimates. As discussed earlier, the dynamic regression estimates are unsatisfactory when LPFOR is included. 30. The time required to dissipate x% of a shock is determined according to: (Ji)t=(J-x), where t is the number of years and/, is the absolute value of the speed of adjustment parameter. 31. For example Elbadawi and Soto (1995), using a similar methodology, estimate that the RER in Mali was virtually in equilibrium (on average) during the 1987-94 period, while the CGE estimates of Devarajan (1997) suggest that the RER in Burkina Faso was overvalued by about 9% in 1993. 35 TABLE 1: Stationarity Statistics - Levels without and with Time Trend C8te d'Ivoire Burkina Faso DF ADF PP DF ADF PP Levels without Time Trend log(REER) -0.59 -1.26 -1.89 -2.25 -4.25 -2.25 log0(TO7) -1.42 -1.54 -1.78 -1.95 -1.82 -1.87 RESGDP -2.11 -2.57 -2.25 -3.84 -2.22 -4.07 log(OPENI) -1.06 -1.39 -1.42 -4.02 -3.04 -4.30 log(OPEN2) -2.35 -1.99 -2.48 -3.23 -3.02 -3.35 log (OPEN3) -2.52 -2.16 -2.69 -3.63 -2.99 -3.82 log (ISHA RE) -1.01 -0.78 -0.68 Levels with Time Trend log(REER) -1.83 -2.46 -2.09 -4.89 -2.76 -5.35 l0og (TOT) -1.51 -1.56 -1.69 -2.30 -2.08 -2.34 RESGDP -2.05 -2.50 -2.24 -4.27 -2.69 4.64 log(OPENl) -1.02 -1.32 -1.29 -3.84 -2.94 -4.20 log(OPEN2) -2.81 -2.30 -3.02 -3.12 -2.95 -3.31 log(OPEN3) -2.47 -1.99 -2.72 -3.47 -2.91 -3.75 log (ISHARE) -2.42 -2.19 -2.42 NOTES: DF, ADF, and PP refer to Dickey-Fuller, augmented Dickey-Fuller, and Phillips-Perron stationarity statistics. The number of observations is 29 for CMe d'Ivoire and 24 for Burkina Faso. The variables are defined in Appendix 2 (ISHARE is not available for Burkina Faso). 36 Table 2: Johansen's Maximum Likelihood Test of Cointegration Rank for Cote d'Ivoire 10% critical value 5% critical value L-Max unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted With the dummy r = 0 45.01 36.35 48.34 39.43 52.44 r < 1 30.05 30.84 41.02 33.32 44.31 Without the dummy r = 0 32.65 30.84 39.17 33.32 42.32 r< 1 18.63 24.78 31.47 27.14 34.47 NOTES: The first row (r = 0) tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration; the second (r < 1) tests the null hypothesis of at most one cointegration vector. The first column (L-Max) gives the estimated Johansen likelihood value in each case. The second and fourth columns give the 10% and 5% critical values taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992, Table 1.1). The third and fifth columns give the small-sample-adjusted critical values. The adjustment factor is calculated as T/(T-nk), where T is the number of observations (28), n is the number of variables including the intercept and drought dummy variable (7), and k is the number of lags (1). When the dummy is included (upper panel), the adjustment factor is 1.33; when it is excluded, this becomes 1.27. See Cheung and Lai (1993) for discussion of the adjustment factor. 37 TABLE 3: Long Run Parameter Estimates for Cote d'Ivoire. Dependent Variable is log(REER). OPENI OPEN2 OPEN3 OLS-ECM IV-ECM Constant 3.61 4.29 4.30 1.72 1.35 (16.71) (22.01) (12.22) (2.22) (1.42) log(TOT) 0.40 0.16 0.15 0.80 0.75 (3.03) (1.06) (0.94) (2.07) (2.21) RESGDP -2.67 -1.47 -1.45 -0.89 -1.53 (-5.49) (-3.25) (-3.71) (-0.49) (-1.04) log(OPEN) -0.78 -0.08 -0.03 -0.28 -0.46 (-3.68) (-0.34) (-0.12) (-0.42) (-0.82) log(ISHARE) -0.27 -0.31 -0.30 -0.47 -0.43 (-5.83) (4.63) (-5.15) (-3.24) (-3.56) D83-85 -0.22 -0.30 -0.30 -0.52 -0.44 (-3.01) (-3.43) (-3.49) (-2.35) (-2.51) R2-Bar 0.72 0.56 0.56 0.42 0.36 Q 14.32 13.80 14.21 7.16 4.68 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.31) (0.59) DW 1.16 1.14 1.15 2.22 2.15 DF -3.55 -3.31 -3.31 ADF -3.54 -3.84 -3.89 PP -3.61 -3.30 -3.29 NOTES: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios (note that these have non-standard distributions even asymptotically in columns 1-3). The static cointegration regressions in columns 1-3 use the three alternative openness variables discussed in Appendix 2. The last column reports the long-run parameters of the unrestricted ECM (equation (11) in the text; equivalent to the unrestricted ADL), using OPEN 1 as the openness variable. The long-run parameters and associated standard errors are obtained by estimating the Bewley transform of the ECM; see Banerjee, et al (1993) for details. The full set of parameters for this regression appear in column 1 of Table 4. 38 TABLE 4: ECM Parameter Estimates for C6te dIlvoire. Dependent Variable is log(REER). 2-step ECM Unrestricted ECM OLS IV OLS IV Constant 3.61 3.53 1.72 1.35 (16.71) (15.68) (2.22) (1.42) Adjustment Speed log (REERt-1 or Error,-, -0.30 -0.39 -0.45 -0.37 (-1.85) (-2.09) (-2.32) (-1.63) Long-Run Parameters log(I'OTt1) 0.40 0.49 0.80 0.75 (3.03) (3.29) (2.07) (2.21) RESGDP,-] -2.67 -2.81 -0.89 -1.53 (-5.49) (-5.58) (-0.49) (-1.04) log(OPEN,.1) -0.78 -0.81 -0.28 -0.46 (-3.68) (-3.71) (-0.42) (-0.82) log (ISHARE,_1) -0.27 -0.30 -0.47 -0.43 (-5.83) (-5.27) (-3.24) (-3.56) D83-85 t-I ~~-0.22 -0.22 -0.52 -0.44 (-3.01) (-3.03) (-2.35) (-2.51) Short-Run Parameters Alog (TOTd 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.33 (2.86) (2.97) (1.78) (1.44) ARES GDPt -1.47 -1.86 -0.95 -0.76 (-3.29) (-3.72) (-1.27) (-0.90) Alog (OPENd -0.38 -0.49 -0.29 -0.28 (-1.99) (-2.59) (-0.95) (-0.87) Alog (ISHA4REd -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 -0.11 (-1.72) (-1.40) (-2.37) (-0.96) Alog (PFOR,-.4 -0.30 -0.14 -0.29 -0.14 (2.39) (-1.06) (-0.97) (-0.58) AD83-85 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 (-1.04) (1. 01) (-0.97) (-0.43) Q 14.32 7.17 7.16 4.68 (0.05) (0.31) (0.31) (0.59) R2-Bar 0.49 0.74 0.42 0.36 D W 1.11 1.12 2.22 2.15 NOTES: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. The period of estimation is 1965-93. In columns I and 3, the long-run parameters and associated standard errors are obtained by estimating the Bewley transform of the ECM. In columns 1 and 2 we use the lagged residual from the static regression as the error-correction term. Colum-ns 2 and 2 are instrumental variable estimates, using two lags of all right-side-variables as instruments for ISHARE. 39 TABLE 5: Observed and Equilibrium RER Indexes for CMte d'Ivoire - 1980 to 1993 Equilibrium RER Year Observed Fitted S-year MA B-N "Sustainable" Overvaluation 1980 139 130 137 136 92 34 1981 121 121 120 124 94 22 1982 109 109 112 116 99 9 1983 104 104 108 121 107 -3 1984 100 100 103 121 131 -31 1985 100 100 103 104 112 -12 1986 126 116 128 115 118 6 1987 149 149 149 121 102 31 1988 149 149 149 132 97 35 1989 143 143 144 186 108 24 1990 152 152 149 185 121 20 1991 151 151 145 165 110 27 1992 164 164 153 168 108 34 1993 166 166 154 156 118 29 NOTES: The observed RER is the one used in the econometric analysis. The long-run parameter vector is taken from the static regression in column 1 of Table 3. "Fitted" values are obtained directly from that regression; "5-year MA" refers to five-year moving averages for all fundamentals; "B-N" refers to Beveridge- Nelson decompositions of all fundamentals; and the "sustainable" RER is defined as the fitted RER with all fundamentals replaced by counterfactual sustainable values, as determined in Appendix 3. Overvaluation is defined as 100*(observed RER - sustainable RER)/(sustainable RER). 40 TABLE 6: Error Correction Model Parameter Estimates for Burkina Faso. Dependent Variable is Alog(REER) Unrestricted Restricted wl Trend w/o Trend wl Trend wlo Trend Constant 0.92 1.21 1.59 2.78 (0.64) (1.16) (1.36) (2.31) Trend 0.01 0.01 (0.30) (1.06) Adjustment Speed log(REERt-1) -0.50 -0.51 -0.54 -0.60 (-2.76) (-2.87) (-2.81) (-3.20) Long-Run Parameters log(fOT,1) 0.79 0.81 0.45 0.03 (1.20) (1.28) (1.37) (0.13) log(OPEN,1) -1.02 -0.78 -0.78 -0.06 (-0.92) (-1.15) (-1.37) (-0.20) RESGDP,.I -7.69 -6.87 -5.69 -2.20 (-1.62) (-1.97) (-2.15) (-1.88) log(PFORt-I) 0.10 0.17 (0.48) (1.28) Short-Run Parameters Alog(TOTd 0.17 0.17 (0.74) (0.74) Alog(OPENd -0.13 -0.08 (-0.42) (-0.32) ARESGDP, -3.20 -2.99 4.42 -2.24 (-2.75) (-3.33) (-2.66) (-5.32) Alog(PFORd -0.30 -0.30 (-1.31) (-1.42) R2-Bar 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.72 Q 8.76 9.51 7.44 3.99 (0.12) (0.09) (0.19) (0.55) DW 2.24 2.20 1.99 2.01 NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. The period of estimation is 1970-93. The unrestricted ECM corresponds to equation (11) in the text. The long-run parameters and associated standard errors are obtained by estimating the Bewley transform of the ECM. 41 TABLE 7: Observed and Equilibrium RER Indexes for Burkina Faso - 1980 to 1993 Equilibrium RER Year Observed Fitted Trend 5-year MA "Sustainable" Overvaluation 1980 115 92 106 93 87 31 1981 102 92 105 93 90 14 1982 104 94 105 91 100 4 1983 99 93 105 92 122 -18 1984 96 83 104 95 138 -16 1985 100 99 104 95 119 -6 1986 102 106 103 96 109 -2 1987 99 95 103 100 101 -4 1988 99 99 103 98 103 -16 1989 95 99 102 97 114 -11 1990 95 90 102 99 107 -13 1991 93 102 102 100 108 -12 1992 92 104 101 100 104 -12 1993 91 103 101 103 103 -27 NOTES: The observed RER is the one used in the econometric analysis. The fitted RER is the one estimated from the cointegration regression (Table 6). "Trend" refers to fitted linear trend for the RER. "5-year MA" refers to 5-year moving averages. The sustainable RER is the fitted RER where the fundamentals (i.e. RESGDP and OPEN) have been replaced by their sustainable counterparts as outlined in Appendix 3. Overvaluation is defmed as 100*(observed RER - sustainable RER)/ (sustainable RER). 42 Figure 1 Internal and external balance e EB IB C C The EB schedule is drawn for steady-state values of the service account and transactions costs. A rise in e is a real depreciation. Figure 2 Adjustment to an increase in r, (under a binding credit constraint) e EB EB 2 17~ e . .. X........................... e ; ...... ............... ...:....... IB c * * *C C3 C2 Cl A rise in rw shifts EB downwards to EB./ With flexible wages and prices, adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium at point 2 is immediate. With nominal rigidities, the economy jumps to point 3 and then converges gradually to point 2 along EB. FIGURE 3: VARIANCE RATIO TESTS FOR COTE D'IVOIRE log(TOT) RESGDP 1.80 1. 80 1.60 1.60 1.40 1.40 120 W 1.20 K. 00 10 0 080 - -0.80 J. 0.60 ~0.60-- 0.40 0.40 -- 0.20 --0.20+ 0.00-I I I I I III I 1 2 34567891011121314 15 12 3 4 567891091112213 14 15 log(OPENI) log(REER) 1.80 1.80 1.60 1.601 1.40 -1.40- 1.20 -1.20 1.00 - 1.00 ~080 0 080± 0.60 - -0.60 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.20T 1 2 345678910911121213 14 15 12 3 4 567891091112213 14 15 logISEARE) 1.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 K. 00 0.80 ~.0.60- 0.40- 0.20- 0.00 I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91011 121314 15 FIGURE 4: VARIANCE RATIO TESTS FOR BURKINA FASO log(TOT) RESGDP 1.80 1.80 1,60 1.60- 1.40 1.40 1.20 .~1.20 1.00 -10 0.80 -08 tr 0.60 -06 0.40 -0.40 0.20 --0.2014 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 1213 1415 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 log(OPEN1) log(REER) 1.80 1.80 1.60 1.60 1.40 1.40 N 1.00 N ~.00 .%3.80 ~8 Z.60 ~360 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 I I I I 123456789101112131415 123456789101112131415 References Banerjee, A., J. Dolado, J. W. Galbraith and D. F. 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World Bank (1989), Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study, Washington, D.C. 45 Appendix 1: Conditioning and weak exogeneity Weak exogeneity is a property of the joint distribution of the real exchange rate and the fundamentals. In this appendix we introduce the concept of conditional and marginal models and explore the relationship between the single-equation model (I 1) and the full distribution of the (nxl) vector [In et, Ft, zt ', conditional on its own past (see also Ericsson (1992)). With reasonable generality we can describe this distribution as the p-th-order Gaussian vector autoregression (VAR) p x, = E njxt, + El, -P - IN(O, c72), (A 1 ) j=J where the 17) are (nxn) matrices of reduced-form coefficients and is the nxn symmetric and positive definite matrix of contemporaneous covariances between the innovations sit Equation (Al) can be written equivalently as p Ax, = Tx,_ + AjAx,, + E,, (A2) j=J where F=[(Ej=1,pJll)-I] and A1 =17 The first row of (A2) is a reduced-form error- correction model for Alnet; it is similar to (I 1) but excludes contemporaneous values of F and z. To obtain the distribution of lnet conditional on lagged xt and contemporaneous F and z, we first partition the vector xt into xt = [In et, w t]', where wt = [F't, z 't1 is the vector of macroeconomic determinants of the real exchange rate. Without loss of generality, we can then factorize the joint distribution represented by (A2) into the distribution of Alnet conditional on contemporaneous wt's (and lagged xt's) and and the associated marginal distribution of the wt's (given lagged xt's). Under normality of et, the conditional and marginal models take the form p Aw =J>2X, + E A2Ax, 1 +±2j (A3b) Ji=1 where the numerical subscripts refer to the blocks of appropriately partitioned matrices. By construction, the disturbance term in (A3a), , =22, - £,2(2222-%'21 is uncorrelated with all of the 46 variables on the right-hand side of that equation. Equation (A3) follows the standard regression relationship between two jointly normal scalar random variables y and z, i.e., the conditional distribution of yt is given by yt =,ul + (f12/q2)(zt -,u) + vt, where the pi's are means and the aj's are covariances; and the disturbance vt has the properties E(vt I zJ = 0 and Var(vt I z) = a I - (a92 2/-2. That this representation is simply a re-parameterization of (A2) can be confirmed by pre- multiplying (A2) by the nxn nonsingular matrix B = 11£2 (E22 ) which results in (A3). Equation (A3a) is a single-equation conditional error-correction model whose general form mimics that of equation (11). Although it is often assumed in writing an equation like (11) that the disturbance is uncorrelated with the right-hand side variables, this is true by construction for equation (A3a). To the degree that the parameterizations differ, therefore, OLS estimation of ( 1) will tend to uncover the parameters of (A3a) (in which orthogonality holds by construction), yielding inconsistent estimates of the parameters of (1 1). Moreover, even if the parameters of (1 1) can be recovered from those of (A3a), the latter are potentially complicated functions of the underlying VAR parameters. There may therefore be cross-equation restrictions linking these parameters to those of the marginal model (A3b). In such a case efficient estimation of the conditional model requires that these restrictions be imposed; and failure to impose them may produce inconsistent standard errors, invalidating inference. These considerations motivate a search for conditions under which estimation and inference regarding particular parameters of ( 1) can proceed successfully in the conditional model alone (i.e., without analyzing the full system). In such cases the sub-vector wt is said to be weakly exogenous for the parameters of interest (Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983)). In the context of the above discussion, weak exogeneity requires (a) that the parameters of interest can be directly recovered from those of the conditional model; and (b) that there be no cross-equation restrictions linking these parameters to those of the marginal model. 47 Appendix 2: Data Description The data were taken from three sources: (1) IMF, International Financial Statistics, (2) UNCTAD, and (3) the World Bank's Unified Survey. The variables were constructed as follows: Real Exchange Rate (RER). Ratio of the domestic consumer price index (CPI) to the trade- weighted foreign wholesale price index (WPI), multiplied by the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate (NER): RER = (CPI/WPI)*NER. Terms of Trade (TOT). Ratio of export price index (Px) to import price index (PM) (expressed in dollars, taken from UNCTAD): TOT = PX/PM. Openness (OPEN). OPEN 1 is the import to GDP ratio (IMPGDP), and is defined as the value of imports at current prices (IMPCP) over GDP at currrent prices (GDPKP): OPEN 1 = IMPCP/ GDPCP. OPEN2 is the ratio of the value of imports at constant prices (IMPKP) plus exports at constant prices (EXPKP) to GDP at constant prices (GDPKP): OPEN2 = (IMPKP + EXPKP)/GDPKP. OPEN3 is the ratio of imports at constant prices to domestic absorbtion at constant prices: OPEN3 = IMPKP/(GDPKP - (EXPKP - IMPKP)). Resource Balance to GDP Ratio (RESGDP). Value of exports at constant prices (EXPKP) minus value of imports at constant prices (IMPKP), divided by GDP at constant prices (GDPKP). EXPKP has been adjusted by the domestic terms of trade (TOTD) which are defined as the ratio of export to import deflator. Thus RESGDP = (EXPKP*TOTD - IMPKP)/GDPKP. Investment Share (ISHARE). Ratio of gross investment at constant prices (IGROSS) to the sum of private consumption (PCONK), government consumption (GCONK), and gross investment, all at constant prices: ISHARE = IGROSS/(PCONK+GCONK + IGROSSK). Foreign Price Level (PFOR). Domestic consumer price index (CPI) divided by the real effective exchange rate (RER): PFOR = CPI/RER. 48 Appendix 3: Sustainable Fundamentals A3.1 Time-series measures: TOTandLPFOR Both Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire are very small economies by world standards and are therefore price takers in the markets for both their exports and imports. Moreover, the nominal exchange rate for the CFA francs was fixed throughout the 1970-93 sample period and could not be changed by individual CFA countries. The terms of trade (TOT) and the foreign price level converted to CFA francs (LPFOR) are therefore exogenous variables. While these variables fluctuate substantially from year to year, we have no basis on which to question the sustainability" of their longer-run movements. We therefore use 5-year centered moving averages as the sustainable values of these variables (extrapolating out of sample using the first and last-year values). We also generate alternative sustainable values for Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire using sample means and Beveridge-Nelson decompositions, respectively. A3.2 Counterfactual simulations: RESGDP RESGDP is the ratio of the resource balance to GDP, both in constant prices. Since Burkina Faso relied heavily on concessional aid flows in 1970-93, determining a sustainable resource balance is essentially a problem of determining sustainable levels of financial inflows. These inflows can be divided into net factor income, net transfers, and net capital flows. We used 5-year moving averages for the first two (interest payments were small and changed very slowly over the sample, so we ignored the feedback from borrowings to interest payments). We then divided net capital flows into its dominant component - net long-term concessional borrowing - and "other" flows (net direct investment, net portfolio investment, net short term borrowing, net errors and omissions), using 5- year moving averages for the latter. The government of Burkina Faso attempted to maximize net concessional borrowing during the sample period, so this component was ultimately determined by the foreign donors. To smooth out year-to-year fluctuations in net concessional borrowing, we used the smaller of the 5-year moving average of the actuals or 3.5% of GDP (the highest level reached except in drought years). The sustainable resource balance is then the sum of these sustainable components. Note that the Bank's debt stock and flow data are not consistent with the national accounts and balance of payments data for Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. Since the balance of payments and national accounts data are consistent with each other and essential for the analysis, we used balance of payments data when there were conflicts between these and Bank's debt data. 49 The C6te d'Ivoire case is both more complicated and more representative of the problems likely to emerge in developing country applications. C6te d'Ivoire avoided balance of payments and debt problems in the 1970s. We therefore treated actual flows as essentially sustainable during the 1965-79 period, using 5-year moving averages to smooth out temporary fluctuations. After 1980, it was unable to meet its debt service payments. Moving averages therefore seem unlikely to capture sustainable movements in net borrowing and interest payments after 1980, and we cannot ignore the feedback from higher debt levels to higher interest payments. For 1980-93 we proceed as follows. To proxy the sustainable level of borrowing, we used zero net repayments and net disbursements after 1979 (i.e., no change in the debt stock other than through write-downs). C6te d'Ivoire's debt ratio jumped from 47% in 1979 to 62% in 1980, then climbed to 115% in 1985 after which the country defaulted. The Mastricht Treaty, after which the fiscal guidelines for the West African Monetary Union are modelled, sets 60% of GDP as the maximum desirable debt level for the EU countries. A developing country might be able to target a somewhat higher debt level than 60% depending upon its rate of growth and its access to financing on concessional terms; so 1979 is by these criteria the last year of sustainable debt levels. We calculate sustainable direct and portfolio investment as assumed percentages of total sustainable investment as determined below; together with the sustainable borrowing figures, these yield a sustainable level of total capital inflows. To proxy sustainable interest payments, we use 4% of GDP. This represents a kind of compromise between a normative scenario in which interest payments are capped at 2.5% of GDP and a positive scenario (essentially feasibility calculation) that caps them at 5%. For comparison, the Mastricht debt ceiling, with an inflation rate of 3% and a real interest rate of 3% implies interest payments of 1.8% of GDP for the EU countries. Cote d'Ivoire was unable to sustain the service payments on its debt after interest payments reached 3.5 and 5.2% of GDP in 198 land 82. The sustainable resource deficit for 1980-1993 is then calculated as the sum of net transfers, net factor income, and net capital inflows, using 5-year moving averages of the actuals for transfers and factor income flows other than interest payments. A3.3 Counterfactual simulations: ISHARE and OPEN] ISHARE is the ratio of investment to GDP in constant prices; OPEN 1 is the ratio of imports to absorption in current prices. The sustainability criterion we use for these variables is consistency 50 with a 3% long run growth rate of GDP per capita. With population growth estimated at about 3% for both countries over the sample, GDP growth of 6% is required to achieve 3% growth in GDP per capita. Using ICORs of 4 for COte d'Ivoire and 5 for Burkina Faso, this would in turn require investment ratios of about 25% and 30% of GDP, respectively. The 25% ratio is in line with those actually achieved during 1960s and 70s in COte d'Ivoire; it is also the target that the World Bank has suggested as a guideline for Africa as a whole (World Bank (1989)). For Cote d'Ivoire, thererfore, we use a moving average of the actual investment levels for 1965 to 1981, which were reasonably close to 25%, and 20% for 1982-93 when investment was depressed far below this level. For Burkina Faso, where the investment/GDP ratio is used only as an input to calculate the target import/absorption ratio (see below), we assume a sustainable investment ratio of 25%. For both countries we assume that increases in the import to GDP ratio were required to deliver the import content of additional investment and also support a more liberal trade regime. We estimate an import content of investment of roughly 0.6 for both countries. To incorporate trade liberalization, we assume increases in the import ratio of 3% and 2%, respectively, for Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. The target import ratio is then estimated as the actual import ratio plus 3% of GDP plus 0.6 times the difference between the target investment ratio and the actual investment ratio. This target import/absorption ratio is used for the entire sample period as a more open trade policy would have been desirable throughout. A3.4 A caveat As the above discussion suggests, determining target values for particular countries requires considerable country specific knowledge and a number of assumptions based on partial information and analysis. These assumptions are open to question, and different ones - regarding either the key parameters or the underlying notion of sustainability - would yield different results. It may therefore be important in specific cases to consider alternative plausible assumptions and to compare the results of the various alternatives to those from using moving averages for the target variables. 51 Policy Research Working Paper Series Contact Title Author Date for paper WPS1773 The Costs and Benefits of J Luis Guasch June 1997 J Troncoso Regulation Implications for Robert W Hahn 38606 Developing Countries WPS1774 The Demand for Base Money Valeriano F Garcia June 1997 J Forgues and the Sustainabity of Public 39774 Debt WPS1775 Can -tlch-Inflation Developing Martin Ravallion June 1997 P Sader Count; es F-'ape Absoclut- Poventy-/ 33902 VVPS1 776 From Prices to ricories Agricultural John Baffes June 1997 P Kokila Subsidization Vlithoiit Protect<,n- uacob Meerman 33716 WPS1777 Aid, Policies, and Gtowth Craig Burnside June 1997 K. Labrie David Dollar 31001 WPS1778 How Government PolI-ies Aftect Szczepan Figiel June 1997 J Jacobson the Relationsh!p between Pclisi Tom Scott 33710 and World Vheat Pr,ces Parios Varangis WPS1779 Water Allocation Mecnariasns Ariei Dinar June 1997 M. Rigaud Principles and Exanipies Mark W Rosegrant 30344 Rutr Meinzen-D,ck WPS1780 High-Level Rent-Seekirng ana Jacqueline Coolidge June 1997 N. Busjeet Corruption in African Regmimes Susan Rose-Ackerman 33997 Theory and Cases WPS1781 Technology Accumuiation oiri Pier Carlo Padoan June 1997 J Ngaine Diffusion Is There a F& c;cn3l 37947 Dimension'- WPS 1782 Regional lnreyration anc thi - ;:ices L Alan Winters June 1997 J Ngaine of Imports An VV011i Vvoi CIhang 37947 Investigation WPS1783 Trade Policy ODPtions for the Glenn W Harrison June 1997 J Ngaine Chilean Government A Quantitative Thomas F Rutherfoid 37947 Evaluation David G Tarr WPS1784 Analyzing the Sustainabil:ty of Fiscal John T Cud(iington June 1997 S King-Watson Deficits in Deveiopirg Cour,tries 31047 WPS1785 The Causes of Governmi,nt arnd the Simon Commande? june '997 E Witte Consequences tor Growtr and Hamic, R Davoc.i 85637 Weli-Beiu .J Lee WPS1786 The Economics of Custtms Unions Corstant;ne MichalocoIos June I997 M Patena in the Commonwealth o' Dahld Ta'r 39515 Independent St-tes Policy Research Working Paper Series Contact Title Author Date for paper WPS1 787 Trading Arrangements and Diego Puga June 1997 J Ngaine Industrial Development Anthony J Venaoles 37947 WPS1788 An Economic Analysis of Woodfuel Kenneth M. Chomitz June 1997 A. Maranon Management in the Sahel The Case Charles Griffiths 39074 of Chad WPS1789 Competition Law in Bulgaria After Bernard Hoekman June 1997 J Ngaine Central Planning Dimeon Djankov 37947 WPS1 790 Interpreting the Coefficient of Barry R Chiswick June 1997 P Singh Schooling tn the Humarn Capital 85631 Earnings Function WPS1791 Toward Better Regulation of Private Hemant Shah June 1997 N. Johl Pension Funds 38613 WPS1792 Tradeoffs from Hedging Oil Price Sudhakar Satyanarayan June 1997 E. Somensatto Risk in Ecuador Eduardo Somensatto 30128 WPS1793 Wage and Pension Pressure Alain de Crombrugghe June 1997 M Jandu on the Polish Budget 33103 WPS1794 Ownership Structure Corporate Xiaonian Xu July 1997 J Chinsen Governance, and Corporate Yan Wan 34022 Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies WPS1795 What Educational Production Lant Pritchett July 1997 S. Fallon Functions Really Show A Positive Deon Filmer 38009 Theory of Educatiorn Spending WPS1796 Cents and Sociability Household Deepa Narayan July 1997 S. Fallon Income and Social Capital in Rural Lant Pritchett 38009 Tanzania WPS1797 FormaI and inforiTIaI Regulation Sheoli Pargal July 1997 E de Castro of Industrial Pollution Hemamala Hettige 89121 Comparative Evidence from Manjula Singh Indonesia and the United States David Wheeler WPS1798 Poor Areas, Or Only Poor People? Martin Ravallion July 1997 P Sader Quentin Wodon 33902 WPS1 799 More for the Poor Is Less for the Jonath B Gelbach July 1997 S Fallon Poor The Politics of Targeting Lant H Pritchett 38009