Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR0000364 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-36380) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 32.2 MILLION (US$40 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO FOR AN EMERGENCY INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION AND LIVING CONDITIONS IMPROVEMENT PROJECT July 25, 2007 Water and Urban 2 Central Africa 2 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Exchange Rate Effective January 17, 2007 Currency Unit = FCFA FCFA 1.00 = US$ 0.00197 US$ 1.00 = FCFA 506.45 FISCAL YEAR July 1 ­ June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFD Agence française de développement ­ French Development Agency AfDB African Development Bank CFCO Chemin de fer Congo-Océan ­ Congo-Ocean Railway EU European Union FCFA Franc de la Coopération financière en Afrique centrale ­ Franc of the Central African Financial Cooperation GNP Gross National Product HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ICR Implementation and Completion Results Report IDA International Development Association ILO International Labor Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IPCP Interim Post-Conflict Program ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status and Results Report M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MEPW Ministry of Equipment and Public Works NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPFA National Program to Fight AIDS OP Operational Policy PDO Project Development Objective PIU Project Implementation Unit PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSR Project Status Report PTA Parent Teacher Association PURICV Projet d'urgence de réhabilitation des infrastructures et du cadre de vie ­ Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Living Conditions Improvement Project ROC Republic of Congo SC Steering Committee TSS Transitional Support Strategy Vice President: Obiageli K. Ezekwesili Country Director: Elena Kastlerova (Acting) Sector Manager: Eustache Ouayoro Project Team Leader: Mahine Diop ICR Team Leader: Mahine Diop REPUBLIC OF CONGO Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Living Conditions Improvement Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design............................................................1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...........................................................5 3. Assessment of Outcomes.........................................................................................................8 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome .....................................................................14 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................................15 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................................17 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners........................18 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.......................................................................................19 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ..............................................................................................20 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis..............................................................................25 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes..........................26 Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results........................................................................................28 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................................29 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and Comments on Draft ICR ......................................30 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders....................................43 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents...................................................................................44 Annex 10 (Supplemental Annex): Photo Documentation .........................................................45 MAPS A. Basic Information Emergency Infrastructure Country: Congo Project Name: Rehabilitation and Living Conditions Improvement Project Project ID: P074006 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-36380 ICR Date: 07/25/2007 ICR Type: Core ICR REPUBLIC OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: CONGO Original Total XDR 32.2M Disbursed Amount: XDR 30.8M Commitment: Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Project Implementing Unit Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 10/11/2001 Effectiveness: 12/09/2002 12/09/2002 Appraisal: 10/17/2001 Restructuring(s): Approval: 05/02/2002 Mid-term Review: 05/30/2005 05/24/2005 Closing: 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Supervision:Moderately Implementing Unsatisfactory Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Performance: Unsatisfactory Performance: Moderately Satisfactory i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Performance Indicators (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project Yes Quality at Entry None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General public administration sector 5 6 Health 5 3 Other social services 27 26 Railways 33 29 Roads and highways 30 36 Theme Code (Primary/Secondary) Access to urban services and housing Primary Primary Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction Primary Primary HIV/AIDS Secondary Secondary Improving labor markets Secondary Secondary Infrastructure services for private sector development Primary Primary E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Elena Kastlerova Emmanuel Mbi Sector Manager: Eustache Ouayoro Letitia A. Obeng Project Team Leader: Mahine Diop Eustache Ouayoro ICR Team Leader: Mahine Diop ICR Primary Author: Christian Vang Eghoff ii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The PDO of the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Living Conditions Improvement Project was to assist the Borrower to re-establish basic economic activities and social services through the rehabilitation of the railway system, primary, secondary and urban roads, drainage systems, and school facilities. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO and indictors were not formally revised. However, an additional financing and project restructuring was prepared and ready to address funding gaps that arose during implementation but it could not be implemented, as the financing was ultimately not granted. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Revised Achieved at approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : At end of 2003, 50 percent increase in tonnage of merchandise transported by the railway line from Pointe-Noire to Brazzaville, compared to 2001. Value quantitative or 548,000 50% N/A 13% Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2001 12/31/2003 12/31/2003 12/31/2006 Comments 5% achieved by the end of 2003, 13% achieved by the end of 2006. The indicator (incl. % was to be achieved in a short time to monitor support to a speedy economic achievement) revival, but the component suffered from weak capacity of the railway company. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Achieved at approval Revised Completion or documents) Target Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Number of kilometers of urban roads rehabilitated. Value (quantitative 0 15 N/A 0 or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/17/2001 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 Comments 0 percent achievement. The program was reduced after the mid-term review due (incl. % to cost increases. Part of the program was to be implemented using additional achievement) financing, which did not materialize. Indicator 2 : Number of kilometers of inter-urban and rural roads rehabilitated. Value 470 (180 km inter- 277.5 km (180 km (quantitative 0 urban; 290 km N/A inter-urban; 97.5 or Qualitative) rural) km rural) iii Date achieved 10/17/2001 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 Comments 59% total. Inter-urban: 100 percent; Rural: 34 percent. The program was reduced (incl. % due to continued security concerns and cost increases. Component restructuring achievement) was to be part of an additional financing, which did not materialize. Indicator 3 : Number of kilometers of urban drainage rehabilitated. Value (quantitative 0 7 N/A 4.5 or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/17/2001 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 Comments (incl. % 60% achievement. Part of the program (2.5 kilometers) was dropped after the achievement) mid-term review due to cost increases. The remaining program was completed. Indicator 4 : Number of person-days of employment generated. Value (quantitative 0 750,000 person- N/A 400,000 or Qualitative) days Date achieved 10/17/2001 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 Comments 54% achievement. Lack of achievement of the target is mainly due to necessary (incl. % design changes to rural roads, cost increase, and lack of additional financing. achievement) Revision of the indicator was to be part of an additional financing, which did not materialize. Indicator 5 : Amount of civil works contracts implemented with local contractors as main contractors. Value (quantitative 0 US$6 million N/A US$25.9 million or Qualitative) equivalent equivalent Date achieved 10/17/2001 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 01/31/2007 Comments 367% achievement. Many local contractors won contracts because major (incl. % international contractors were still concerned with the security situation in the achievement) country and considered the Republic of Congo to be a high risk environment for doing business. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Disbursements (USD millions) 1 11/21/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/12/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 03/10/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.33 4 04/21/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.33 5 07/28/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.13 6 10/05/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.59 7 04/07/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.56 8 10/25/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 23.33 9 04/28/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 32.23 iv 10 11/21/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 38.52 11 05/17/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 41.98 12 11/17/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 44.98 H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable I. Disbursement Profile v 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal At the time of project appraisal in 2001, the Republic of Congo (ROC) was emerging from three rounds of violent conflicts between 1993 and 1999. The security situation in parts of the country remained precarious and visiting many parts of the country entailed life threatening risks. At the height of the crisis in late 1999, approximately 800,000 people, almost one third of the population, were displaced. Life expectancy was reduced from 53 years in 1993 to 48.6 years in 1999 due to the combination of the spread of HIV/AIDS (prevalence estimated at 7 percent), violent deaths, and deteriorating health services. Unemployment was estimated at close to 50 percent and approximately 70 percent of the population was estimated to be living below the poverty line. GNP per capita declined from US$1,300 in 1982 to US$630 in 2000. Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire are home to more that half of the country's population and the railway line between these two cities (Chemin de fer Congo-Océan ­ CFCO) is the only effective means of goods transport and the economic lifeline of the country. It was severely damaged during the conflicts and traffic sometimes halted for several days, severely impeding economic activities and the flow of much needed goods to Brazzaville. Other physical infrastructure had suffered equally, either as a direct result of the conflicts or due to lack of maintenance. Many inter-urban and rural roads were almost completely impassable, practically isolating large parts of the population, strangling the rural sector, and endangering the social cohesion of the country. In Brazzaville, the drainage system and most asphalted roads were severely degraded, isolating many neighborhoods and with the southern districts of the city experiencing severe soil erosion, threatening to collapse buildings, roads, and the water distribution network. The reconstruction efforts were critically hampered by the severe disruption of the country's administrative and technical capacities and institutional assets, caused by loss of administrative professionals, databases, equipment, and buildings. The technical ministries had no means of evaluating the level of destruction and planning and managing the reconstruction effort, leaving a vacuum in the areas of service delivery and infrastructure rehabilitation. Government Response The Government prepared an Interim Post-Conflict Program (IPCP) for the period 2000-2002 with two major elements: emergency and growth, aiming at moving the ROC to some level of sustainable economic and social development. Among other measures, the Government financed a partial rehabilitation of the CFCO and service resumed in July 2000. However, a lot remained to be done to bring infrastructure and social services back to pre-war levels and growing demands from the population and resumption of economic activities were far from being satisfied. International Response Support from donors was limited and scarcely able to address the basic needs of the country, concentrating on humanitarian needs and reintegration, while leaving much of the burden of rehabilitating infrastructure and rebuilding the economy to the Government. The European Union (EU) was mostly engaged in the institutional framework of the road sector, and the French Development Agency (Agence française de développement - AFD) cofinanced, with IDA, limited studies on roads, drainage, and capacity building in Brazzaville, while the French Ministry of Cooperation was supporting programs in education and health. 1 World Bank Response The Bank prepared a Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for the ROC to guide operations over the 2001-2003 period. The principal objective of the TSS was to support the Government through: (i) strengthening economic stability and equitable growth; supporting the transition to a market-based economy; (ii) re-establishing basic economic and social services; (iii) building the capacity of Government and civil society; (iv) fighting the growing threat of HIV/AIDS; and (v) providing assistance to war-affected and vulnerable population groups. The Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Living Conditions Improvement Project (Projet d'urgence de réhabilitation des infrastructures et du cadre de vie ­ PURICV) was approved on May 2, 2002 for a total amount of US$40 million and became effective on December 9, 2002. It was an integral part of the TSS and complemented the other major IDA operations of the TSS, a demobilization project and an HIV/AIDS project. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators The PDO of the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Living Conditions Improvement Project was to assist the Borrower to re-establish basic economic activities and social services through the rehabilitation of the railway system, primary, secondary and urban roads, drainage systems, and school facilities.1 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification The PDO and indictors were not formally revised. However, a project restructuring was prepared and ready to address funding gaps that arose during implementation but it could not be implemented, as the additional financing was ultimately not granted (see Section 2.5). 1.4 Main Beneficiaries The project aimed at jump-starting the economy and creating conditions for long-term development, while at the same time tackling immediate economic and social needs of some of the most vulnerable groups. Re-establishing a well functioning railway system between Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville was paramount to reviving economic and industrial activity in Brazzaville and in the country. The general population of the country would benefit from this through increased access to a reasonable range of goods and more opportunities for employment due to the re-launching of some economic activities. Industry would benefit from regular supply of primary commodities at reasonable prices with some impact on limiting inflation. Youth and ex-combatants would benefit from short-term employment through the use of labor- intensive construction methods which would reduce the likelihood of their engagement in further conflicts. Benefits encompassing the entire ROC (and spread over the region) were expected from the project due to greater stability and peace in the country. In Brazzaville, people would get better access roads, drainage, protection from soil erosion, and better schooling conditions. Residents of isolated rural areas benefiting from road works would escape quasi-isolation from the rest of the country and get access to markets to sell their produce and to health services and education. 1The PDO as stated in the Project Memorandum does not specifically include the railway system; it is, however, included in the PDO as stated in the Credit Agreement. 2 The population of Brazzaville would benefit from HIV test centers and HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns. People living near project construction sites (both rural and urban) would also benefit from HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns, in particular the rural population that would experience an increased interaction with the rest of society. 1.5 Original Components The project had five components:2 Component 1 - Primary and Secondary Infrastructure Rehabilitation (Appraisal: US$12.1 million. Actual: US$12.3 million) This component would finance the rehabilitation of: (i) 180 kilometers of roads in the primary inter- urban road network3; and (ii) 15 kilometers of badly damaged primary roads in Brazzaville. Component 2 - Employment Generation (Appraisal: US$10.6 million. Actual: US$18.0 million) This component would help create temporary employment and, in the process, develop skills to help provide income to unemployed youth and demobilized combatants through: (i) rehabilitating and constructing social and environmental infrastructure (124 classrooms and 7 kilometers of tertiary drainage in Brazzaville); (ii) construction of infrastructure to protect 12,000 square meters of eroded sites in Brazzaville to prevent further collapse of roads, houses, and water lines; and (iii) rehabilitating transport Infrastructure (290 kilometers of rural roads connecting agricultural areas to secondary urban centers and construction of 10 kilometers of tertiary roads in Brazzaville). Component 3 - Railway Rehabilitation (Appraisal: US$13.0 million. Actual: US$14.5 million) Emergency railway rehabilitation aimed at improving the transport capacity of the railway line and the safety of train movements by: (i) reinforcing the radio-telecommunication network between stations and trains; (ii) strengthening engine power capacity through spare parts acquisition; (iii) acquiring materials for emergency track repairs and spare parts for maintenance equipment, freight wagons, and passenger coaches; and (iv) improving security conditions in the Mayombe tunnel. Component 4 - HIV Awareness (Appraisal: US$1.5 million. Actual: US$1.5 million) This component would support the fight against HIV/AIDS via: (i) awareness programs at the national level and in primary and high schools, in Brazzaville, and in areas neighboring project construction sites (e.g. roads and railway) as well as condom distribution, treatment of infected workers and sexual workers for sexually transmitted diseases; and (ii) constructing and equipping two HIV test centers in Brazzaville. Component 5 - Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building (Appraisal: US$1.9 million. Actual: US$2.8 million) This component aimed at giving limited institutional support and developing awareness on how the population could participate in the maintenance of rehabilitated infrastructure by assistance to: (i) the MEPW for computerization of road units and computerization and updating of the road database, 2See project maps at the end of this report showing the geographical distribution of project interventions. 3The figure in the DCA and Project Memorandum is 190 kilometers, but the sum of the length of all planned road sections is 180 kilometers. 3 development of and training in procedures to contract out maintenance activities to the private sector and to monitor employment creation in labor intensive public works and project implementation progress; and (ii) the municipality of Brazzaville for computerization of technical and financial units and development of procedures to contract out operations and maintenance of drainage and roads to the local private sector as well as capacity building in maintenance planning, procurement, monitoring of maintenance activities and performance of private sector contractors. Training of local consultants and contractors in implementing labor-intensive public works. 1.6 Revised Components After appraisal and just before negotiations, the Credit amount was reduced from US$57 million to US$40 million due to lack of IDA resources for the ROC. This resulted in a reduction of the works program; from 510 to 180 kilometers of inter-urban roads and from 500 to 290 kilometers of rural roads. As recorded in the minutes of negotiations, the Congolese delegation was informed that additional resources could be made available at a future date, if the implementation of the project was satisfactory and if the disbursement rate justified such additional resources. The PURICV was an emergency project, and the security situation in the country had prevented site visits and preparation of technical studies in advance of project approval. Following credit effectiveness and with the gradually improving security situation, it became possible to carry out technical design studies, showing that road conditions were very different from what was anticipated during preparation. During the mid-term review it was realized that the road components had to be reduced because of higher unit costs and cost increases due to: (i) The needed changes to the design of inter-urban and rural roads to include drainage works, culverts and bridges to ensure sustainability of works resulted in a cost increase of 54 percent over appraisal estimates. (ii) Changes to the conditions of the rural roads that experienced heavy degradation as a result of rainfall. (iii)Insufficient information on unit costs due to the destruction of all databases and the many years without any contract being awarded in the sector. (iv) Limited competition in the construction industry combined with a high risk perception of a post- conflict country by international contractors and high financial bids. (v) Depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the FCFA. The actual average price for inter-urban and rural roads was US$63,000 per kilometer, versus a forecast of US$28,000 per kilometer. It was further realized that it would not be possible to carry out rehabilitation of roads in the Pool Region due to the continued precarious security situation in that Region. Consequently, it was decided after effectiveness to reduce Components 1 and 2, while keeping a geographical distribution of interventions. These revisions were not formally approved, but were to be included in a formal restructuring to be carried out in connection with an expected additional financing (see Section 2.2 below). The following not formally approved revisions were made: Component 1: Reduction of the primary roads in Brazzaville from 15 to 7.9 kilometers, retaining the coherency with tertiary roads and drainage under Component 2. Component 2: Reduction of drainage works from 7 to 4.5 kilometers and of tertiary roads from 10 to 4.5 kilometers. Reduction of rural roads from 290 to 206 kilometers, as 84 kilometers of rural roads in the Pool Region were dropped due to the security situation in this region. 4 1.7 Other significant changes Restructuring of the project was considered at mid-term. However, Bank management wanted a restructuring to take place along with an additional financing, which was ultimately not granted, as described under Section 2.2 below. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry The preparation of the project was carried out in a very weak institutional environment, as the country was just coming out of a major conflict. Costing and technical design of the road program was difficult because the road databases were destroyed and there was no information on the condition of the road network, the construction industry was crippled, and unit costs benchmarking had too be carried out with data collected in West Africa due to lack of procurement activities for many years in the ROC and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Taking into account these challenging conditions and learning from earlier operations, implementation arrangements and components were kept as simple as possible. Activities related to water supply, electricity, and telecommunications were not included in the project, although they were part of the IPCP. Showing quick and visible results on the ground by addressing critical infrastructure deficiencies with a direct impact on the lives of the population and re-launching economic activities was critical in the design of the project. It was clear that long term sustainability of the investments could be at risk but it was felt that these issues could be tackled by involving the entities in charge of the respective sectors fully in the design of the project. Activities included in the project were prepared by the implementing agencies (supported by the Bank task team), i.e. roads, drainage, and capacity building respectively by the Ministry of Equipment and Public Works (MEPW) and the municipality of Brazzaville; activities associated with the rehabilitation of schools by the Ministry of Education together with the local leaders and Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs); the railway component was prepared by the CFCO, and the HIV/AIDS component by the National Program to Fight Aids (NPFA) under the Ministry of Health. In order to bypass existing, cumbersome and opaque procurement procedures and to speed up implementation in order to show quick results on the ground, the Government entrusted overall project responsibility to a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) with competitively hired staff. The PIU would assure project management and involve the implementing agencies in the execution of relevant components. Coordination of activities was also an important element of the design of the project. To that effect, the Government established a project Steering Committee (SC), including relevant ministries, the municipality of Brazzaville, representatives of private sector construction associations, and NGOs. To increase the likelihood of maintenance of project works after project completion, the municipality of Brazzaville agreed to contract out operation and maintenance (O&M) of urban roads and drainage facilities to the local private sector and earmark appropriate funds for maintenance purposes. The project would further finance a road database in the MEPW to serve as a tool in programming maintenance of roads. The railway component was developed at the same time as the Government was preparing a privatization of the CFCO. While privatization was not part of the project, the technical rehabilitation of the company was thought to facilitate the privatization, which would increase the likelihood of sustainability of project outcomes. 2.2 Implementation The project was implemented in four years and 98.9 percent of the credit amount was disbursed. Implementation of works suffered from a number of difficulties beyond the control of the project. Most importantly, increase in unit costs and deterioration of the U.S. dollar against the FCFA 5 resulted in less resources being available to the project. At the end of the project, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar amounted to FCFA 6.1 billion, equal to US$12.0 million, compared to appraisal exchange rates. The price of construction materials increased, e.g. with the cost of cement in Brazzaville going up by over 80 percent between 2002 and 2004 and periodical diesel shortage sending the price soaring from the official price of FCFA 295 to FCFA 1,000. The mid-term review, carried out in May 2005, highlighted the cost increases and funding gap. In order to assure completion of critical parts of the program, the client requested, on July 11, 2005, an additional financing for primary roads in Brazzaville and a bridge over the Niari River, which had proven necessary to improve the flow of traffic on the Madingou-Sibiti road financed by the project. On August 4, 2005, Bank management officially informed the Government that it would consider the request favorably, consistent with the outcome of negotiations, and asked the task team to start the preparation of the additional financing.4 By August 2005, the task team had prepared the draft additional financing memo, including the needed project restructuring to ensure coherency of project interventions. The processing was delayed due to IDA funding constraints, and the Board presentation date was pushed to FY07. However, on September 8, 2006, before presentation to the Board, Bank management informed the Government of its decision not to grant the additional financing, the reason being that the country was benefiting from more favorable economic conditions, especially due to increased oil prices. It was also agreed that further support to the sectors supported through the PURICV would be explored as part of the preparation of the Interim Strategy Note (ISN, FY08-09). The announcement of the rejection of the additional financing four months before the closing of the project left the task team with no time to implement a restructuring of the project. In general, the PIU performed well during implementation, assuming overall implementation responsibility for all components. Components 1 and 2 (Primary and Secondary Infrastructure; Employment Generation) did not experience other problems than the ones related to the lack of funding to carry out all component activities. Implementation of Component 3 (Railway Rehabilitation) was affected by the weak capacity of the railway company (the CFCO). The Bank mission of June 2002 and subsequent missions highlighted the weak capacity of the CFCO. The company was unable to prepare the technical specifications for the bidding documents, delaying implementation of the component. Management of spare parts also turned out to have a significant negative impact on project outcome, as described under Section 3.2 below. The NPFA implemented awareness-raising activities under Component 4 (HIV Awareness) and the HIV test centers were constructed as planned. However, condoms procured by the project were distributed at a very slow rate in the beginning as the awareness raising activities were slow to start and to pick up due to limited implementation capacity. Only two of four blood screening equipment procured by the project were put into service in Brazzaville as planned while the other two were finally installed in Dolisie and Pointe-Noire as they were not needed in Brazzaville after all due to miscalculation of screening needs. Further, management of the reactants needed for the blood test was very poor, with many reactants passing the expiration date. 4The letter signed by the acting Country Director states that: "Nous vous informons que votre requête a été examinée et que nous sommes favorables à l'octroi de l'enveloppe supplémentaire requise." This translates as: "We inform you that your request has been considered and we look favorably on the granting of the required additional amount." While this does not constitute a legally binding Credit Agreement, it can easily be interpreted as a firm promise. 6 Under Component 5 (Institutional Strengthening) capacity strengthening activities were implemented as planned, except for the road database. In spite of repeated recommendations by Bank supervision missions, the General Directorate of Public Works in the MEPW was not given the human resources necessary for the establishment of the road database, which was intended to have played a key role in the programming of maintenance of roads. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization The M&E framework was simple and directly related to the reconstruction of the country and the generation of employment. One single indicator was used to capture the main aspect of the PDO: the increase in level of goods transported by railway as a proxy of economic recovery. In retrospect, more than one outcome indicator should have been included in the results framework to report on the multifaceted nature of the project. The goal of achieving a 50 percent increase in transport of goods by the end of 2003 was considered to be relatively easily achievable based on CFCO estimates and the understanding that the rehabilitation of the locomotives, tracks, and other railway facilities would rapidly increase the effectiveness of the railway company and therefore the transported tonnage. According to CFCO data, despite the delay in procurement of the spare parts by the CFCO, an 8 percent increase was achieved at the end of 2004 and a 57 percent increase was noted at the end of 2005, following the delivery of most of the spare parts procured through the project. However, site visits of the CFCO workshops by the task team revealed poor management practices of the spare parts and the loss of a number of spare parts procured, and triggered the task team to request an audit of the CFCO. The audit was carried out under difficult circumstances due to the poor spare parts bookkeeping, but revealed that indicator values for transport of goods had not been properly calculated and communicated by the CFCO. The CFCO recognized this error and it became clear that instead of 57 percent increase in tonnage reported in 2005, the actual increase was 25 percent. This led to the main indicator erroneously being rated as achieved for some time. The 50 percent target was probably overly optimistic in retrospect, given a very precarious organizational and financial situation of the CFCO at appraisal. It has to be noted that although not formally revised, the task team informally revised the output- oriented indicators in the ISRs, along the findings of the mid-term review and to reflect the updated indicators as discussed with the borrower during the mid-term review. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance The project was rated Category B because it did not entail major adverse environmental impacts. In accordance with emergency lending policies (OP 8.50 - Emergency Recovery Assistance), the safeguard documentation was to be prepared during implementation, and no later than six months after credit effectiveness. A safeguards mission was carried out in May 2003, but the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment was delayed until March 2005 as a result of a poor understanding of the consultant selection process. At this time, most works had been launched. The Assessment was followed by an Environmental Evaluation Report in June 2005. For the ongoing works, corrective measures were implemented during site meetings to take into account the recommendations of the Evaluation. Other recommendations mostly concerned the works that had to be dropped due to the funding gap, and so the recommendations lost relevance. Certain recommendations concerning institutional aspects and training of involved organizational structures were to be implemented with the cooperation of the Environmental Department of the Ministry of Water and Forests, but this Ministry prioritized issues of forestry higher and could not provide the necessary technical assistance to the PIU for the implementation of the recommendations. 7 The technical audit concluded that no major negative environmental and social impacts were triggered as a result of project implementation. In fact, implementation of the project has improved the environmental conditions of the areas where it was carried out. In general, the implemented activities conformed to the various safeguard politics of the Bank. The activities did not result in resettlement or loss of important economic activities; they were not implemented in natural habitats and did not affect indigenous peoples or cultural property. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase Steps have been taken to assure the transition to post-completion operation of project achievements. However, post-completion operation of project outputs is largely compromised by the lack of maintenance funds and planning capacity. Management of the CFCO continues to remain problematic (e.g. productivity is one quarter of that of Camrail in Cameroon) and the financial situation of the company is precarious. A major restructuring of the CFCO is long overdue to avoid a collapse of the company in the near future. Previous attempts at privatization of the CFCO did not succeed, and it would be crucial for the government to be more proactive in restructuring the operations of the CFCO. Although the Government has shown its commitment to fund road maintenance by allocating an amount equal to 2 percent of the cost of the PURICV road works in the 2007 budget for the Road Fund, this Fund still lacks resources to address the O&M needs of the country's road networks. For example, only 52 percent of the collected taxes targeted for the Road Fund were transferred from the Treasury to the Fund in 2005. The likelihood of proper O&M of the roads remains limited with the Road Fund focusing on construction of new roads rather than on maintenance and the absence of a road database. This situation is of great concern to the Government. The Government's National Transport Plan is currently addressing these problems and aims to strengthen the role of the Road Fund, with assistance from the EU, the major donor involved in the road sector. The implementing agencies participated in the procurement process and field visits and learned from PIU technical competencies. Overall, the national construction sector is now better equipped to bid for and execute contracts than before the project and the labor-intensive construction methods have been widely disseminated and are being adopted. However, at project closure, no arrangements had been made to assure the systematic transfer of competences acquired by the PIU to other public entities (e.g. training sessions, workshops). The lack of exit strategy for transfer of competencies of the PIU represents a missed opportunity for capacity building. In terms of follow-up, all technical studies for works that could not be financed under the project have been transferred to the relevant administrations. A follow-up operation is under preparation under the current ISN and this project will address some of the key issues facing the sustainability of some of the achievements of this operation including the capacity of local governments to finance and manage the delivery of services. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The objectives of the project accurately reflect the current development priorities of the ROC. The draft PRSP of January 2007 has three pillars, all supported by the PURICV: (i) consolidation of peace, security and good governance was promoted via the reintegration of previously isolated areas and the creation of temporary jobs to prevent ex-combatants from becoming involved in continued conflicts; (ii) advancement of strong, sustainable and equitable growth was supported by the railway component and the rural and inter-urban roads, which facilitate economic development in rural areas; and (iii) advancement of sustainable human development and living conditions was assured through road rehabilitation in rural areas and social and basic infrastructure rehabilitation in Brazzaville. This 8 work remains relevant in light of the ISN (to be presented to the Board on July 31, 2007), which will continue to support improved implementation of poverty alleviation programs, with special emphasis on health, underserved communities in urban areas, and the rural sector to foster economic diversification and address poverty issues. In terms of project design, the focus on key infrastructure and social services remains relevant. A more precise diagnosis of the institutional environment of the CFCO could have revealed the difficulties that prevented privatization, and pointed to the need for a more concerted effort at the organizational level. Given the emergency nature of the project, this was not carried out, but in hindsight could have benefited the project immensely. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives The achievement of the PDO is primarily evaluated against the target values of the project's indicators and secondarily by taking into account some of the project's impacts on the lives of the population benefiting from the project. The evaluation is primarily based on an audit of the CFCO, a technical audit, and four impact evaluations5 carried out by national consultants at the end of the project. The project did not achieve its PDO as measured by the outcome indicator. The transport of goods on the railway between Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville had increased by 5 percent at the end of 2003 against a target of 50 percent and by only 13 percent at the end of the project. The target for contracts awarded to national contractors was largely surpassed with US$25.9 million of contracts won by local contractors against a target of US$6 million. Other outputs directly related to the reconstruction of the country were not achieved as no primary roads were rehabilitated in Brazzaville compared to a target of 15 kilometers; 277.5 kilometers of inter-urban and rural roads were rehabilitated against a target of 470 kilometers; and 400,000 person-days of employment were generated out of a target of 750,000. Despite these shortcomings, project impact evaluations have concluded that the project had positive economic and social impacts on the lives of many people, as noted below. Rail transport ­ the CFCO Even though the target of transport of goods was not achieved, the rehabilitation of the railway had positive impacts on the economy. The IMF has estimated that a decline in the level of railway disruptions was accountable for a moderation of inflation to 2.5 percent in 2005, down from 3.5 percent in 2004.6 However, even though the service is now generally more regular on the railway and the number of kilometers traveled by the trains increased by 78 percent between 2000 and 2006, the technical improvements have been offset by an increase in engine incapacity. Some sections of tracks are so steep that the wagons have to be transported past these sections in several trips, and hence the locomotives travel longer, but without increasing the quantity of goods transported. According to the CFCO, this engine incapacity results from the lack of spare parts to carry out a general overhaul of the locomotives, as needed. The difficulties experienced by the CFCO in determining the technical specifications of what was required to fully address the needs of the locomotives and the poor management of procured spare parts are to be blamed for this situation, as it was not possible to carry 5Evaluations of: (i) the school and HIV/AIDS component in Brazzaville; (ii) the roads, drainage and erosion protection works in Brazzaville; (iii) the roads rehabilitated in the Bouenza and Lekoumou Regions; and (iv) the roads rehabilitated in the Plateaux Region. 6IMF Country Report No. 06/262. July, 2006. 9 out the needed overhaul of the locomotives.7 The figure of 13 percent increase in goods transported by the end of 2006 is actually down from 25 percent in 2005, as revealed by the audit of the CFCO, showing how the CFCO is struggling to maintain service levels. Despite not achieving the 50 percent target, it is highly likely that the project has contributed to the continued functioning of the CFCO. There is a general agreement that the CFCO would have almost stopped its operations without the support of the project, negatively impacting the economic activities in the country. The privatization of the CFCO (not part of the project) was eventually abandoned, as the Government did not commit to the prerequisite reorganization of the CFCO, despite a concerted dialogue between the Government and the Bank. This privatization would have introduced more competent management of the CFCO and improved the operation of the railway company. Inter-urban and rural roads The rehabilitation of 277.5 kilometers of inter-urban and rural roads has impacted more than 63,000 persons in 59 villages who have gained easier access to nearby larger cities. A further 150,000 inhabitants of these larger cities now benefit from greater food security and reduced travel times. After having been closed to motorized transport for up to 30 years in some cases, these roads are now regularly served by various forms of transportation, facilitating the flow of people and of agricultural goods, the major source of income of the rural population. As a result, revenues generated by the marketing of agricultural production has increased by more than US$1.8 million per year since before the rehabilitation of the roads, equivalent to an increase in annual revenue of over US$28 per inhabitant of the 59 villages. According to project impact evaluations, privately managed commercial transportation made possible by the rehabilitation of the roads has generated additional revenue to the transportation operators, estimated to be over US$1 million per year. Average travel time to the nearest city for some of the people living along the rehabilitated roads has been reduced by over 80 percent (from 17.9 hours to 2.3 hours). Transportation costs are an important factor in determining the usage of roads, but no conclusion can be drawn from the figures available, since costs have gone up in some areas while they have decreased in others. Over time, as supply and demand stabilize, it is expected that prices will decrease. The opening of the roads has contributed to the reunification of the country by reducing the seclusion of the rural population and has triggered the development of economic activities. Women-led credit associations have been established and money transfer bureaus have opened in the urban centers of Abala and Mpouya where they did not exist before, thus opening up for a complete restructuring of the local economy. Roads and drainage in Brazzaville The roads and drainage facilities rehabilitated in Brazzaville have resulted in a better flow of traffic and have facilitated the reintegration of 43,000 inhabitants of previously isolated neighborhoods in the Moungali District with the rest of the city. Rainwater no longer stagnates in the streets to the same extent, the number of periodically flooded houses has decreased by 50 percent in the District, and sewage is no longer emptied directly onto the streets. Cases of malaria reported at the local health clinic have dropped by 17 percent and typhoid fever has dropped by 38 percent8. Because 7See Annex 2 for details on usage of spare parts. As an example, only 28 percent of spare parts procured for a specific engine type were used. 8Comparison of a three month period before the implementation of works to a three month period after completion of works. 10 roads are now passable, solid waste collection has begun, with a private enterprise ensuring door-to- door collection for US$2 per household per month. Living and environmental conditions have improved and land prices have increased fourfold on average, from US$10-US$15 per square meter before the PURICV to about US$50 after. Small-scale commercial activities are picking up along the streets in the area, with a quasi-doubling of informal trading from 70 shops to 134 shops. It has been estimated that the increase in turnover as a result of the works is over US$1 million per year. However, the incomplete nature of the road and drainage network, due to the lack of rehabilitation of roads and drainage originally included in the project, has prevented the full impact of implemented works from materializing. Employment generation The project generated 400,000 person-days of work and about US$2 million were paid in salaries to youth, who also received training. This is equivalent to over 400 full time jobs for the duration of project implementation. The shortfall of the target of 750,000 person-days can be attributed to: (i) the fact that the original project works program was not completed due to funding constraints; (ii) changes to the construction methods for some rural roads; and (iii) the lack of specification of a ratio of unskilled labor in bidding documents. There was a disbursement of US$25.9 million to local companies, clearly contributing to the revival of the economy and an otherwise moribund local constructing industry. This result far exceeds the target of US$6 million. Many local contractors won contracts as international contractors were still concerned with the security situation in the country. School rehabilitation The rehabilitation and construction of 129 classrooms benefited about 15,000 pupils, corresponding to about 13 percent of the total number of pupils in Brazzaville. The construction of new latrines has also helped attendance and better learning opportunities for the children. The number of teachers in the rehabilitated schools has almost doubled from 113 in 2003 to 200 in 2006. However, most of the teachers are unpaid, but they seem to have been partially motivated by the improved quality of the school facilities. The graduation rate (pupils moving up one grade) increased from 61 percent in 2004 to 72 percent in 2006 and this may be attributable to the improved schooling conditions. Electricity is now available in the classrooms with evening literacy classes taking place, so far attended by 466 students. Of the 15,000 pupils in the schools rehabilitated by the PURICV, about 4,250 have transferred from private schools or other public schools located further away from where they live, allowing average monthly savings by families of up to US$10 on schooling fees and US$15 on transportation costs. Protection from erosion The protection of 14,714 square meters against erosion (compared to a target of 12,000 square meters) has benefited a population of 25,000 persons living in the affected areas and 52 plots have been directly safeguarded from collapse. HIV Awareness In terms of social services, the project has had highly positive impacts through the awareness-raising campaigns and the two HIV test centers constructed by the project. The cost of testing in the centers financed by the project is US$1, compared to a minimum of US$2 in other centers. The centers have tested 12,823 persons (44 percent women and 56 percent men), with an average HIV sero-prevalence rate of 12 percent over the entire period. HIV positive persons are referred to local hospitals for anti- retroviral treatment. According to the doctors, the capacity of the centers is used to about 60 percent. For the period of January to May 2006, for which the statistics are reliable, the two centers carried 11 out 71 percent of all HIV tests in Brazzaville. The percentage of persons tested positive has declined from 16 percent in 2004 to 15 percent in 2005 and 10 percent in 2006, suggesting that the people from the most exposed groups have benefited from testing when the centers were new. Twenty NGOs have been trained in carrying out HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns and 42 awareness campaigns under the project have reached more than 80,000 persons along the rehabilitated roads and other project sites, in markets, and in schools. 180 "clubs of friends" to fight AIDS have been created and 210 pairs of trainers have been trained. Capacity building The Brazzaville municipal administration received training in programming of infrastructure maintenance and control of technical quality, procurement, and contract management. IT was widely introduced and used in the technical services of the municipality. 3.3 Efficiency The project was prepared under OP 8.50 - Emergency Recovery Assistance and no economic evaluation was carried out at appraisal. A full cost-benefit evaluation for inter-urban and rural roads and roads in Brazzaville was not conducted because of the rural nature of some of these roads and the logistical difficulties in carrying out traffic counting. For the inter-urban and rural roads there were no alternatives to the chosen project activities and no other way to assure the reuniting of the country. Benefits accruing only from incremental agricultural production, transportation revenues generated by the reopening of the roads, and additional sales from the small shops in the Moungali District have been estimated to be at least US$3.8 million per year for a total investment of US$19.3 million for these project activities. For comparison, the Democratic Republic of Congo Emergency Economic and Social Reunification Support Project, appraised in 2003, has experienced more significant cost increases than the PURICV. With appraisal figures of US$20,000 per kilometer of road, the final costs have ended up in the range US$70,000 to US$100,000 for this project, higher than the actual average of US$63,000 for the PURICV roads against the appraisal average of US$28,000 per kilometer. Rehabilitation of tertiary roads using cobblestones for the first time in Brazzaville is assessed as cost effective with an average cost of US$24 per square meter, slightly below the average of US$24.7 for road reconstruction in Africa,9 and probably much less than what could have been obtained by using traditional construction techniques, given the otherwise high unit costs obtained for road activities in the project. The efficiency of the railway rehabilitation is not easy to evaluate due to the lack of a counterfactual situation for the CFCO without the project. However, efficiency is potentially very high, under the hypothesis that the railway would have stopped functioning without the PURICV. On the other hand, efficiency could be evaluated as low, given that the activities did not achieve the desired results, while a more precise diagnosis of the CFCO needs might have resulted in better returns to investments. The efficiency of the school rehabilitation, erosion protection works, HIV awareness component and institutional strengthening activities of the project cannot be evaluated due to the many unquantifiable benefits from these activities. 9Road Costs Knowledge System (ROCKS). World Bank road software tool. 12 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory Summing up the evaluation above, the major factors that combine to give the project rating are: Relevance The project had a highly relevant development objective for the reconstruction of the country after periods of civil wars. This objective remains relevant today. Achievement of PDO (i) The project did not achieve its major relevant objective as measured through the outcome indicator of increasing the tonnage of goods transported by rail. In addition, four out of five output indicators were not achieved. Although these output indicators do not relate directly to impact on people they are highly relevant to measure the reconstruction of the country. (ii) Although the 50 percent target of increase in tonnages was not achieved, the rehabilitation of railway equipment and facilities was a factor in limiting inflation and contributing to the revitalization of the economy. Furthermore, social services clearly improved through the rehabilitation of schools and HIV/AIDS activities of the project. The project was implemented on time with no extension, which is quite remarkable in the ROC and for an emergency operation. (iii)The impact at the institutional level was mixed. Dramatically changing the procurement practices by moving away from the generalized use of single sourcing was a major achievement as well as introduction of new construction techniques in the rehabilitation of tertiary roads with local materials. However, the lack of development of the road database is a drawback. Efficiency The overall efficiency of the project is not easy to evaluate due to the multifaceted nature of the project. Cost-efficiency is evaluated as moderately satisfactory, given the unit cost for road works in the ROC benchmarked against other countries in the region (e.g. higher unit costs for rural roads in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Further, there were no alternatives to the chosen activities in order to promote the reuniting of the country. The efficiency of the railway rehabilitation cannot be evaluated, while economic benefits generated for the project beneficiaries are high. A detailed evaluation of financial or economic rate of return has not been carried out due to lack of complete and reliable data. Overall rating The relevance of the project was high. The PDO was not achieved nor were the targets for four out of five output indicators, although at project closure the project had brought about some improvements in the social conditions and the economic prospects for a great number of people and had contributed to the economic revitalization and the reunification of the country. However, there are no indicators available to measure the degree of achievement of these impacts against. For this reason, the evaluation of achievement of PDO is primarily based on the achievement of the indicators set up by the project. The efficiency of the project cannot be evaluated accurately. By combining the relevance, achievement of PDO, and efficiency the project is rated moderately unsatisfactory in spite of the many positive project achievements. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development (Nothing to add to the above) 13 (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Lack of transparency of procurement was a major problem in Congo following the years of conflict, and sole sourcing was the only method used. The introduction of open bidding has resulted in improved transparency of the procurement process and is slowly being generalized in Congo with the support of the donor community. Contracts were enforced for the first time in the country and contractors were penalized US$372,000 due to delays in delivering works on some of the roads. Local capacity was built on a limited scale by using local consultants for the impact evaluations as opposed to international consultants. This was an explicit choice and in spite of methodological difficulties encountered at the beginning of these studies the quality of the data in the final studies is satisfactory. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) Paving of roads by cobblestones was introduced for the first time in Congo and resulted in the creation of more jobs, especially for youth. The adoption of this technology in the future will be beneficial for the ROC as it will improve the balance of payments and will allow for the rehabilitation of more urban roads because of lower unit costs compared to asphalted roads. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops (Not applicable) 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High The risk to development outcome is rated as high due to the general lack of funds for maintenance of infrastructure in the country in general and for the activities financed by the project in particular. The situation of the CFCO poses a high risk. While it is unlikely that the Government will let the CFCO collapse completely, it is difficult to envisage that the CFCO can assure the longer term sustainability of its operations under the current institutional and organizational arrangement. Operating and maintaining the rehabilitated inter-urban and rural roads also poses a high risk. It is likely that funding to maintain the rehabilitated roads will not be available, be limited or not be provided on time (see Section 2.5) and that road conditions will quickly deteriorate. Dirt roads in the climatic environment of Congo, characterized by heavy rainfalls, have a short lifespan if they are not properly built and maintained on a regular basis. As a mitigation measure, the project has financed barriers that can be lowered to block the roads during rains to prevent premature degradation of the road surface. Normal operation of infrastructure facilities in Brazzaville is at risk because the financial means at the disposal of the municipality of Brazzaville remain limited and depend on transfers from the Government. In 2006, only US$620,000 was devoted to maintenance according to the Brazzaville technical services, corresponding to 2.8 percent of the municipal budget, which is quite low. While the neighborhood organizations have been engaged in ensuring maintenance of the drainage and erosion works, it appears that this arrangement will not be sustainable in the longer run. As part of the project preparation dialogue, one of the areas identified for improving efficiency of maintenance was the contracting out by the municipality of Brazzaville of O&M of urban roads and drainage facilities to the local private sector. This process has to be completed by earmarking appropriate funds for maintenance purposes. However, this has so far not taken place at the required scale. 14 The prospects for the rehabilitated schools to continue to have teachers are more positive despite the fact that there is a general lack of teachers in the country. The decision of the Government to recruit 1,000 teachers per year to address this deficiency through a World Bank financed Support to Basic Education Project should be noted. In 2006, 650 teachers were recruited and this effort will have a positive impact on the learning outcomes of the pupils in the longer term. A key achievement of the project has been the implication of the PTAs in the financing of the maintenance of school facilities on the basis of contracts signed between the PTAs, the Directorate of Primary Education in the Ministry of Education and each headmaster. These arrangements have been working for some years now. Despite sustained efforts by the project team to have the HIV test centers totally integrated into the public health system, they continue to suffer from low levels of resources to cover their operating costs and they are already starting to suffer from lack of maintenance. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately satisfactory The Bank engaged actively in donor coordination after the conflicts, and provided much needed technical assistance for project preparation. It was also on the insistence of the Bank that transparent and efficient project management procedures were set in place. The technical expertise of the Bank was indispensable for project preparation in the post-conflict environment with extremely low client capacity on the technical and organizational level. The task team reacted quickly during project preparation at the late request of the Government to include a railway component and the Bank team was therefore reinforced by a railway specialist. The task team engaged the Government and the municipality of Brazzaville on the contracting out of activities, which would help assure sustainability of investments. The difficulties to adequately estimate the costing of the works at appraisal were due to reasons beyond the control of the team, as described under Section 2.1. The project was appraised with 11.5 percent unallocated funds. The reduction in project amount between appraisal and negotiations forced a reduction of the project activities, while unallocated funds were reduced to 5 percent. This was too low given the high uncertainty around the technical design of works and exchange rate risks and the project should have been downsized more. Costing turned out to be a major factor in project performance, since cost increases caused a reduction in the works program, negatively impacting project evaluation. The preparation of the project took 9 months because some work had to be carried out by the Bank and the IMF to restructure debt owed by the ROC and because it took time to establish the PIU, which the Bank and the Government discussed at some length. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory Supervision missions were carried out regularly and were adequately staffed. Technical assistance by the task team was essential for the implementation of the project, and supervision missions were used to train PIU personnel. Technical and financial audits were conducted regularly and assured implementation quality. The task team knew after the mid-term review that the funds would not be sufficient and was ready to prepare a restructuring. Bank management wanted this restructuring to take place along with an additional financing and this was the main reason that the project was not restructured early on. The 15 Bank was not consistent in the response to the Government regarding the provision of an additional financing. In spite of commitments made during negotiations and repeated in August 2005 the Bank did not grant this additional financing. This decision, taken late in the project, precluded the required corrective restructuring of the project. A clear position of the Bank, rejecting the request for additional financing, would have permitted a restructuring immediately following the mid-term review. This inconsistency concerning additional financing is a major factor in rating Quality of Supervision. Furthermore, the task team did not make use of M&E to flag the low performance of the CFCO in PSRs / ISRs, and the project retained a satisfactory rating based on figures provided by the CFCO, which were ultimately discovered to be erroneous. In fact, poor performance of the CFCO could not have been reversed by the project as the emergency operation had limited impact on the management of the CFCO. Given the emergency nature of this operation and in the absence of deeper policy dialogue, the task team could not make any more progress concerning the contracting out of maintenance activities, which would help assure sustainability of investments. This type of dialogue was also premature and difficult to conduct in a post-conflict environment while the country was engaged in reestablishing some organizational and operational normalcy. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory The task team worked under difficult circumstances during appraisal but were able to prepare a well- targeted, coherent, and relatively limited (given the needs) number of interventions. The reduction of the credit amount prior to negotiations resulted in a too tightly budgeted program of interventions, negatively impacting the quality at entry, and the quality at entry is rated moderately satisfactory. The performance of the task team during supervision was moderately unsatisfactory for the reasons mentioned above. The needed restructuring was linked to the additional financing and the inconsistency in the Bank position on additional financing prevented a timely corrective restructuring of the project. Since the lack of restructuring is a principal cause for the moderately unsatisfactory outcomes rating, the overall Bank performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The Government agreed to use effective and transparent procurement procedures in a country that was unaccustomed to this, and to establish an independently working PIU. Establishing the Steering Committee including all the stakeholders greatly facilitated project preparation and guided project supervision. The Government has made efforts to assure sustainability by establishing the Road Fund and funding this Road Fund with some difficulties but the Government failed to implement the road database. Teachers are being recruited but more teachers should be recruited to address the needs of the schools. Further, the performance of the CFCO was weak and the project would have benefited from the Government being more proactive in restructuring the operations of the CFCO, particularly when the privatization of the CFCO did not materialize. The Government produced an ICR listing project achievements and shortcomings, included in Annex 7. However, the Government has not capitalized fully on the experience and expertise of the PIU by making a coordinated effort to transfer their competencies and build much needed capacity in the administration. 16 (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory Implementing Performance Agency 1. PIU Efficiency and efficacy of the PIU was high, with an operating cost of 4.4 percent of total project cost compared to the normal range of 5 ­ 10 percent, and an average turnaround time in effecting payment of invoices of 7 days, a best practice in the country. This short period was crucial to a construction industry that was still re-establishing itself after the conflicts. The PIU further assisted other project units executing Bank financed projects; including managing the PPF for the now active Bank financed HIV/AIDS and Health project. 2. CFCO The CFCO received almost all materials foreseen during appraisal, based on their own analysis. In spite of this, the CFCO was unable to assure improved transport of goods since the ordered spare parts were not fully consistent with some of the most urgent needs of the fleet. The incorrect figures provided by the CFCO on transport of goods was a major factor in the project rating not reflecting actual project progress. 3. Municipality The municipality has so far not been able to assure sufficient resources for maintenance of of Brazzaville project works, partly because of low and erratic transfers from the Government. 4. NPFA The system is overall working well, but the Program under the Ministry of Health was not able to fully integrate the new HIV test centers, failing to provide them with the necessary resources to maintain and operate the facilities (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory The Government has made efforts to assure sustainability of project impacts, but there were shortcomings in Government performance concerning the institutional environment of the CFCO and in the performance of the CFCO itself. The PIU performed satisfactorily; the NPFA performed moderately satisfactorily; and the municipality of Brazzaville did not perform satisfactorily. 6. Lessons Learned A multi-faceted approach to mitigating capacity constraints is necessary in a post-conflict environment. The PURCIV showed that a Project Implementation Unit was able to address the almost complete lack of capacity and motivation prevailing in the administration at appraisal. The PIU assured sound organization and timely project implementation and it is unlikely that the project could have been implemented without the creation of a PIU with operational autonomy. Unlike most emergency operations, the project was not extended, but disbursed almost 100 percent. However, a clear exit strategy for the transfer of PIU competencies has to be defined at appraisal and implemented diligently to ensure capitalization of experiences. A transparent and simple project oversight and control environment further helped implementation and capacity building for private contractors and quick payment of invoices was critical for the recovery of the construction sector and to mitigate the shortcomings in terms of organizational capacities and mobilizing the necessary construction equipment. Cost overruns are common features of emergency operations dealing with infrastructure activities and higher levels of unallocated resources are needed to address the higher level of uncertainty. Dilapidated infrastructure is the norm in most countries before they dive into conflicts and their conditions worsen during the years of conflict. Inability to visit isolated parts of the country and the emergency nature of the projects will rarely allow for detailed technical studies to be carried out before implementation, increasing the level of uncertainty in relation to costing of works. This high level of uncertainty can be partially mitigated if a sizable amount of resources is posted as unallocated in the financing of these projects. 17 Expectations in achieving results in emergency operations should remain low, particularly in the absence of information on indicators and baselines. Baseline information is difficult to obtain during preparation of emergency operations due to the speed in preparation and the lack of data in the country. The tendency is to address the most pressing issues for the country to jump-start its recovery but poor capacity, weak institutional arrangements, and limited financial means are real constraints to achieving substantive progress in the relatively short implementation time of Bank projects. Target-setting should be cognizant of these constraints and be less ambitious. Balancing long term sustainability and short term impacts is a difficult exercise and normal Bank operations should immediately follow the completion of emergency operations to address long term sustainability. Achievement of immediate impacts remains the primary objective of an emergency project. A challenging post-conflict institutional environment cannot be changed during implementation because of poor capacity and inability to address the policy constraints that are impeding sustainable delivery of services. The ability of emergency operations to address the most pressing needs and showing some results on the ground offers opportunities to engage in policy dialogue to address constraints to sustainability in a more traditional follow-up operation, as countries and stakeholders become more ready to embrace these reforms. Project performance is at risk when project restructuring is not carried out timely. After the mid-term review, it was clear that unallocated resources were too limited to address the financing gap and assure coherency of interventions. In hindsight it is clear that a project restructuring would have been the best solution. Given the difficulties the project encountered with the additional financing, combining the restructuring of the project and the search for additional financing increased the risk of poor performance of the project. This is why it is advisable to opt for a fast restructuring of the project in this type of circumstance and not to link restructuring and additional financing. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies In its comments on the draft Bank ICR, the borrower expresses satisfaction with the results achieved by the project with the available resources but strongly regrets the change of position by the Bank concerning the additional financing and the lack of restructuring of the project. The response to this is that the Bank wanted to prepare a coherent set of interventions, combining the additional financing and the restructuring of the project. However, the Bank has not been consistent in its message to the client concerning additional financing. Had the Bank taken steps to restructure the project, including a revision of project indicators, or honored commitments for an additional financing, the project would have formed a more coherent set of interventions and the outcome might well have been rated more positively. (b) Cofinanciers There were no cofinanciers. (c) Other partners and stakeholders The task team has followed up with the EU and the AFD, which received the French translation of the draft ICR, but they have not provided comments. 18 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Project costs were verified by the project Financial Management Specialist using actual exchange rates. Components Appraisal Estimate Actual /Latest Percentage of (US$ million) Estimate Appraisal (US$ million) 1. Primary and Secondary 12.10 12.27 101.4 Infrastructure Rehabilitation 2. Employment Generation 10.58 17.99 170.0 3. Railway Rehabilitation 12.96 14.47 111.7 4. HIV Awareness 1.47 1.46 99.3 5. Institutional Strengthening and 1.93 2.77 (*) 143.5 Capacity Building Total Baseline Cost 39.04 48.97 125.4 Physical Contingencies (**) 0 Price Contingencies (**) 0 Total Project Costs 39.04 48.97 Project Preparation Facility (PPF) 1.03 0.00 125.4 Total Financing Required 40.00 48.97 122.4 (*) Including PPF. (**) Unallocated 5 percent of project cost contained in component costs. (b) Financing Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing Appraisal Estimate Actual Percentage of (US$ millions) (US$ millions) Appraisal Borrower N/A 0.00 0.00 -- IDA N/A 40.00 48.97 122.4 19 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1: Primary and Secondary Infrastructure Rehabilitation Cost: Appraisal: US$12.1 million. Actual: US$12.3 million. 25.1 percent of actual total project cost. (i) Rehabilitation of 180 kilometers of roads in the primary inter-urban road network The 180 kilometers of inter-urban roads were constructed as foreseen, including construction of hydraulic works, refurbishing of the road surface and drainage works. The figure in the DCA and Project Memorandum is 190 kilometers, but the sum of the length of all planned road sections is 180 kilometers. The technical quality of the works was assessed as follows: (a) Madingou-Sibiti (79 km) and Ngo-Mpouya (58 km): - Satisfactory for the hydraulic works. - Moderately satisfactory for the road surface. (b) Kimandou-Moukoukoulou (43 km): - Unsatisfactory due to lack of terracing and profiling, badly constructed trenches and water underpasses, unremoved excavated earth and deforestation products, and quarried areas that have not yet been rehabilitated. The bridge over the Niari River, which was included in the works program at mid-term, was not constructed as foreseen due to lack of additional financing. Unit costs of the rehabilitation vary between US$20,000 and US$125,000, depending on the importance of collateral works (bridges, drainage and opening up of dense forests). The average cost of inter-urban roads is US$68,333 per kilometer. Nine construction companies submitted bids for the 4 lots of works. Three Congolese companies won the contracts. Two international consultants undertook the works supervision. (ii) Rehabilitation of 15 kilometers of badly damaged primary roads in Brazzaville The primary roads planned for Brazzaville (15 km) have not been constructed due to increased unit costs and budget constraints. Technical design studies were prepared for all road sections. Component 2: Employment Generation Cost: Appraisal: US$10.6 million. Actual: US$18.0 million. 36.7 percent of actual total project cost. (i) Social and Environmental Infrastructure - Rehabilitation of 124 classrooms in Brazzaville, including equipment. - Construction of 7 kilometers of tertiary drainage in Brazzaville. 129 classrooms have been constructed or reconstructed in 14 schools compared to a target of 124 classrooms; 11 administration buildings have been constructed; all works were judged technically satisfactory by the technical audit. 4,264 meters of walls have been constructed to protect the schools, 65 latrines have been constructed and 13 schools have been connected to the electricity grid. 20 The schools have been entirely supplied with furniture: 2,224 tables with chairs, 124 teacher tables, and 13 tables for the school management as well as other furniture (tables and chairs for the administration, and tables for pre-schools). Forty-two construction companies submitted bids and the 13 lots were awarded to 4 Congolese construction companies. The technical audit assessed the quality of the works as highly satisfactory. (ii) Infrastructure to prevent further damage from erosion Three sites were protected from erosion covering an area of 14,714 square meters against a target of 12,000 square meters. Six companies submitted bids and the contracts were awarded to Congolese firms. The technical quality of the works was assessed as satisfactory by the audit. (iii) Transport Infrastructure Only 97.5 kilometers of rural roads were constructed out of a target of 290 kilometers, at a total cost of US$5.19 million or a unit cost of US$53,262 per kilometer. The difference between target and actual achievement is due to budget constraints and unit cost increases. 13 construction companies submitted bids and two contracts were awarded to Congolese firms. The technical quality of the works was assessed as follows: (a) Abala-Impini (68 km): - Satisfactory for the hydraulic works. - Moderately satisfactory for the road surface. (b) Bouansa-Ngouédi (12 km): - Unsatisfactory due to lack of terracing and profiling, badly constructed trenches and water underpasses, unremoved excavated earth and deforestation products, and quarried areas that have not yet been rehabilitated. (c) Sonel-Kikongo (17 km): - Not evaluated by the technical audit. Out of an objective of rehabilitation of 10 kilometers or tertiary roads and 7 kilometers of tertiary drainage, 4.5 kilometers of both roads and drainage have been constructed. The difference is due to budget constraints. The works actually constructed were concentrated in the Moungali District due to the drainage problems of the area and the integration with primary roads included in the original works package (but not constructed due to budget constraints). The paving technique used for the surface of the roads was innovative for Congo. The roads were constructed with cobblestones manufactured by hand, which facilitated the creation of more work for youth. The technical quality of the road works was assessed as satisfactory by the technical audit. The technical quality of the drainage works was assessed as partially satisfactory as they are not completely straight, they slope the wrong way in places, and there are a number of spallings (broken bricks). 21 Component 3: Railway Rehabilitation Cost: Appraisal: US$13.0 million. Actual: US$14.5 million 29.5 percent of actual total project cost. (i) Reinforcing the radio-telecommunication network between stations and trains The telecommunications equipment was not procured due to budget constraints. (ii) Strengthening engine power capacity through spare parts acquisition Spare parts have been delivered to the CFCO for the CC500, CC600 and BB700 engines, as well as rails, sleepers and various spare parts for railway track maintenance. The audit on the usage of the stock revealed that spare parts had been used as follows: 57 percent usage for the CC600 engines and 28 percent for the CC500 engines. The low level of usage for the CC500 engines was because three engines are waiting for a general renovation and the available spare parts do not suffice for this due to faulty diagnostics of needed spare parts. The spare parts delivered have made possible the implementation of 38 limited repairs, 52 general repairs and four complete repairs of engines. A total of 16 locomotives have been rehabilitated. Locomotive availability has gone up from 47 percent to 52 percent. (iii) Acquiring materials for emergency track repairs and spare parts for maintenance equipment, freight wagons, and passenger coaches Sixty-three percent of the 36 kg rails have been used to upgrade 69,820 meters of railway compared to a target of 109,990 meters. Only 3 percent of the 46 kg rails have been used on a total of 330 meters out of a target of 10,995 meters. 41,000 metal sleepers have been delivered to the CFCO and used on the railway. For the wooden sleepers, only 3,853 have been delivered out of 17,500 procured. The sleepers actually delivered are presently drying before being saturated with tar. The difference in the number of sleepers procured and delivered is due to the failure of the supplier to deliver on time, and the contract was terminated due to the short remaining duration of the project. 480 barrels of 200 liters of tar have been delivered, of which only 60 (corresponding to 11 percent) are needed to treat the number of sleepers actually delivered. The spare parts delivered have made possible the rehabilitation of 214 commercial wagons. The project further financed the construction of a weigh station in Brazzaville and the training of eight staff of the CFCO in the management of the equipment. (iv) Improving security conditions in the Mayombe tunnel The rehabilitation of the Mayombe tunnel has not been carried out, because the sleepers were delivered late and are currently drying so they can be impregnated with tar and used to upgrade the tracks in the tunnel. 22 Component 4: HIV Awareness Cost: Appraisal: US$1.5 million. Actual: US$1.5 million. 3.0 percent of total actual project cost. (i) Awareness programs at the national level and in primary and high schools, in Brazzaville, and in areas neighboring project construction sites (e.g. roads and railway) as well as condom distribution, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases of infected workers and sexual workers Twenty NGOs have been trained in HIV/AIDS awareness raising and participated in the implementation of the awareness campaigns. Forty-two awareness campaigns have been carried out in the seven largest markets of Brazzaville, 14 schools, and in connection with all works carried out by the project. The awareness campaigns have reached 80,000 persons, 180 clubs of friends fighting AIDS have been formed, and 210 educator pairs have been trained. (ii) Constructing and equipping two HIV test centers in Brazzaville Two centers for anonymous HIV testing and a storage facility for contraceptives have been constructed as planned. The works were judged satisfactory by the technical audit. The two test centers have been entirely equipped by the project, including medical equipment, furniture, IT and power generators. Four Elisa test systems (for blood transfusion) were purchased by the project and reactants and products for testing were purchased for the centers. 2,052,000 male condoms and 17,000 female condoms were purchased by the project. 12,823 persons have been tested in the centers, and 12 percent were found to be HIV positive. These persons are referred to local hospitals for antiretroviral treatment. The two centers have carried out 71 percent of all testing in Brazzaville. Nationwide, 17.5 percent of all blood packages have been tested by the equipment delivered by the project. Component 5: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Cost: Appraisal: US$1.9 million. Actual: US$2.8 million. 5.7 percent of total actual project cost (including PPF). (i) In the Ministry of Equipment and Public Works - Computerization of the road units. Development of and training in procedures to contract out maintenance activities to the private sector and to monitor employment creation in labor intensive public works and project implementation progress. - Computerization and updating of the road database. MEPW has benefited from technical assistance for creation of a road database. Two civil servants were trained as trainers of labor intensive construction methods and the General Directorate of Public Works and the General Directorate of Equipment in the Ministry have been equipped with IT. A civil servant of the General Directorate of Public Works and two members of the PIU have were trained in the technique of paving roads using hand manufactured rocks. 23 (ii) In the municipality of Brazzaville - Computerization of the technical and financial units and development of procedures to contract out operations and maintenance of drainage and roads to the local private sector. - Capacity building in maintenance planning, procurement, monitoring of maintenance activities and performance of private sector contractors. Training of local consultants and contractors in implementing labor-intensive public works. The municipality of Brazzaville has been equipped with IT and staff has undergone training in labor intensive construction methods. A staff of the technical department of the municipality of Brazzaville was trained in the technique of paving roads using hand manufactured rocks. Further, training programs were carried out for the staff of MEPW and the municipality of Brazzaville in the areas of planning and control of maintenance of roads and drainage, procurement, management of labor intensive works and control of performance of construction companies. The PIU organized this training, which was carried out by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and reached more than 70 persons of the MEPW, the municipality of Brazzaville, private construction companies, consultancy firms, and NGOs. 24 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis The full text of the economic analysis can be found in the main text. 25 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty Lending Eustache Ouayoro Sr. Water and Sanitation Specialist AFTU2 TTL Solange Alliali Senior Counsel LEGOP Jainaba Kah Urban Specialist AFTU2 Renée Desclaux Disbursement Officer LOAAF Abdul Haji Sr. Financial Management Specialist Francesco Samo Lead Procurement Specialist AFTQK Ernestina Attafuah Senior Program Assistant AFTU2 Armele Vilceus Program Assistant AFTU2 Alassane Diawara Resident Representative for the AF09 Republic of Congo Karim Jacques Budin Lead Railway Specialist TUDTR Mamadou Sevedé Consultant Consultant Dossou Yovo Road Engineer Consultant Supervision/ICR Mahine Diop Municipal Engineer AFTU2 TTL Ernestina Attafuah Senior Program Assistant AFTU2 Monthe Bienvenu Biyoudi Economist AFTP3 Josyane E. Carmen Costa Team Assistant AFMCG Mbaye Mbengue Faye Consultant AFTU2 Jean Charles Amon Kra Sr. Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Eustache Ouayoro Sector Manager AFTU2 Christian Eghoff Urban Development Specialist Consultant ICR primary author 26 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle No. of Staff Weeks US$ Thousands (including travel and consultant costs) Lending FY01 6 42.51 FY02 24 166.23 FY03 2 5.41 FY04 0.00 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 Total: 32 214.15 Supervision/ICR FY01 0.00 FY02 0.00 FY03 19 76.11 FY04 19 100.61 FY05 21 46.14 FY06 26 30.62 FY07 9 31.94 Total: 94 285.42 27 Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results (Not applicable) 28 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (Not applicable) 29 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and Comments on Draft ICR Below are: 1. The borrower's summary of the borrower's ICR. 2. A translation of the borrower's summary of the borrower's ICR. 3. The comments received from the borrower on the draft Bank ICR. 4. A translation of the comments received from the borrower on the draft Bank ICR. 1. The borrower's summary of the borrower's ICR RESUME La République du Congo et l'association internationale de développement (IDA) ont conclu en date du 10 septembre 2002 l'accord de crédit de développement Cr.3638-COB en vue de financer à cent pour cent le coût raisonnable des travaux, fournitures et services de consultants nécessaires pour réaliser les activités éligibles du projet d'urgence de réhabilitation des infrastructures et d'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations (PURICV). Le PURICV a pour objectifs d'aider le gouvernement du Congo à rétablir les activités économiques et services sociaux de base par la remise en état des routes primaires et secondaires et des voies urbaines, du Chemin de Fer Congo-Océan, des systèmes de drainage et des installations scolaires ainsi que l'appui à la lutte contre le VIH/SIDA. Le Projet s'articule autour de cinq composantes : · Composante A : Remise en état de l'infrastructure de routes primaires (15 km) à Brazzaville et secondaires (190 km) dans les départements de la Lékoumou, la Bouenza et des Plateaux ; · Composante B : Création d'emplois : Création de possibilités d'emploi pour les segments défavorisés de la population de l'Emprunteur, notamment les jeunes et les combattants démobilisés, par la conception, la préparation, l'exécution et le suivi de travaux de génie civil dans les départements de la Bouenza, des Plateaux et du Pool ; · Composante C : Remise en état partielle du Chemin de Fer Congo-Océan par le renforcement de la sécurité des liaisons ferroviaires, l'amélioration du transport ferroviaire et le développement des capacités de transport ; · Composante D : Sensibilisation au VIH/SIDA appui à la mise en oeuvre du programme national de lutte contre le VIH/SIDA ; · Composante E : Renforcement des institutions et des capacités : renforcement et optimisation des opérations du METP et de la municipalité de Brazzaville aux fins de l'exécution du projet. Aux fins du Projet, le Gouvernement du Congo a ouvert des comptes spéciaux de dépôt libellés en FCFA pour la gestion des ressources du projet. Tous ces comptes ont été ouverts, à des conditions jugées satisfaisantes par l'IDA, y compris des protections appropriées contre toute compensation ou saisie, ou tout blocage. Pour l'exécution du projet, le gouvernement a créé le 1er février 2002 et maintenu par la suite, pendant toute la durée de l'exécution du Projet, une unité de gestion du projet (UGP) dotée d'un personnel qui possède des qualifications, une expérience, des performances au travail et des règles déontologiques jugées satisfaisantes par l'IDA. L'UGP/PURICV est responsable de la gestion et de l'exécution des activités du Projet, y compris la gestion financière dudit Projet. Elle est placée sous l'autorité administrative du ministre de 30 l'équipement et des travaux publics et sous le contrôle du comité de pilotage du projet, auxquels elle fait rapport tous les trimestres. Le gouvernement du Congo a maintenu pendant toute la durée de l'exécution du Projet le Comité de Pilotage du Projet, lequel comprend des représentants des ministères des travaux publics et de l'équipement, du plan de l'aménagement du territoire de l'intégration économique et du NEPAD, de l'économie et des finances, de l'agriculture de l'élevage et de la pêche, de la santé et de la population, de l'enseignement primaire et secondaire chargé de l'alphabétisation, des transports et de l'aviation civile, de la Municipalité de Brazzaville ; des syndicats patronaux du secteur privé du bâtiment et des travaux publics, des ONGs. L'érosion monétaire du dollar par rapport à la monnaie de la République Française, combinée aux dépassements des coûts des activités engagées, dus à une évaluation initiale trop faible a rendu improbable l'exécution d'une partie substantielle du programme d'exécution du projet. Au 30 mai 2007, l'érosion monétaire est de 5.451.183.818 FCFA. Le gouvernement du Congo a introduit à l'IDA, le 11 juillet 2005, une requête de ressources additionnelles de 14,6 millions USD à l'effet de financer les activités des routes primaires de Brazzaville et du pont sur la rivière Loudima à Kikongo. L'IDA, en date du 8 septembre 2006, a reconsidéré l'opportunité d'accorder au gouvernement du Congo le crédit supplémentaire. Au 31 janvier 2007, date de clôture du projet, l'exécution du programme détaillé des 136 activités éligibles du PURICV se présente ainsi qu'il suit : · Activités terminées et réceptionnées sans réserve (travaux, fournitures, services de consultants) 126 · Activités en cours (travaux et services de consultants) Réception partielle des travaux 02 · Activités non engagées faute de ressources au projet (travaux, fournitures, services de consultants) 07 · Activités abandonnées pour insécurité dans la zone d'implantation (services de consultants) 01 Le taux de décaissements au 30 avril 2006 est de 98,78% et s'élèvent à la somme de 25.344.643.197 FCFA dont : · Travaux 13.364.620.865 FCFA · Fournitures 8.028.457.252 FCFA · Services de consultants 2.867.135.363 FCFA · Charges d'exploitation 1.084.429.717 FCFA Au 31 janvier 2007, toutes les routes du projet ont fait l'objet d'études techniques et de dossiers d'appel d'offres, à l'exception des routes rurales dans le Pool dont les études n'ont pas été réalisées pour des raisons d'insécurité dans cette partie du pays. 180 km de routes interurbaines et de 97,5 km de routes rurales ont été réhabilités. La remise en état de ces routes, a permis à 63.621 habitants de 59 villages d'avoir un meilleur accès aux centres urbains. Le sentiment d'exclusion que certaines zones enclavées depuis plus de quinze ans avaient a été effacé, contribuant ainsi à la réunification du pays. Ces axes desservent des secteurs à forte potentialité agricole. La réhabilitation de ces axes a permis de désenclaver ces zones agricoles et favorisé l'évacuation certaine de diverses spéculations. Les campagnes de sensibilisation sur le VIH/SIDA menées pendant les travaux ont eu des impacts positifs dans le comportement des populations et ont permis une meilleure connaissance de la maladie. 31 L'érosion monétaire du dollar par rapport à la monnaie de la République Française, combinée aux dépassements des coûts des activités engagées, a rendu impossible l'exécution de 192,5 km de routes rurales dont les études et dossiers de consultation des entreprises sont disponibles ainsi que la construction du pont à structure métallique sur la rivière Niari à Mpassa / Madingou. Il convient de souligner que la route Madingou Kimandou Sibiti réhabilitée par le projet pour un coût global de 4.084.970.219 FCFA (y compris les études et la supervision des travaux) ne peut être réellement fonctionnelle que si le pont sur le Niari à Mpassa est réalisé. Actuellement la traversée de la rivière sur le Niari se fait par un Bac vétuste qui ne fonctionne que trois à quatre mois dans l'année. La reconsidération par l'IDA de l'octroi des ressources additionnelles au projet pour financer entre autres ledit pont est forte de conséquences négatives sur la pérennité de la route Madingou Kimandou Sibiti et la fonctionnalité de la boucle allant jusqu'à Moukoukoulou. Le gouvernement a retenu de financer ces activités dans le cadre de son budget d'investissement. Le projet a réalisé l'aménagement et la protection de 14.714 m2 de sites en proie à l'érosion à Brazzaville pour un coût global de 1.251.271.827 FCFA (y compris études et supervision des travaux) contre une prévision initiale de 1.245.083.485 FCFA. Ces travaux ont permis de nettoyer les foyers d'ordures, de valoriser le bâti foncier dans les zones touchées par le projet, de redonner confiance à de nombreuses familles qui avaient quitté le quartier pour de raison de risque trop élevé d'éboulements. Le projet a réalisé le pavage des routes tertiaires de Brazzaville. Ces activités ont permis de réhabiliter près de 22.737.000 habitants de Brazzaville dans leur statut de citoyens de Brazzaville et d'éradiquer entre autres les déversements des eaux vannes directement sur les rues, les gîtes larvaires rendant par conséquence à cette zone son caractère viable, accessible et urbain. Au plan technique, le fait que les routes primaires du projet ne soient pas réalisées, aura un impact négatif sur la gestion et l'entretien des routes tertiaires remises en état au titre du projet. En effet, le très bon niveau de service offert par ces routes induit un détournement de trafic lourd de la voirie primaire actuelle (dégradée) sur ce réseau tertiaire. L'usure précoce de ces ouvrages est à prévoir faute d'alternative immédiate. Le projet a réhabilité et ou construit 129 salles de classes, 11 blocs administratifs, 4 264 mètres de murs de clôture et 65 latrines et électrifié 13 écoles. Les écoles retenues au titre du projet ont été équipées de mobilier scolaire. La réhabilitation des salles de classes dans 14 écoles primaires et centres préscolaires (y compris l'équipement en mobilier scolaire) a eu un impact social et environnemental très positif. L'environnement scolaire est devenu plus sûr (réduction du vandalisme à l'intérieur des écoles, tranquillité) et plus sain, améliorant les conditions de travail des enseignants et d'études pour les élèves qui étaient assis à même le sol. Cette activité a permis de ramener 15.443 enfants sur le chemin de l'école et 250 adultes dans le cadre de l'alphabétisation (cours du soir). Le Chemin de fer Congo-Océan (CFCO), épine dorsale de l'économie du Congo a bénéficié de l'appui du projet. Sur la base de la demande élaborée par les services compétents du CFCO, le projet a acquis au nom et pour le compte du CFCO, des pièces de rechanges pour locomotives CC600 et BB700, des fournitures à savoir rails, traverses métalliques, selles en fonte pour rail, attaches rigides et accessoires (crapauds), éclisses. Le coût des activités ferroviaires est de 7.436.028.196 FCFA contre une prévision initiale de 9.921.492.158 FCFA. Les acquisitions du PURICV au titre de la composante ferroviaire ont permis au CFCO notamment de réaliser des interventions sur la ligne de chemin de fer (voie) par le traitement de points critiques, la réhabilitation des locomotives et deux cent quatorze (214) wagons, fourgons et voitures, trois grandes visites générales sur les locomotives CC600, l'amélioration du taux de disponibilité des locomotives et des wagons ainsi que la modernisation du système d'exploitation du trafic de marchandises par la construction et la mise en service du pesage au défilé à la gare de Brazzaville. Malgré ces améliorations au niveau de l'exploitation (disponibilité et une rotation assez régulière de trains entre Brazzaville et Pointe Noire), 32 l'objectif commercial d'augmenter le tonnage transporté de 50% entre 2002 et 2006 n'a pas été atteint. Le tonnage de marchandises transportées au 31 décembre 2005 de 664.865 T ; ce qui correspond à une progression de 7,7% par rapport à l'année de base 2002 où le tonnage transporté était de 617.056 T. Sur le plan de l'appui à la lutte contre le VIH/SIDA et tenant compte de la situation post-conflit, le projet a permis, d'une part construire et équiper deux centres de dépistage anonyme et gratuit et un site de stockage des préservatifs à Brazzaville et d'autre part réaliser des campagnes nationales d'information éducation communication (IEC) sur le VIH /SIDA, particulièrement axées dans les établissements scolaires réhabilitées et les principaux marchés à Brazzaville, et sur les zones attenantes aux routes et aux infrastructures et installations ferroviaires remises en état au titre du projet. Une vingtaine d'ONGs ont été formées et mises à contribution pour ces activités de sensibilisation au VIH/SIDA. Le taux de fréquentation des centres de dépistage est de 60%, ce qui correspond à un impact important sur le changement de comportement des populations. Le projet a permis de sensibiliser directement près de 80.000 personnes, créer 180 clubs d'amis de lutte contre le SIDA et former 210 pairs éducateurs. Les activités du bâtiment et des travaux publics au titre du PURICV ont induit la création de près de 400.000 hommes jours d'emplois à durée déterminée et permis de distribuer en deux ans près de 1.000.000.000 FCFA aux jeunes. Le projet a généré 57 contrats de services de consultants, 18 marchés de travaux et 40 marchés de fournitures pour un montant global de 25.656.565.824 FCFA. Les entreprises nationales ont exécuté 13.985.267.134 FCFA équivalent à 25.898.642,84 USD ce qui représente près de 55% des contrats et marchés. Les objectifs du projet sont pertinents et concordent avec les priorités du gouvernement de la République du Congo en matière de lutte contre la pauvreté. L'approche d'intervention adoptée dans le cadre du PURICV met l'homme au centre du développement. Cette approche a révélé une dimension de renforcement des capacités et de la lutte contre la pauvreté des populations, caractérisée par l'appropriation par les populations des investissements consentis. Cette approche participative constitue une garantie importante pour la pérennisation des ouvrages réalisés. La Banque Mondiale, unique partenaire financier du projet, a régulièrement mobilisé et mis à la disposition du gouvernement les fonds nécessaires. Le gouvernement en a assuré le suivi de l'utilisation par l'unité de gestion du projet. Les différentes missions de supervision de l'IDA, les audits techniques et financiers par des auditeurs indépendants ont conclu d'une exécution satisfaisante du projet. La transparence dans la procédure de consultation et de sélection des opérateurs a induit un engagement et un intérêt de plus en plus croissant du secteur privé, de la société civile, des ONGs dans les activités éligibles du projet. Dans l'exécution des activités opérationnelles, les services de l'Etat ont collaboré de manière appréciable dans la concrétisation des activités éligibles engagées. Ils ont pris part activement à la procédure de passation des marchés, au suivi des activités sur le terrain. Le projet a été conduit par un comité de pilotage dont le rôle a été de s'assurer de l'avancement harmonieux des activités éligibles. Les demandes de remboursement de fonds transmises aux services de décaissement de la Banque Mondiale ont été traitées dans des délais raisonnables. 33 La difficulté majeure durant le projet est la gestion de l'érosion monétaire du dollar par rapport à la monnaie de la République Française, combinée aux dépassements des coûts des activités engagées, dus à une évaluation initiale. Cette situation a rendu improbable l'exécution d'une partie substantielle du programme d'exécution du projet. Le recours introduit par le gouvernement du Congo le 11 juillet 2005 à cet effet n'a pas abouti du fait que l'IDA a reconsidéré par lettre du 8 septembre 2006 son accord du 5 août 2005 sur l'opportunité d'accorder au gouvernement du Congo des ressources additionnelles pour financer lesdites activités. A la clôture du projet, de nombreuses activités éligibles sont non engagées pour insuffisance de ressources au crédit. Pour une meilleure évaluation des performances du projet, l'IDA aurait pu redéfinir les indicateurs du projet. En vue de la pérennisation des activités, et sur la base des exigences en la matière (2%), pour un investissement global de 13.382.947.022 FCFA au titre du PURICV pour les routes rurales et urbaines, le gouvernement a inscrit au budget d'investissement exercice 2007 pour l'entretien des routes par les ressources du Fonds routier, la somme de 270.000.000 FCFA soit 2,02% de l'investissement du PURICV. 2. Translation of the borrower's summary of the borrower's ICR The Republic of Congo and the International Development Association (IDA) signed a Development Credit Agreement (Cr.3638-COB) on September 10, 2002, to finance at 100 percent the reasonable costs for works, goods and services necessary to carry out activities eligible under the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Living Conditions Improvement Project (PURICV). The objective of the PURICV was to assist the Government of Congo in re-establishing economic activities and basic social services by the rehabilitation of primary, secondary and urban roads, the Congo-Océan railway line, drainage networks and school facilities, as well as supporting the fight against HIV/AIDS. The project comprised five components: · Component A: Rehabilitate 15 kilometers of primary roads in Brazzaville and 190 kilometers of secondary roads in the Lékoumou, Bouenza and Plateaux Departments. · Component B: Employment generation: Generating job opportunities for the deprived parts of the borrower's population, especially youth and demobilized combatants, through designing, preparing, implementing and monitoring of public works in the Bouenza, Plateaux and Pool Departments. · Component C: Partial rehabilitation of the Congo-Océan railway through increasing security of the railway line, improving railway transport and developing the transport capacity. · Component D: HIV/AIDS awareness-raising and support to the implementation of the National Program to Fight HIV/AIDS. · Component E: Institutional strengthening and capacity building: Strengthening and improving the functioning of the MEPW and the municipality of Brazzaville with a view to project implementation. The Government of Congo opened special deposit accounts maintained in FCFA for the management of project resources. All these accounts were opened under conditions being satisfactory to IDA, including adequate safeguards against inappropriate use or access, or any blocking. For the implementation of the project, the Government created a Project Implementation Unit on February 1, 2002. This PIU was maintained during the implantation of the project and was provided with staff with qualifications, experience, work performance and ethical standards satisfactory to IDA. 34 The PIU is responsible for the management and implementation of project activities, including the financial management of the project. The PIU is under the administrative authority of the Ministry of Equipment and Public Works and works under supervision of the Project Steering Committee, to which it reports every quarter. The Government of Congo has maintained the Steering Committee during the entire period of project implementation. This Committee includes representatives from the ministries responsible for public works and equipment, for planning and territorial administration, for economic integration and NEPAD, for economy and finances, for agriculture, farming and fishery, for health, for primary and secondary education in charge of literacy, for transport and civil aviation; from the municipality of Brazzaville; from associations of private sector construction companies; and NGOs. The depreciation of the dollar compared to the currency of the French Republic and the increase of the cost of the launched activities due to a too low initial evaluation has made the implementation of a substantial part of the project program unlikely. As of May 30, 2007, the depreciation amounts to FCFA 5,451,183,818. On July 11, 2005, the Government of Congo submitted to IDA a request for additional resources of USD 14.6 [sic] million to finance activities on primary roads in Brazzaville and the bridge over the Niari River at Kikongo. On September 8, 2006, IDA reconsidered its decision to grant a supplementary credit to the Republic of Congo. As of January 31, 2007, the closure date of the project, the detailed program of implementation of 136 activities breaks down as follows: · Activities completed and received without qualification (works, goods and consultant services): 126. · Ongoing activities (works and consultant services). Partial reception of works: 02. · Activities not engaged due to lack of project resources (works, goods and consultant services): 07. · Activities abandoned due to insecurity in the area of implementation (consultant services): 01. On April 30, 2006 [sic], the disbursement rate was 98.78 percent, equal to FCFA 25,344,643,197, of which: · Works: FCFA 13,364,620,865 · Goods: FCFA 8,028,457,252 · Consultant services: FCFA 2,867,135,363 · Operating expenses: FCFA 1.084.429.717 As of January 31, 2007, all roads of the project have been the subject of detailed technical studies and bidding documents, with the exception of roads in the Pool Department, for which studies have not been carried out due to the lack of security in this part of the country. 180 kilometers of inter-urban roads and 97.5 kilometers of rural roads have been rehabilitated. The rehabilitation of these roads has given 63,621 inhabitants of 59 villages better access to urban centers. The feeling of isolation in some areas that had been cut off from the rest of the country for more than 15 years has been brought to an end, thus contributing to the reunification of the country. These roads connect areas with strong agricultural potential and the rehabilitation of these roads has opened up these agricultural areas and facilitated secure export of various assets. The awareness campaigns on HIV/AIDS carried out concurrently with the works have had a positive impact on the behavior of the population and have ensured a better knowledge of the disease. 35 The depreciation of the dollar relative to the currency of the French Republic and the increase of the cost of the launched activities has prevented the rehabilitation of 192.5 kilometers of rural roads, for which the technical studies and bidding documents are available, and the construction of the steel bridge over the Niari River at Mpassa/Madingou. It should be noted that the road Madingou- Kimandou-Sibiti rehabilitated by the project at cost of FCFA 4,084,970,219 (including studies and supervision of works) will only be fully functional if the bridge over the Niari at Mpassa is constructed. At present, the crossing of the Niari River is assured by a dilapidated ferryboat, which only operates three to four months per year. The reconsideration by IDA of the granting of additional resources for the project to finance, among others, the above mentioned bridge has strong negative implications for the sustainability of the road Madingou-Kimandou-Sibiti and the functioning of the road section going to Moukoukoulou. The Government has decided to finance these activities within the framework of its own investment budget. The project has assured the improvement and protection of 14,714 square meters of land in Brazzaville threatened by erosion, at a cost of FCFA 1,251,271,827 (including studies and supervision of works) compared to an initial provision of FCFA 1,245,083,485. These works have facilitated the removal of waste from living spaces, increased the value of built-up land in the areas affected by the project, given back confidence to a number of families that had left the area due to the high risk of landslides. The project has paved tertiary roads in Brazzaville, thus restoring the status of citizens to 22,737,000 [sic] inhabitants of Brazzaville and eliminating, among others, the emptying of black water directly into the street and the breeding grounds for mosquitoes, thus making this part of the city livable, accessible, and urban once more. On a technical level, the fact that the primary roads of the project were not completed will have a negative impact on the operation and maintenance of the tertiary roads rehabilitated by the project. In fact, the high level of service provided by these roads encourages heavy traffic to take an alternative route to the primary, degraded road network and use this tertiary road network in stead. An intensified use of the roads is foreseeable, due to the lack of direct alternative. The project has rehabilitated or constructed 129 classrooms, 11 administration buildings, 4,264 meters of enclosure walls and 65 latrines and connected 13 schools to the electricity gri