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How Dirty Are “Quick and Dirty” Methods of Project Appraisal?

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Routine “quick-and-dirty” methods of project appraisal can be so dirty in guiding project selection as to wipe out the net social gains from public investment.

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Summary findings

Routine “quick-and-dirty” methods of project appraisal can be so dirty in guiding project selection as to wipe out the net social gains from public investment, contend van de Walle and Gunewardena, illustrating their point with a case study of irrigation projects in Vietnam.

They test a common quick-and-dirty method for estimating benefits from irrigation investments, using data for Vietnam. They compare the results with impacts assessed through econometric modeling of marginal *returns*, which allows for household and area heterogeneity using integrated household-level survey data.

The quick-and-dirty method performs well in estimating average benefits nationally but can be misleading for some regions and, by ignoring heterogeneity, overestimates how much the poor gain.

At moderate to high project cost levels, quick-and-dirty makes enough mistakes to eliminate the net benefits from public investment. When irrigating as little as 3 percent of Vietnam’s nonirrigated land, the savings from the more data-intensive method are enough to cover the costs of the extra data required.

This paper — a product of the Development Research Group — is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the welfare impacts of public spending. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Cynthia Bernardo, room MC2-501, telephone 202-473-1148, fax 202-522-1154, Internet address cbernardo@worldbank.org. April 1998. (38 pages)

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How Dirty are "Quick and Dirty" Methods of Project Appraisal?

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1 Introduction

An essential input to any project appraisal is an estimate of the quantity changes induced by the project.¹ Ideally, these estimates will allow for heterogeneity across projects and beneficiaries. Ignoring such heterogeneity—by looking only at aggregates—can bias estimates of both average benefits and their distribution. Typically, however, rapid assessments must be resorted to, and the analysis conducted for a representative project and/or beneficiary. It is recognized that the methods used in practice for assessing quantity changes in project appraisal simplify reality in this respect; they often ignore household and area heterogeneity, behavioral responses and general equilibrium impacts. It is implicitly assumed that economic losses due to these deficiencies are of second order importance. Is that right? Would collecting better data, or using better methods, make an appreciable difference to the social welfare outcomes from public investments? Would it be worth investing the extra resources needed to make a more thorough assessment? Indeed, could the deficiencies of commonly used methods be so great as to eliminate the entire social gains from the investments?

This paper addresses these questions for a commonly used "quick-and-dirty" (QD) method for assessing rural infrastructure investments. The QD method we study is a stylized version of the method that is normally used in practice to assess both the average gains and the distributional impacts of an irrigation project. The method is implemented and the implied average benefit from irrigation in Viet Nam is compared to the marginal benefit estimated by an alternative, more sophisticated econometric method for estimating impacts on farm profits at the farm-household level. We call this the "slow-and-clean" (SC) method. This is closer to a well-defined theoretical ideal, and is about as sophisticated a method as one would expect to find in a small research project set up for the evaluation task. While it is

not perfect, we believe it represents a distinct improvement, and hence a reasonable test of the conventional QD approach.

The comparison of our stylized QD and SC methods allows us to estimate the potential gains from using more theoretically sound but costly behavioral methods, where those gains are assessed by the same criteria used to assess the projects themselves. Here we will be concerned with both the impacts on average incomes and the distribution of income. QD methods found in practice often appeal to both efficiency and equity criteria for project selection. For example, appraisals of rural infrastructural projects in developing countries often argue that since the project is to be located in a poor area, it will help reduce poverty. However, this may be quite deceptive. The benefits from physical infrastructure investments will be influenced by a number of factors which will typically be hidden by quick and dirty methods. Behavioral responses on the part of households may alter expected outcomes. There may be complementarities between physical and human infrastructure such that the returns to individual households depend in part on the household's level of human capital (van de Walle 1997). If wealthier households have higher human capital, they may also have higher gains. Returns to irrigation on the family farm may further depend on household size and composition in settings with underdeveloped labor markets. The size of landholdings may also matter, again with obvious potential skewness of benefits. A project analysis which ignores these factors may seriously misinform policy conclusions about the impacts on poverty of public investments.

The next section outlines the theoretical ideal and the principles underlying the SC and QD methods. It also briefly discusses the setting and the data which are used to implement the methods. Section 3 then compares and contrasts results obtained by the alternative approaches including

implications for distributional assessments, for project selection and for the net social gains from public investments. Section 4 concludes with a few comments.

2 Methods

In this section we start with a description of the theoretical ideal and then describe two approximations—the SC and QD methods.

2.1 *The ideal*

An important input to the appraisal of irrigation projects is assumed to be an estimate of the gain in farm profit from irrigating given amounts of previously unirrigated land.² The ideal method would start with a general specification of the profit function for a farm household. We measure farm household profit from crop production by total revenue minus total production costs, which we term net crop income. This is assumed to be a function of output and input prices (p), non-irrigated (L^N) and irrigated (L^I) annual crop land amounts, and other relevant variables (z). The generic profit function is:

$$(1) \quad \pi_j = \pi(p_j, L_j^N, L_j^I, z_j)$$

which is the maximum profit received by the j 'th household, ($j = 1, \dots, n$). The vector z will include other fixed factors and parameters of the production function used by the j 'th household.

In the case where a complete set of perfect markets exists for all farm outputs and inputs, variables influencing consumption decisions, such as the prices of consumer goods and the size and demographic composition of the household, would not alter the maximum profit from farming. However, when markets are incomplete—so that the conditions required for separability between

production and consumption decisions do not hold—such variables will spillover into production decisions (Strauss 1986). For example, in Viet Nam, rural labor markets are thin, or non-existent, reflecting the dual effects of the past socialist organization of rural production and reliance on self-subsistence farming as well as possibly high supervision costs and limited mobility in the early stages of transition. Variables such as family size and composition will then influence the amount of labor available for farming and hence, maximum profits. Then z may include factors besides the parameters of the farm household's production function. The specification in (1) can thus be made general enough to encompass market effects of credit or labor market failure.

Now consider a project which involves irrigating amounts ΔL_j^I of previously unirrigated land for each of n households (possibly zero for some). The benefit to the j 'th farm-household is given by the increment to its profits from farming, i.e., the benefit is

$$(2) \quad B_j = \pi(p_j, L_j^N - \Delta L_j^I, L_j^I + \Delta L_j^I, z_j) - \pi(p_j, L_j^N, L_j^I, z_j)$$

One would then calculate average benefit ($\sum B_j / n$) or some distribution-weighted average benefit. In the special case in which one unit of land is irrigated it is useful to define the *marginal benefit function* as

$$(3) \quad MB_j = \pi(p_j, L_j^N - 1, L_j^I + 1, z_j) - \pi(p_j, L_j^N, L_j^I, z_j)$$

If we knew the profit function then the task would be complete. In the rest of this section we describe two approximations to this ideal, one of which—the SC method—is undoubtedly more accurate than the other, but is still an approximation. But first we need to describe some key features of our data.

2.2 *Setting and data*

We test irrigation project appraisal methods using data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VNLSS) of 1992-93. This is a nationally representative, high quality household consumption survey covering a sample of 4800 households.³ The data include detailed coverage of agricultural production and incomes which allows us to construct a comprehensive measure of annual crop incomes net of all production costs. The survey also collects detailed information on land assets, including quality of plots, and other inputs to crop production, including family labor inputs. We use total household per capita expenditures (including the imputed value of consumption from own production), appropriately deflated to allow for spatial cost of living differences, as our welfare measure.

Viet Nam is a largely agricultural economy where in 1992/93 84 percent of the rural labor force aged 6 years or older claimed agriculture as their primary occupation. A majority of households are engaged in small-scale self-subsistence farming relying almost exclusively on household labor and traditional inputs. About half of the country's arable crop land is under irrigation. It is generally agreed that there is great potential for an expansion of the area served by new irrigation infrastructure as well as by the rehabilitation of long non-functioning irrigation networks (Barker 1994). Such investments have not been undertaken due to the combination of historical factors such as war, highly constrained public budgets, and lack of access to credit.

The current distribution of access to crop land and irrigation varies across regions but much less so within regions due to past land reform. In general, land endowments are relatively equitably distributed in the North but less so in the South where on average the poor have access to less than half the amount of land the non-poor have (van de Walle 1996). The existing distribution of irrigation is

somewhat more equitable than that of land, though similar. Given its current distribution, it cannot be argued that irrigation investments will necessarily benefit the poor more than the rich.

Although Viet Nam has been undergoing reform since 1986, markets were still relatively underdeveloped in 1992-93. Field work suggested that, in some parts of the country, labor and land markets did not exist at all. Using the same data, van de Walle (1997) finds evidence that household demographics and human capital exert considerable influence on farm household crop incomes. As already discussed, this would not be the case if markets performed well such that households could buy and sell labor time and skills.

2.3 *A slow and clean approach*

The SC method works by assuming a functional form for the profit function which is then estimated by regression methods using suitable micro data—in this case the 1992/3 VNLSS. The chosen specification allows a number of variables—including land itself, demographics, education variables and regional dummy variables for Viet Nam's 7 regions—to have direct effects on the marginal returns from irrigated and non-irrigated crop land. For the SC method used here, the profit function is assumed to have the following parameterization:

$$(4) \quad \pi_j = \alpha + \beta_j^N L_j^N + \beta_j^I L_j^I + \gamma z_j + \delta d_j + \varepsilon_j$$

where

$$(5) \quad \beta_j^N = b_0^N + b_1^N d_j + b_2^N z_j + b_3^N L_j^N$$

and

$$(6) \quad \beta_j^l = b_0^l + b_1^l d_j + b_2^l z_j + b_3^l L_j^l$$

and where d is a vector of regional dummy variables which are assumed to fully capture the variation in prices faced.⁴ The error term ε_j is assumed to be independently and identically normally distributed.

The country's regions are made up of provinces, districts and, at the lowest level, communes. Dummy variables for 119 out of the 200 sampled communes are included in the intercept of the profit function (d in equation 4) to capture variations in prices and any other spatial, cross-commune variations in omitted or fixed factors such as land and soil quality. Thus, prices of outputs and variable inputs are assumed to vary between but not within communes. The commune dummies will also pick up the influences of geographical and social and physical infrastructure variations at the commune level. We also collapse the commune dummies into 7 regional dummy variables and interact them with irrigated and non-irrigated land (d in equations 5 and 6) and other land types, thus permitting regional effects on the marginal returns to land.

Of course, this specification is only one of a number that might be proposed. However, by allowing nonlinearity in land and interaction effects with other variables, it is a reasonably flexible functional form for the present purposes.⁵

The vector z includes other land in agricultural production, land tenure variables, education, health and demographic variables, and location specific agro-ecological variables. As discussed, a range of variables are included in z in order to capture characteristics specific to a transition economy in which markets are still underdeveloped.

OLS is used on a sample consisting of the 3049 farm households in the data set (including some urban farming households). Table 1 describes the variables. Regression results are given in Table 2.⁶

Irrigated and non-irrigated crop land are both found to have high but diminishing impacts on crop income. Household size has a positive effect as does its interaction with many land variables. One notable exception is size interacted with irrigated land with a pronounced negative effect on crop income. Further investigation finds that when the model is run separately for the North and South of the country, the negative impact is only upheld for the South where labor markets are somewhat more developed and where farms are often larger and either fully irrigated or completely without irrigation. We interpret the results as showing that family labor is more of a constraining factor in farm household production in the North than in the South and even less so for large irrigated farms in the South (particularly the Mekong Delta).

The effects of education are also strong. The primary education of the household head is convex in its impact suggesting increasing returns to schooling. Interaction effects between primary education variables and irrigated land are generally large and positive. There are also significant commune fixed effects and significant spatial differences in the effects of both irrigated and non-irrigated land, and other land types.⁷

From the regression model, a marginal benefit function for irrigation is derived which allows for the heterogeneity across households. The marginal benefit from irrigating one unit of previously unirrigated land is given by the difference in the derivatives of the regression function with respect to irrigated land and non-irrigated land:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (7) \quad MB_j &= \beta'_j - \beta_j^N \\
 &= (b'_0 - b_0^N) + (b'_1 - b_1^N) d_j + (b'_2 - b_2^N) z_j + b'_3 L_j^I - b_3^N L_j^N
 \end{aligned}$$

The estimates of equation 7 are given in Table 3. As expected, marginal benefits from irrigation fall as irrigated area increases, and increase with the amount of unirrigated land. The results also show the strong influence of the household's demographic and education endowments on the gains from moving one unit of non-irrigated land into irrigation. In order to calculate the mean marginal benefit we evaluate this function at the sample variable means.

2.4 *A quick and dirty approach*

The "slow-and-clean" method described above is demanding in a number of respects. Special microdata are required—namely an integrated household survey ("integrated" in that the survey collected all the relevant variables for the same sampled households). And the method requires econometric modeling. Without such data and methods (or the resources to obtain them) one has little option but to do a rapid assessment of the impacts of an irrigation infrastructure expansion on less than ideal data. The essence of the QD method is to estimate the marginal benefit function using simple averages that can be readily calculated in the field or using simple pre-existing (non-integrated) surveys.

To guide our characterization of the QD approach it is useful to look first at what is currently done in practice. In general the aim is to assess the income gain over pre-project rainfed crop incomes for the average farmer with the average amount of land (for example see Londero 1987; Carruthers and Clark 1983; OECD 1985). Project appraisal staff typically go to a target area, observe the amount of land that can be irrigated in the catchment area, and make an estimate of incomes on non-irrigated farms. Predictions of the gain in farm output from the irrigation project are made on the basis of these field observations, sometimes also drawing on an assumed "model" of a representative farm household.

Sometimes province level statistics on cropping patterns, intensities and yields are employed; sometimes estimates are based solely on the field visit. It is rarely clear how the estimate of the gain in farm output is obtained and what confidence one might have in it.

Such methods are the norm in the World Bank's practice.⁸ However, there is heterogeneity in the quality of the inputs. In reviewing the institution's irrigation project appraisals, we found that some project analyses used more finely disaggregated assessments of the output gains by geographical area, by type of crop or by allowing for some farm heterogeneity through using representative farm models for more than one farm size. But we also found that in most cases the methods do not allow for within-area heterogeneity and tend to assume that all farmers will have equal access and benefits.

The method proposed here is a characterization of the methods found in practice. We do, however, take advantage of the availability of farm level data on crop incomes from the VNLSS consumption survey. Although we use household survey data to carry out this exercise that is solely a matter of convenience—there is nothing inherent in our procedure which requires such data. We do not use the integrated nature of the survey (whereby a wide range of different types of data are obtained for the same sample). Rather we use the survey to estimate simple means as one might obtain from special purpose surveys or field trips. The same approach could be enacted through a rapid assessment survey of a project area or drawing on information collected through a small agricultural survey.

There is an advantage to using the same survey for calibrating both methods since it allows us to control for differences due to sampling. We may otherwise find differences in the results which are due to nothing more than sampling errors. By the same token, it could be argued that basing the QD estimates on a statistically-sound household survey renders them less "dirty" than the typical rapid

appraisal estimates using less rigorous sampling methods.

Our aim is to calculate the difference in the value of crop incomes net of costs per area of irrigated versus the same area of non-irrigated land. This difference is then a measure of the average benefit from irrigation allowing for any difference in production costs associated with a change in irrigation.

We use the survey data to approximate what the project appraisal would do in the field. Clearly, the appraiser would not pay attention to non-farmers, or farmers producing crops which do not require irrigation. This leads us to estimate the mean over a restricted sample of the survey households. Specifically, we exclude households who are not primarily engaged in the production of rice, other food crops or annual industrial food crops—typically the major users of irrigation. We restrict the sample to households whose income from these sources comprise 90 or more percent of their total crop income. The excluded households have a greater dependence on income from perennial industrial crops, fruit and forest tree crops.

It is unlikely that a rapid field appraisal would be able to exactly identify households that have only irrigated (or non-irrigated) land. We therefore allow for some probable margin of error and further limit the samples to households that have 90 percent or more irrigated or non-irrigated land (as opposed to 100%) and calculate mean net crop incomes for these groups. The difference between these amounts expressed per unit of irrigated and non-irrigated land gives us our measure of the average benefit. We calculate average benefits for the national level as well as for regional subsamples. The latter is done for six of Viet Nam's seven regions—excluding the Central Highlands where there is very little irrigation and no households with 90 or more percent of their land under irrigation.⁹

In trying to emulate the approach that a rapid appraisal might adopt, we have made a number of choices and assumptions in calculating the average benefits from irrigation as described above. To check the sensitivity of the estimates to our choices we also calculate the means under alternative assumptions. We experiment by increasing (decreasing) the sample to include households with a smaller (larger) share of crop incomes from rice, other food and annual industrial food crops, and more or less precision in defining the sample of only irrigated and non-irrigated land. The results indicate reasonably similar magnitudes (details below).

The QD method just described has a number of obvious limitations. These include the neglect of heterogeneity across households and regions and of behavioral effects. For example, the household's level of human capital and demographic size and composition may influence the returns to irrigation infrastructure. Impacts will then vary according to how such characteristics vary across households. Furthermore, these characteristics will not be changed by the irrigation project, so they should be controlled for when assessing project benefits.

Our QD method appears to be representative of common practice. However, as discussed above, there is some diversity in the amount of effort put into estimating quantity changes in practice. Some project appraisals may well do better than our QD method, such as by allowing for some heterogeneity. Equally well, some are likely to do worse, since simple models are used and estimated benefit streams driven by assumptions. The comparison of our SC and QD methods does allow us to judge how much extra effort is warranted.

2.5 *Can we predict what difference the choice of method makes?*

Before we compare empirical results from the two methods, we may well ask whether something can be said *a priori* about the comparison. Can we expect the QD method to over- or underestimate the marginal benefits? Consideration of two stylized cases is sufficient to establish that there can be no theoretical presumption as to which method will indicate higher benefits.

Consider the relationship between profits and land holding, both irrigated and non-irrigated, under the following assumptions: **Case 1:** The function relating profits to the amount of irrigated land is strictly concave (marginal profit declines as land increases throughout) while that of the function relating profit to non-irrigated land is linear. **Case 2:** The reverse holds; profit is linear in irrigated land, but concave in non-irrigated land. Let us also assume that profits are zero when there is no land. In case 1, both the QD and SC methods will give exactly the same estimate of the lost profit from having one unit less unirrigated land, while the QD method will overestimate the marginal gain from an extra unit of irrigated land (because the concavity implies that the average profit per unit of land will be higher than the marginal profit). Thus, in case 1, the QD method will overestimate the gain as assessed by the SC method. The ordering reverses in case 2, since the QD method will then overestimate the loss from one less unit of non-irrigated land, while the two methods will agree on the gain from extra irrigated land.

It is possible to construct a number of other examples which relax these assumptions and exhibit similar ambiguity. The above argument is sufficient, however, to illustrate that there can be no general supposition as to which of the two methods will give the higher estimate of the gains from irrigation. That is an empirical question to which we now turn.

3 Quick-and-Dirty versus Slow-and-Clean

This section turns to the empirical implementation of the two methods described above and attempts to assess what the gains are from the SC method relative to QD and how those gains are distributed.

3.1 *Comparing mean and marginal benefits*

For the national sample, the QD method gives a mean benefit of 316 Dongs per year per meter square of irrigated land. The mean marginal benefit calculated by the SC method is not far off at 304 Dongs.¹⁰ Given the same data base, the means are probably biased to being close. However, upon disaggregating to the regional level, we find both larger variation between the two methods' estimates for a particular region and a striking variation in the mean regional gains whatever the method employed. Table 4 presents the regional benefit estimates.

There is clearly a regional dimension which is quite diverse. As one would expect, it is clearly more accurate to use the QD regional estimates than the QD national mean. Figure 1 plots the SC marginal benefits (on the vertical axis) against the QD mean benefits at the household level. This provides an overall summary of our results. (Recall that the SC estimates are household specific while the QD estimates are the same for all households within a specific region. The figure also identifies the regional means.) The 45 degree line indicates the line of equality between the estimates. The horizontal distance between the line of equality and the SC regional means indicates the amount by which the QD mean over- or underestimates the SC mean. This distance is greater for regions in the North (especially in the Northern Uplands and in the Red River region) than in the South (South East and Mekong Delta).

In no case is the SC only over-or underestimated by the QD method. The scatterplot of SC estimates indicates a rather wide distribution of household level marginal benefits within each region that is not captured by the QD. We now take a closer look at the distributions.

3.2 *Distributional implications*

We have seen that there is much variation in mean and marginal benefits across regions. Our next question concerns how much the SC estimates vary with per capita expenditures and what that means for the QD approximation. We first look at the distribution across per capita expenditures for each region individually in Figures 2a and 2b. We have plotted the QD measure (a constant in each region and hence a horizontal straight line), and the household level measures estimated by the SC method. The figures also show the line of best fit estimated using non-parametric methods for the distribution of marginal benefits across per capita expenditure.¹¹

The figures display a positive association of benefits with per capita expenditure, although this is stronger in some regions than others. The Red River region has the least variation in benefits across expenditure while the other regions have slightly higher variation. In general, there is a tendency for the QD method to overestimate (underestimate) benefits to households with low (high) per capita expenditure.

Figure 3 puts together these household level SC estimates to provide a national picture. One can observe concentration of both high and low marginal benefits. This is partly due to the regional composition. The line of best fit takes on a slight inverted U shape reflecting regional and household specific variation in the level and distribution of benefits.

In figure 4, we plot the line of best fit for the QD measures overlaid with the line of best fit obtained in figure 3 for the SC measures. This emphasizes the main distributional implication: the regional QD tends to overestimate benefits for the poor and underestimate them for the better off.

The distributional results partly reflect the influence of household specific characteristics as shown by the marginal benefit function (table 3). In addition to an important regional dimension, the marginal benefits from irrigated land are significantly affected by the household's size and its level of primary education. Household size—which has a negative effect on the marginal benefit—tends to be larger for poorer rural Vietnamese households and to decline with per capita expenditures. Primary education has a positive influence on marginal returns, and tends to be positively associated with the level of consumption. In the aggregate, both variables will tend to lower marginal benefits for less-well off households and to raise them for households at higher per capita expenditure levels. Thus, even allowing for regional differences, there are household specific characteristics which drive the potential benefits from irrigation down for the poor and by the same token, enhance the returns to the better off. These factors are missed by QD.

3.3 Distributional impacts of an irrigation expansion

So far we have explored the marginal and mean benefits associated with a small change. We have shown that these vary regionally and with household expenditures. Together these factors have distributional implications. However, in determining the distributional impact of a policy of irrigation infrastructure investment, the existing distribution of land and access to irrigation will influence the outcomes. Farms with larger amounts of non-irrigated land are those best positioned to gain from such a

policy but we have seen that the level of their gains will depend on a number of factors not connected to their land assets.

To examine the distributional implications of irrigation infrastructure investments, we simulate a policy of a 10 percent expansion in the area of currently non-irrigated land into irrigation. The distribution across households of that expansion is enacted under two scenarios. Policy I simply increases the amount of land covered by irrigation similarly for each household subject only to feasibility as determined by current land and irrigation holdings and the expansion being considered. Policy II is explicitly pro-poor in that it distributes the 10 percent irrigation expansion to households with low per capita land holdings only.¹²

Figure 5 presents the results of these simulations. The impact of irrigation expansion is simply the (household-level) benefit per meter square times the (household-level) increase in irrigated land. We present the results in terms of the lines of best fit for total impacts per capita and household impacts as a percentage of household expenditure. While the distribution of total impacts under simulation I has a slight inverted-U distribution (figure 5a), the more explicitly poverty-targeting policy II displays a negative association of impacts with per capita expenditure (figure 5b). However, both policies are progressive, in that the impact as a percentage of household expenditure declines over the distribution of per capita expenditure (figures 5c and 5d). How well does the QD-based distribution approximate the SC-based distribution of total impacts? As with the estimates of benefit per meter square (figure 4) the QD measure overestimates the total impacts at the lower end of the welfare distribution and underestimates them at the upper end of the distribution.

3.4 *Impact on project selection*

Irrigation investment projects should ideally be approved where benefits exceed costs. It is interesting to ask how the two methods we have reviewed would differ in determining where and which projects to undertake. Table 5 conducts such an exercise using hypothetical costs. At each unit cost level, we ask how many projects would be accepted by the two methods of calculating household level benefits, where each sampled farm-household is counted as one potential project. The overall results indicate that the SC and QD estimates tend to be in agreement at both ends of the cost spectrum, but there is a greater margin of error when the cost is around 400 per m² (Dongs per year). There is also some regional variation.

Table 6 gives an overall assessment of the outcomes under the QD approach. The table gives summary data on the acceptance rates for projects under both the QD and SC acceptance rules for various cost levels. The QD and SC rules agree in the selection of projects most of the time up to project costs nearing 400. However, there is greater disagreement at 400 Dongs per meter square and higher.

We also present the net benefits which would be realized were project selection to be decided according to each method. Benefits for both sets of projects are evaluated using the SC estimates to work out actual benefit levels. These are then expressed per meter square. The difference between the net benefits realized under each rule then gives us some idea of the potential losses due to use of the QD method; in particular, the final column of Table 6 gives the percentage of the benefits realized under the SC method which is lost under the QD rule for accepting projects.¹³ This is small for low cost projects, which is unsurprising since one is unlikely to make serious errors in this case, as most potential projects will be accepted. However, the loss from the QD method rises rapidly above costs of about 375 Dongs

per square meter; at a unit cost of about 450, the entire project benefit is lost when project selection is based on the QD method. This can be seen clearly in Figure 6a which plots the loss under QD against the unit cost. Figure 6b plots the loss under QD against the proportion of projects accepted under the SC rule which is a decreasing function of the unit cost. The sharp increase in the loss from the QD method starts to set in at a point when less than half of all projects should be accepted under the SC rule. The realized net benefits under QD fall to zero when about one third of the projects should be accepted.

We have said much about the potential benefits of adopting the SC method but little about its costs. Integrated household surveys such as the VNLSS can seem expensive propositions. For example, depending on how one accounts for various inputs (such as jeeps and computers which will continue to be used after data collection) the 1992-93 VNLSS cost between one-half to one million US dollars. However, our results suggest that this outlay is dwarfed by the potential benefits from using the SC method for project selection.¹⁴ Figure 7 graphs the benefits in millions of dollars from using the SC instead of the QD method against irrigation project sizes expressed as percentages of currently non-irrigated arable land in Viet Nam. We plot this relationship for both low and high project unit costs. We also indicate the approximate cost of the VNLSS survey. Even at relatively low unit costs of irrigation projects, the realized benefit from extra data when irrigating only 3 percent of unirrigated land would be sufficient to cover the cost of that data. Of course, that data would also have other benefits.

4 Conclusions

Ex-post, irrigation evaluations often find that measured project benefits are less than had been predicted at appraisal stage (Carruthers and Clark 1983). Problems in project implementation are often

blamed. But errors in appraisal and project selection may also explain the gap between ex-ante and ex-post evaluation results. Extensions of the type of analysis in this paper to other settings would be needed to properly test that hypothesis. Although it would in many respects be harder than our stylized case study, it would also be desirable to apply similar methods to the evaluation of appraisals for specific projects subsequently implemented.

We have provided a case-study of how well commonly used "quick and dirty" methods for project appraisal approximate mean benefits and their distribution, whether such methods would result in fundamentally different project recommendations from those emerging from a more arduous "slow and clean" approach, and what benefits can be expected from the extra effort needed to implement the latter approach. As in all empirical research, our results are to some extent data specific. However, there has been so little research into the benefits of doing more thorough ex-ante project evaluations that even one case study can be instructive. And there do appear to be some potential lessons for other settings.

We find that at the national level in Viet Nam, QD mean benefits are similar to SC mean benefits. At the regional level, there is greater variation. One cannot determine *a priori* whether the QD method would over- or underestimate SC mean benefits, and our empirical results show that there is no tendency for QD to only over- or underestimate the SC benefits.

Our results indicate that the QD method overestimates the progressivity of a policy of irrigation expansion in Viet Nam. The QD results suggest a more pro-poor distribution of gains than the SC method. This is true when we define gains as the benefit per square meter, as well as when we take into account the existing distribution of land and access to irrigation. This is explained by the QD method's neglect of household and regional heterogeneity. The poor have characteristics that reduce the gains

relative to the mean. This cannot be revealed by the QD method.

We find that the QD method rejects some projects that should have been accepted, and accepts some that should have been rejected. We used the SC method to evaluate the realized benefits when project selection is based on the QD method, and compared this to the benefits realized when the SC method is used for project selection. The comparison suggests that the QD method entails only small losses when project unit cost is low, and (hence) most potential projects are easily accepted. However, the loss from the QD method rises sharply at medium to high project cost levels. Indeed, at unit costs at which about one third of the potential projects should be accepted (and would yield large net benefits), the QD method will incorrectly choose enough projects to wipe out the realized benefits.

Although a potentially profitable set of projects exists according to the SC method, selection based on the QD method will realize a net loss. The savings from the more data intensive SC method are sufficient to cover the costs of its extra data requirements (even ignoring other benefits from the data) if irrigating more than 3 percent of unirrigated land. This case study suggests that unless project size and cost are small or distributional impacts are irrelevant, there can be large social benefits to investing in more thorough evaluations.

Notes

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1. For an overview of these and other issues in project evaluation see Dreze and Stern (1990).
2. We can abstract from whether the investments are public or private since either way, an estimate of the gains in farm yields are needed.
3. A detailed description of the data set is given in Glewwe (1994).
4. Because the paper's focus is with irrigated and non-irrigated annual crop land we show the marginal returns only for these land types. Note however that the specification allows for the same variables to also interact with other land types which are contained in the z vector.
5. As is common in the literature and indeed is true of most rapid assessment methods of project appraisal, our SC method ignores general equilibrium and dynamic welfare effects. Moreover, a large number of econometric specifications might be used instead of the one we choose. There is clearly a continuum of quick and dirty as well as slow and clean methods for estimating benefits. Our purpose here is not to challenge the conventional method with the best possible test. Rather, we aim to improve on the method typically used in ways that are methodologically and technically feasible and to then see whether policy conclusions and choices are significantly altered.
6. A number of functional form specifications were tried (for further discussion see van de Walle 1997). The presented linear model with quadratics in land and education variables was found to perform best. Full regression details are available from the authors.
7. Biases due to endogenous explanatory or omitted variables which are correlated with included variables is a potential issue here. However, as a result of past land reform and distribution processes, land and irrigation inputs can reasonably be treated as exogenous at the household level. Possible omitted variable bias is more worrying. The regressions control for omitted between-commune variance through the commune dummies. But, there may also be latent heterogeneity in (say) land or soil quality within communes. Still, including land quality in the regression did not reveal any sign of such bias (van de Walle 1997). This could be more of an issue in the South where salinity and acidity are common problems in the Mekong Delta, though unobserved in the VNLSS data.
8. We reviewed all 19 irrigation project appraisal reports prepared in the World Bank since 1992.
9. Viet Nam's other six regions include the Northern Uplands (NU), Red River (RR), North Coast (NC), and Central Coast (CC) in the North, and the South East (SE), Mekong Delta (MD) and the excluded Central Highlands (CH) in the South.

10. To check for sensitivity of the QD measure to our assumptions, we increased (decreased) the sample to include households with a smaller (larger) share of crop incomes from rice, other food and annual industrial food crops, and more or less precision in defining the sample of only irrigated and non-irrigated land. Keeping the assumptions about crop income shares, but (a) assuming 100% (instead of 90%) precision in defining the sample of households with only irrigated or non-irrigated land, yielded a national mean of 306 Dongs per m^2 . (b) Assuming less precision (75%) in defining households with only irrigated or non-irrigated land gave an average benefit per m^2 of 320 Dongs. Keeping the assumption of 90% precision in defining households with only irrigated or non-irrigated land but changing the sample to include households with a larger (smaller) share of income from rice, other food and annual industrial crops also yielded results of similar magnitude: (c) for households where 100% of crop income is from these crops, the mean benefit per m^2 was 345 Dongs, and for (d) households where 75% or more of crop income is from these crops, mean benefit per m^2 was 310 Dongs. Thus, under all assumptions, the QD estimates at the national level slightly overestimate the gains from irrigation.

11. The estimates are obtained using Cleveland's (1979) locally weighted smoothed scatterplots (LOWESS)—a method of nonparametric estimation which is of the nearest neighborhood type.

12. Given the existing distribution of land, this policy extends irrigation to the non-irrigated land of all households with landholdings less than 610 m^2 per person.

13. Note that columns (3) and (5) give average net benefits, averaged over all accepted projects. To obtain total benefits it is therefore necessary to multiply these columns by columns (2) and (4) respectively. The percentage of benefits lost from using the QD method given in column (6) thus reflects accepted projects which should have been rejected and rejected projects which should have been accepted.

14. The total benefit from using the SC method is simply the loss per square meter from using QD, given in Table 6 by $[Col(4) \times Col(5)]$ minus $[Col(3) \times Col(2)]$ for a given project unit cost times the project size.

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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Summary Data

Variable	Variable Definition	Mean	Std. Dev.
cropinc	Net household crop income, 1993 Dongs	2282069	2391173
sick	Dummy for household member being sick in last year	0.933	0.250
sexhhh	Gender of household head	0.809	0.393
hhsiz	Size of the household	5.033	1.992
prop06	Proportion of hh members 6 yrs & younger	0.156	0.176
prop716	Proportion of hh members 7 to 16 yrs, inclusive	0.213	0.204
pfadlt	Proportion of female adults (17+)	0.327	0.169
pmadlt	Proportion of male adults (17+)	0.282	0.160
hed1	Yrs of primary education of hh head	4.379	1.114
hed2	Yrs of post-primary education of hh head	2.513	2.842
oed1	Yrs of primary ed of other adult hh members (17+)	6.872	5.372
oed2	Yrs of post-primary ed of other adult hh members (17+)	4.111	5.287
irrigated	Irrigated annual crop land area (m ²)	2267.58	3997.50
nonirrigated	Non-irrigated annual crop land area (m ²)	2605.92	5632.34
perennial	Perennial land area (m ²)	678.43	2169.50
forest	Forest land area (m ²)	279.22	1970.98
waterland	Water surface land area (m ²)	122.89	1203.53
otherland	Other land area (m ²)	217.50	2106.11
proplt	Proportion of annual land which is long-term	0.20	0.380
propauct	Proportion of annual land which is auctionned	0.023	0.092
proppriv	Proportion of annual land which is private	0.227	0.341
propshare	Proportion of annual land sharecropped/rented	0.043	0.165
propall	Proportion of annual land which is allocated	0.507	0.431
urban	Dummy variable for urban residence	0.057	0.231
nu	Dummy variable for the Northern Uplands region	0.183	0.387
rr	Dummy variable for the Red River Delta region	0.275	0.447
nc	Dummy variable for the North Coast region	0.178	0.383
cc	Dummy variable for the Central Coast region	0.090	0.286
ch	Dummy variable for the Central Highlands region	0.020	0.139
mk	Dummy variable for the Mekong River Delta region	0.20	0.40

Table 2: Regression Results: Crop Incomes

cropinc	Coefficient	t-ratio
urban	1093640	1.08
sick	-318465.4	2.59
hhsiz	81451.7	2.12
prop06	-586514.9	1.18
hed1	-468646.3	2.69
hed1*hed1	67862.6	2.66
oed1*oed1	-1932.7	2.48
oed2	21023.8	1.24
irrigated	352.40	4.27
irr*irr	-0.0030	4.42
nonirrigated	238.40	3.81
nonirrig*nonirrig	-0.0036	9.60
perennial	-277.04	1.73
perennial*perennial	-0.0097	6.43
forest	-372.88	1.35
forest*forest	-0.0026	1.38
waterland*waterland	-0.0401	3.80
otherland	-611.27	1.22
otherland*otherland	-0.0024	1.32
propauct	1116555	2.54
proppriv	325505.5	1.49
propall	470198.4	2.10
hed1*irrigated	47.87	6.06
hed1*otherland	-113.39	2.58
hed2*irrigated	-6.46	1.53
hed2*perennial	21.90	2.53
hed2*forest	23.01	1.62
hed2*waterland	72.61	1.58
hed2*otherland	33.45	1.51
oed1*irrigated	20.74	8.03
oed1*nonirrigated	7.27	3.38
oed1*perennial	5.42	1.21
oed1*forest	-21.37	1.72
oed1*otherland	-49.20	4.66
oed2*irrigated	-4.179	2.18
oed2*nonirrigated	1.741	1.04
oed2*perennial	-10.914	2.65
oed2*otherland	33.814	4.0
hhsiz*irrigated	-35.991	6.94
hhsiz*nonirrigated	4.639	1.13
hhsiz*perennial	52.933	4.62
hhsiz*forest	37.473	1.68
hhsiz*otherland	79.081	2.62
pfadlt*irrigated	-176.63	2.16
pfadlt*nonirrigated	-137.02	2.07
pfadlt*perennial	610.10	3.33
pfadlt*otherland	1941.44	4.18
pmadlt*irrigated	-162.40	1.71

	Coefficient	t-ratio
cropinc		
pmadlt*perennial	289.39	1.92
prop716*irrigated	155.85	2.03
rr*irrigated	271.75	4.06
rr*forest	135.35	1.03
mk*irrigated	-67.71	1.94
mk*perennial	-158.92	2.94
nu*irrigated	255.81	3.47
nu*perennial	-199.58	2.27
nu*otherland	434.86	1.20
nc*perennial	-218.53	3.02
nc*otherland	528.01	1.39
cc*irrigated	-203.38	3.63
cc*nonirrigated	-152.25	2.62
cc*perennial	-228.68	1.26
ch*irrigated	-973.79	1.66
ch*nonirrigated	-134.37	2.65
ch*perennial	310.57	4.37
ch*waterland	5195.78	1.31
Number of obs = 3049 F(233, 2815) = 19.06 Prob > F = 0.0000 R-square = 0.6120 Adj R-square = 0.5799 Root MSE = 1.5e+06		

Note: For ease of presentation we have not reported results for the 119 commune dummies many of which are significant. The table also omits regressors with t-stats less than 1. The model also contained the following variables: demographic composition variables, pnun716, pfadlt, pmadlt and interactions with land variables; education variables: hed2, hed2², oed1, oed2² and interactions with land; land: waterland and interactions between types of land and regions; prop1t, propshare.

Table 3: Marginal Benefit Function for Irrigation

VARIABLE	$b_j^I - b_j^N$	t-ratio
intercept	114.0	1.24
irrigated land	-0.006	4.42
non-irrigated land	0.0072	9.60
h'hold head primary ed	47.87	5.56
h'hold head other education	-5.131	1.07
other adult primary ed	13.472	4.69
other adult other ed	-5.92	2.57
h'hold size	-40.63	7.04
proportion of female adults	-39.61	0.44
proportion of male adults	-100.14	1.00
proportion of children 7 to 16	148.1	1.94
Red River	315.81	3.05
Mekong Delta	-72.08	3.44
Northern Uplands	274.64	1.63
North Coast	98.67	1.14
Central Coast	-51.13	0.75
Central Highlands	-839.42	1.41

Table 4: Benefits by Region

Benefits (Dongs/year/m ²)	North Uplands	Red River	North Coast	Central Coast	South East	Mekong Delta
(1) Slow and Clean	449	488	272	102	175	100
(2) Quick and Dirty	541	392	342	48	184	129
(2) - (1)	92	-96	70	-54	9	29

Table 5: Irrigation Projects Approved under QD and SC Benefits

Cost (Dong/ m ²)	Benefit Rule	% Projects Accepted by Region						Total % projects accepted
		North Uplands	Red River	North Coast	Central Coast	South East	Mekong Delta	
200	SC	99	100	87	6	45	13	68
	QD	100	100	100	0	0	0	65
250	SC	98	100	67	1	17	7	61
	QD	100	100	100	0	0	0	65
300	SC	95	99	32	0	5	3	52
	QD	100	100	100	0	0	0	65
350	SC	89	97	9	0	2	1	46
	QD	100	100	0	0	0	0	47
400	SC	79	92	3	0	1	1	41
	QD	100	0	0	0	0	0	19
425	SC	69	88	1	0	0	1	38
	QD	100	0	0	0	0	0	19
450	SC	53	81	1	0	0	0	33
	QD	100	0	0	0	0	0	19
475	SC	38	65	0	0	0	0	26
	QD	100	0	0	0	0	0	19
500	SC	26	45	0	0	0	0	17
	QD	100	0	0	0	0	0	19

Table 6: Overall Ex-post Assessment of Quick-and-Dirty Method

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cost (per m ²)	Projects on which the rules agree (as a % of all projects)	% projects accepted under QD rule	Average net benefit realized: projects accepted under QD rule (per m ²)	% projects accepted under SC rule	Average net benefit realized: projects accepted under SC rule (per m ²)	% loss from using QD instead of SC
200	91.80	64.97	216.08	68.15	212.32	2.97
250	91.17	64.97	166.08	61.09	183.88	3.94
300	85.71	64.97	116.08	52.36	160.34	10.16
350	95.35	46.77	122.30	45.94	129.48	3.82
400	69.52	18.70	49.43	41.15	91.52	75.46
425	69.12	18.70	24.43	38.00	73.05	83.55
450	68.38	18.70	-0.57	32.85	57.46	100.57
475	69.89	18.70	-25.57	25.66	44.95	141.47
500	73.47	18.70	-50.57	17.40	35.21	254.41

Note: For all projects accepted, benefits are evaluated using the SC estimates and expressed on a per m² basis.

Column (6) = $1 - [\text{Col}(2) \times \text{Col}(3)] / [\text{Col}(4) \times \text{Col}(5)]$

Figure 1. Comparing SC and QD

North

Figure 2a. Incidence of Benefits by Region

Figure 2b. Incidence of Benefits by Region

Figure 3. National Incidence of Benefits

Figure 4. National Incidence of Benefits

Comparing SC and QD

Simulated total impacts

Figure 5. Impacts of irrigation expansion

Figure 6. Loss from using QD instead of SC

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