EVALUATING EDI’S ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN
UGANDA AND TANZANIA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The report is a midterm evaluation of EDI’s efforts to help reduce corruption in Tanzania and Uganda, which are part of a World Bank/EDI program to curb corruption in developing nations. It concentrates on the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the program, the impact these activities have had to date and the opportunities for the program.

What the evaluation is about

At the three year mark of EDI’s anti-corruption activities in Tanzania and Uganda, this evaluation was commissioned to shed light on their impacts and on their strengths and weaknesses. An evaluation of EDI’s anti-corruption program is timely since the Bank is expanding the program to include other countries. In Helping countries combat corruption: the role of the World Bank (1997) the backgrounds of the activities are outlined.

The following six questions are the main issues in the report.
1. What activities have been completed in Tanzania and Uganda over the last three years?
2. On what assumptions (or logic) about implementing a national integrity system and limiting corruption is the program based?
3. How were EDI’s activities implemented?
4. What are their impacts in both countries?
5. What information exists on the costs of these activities?
6. What recommendations can be formulated concerning EDI’s program?

The methodology applied is that of the case-study, carried out in two countries. We have gathered data through a combination of fieldwork using semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Also, EDI’s underlying program logic has been reconstructed and assessed on the basis of a literature review.

The report covers the period from the end of 1994, when EDI started the first anti-corruption activities in Uganda, to the end of October 1997, when the field work for this evaluation was completed.

Research question 1: Curbing corruption and building national integrity

According to EDI, fighting corruption typically involves all or a number of eight pillars of national integrity: political will, administrative reforms, watchdog agencies, Parliament, public awareness, the judiciary, the media and the private
sector. These pillars are interdependent, and require a “holistic” or integrated approach. If one pillar weakens, an increased load is thrown on to the others. According to Transparency International (TI), this holistic approach is different from earlier reforms. Previous efforts in the countries involved were piecemeal and uncoordinated, and no one “owned” the reforms. They also lacked enforcement or overlooked those at the top. The campaigns failed to deliver “quick wins” and gradually lost public support.

When a national government makes a request, it is EDI’s mission to help develop and institutionalize an anti-corruption program that will be supported in thought and action by the public, the government and civil society. It does so mainly by organizing integrity workshops at the national or regional level or for specific sectors, such as the media, and by helping to conduct Service Delivery Surveys (SDS).

In this endeavor, we distinguished three sets of objectives: programmatic, social and organizational. Programmatic objectives refer to the immediate impact of formulating, agreeing upon and adopting a program to fight corruption, mainly by those present at the workshops or the organizations and groups they represent. They include changing the awareness and attitude of attendants.

The social impact to be achieved is to foster informed public discussion and continuing political debate on the issue of integrity within society at large, and particularly among the political leadership.

And the organizational impact is to foster a sense of ownership and commitment to a national integrity program within government and civil society organizations, so as to make implementation of the program a joint, coordinated effort.

The social and organizational objectives aim at impacts outside the workshops in society at large. EDI’s influence and responsibility diminish as we proceed from the programmatic to the organizational objectives. EDI, as an educational and training agency, can only directly influence objectives at the programmatic level. Still, it is evident that the integrity workshops organized and facilitated by EDI have social and organizational objectives. For example, it is assumed that participants in the workshops will organize themselves in more formal ways (organizational objectives) and that the workshops will influence people not attending (social objectives). Specific instruments are used to this effect: publication of proceedings, integrity pledges, and special workshops to win support and commitment of certain pivotal groups, such as parliamentarians.

Implementation of the anti-corruption program is outside EDI’s control, as it should be. Still, looking at implementation and its problems is important to assess the prospects of EDI’s endeavor.
Research question 2: assessing the logic underlying the EDI-program

To assess EDI’s underlying program logic, we first had to reconstruct it. There was no key document in which EDI itself had articulated this underlying logic. Our reconstruction of the program logic shows that the EDI-program is a rich program, predicated on a set of propositions that can claim a measure of scientific validity. Although there is a focus on awareness raising and on changing the cognition and “mind sets” of officials, parliamentarians and others, several other mechanisms also steer the activities. Our assessment of these mechanisms reveals that they have potential. In particular we believe this is true for reinvigorating social capital and the civic society, the sharing and learning processes, and realizing transparency and accountability. The importance of reinvigorating civic society can also be found in the World Bank Development Report (1997) on “The State in a Changing World”.

However, there are also weaker points in the logic. One concerns the emphasis on awareness-raising. One cannot expect “…an automatic progression from awareness of an unjust situation to intervening to bring it to an end.” Another is the belief in empowerment. We did not find evidence in our review of the literature that this “mechanism” will indeed be effective. Even when individuals are empowered, it is not certain that empowerment in the social or organizational domains will follow. Empowerment at one level does not necessarily lead to empowerment at another. Finally, it was also pointed out that the prospects of trickling down of the contents of the workshops to society at large are not particularly bright, given the limited communication infrastructure in both countries.

As to the Service Delivery Surveys, we do not question their potential importance. However, we think that, due to the limited communication infrastructure, their impact should not be overestimated. Moreover, social scientists have pointed to discrepancies between attitudes and cognition on the one hand and “behavior” on the other hand.

Summing up, we think that EDI’s program logic is rather strong in its assumptions about causal mechanisms involved in fighting corruption and developing national integrity, i.e. the assumptions underlying its Good Governance program. We found that there is considerably less support in social science research for its assumptions underlying the ways in which this program in practice is institutionalized in countries requesting assistance in the fight against corruption.

Research question 3: Workshops and Service Delivery Surveys
The integrity workshops are meticulously prepared and have clear objectives. They were conducted in ways to ensure that the objectives could be accomplished. In general the design, preparation and execution of the workshops, as well as their output and the immediate results achieved, were positively reviewed by our respondents.

For some attendants the workshops made clear that corruption is indeed a serious national problem and that all should participate in fighting it. The discussions at the workshops and tangible output such as reports, programs of action, and pledges provided cognitive tools to address the problems associated with corruption in an integrated fashion. Also the opportunities to meet and associate with like-minded people were valued.

On the other hand, many people think the workshops focused too much on the metropolitan community. Some of our interviewees indicated there is not enough local influence and local ownership of the workshops. Awareness-raising always seems to be one of the objectives of the workshops. The workshops seem to be consultative and “participatory” in their approach rather than “contractual”. This approach clearly meets the needs of a number of people, but it probably also leaves out those who are beyond awareness-raising.

The media workshops were generally judged to be addressing the educational needs of journalists. Most interviewees claim that the workshops raised the subsequent quality of newspaper articles dealing with corruption. Problems reported are a lack of differentiation of the workshops by professional level and type of media. Some of the workshops lacked practical journalistic value. The materials used were sometimes too distant from African problems which mainly involve petty, instead of grand corruption. EDI is taking initiatives to address these problems. Still, our interviewees point out that enhancement of journalists’ skills are not sufficient to strengthen the role of the media. The legal environment is a major constraint for a free press, especially in Tanzania. Necessary reforms are not forthcoming. Also, hardware, such as office computers and laptops, are not available in sufficient quantities.

The Service Delivery Surveys (SDS) are not very well known. Interviewees who are not directly involved in organizing activities of the anti-corruption campaign are not familiar with the surveys or their results. When introduced, the idea and rationale are highly valued because of the information the surveys are expected to generate for formulation of policy and raising public awareness. However, as experiences in Uganda show, civil servants might resist disseminating and using results of SDS, especially when data show weak service delivery.
Research question 4: impact following the workshops

The integrity workshops produced integrity programs, contributed to and agreed upon by representatives of the various pillars, such as the civil service, the media, civil society, and the respective governments. The programs defined four major areas of activity: a national public awareness campaign; improved enforcement of anti-corruption laws (mainly aiming at people in leadership positions); institutional reform and increased transparency and accountability. Soliciting support of the public and civil society, as well as improvement of enforcement were relative innovations in the anti-corruption efforts for the two countries. Also, programs of implementation, or action plans, including a number of “quick wins” were defined. When compared to earlier anti-corruption campaigns in the two countries these strategies constitute, we think, major “programmatic” innovations. The need to fight corruption with these programs, the concrete action points and the logic of the program are supported and, in fact, largely “internalized” by a clear majority of our interviewees.

As to the social objectives, fostering informed public discussion, awareness, and active support by wider circles of society, the picture is less clear. The workshops decided upon a number of provisions to foster dialogue, continuous informed public discussion, awareness and action. The value added by EDI’s involvement at this general level of society is hard to assess. Integrity pledges and workshops for parliamentarians, which are specific efforts to win commitment of the political leadership have, so far, met with little success.

With regard to realizing organizational objectives in neither country did we find evidence of a strong involvement of civil society organizations in the anti-corruption campaigns. Still, in Uganda, we found some of these organizations take interesting initiatives of their own, particularly the Ugandan Chamber of Commerce and the Ugandan Catholic Church.

A number of initiatives have been taken to implement action points of the National Integrity Program. For example, in both countries, first steps have been taken to launch a public awareness campaign. Reform of the civil service is underway in both countries (Uganda’s program is more comprehensive and has been implemented since 1990). Also, the decentralization program in that country looks promising. But overall, progress in implementing a specific anti-corruption program is limited in both countries. Of course, time is needed to implement the wide-ranging reforms.

Lack of capacity of human and material resources is an all pervasive constraint. The major agencies involved in the anti-corruption campaign are confined to the capital cities. Lack of substantial “quick wins” in areas such as enforcement, reform of
public procurement and of registration requirements for private organizations, is, we think, not encouraging for the prospects of the anti-corruption campaigns. The fact that enforcement has not substantially improved, is a major concern for virtually all of our interviewees in both countries. According to them, the necessary reduction in corruption of the nation’s leadership is not taking place. They fear that, as a result, the campaigns are in danger of losing credibility and public support.

Some other differences between Uganda and Tanzania

There are a number of important other differences between Tanzania and Uganda. First of all, in Uganda the anti-corruption campaign forms part of comprehensive efforts to reform the civil service, liberalize the economy, and decentralize public administration. These efforts are judged to be largely effective by outside observers. Further, in Uganda, more public agencies are participating in the campaign and there seems to be more coordination, at least within government circles. A national integrity working group was established with this specific task. Also, a number of important steps have been taken to make enforcement agencies stronger and more independent. Further, the Inspector General of Government is developing plans to deploy activities up country and in civil society.

Research question 5: costs of the program

Information on costs of the EDI-program activities in Back-To-Office reports (BTO) and Seminar Proceedings is very limited. This makes it impossible to assess the relationship between costs of the program involved and its impacts, effects and possible side-effects. Financial information on the program appears not to be part and parcel of ongoing management information. The indicators or benchmarks that are to be used to assess EDI-activities are not targeted at measuring the impact or effects of the activities but only their incidence.

Overall conclusions

- EDI’s program logic is rather strong in its assumptions about causal mechanisms involved in fighting corruption and developing national integrity. There is considerably less support in social science research for its assumptions underlying the ways in which this program in practice is institutionalized in the two countries requesting assistance in the fight against corruption.
- EDI’s main role in the fight against corruption is facilitating and helping to organize workshops/SDS. Judging from the materials in the proceedings and from our interviews, the workshops are well designed and organized, and have a clear result-orientation. Overall, the way the workshops are conducted is positively reviewed by our interviewees. Social Delivery Surveys are believed to be important instruments also.
The new approaches are positively received by representatives from government, parliament and civic society we interviewed. However, the flaws of earlier, pre-1995 campaigns, e.g. the lack of enforcement, and lack of support and involvement of civil society have not yet been redressed in present practice. The social and organizational impacts of EDI’s activities in the larger society are at present still limited.

The limited impact of the integrity workshops at the social and organizational level is, we think, at least partially linked to EDI’s program. As stated earlier, there is “no automatic progression from awareness of an unjust situation to intervening to bring it to an end.” Also, there is the multi-level problem of empowerment. Finally, the prospects of trickling down of the contents of the workshops to the larger society are not particularly bright, given the limited communication infrastructure. Follow-up of the workshops is left too much to the spontaneous interaction of participants and a few formal provisions, such as pledges, joint statements and distribution of workshop material. Based on our analysis of the materials and interviews conducted, we think the workshops are participatory rather than contractual. However, the social marketing approach EDI now is considering might bring improvements in this respect.

Research question 6: recommendations

The findings and conclusions summarized above lead us to make the following ten recommendations.

1. Establishing a national integrity committee, similar to the one in Uganda, is an essential step in Tanzania. Unlike the one in Uganda, however, it is also necessary to include major civil society organizations. The committee is to coordinate, monitor and report anti-corruption activities, define priorities and attainable “quick wins”, agreed upon by actors willing and able to participate in its execution.

2. In organizing workshops, seminars and other activities, more use should be made of already existing specific and coherent groups. These activities should take into account their specific problems and potential.

3. Specialized and more targeted workshops or seminars could be a starting-point for more permanent projects or organizations that help sustain the anti-corruption effort in between workshops. Such projects could deal with the design and implementation of effective systems of control, accountability and transparency, a licensed system of public reporting and public procurement. Or they could support an “alertness network against corruption”, involving persons placed in key-positions in public and private organizations.

4. An explicit communication and utilization strategy is needed to ensure impacts from Service Delivery Surveys. This is to involve public relations, training, and
counseling. It might also prove useful to make civil service departments stakeholders in the surveys.

5. An exit-strategy for EDI should be articulated that can be applied both in cases of success and of lack of progress. A general model can be formulated, to be adapted for each specific country in which a program is started. The strategy should be clearly communicated to beneficiaries. Indicators and options should be agreed upon with beneficiary governments.

6. With fifteen countries now involved in the program, we recommend more attention be devoted to the production and utilization of financial information on the costs of EDI activities as a (day-to-day) tool of management.

7. We suggest the transparency of the EDI program be increased using performance indicators. These can be based on the framework of objectives and indicators developed and used in this report.

8. To define more precisely EDI’s intervention strategy, we suggest the program in question produces a key-document defining EDI’s program, objectives, instruments, program logic and performance indicators.

9. EDI’s Good Governance program is in itself an innovation within the World Bank and is quickly developing. Therefore, we think it is wise to conduct, within a few years, a new evaluation of EDI’s implementation of anti-corruption programs in Uganda and Tanzania, with the focus on the impacts of the programs adopted on the level of corruption within society. The findings reported here can serve as a baseline for such an assessment.

10. We also think it is wise to develop base-line information on the situation within the other countries the program focuses at (or will focus at). Given their social and institutional differences, we recommend comparative institutional analysis of the EDI-program.
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND QUESTIONS ASKED

Questions to be answered and the structure of the report

The goal of this chapter is to describe some of the recent developments within the Worldbank/ EDI that focus on anticorruption. The idea of a National Integrity System consisting of several ‘pillars of integrity’ is described. Also the question is addressed whether or not the recent attention of the Bank for anticorruption can be considered an innovation.

With regard to the research questions, six are central in this report.
1. What activities have been completed in Tanzania and Uganda over the last three years?
2. On what assumptions (“logic” or “theory”) is the program based? Why is it assumed that the program activities will help to develop and implement a national integrity system and why is it believed that they can help curb /prevent corruption?
3. How were EDI’s activities implemented?
4. What are their impacts in both countries? In answering this question we will concentrate on the impact of EDI’s main activity: integrity workshops.
5. What information exists on the costs of these activities?
6. What recommendations can be formulated concerning EDI’s program?

The structure of the report is the following:

Chapter 2 describes the contents of EDI’s anti-corruption program activities (question 1), while Chapter 3 gives information on this evaluation, presents the design, and links our approach to the contemporary literature on the methodology of program evaluation.

Chapter 4 reconstructs and evaluates the logic of EDI’s anti-corruption program, i.e. the assumptions underlying EDI’s activities (question 2). First the economic, behavioral and sociological assumptions on which the EDI-program are spelled out. Next, some of these assumptions are confronted with evidence from the research literature.

Chapter 5 focuses on the ways in which the integrity and journalists workshops are developed, implemented and evaluated in both countries (question 3). This chapter also looks into experiences with the Service Delivery Surveys.

Chapters 6 and 7 describe the major findings from our country studies of Uganda and Tanzania on the impact of EDI’s (main) activities (question 4).

Chapter 8 presents information on the costs of the program (question 5) while

Chapter 9 summarizes the findings and sets out recommendations (question 6).
This evaluation covers the three year period from the start of EDI’s anti-corruption activities in December 1994 till the end of 1997.

**The role of the World Bank/ EDI in helping curb corruption**

The involvement of the Worldbank in anticorruption strategies is relatively new (Worldbank, 1997:3). The strategic framework for these activities consists of four levels. The first level is to prevent fraud and corruption within Bank-financed projects. The second level is to help countries that request Bank support to reduce corruption. The third level is to take corruption more explicitly into account in national assistance projects, in national lending operations, in policy dialogue, in analytical work and in the choice and design of projects. And the fourth level focuses on “adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce corruption” (World Bank, 1997:3; 23).

The topic of this report falls within the scope of a combination of the second and the third level of activities.

“The main thrust of the Bank’s support (…) will be in helping to design and implement government programs. In some cases the Bank may be asked to help with specific anticorruption efforts (…) In other cases, the Bank may provide assistance in economic policy reform and institutional strengthening. (…) In addition, the Bank, and in particular the Economic Development Institute EDI can support government efforts by facilitating workshops for parliamentarians or journalists on these issues”(World Bank, 1997: 24).

What matters here is to help countries to strengthen their institutions. In practice, this means attending to building systems of well-performing government and ensuring sound financial management and budget reforms, results-oriented management, transparency and decentralization. Civil society and the media are also focuses of concern. In the words of the World Bank:

“(These) are crucial to creating and maintaining an atmosphere in public life that discourages fraud and corruption (…) They are arguably the two most important factors in eliminating systemic corruption in public institutions. Private organizations, professional organizations, religious leaders and civil groups all have a stake in the outcome of anticorruption initiatives (…) They also may play an important role as watchdogs (…) The Bank as a lender to governments can play only a limited role in supporting civil society in the fight against corruption. But within its mandate and with full support of governments,
the Bank, mostly through EDI has undertaken activities such as integrity workshops and the training of journalists” (p. 44/45; emphasis added).

In an EDI Working Paper, Langseth, Stapenhurst and Pope (1997) describe the approach emphasizing a “National Integrity System” (NIS) as a comprehensive method of fighting corruption (see figure 1). As the creation of a NIS is considered an integral part of the process of public sector reform, we briefly outline the core elements of this approach below, following Langseth and Stapenhurst².

**Figure 1: The pillars of integrity.**

The ultimate goal of establishing a national integrity system is “to make corruption a high risk and low return undertaking. As such, it is designed to prevent corruption from occurring in the first place. And because corruption tends to be a systemic problem, the primary emphasis is on changing systems, rather than blaming individuals. [World] wide the policy responses to corruption typically involve one or more of the eight following pillars: political will, administrative reforms, watchdog agencies, Parliament, public awareness, the judiciary, the media and the private sector³. These pillars are interdependent. If one pillar weakens, an increased load is thrown on to the others (...) Establishing a National Integrity System requires identifying gaps and opportunities for utilizing each of these pillars, as well as

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² E.g. the Uganda Country Study and the Tanzania Country Study, published as ‘National Integrity System Country Studies’.  
³ Recently, the pillars are referred to as follows: the executive, parliament, watchdog agencies, the judiciary, the media, civil society, the private sector and enforcement agencies (Personal communication by R. Stapenhurst by e-mail June 12, 1998). As this evaluation was carried out during the latter part of 1997, in this report we refer to the ‘older’ concepts.
catalyzing the work of the government, civil society, donators into a coherent framework of institutional strengthening” (page 5/6).

Workshops and Service Delivery Surveys (SDS) are central aspects of this report. In the light of EDI’s emphasis on linking learning and lending and given its goal to “deliver usable knowledge to those who need it when they can best put it to use” (Thomas, 1996:9), it is evident that workshops and SDS are crucial. Therefore it can be understood why EDI was to be major player in the Bank’s fight against corruption. The focus of EDI is on the “power of learning”. This is as relevant to traditional Bank enterprises as to novel activities like those aimed at curbing corruption. As an educational institute with a focus on the production of and dissemination of knowledge, EDI can be considered an obvious partner in this “war on corruption”.

The activities which EDI/the Bank have undertaken over the last couple of years can therefore be seen as an organizational as well as a cognitive innovation. Cognitive, because the Bank has only recently invested in acquiring data on the costs and consequences of corruption. Organizationally it is an innovation, because these activities had consequences for the Bank’s internal operations as well as for the agenda of EDI. These EDI-activities were among the first in which attention was systematically paid to anti-corruption activities, strategies and consequences.

Although novel in approach, the Bank’s production of scientific knowledge on the negative consequences of (major and minor) corruption has been impressive. Apart from an overview of what has been produced by economists and political scientists (World Bank, 1997: 14 ff), the World Development Report 1997 provides empirical evidence of relationships between corruption and fraud, the weakness of public sector institutions and the civil society, and makes clear how important the fight against corruption is.

For Sub-Saharan Africa, this report states that “most of the countries are suffering from a crisis of statehood- a crisis of capability. An urgent priority is to rebuild state effectiveness through an overhaul of public institutions, reasserting of the rule of law, and credible checks on abuse of state power. Where the links between the state, the private sector, and civil society are fragile and underdeveloped, improving the delivery of public and collective services will require closer partnerships with the private sector and civil society” (p. 14).

This report also provides a theoretical underpinning for the attention the Bank gives to establishing national integrity systems and strengthen the civil society (chapter 6 and 7). The main themes are: bringing the government closer to the people, creating accountability and transparency, focusing on creating new pressures on states to listen and respond to the voices of their citizens, implementing participatory
mechanisms like councils and helping to establish and empower a free press. Strengthening institutions that act as “watchdogs”, introducing results-oriented management within the public sector, and implementing participatory mechanisms will enhance accountability and transparency. On the other hand, teaching and training programs focused on investigative journalism stimulate a free press, promote accountability, and enhance the flow of “accountability information” to the public.

Theoretically, the World Development Report describes these activities in terms of improving institutional capacity, increasing the public’s opportunities for participation, and providing the public with a voice. Improving state capability can take place in three ways (p. 117). First, when its citizens are able to express their opinions and press their demands publicly within the framework of the law, a state has some of the credibility it needs to govern well. Second, where markets are absent, a popular voice can reduce informational problems and lower transaction costs. Third, no matter how dedicated, hardworking or public spirited state officials are, they cannot anticipate all the public goods and services that citizens desire. The emergence of private and NGO alternatives to public provision can help meet gaps in the supply of public goods. Citizen involvement, civil society, media coverage and techniques for consulting users and intended beneficiaries (such as service delivery surveys) play a major role here.

The overall picture, then is that the Bank, and in particular EDI, some years ago initiated a novel approach to an old problem, which can be called the “Governance Program” (Langseth, 1997:15), sometimes also referred to as the “New Governance Strategy” (Langseth, 1998: 10). This program focuses on capacity building and the involvement of civil society.

Within three years of the formulation and implementation of EDI’s activities, this present evaluation was commissioned to shed light on the impact and on the merits and drawbacks of these activities. This was also an innovation. Often new programs are either not evaluated at all or they are only evaluated after results have been established and nothing can be changed. One should point out that an evaluation is timely since the Bank is expanding implementation of the program to other countries (e.g. Ukraine, Georgia and Mauritius). Following up the adage of the “learning organization”, an evaluation such as we report here, in which not only the pros and

\[4\] An explanation may be the “vested interests” and “vested stakeholders” in the program under review.

\[5\] Office Memorandum from D. Leipziger (November 18th, 1997) to P.Langseth (TOR for Ukraine, Mauritius, Tanzania and Uganda). Langseth (1998: 8) mentions several other countries (eg. Benin, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Gaza, Jordan and Bangladesh). In total ‘EDI is doing governance and anti-corruption work in 15 countries’ (Langseth, 1998: 8).
cons of the program are scrutinized but also the underlying program logic, may indeed serve as a mechanism for both single and double loop learning.
CHAPTER TWO: CONTENT OF THE PROGRAM

Characteristics
As part of its assistance to client countries to help control and curb corruption, EDI\(^6\) has developed the concept of *National Integrity Systems* as a means to identify and strengthen those institutions whose mandate includes fighting corruption. These institutions are known as the "pillars of integrity". They include:

- Executive branch
- Watchdog Agencies
- Parliament
- Civil Society
- Media
- Judiciary
- Police and Prosecution
- Private sector.

It is a central goal\(^7\) of EDI to help develop:

- awareness-raising within the civil society;
- institution building;
- the prevention of corrupt practices, and
- prosecution of corrupt officials.

According to Transparency International\(^8\) (TI) this *holistic* approach is different from earlier reforms, in the sense that prior efforts were piecemeal and uncoordinated. The consequence was that no one “owned” the reforms, that no one was committed to them and that not many were focused on results. Earlier reforms relied too heavily upon the law, overlooked those at the top and focused on the “small fry”. Another characteristic of earlier reforms is that they failed to deliver *quick wins* and therefore gradually lost public support.

Types of activities

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\(^6\) A number of the activities are carried out together with Transparency International.

\(^7\) In the end the ultimate goal is “empower[ing] individuals, communities and governments in client countries with knowledge that enhances their capacity to foster sustainable, equitable development”. EDI stresses the importance of partnership with the government and civil society in this process.

\(^8\) Transparency International is an international non-governmental organization. Its mission involves the forming of coalitions of like-minded interests and individuals around the concept of accountability and transparency.
Three activities constitute the backbone of the anti-corruption approach: integrity workshops, media workshops, and the Service Delivery Surveys. These activities are believed to be (fully) integrated.

**Integrity workshops**
The main purpose of integrity workshops is to formulate and agree upon an anti-corruption program and in the process raise awareness of the costs of corruption and discuss the roles the various pillars of integrity play in the fight against corruption. Workshops are also intended to create a partnership between members of the integrity-pillars and to develop, in general terms, an outline of a national integrity system which will be geared to helping curb corruption. The workshops are generally organized on a national bases, with members of all pillars present, but it can also be organized for one specific pillar of the integrity system (e.g. the Cabinet, Parliament or Judiciary).

It is crucial that workshops become *forums* for establishing *policy dialogues focused on developing programs/activities to fight corruption*. These discussions take place with officials from the government, parastatals and the civil society. The workshops solicit views from these participants on the evil of corruption and how it can be fought. These discussions stimulate participants to actively support countermeasures against current corruption and to help prevent corruption in the future. As a result, the awareness of participants is enhanced, which facilitates the development and implementation of the program. The program basically consists of public awareness campaigns, following up cases (enforcement) where corruption is reported and implementing legal and institutional change.

**Media workshops**
The media are seen as a key player in informing the public about corruption and exposing corrupt practices. The first generation media workshops (the *Introductory Investigative Journalism Workshops, abbreviated as IIJ-workshops*) focused on awareness raising and on discussing the role of the media in the fight against corruption, but also on improving professional techniques. Journalists were given a basic training in the skills needed to carry out investigative journalism. They learned to obtain information in ways that are ethical, that respect privacy and avoid litigation. This training is given through the use of (a) “mini press conferences”; (b) the simulation exercise "Freedonia" and (c) a field trip. In the “mini press conference” an important person in the fight against corruption can be interviewed and the information used as material for media coverage. The "Freedonia" simulation is a continuous unfolding story in the fictitious land of “Freedonia”, with four newspapers competing to get the best stories. Each day the news-room receives information on possible corrupt practices, and journalists have to decide what the reports mean, what lies behind the story, what line or approach to take, and how to
write stories accordingly. The goal of the “field trip” is to get a taste of the real life experience of journalism.

The introductory Investigated Journalism workshops led to a second generation: an Advanced Investigative Journalism course (abbreviated as: Advanced IJW) and an Investigative Journalism Workshop for Editors. The Advanced IJW concentrated on the identification of key repositories of public information in the country. Participants actively researched the ease of accessing this information and the results of their research were printed. This Directory of Information Available at Public Repositories was then available as a reference tool for journalists.

The IIJ-workshop for Editors has been based on the special needs of editors; the curriculum has been developed in assistance with editors. Issues that were addressed included Integrity and editorial policy, Advertising and Marketing and Budgeting.

Service Delivery Surveys
As a part of its program EDI and its principal partner, CIETInternational are assisting countries to design and implement Service Delivery Survey (SDS) systems. CIETInternational is a non-profit organization who developed and refined the “sentinel community surveillance methodology”, that forms the base of the SDS-cycles. CIETInternational describes SDS as “a measurement tool that combines social and economic data with information on the experience, expectations and perceptions of citizens about service delivery.” This is done through a combination of techniques: analysis of available data, household surveys (which are seen as the cornerstone of the community-based data), focus group discussions, key informant interviews, institutional reviews, and observation studies.

The reason EDI promotes SDS is “to improve governments’ capacities to design and implement reform programs, and to build capacity to manage the process of service delivery to provide services that better satisfy the public’s needs.” To build this local capacity, local counterparts are trained and participate in all phases of the cycle. Another reason why EDI stimulates the use of SDS in developing countries is the belief that SDS can enhance greater attention towards the needs of the clients. It is hoped that SDS will stimulate a client-orientation environment, which means both result-oriented-management and by the same means increased accountability.

The main goals of SDS are:
• to provide national and local governments with information on the quality of service delivery;

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9 See the National Integrity System in Tanzania II, 1996: 100.
• to allow the intended beneficiaries of state provided service a “voice” in the management of the service;
• to document the incidence, form and consequences of corruption in service delivery;
• to provide baseline and follow-up information on which to judge progress in efforts at reform; and
• to provide indices against which to gauge the benefits and costs of political democratization as regards "stakeholders empowerment."

By documenting problems in service delivery, it is hoped that the public and political debate on the state’s performance in its efforts at reform will be strengthened.

**Impacts to be realized**

Stated briefly, it is EDI’s mission to help develop nations on request, an anti-corruption program that will be supported in thought and action by the public and civil society. The impacts strive for can be defined as programmatic, organizational and social.

The activities have a **programmatic impact** when:
• a program for fighting corruption and building a national integrity system is discussed and agreed upon;
• the need to curb corruption and to build a national integrity system is put on the agenda of policy officials of governments and of representatives of civil society. Programmatic impact as defined here therefore also includes changes of cognition and attitude of attendants at the workshops.

The **social impact** to be achieved is to foster informed public discussion and continuing political debate on the issue of integrity within society at large, and particularly among the political leadership.

The **organizational impact** is to foster a sense of ownership and commitment to a national integrity program within government and civil society organizations.

As more of these impacts are realized, the likelihood of a successful anti-corruption program will increase. The dependent variable of the EDI-program we will use when reconstructing its underlying logic (see chapter 4), therefore is the likelihood of implementing effective anti-corruption activities.

We refer to *appendices a and b* for detailed information on the activities EDI has carried out in Tanzania and Uganda. Both are available through *EDI’s Evaluation Unit* in Washington DC.
CHAPTER THREE: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Type of evaluation
The EDI program is four years old. This evaluation must therefore be considered a mid-term-study, focusing on:

• the strengths and weaknesses of the process of development and implementation of the program (activities);
• the impact these activities have had to date and
• the opportunities for the program.

It is neither a full-scale impact evaluation, nor a cost-benefit analysis. Reconstruction and assessment of the underlying program logic is an essential part of the evaluation.

Key questions, evaluation strategy and design and methodology used
The strategy followed is that of the case-study, carried out in two countries. We have gathered data through:

• fieldwork using semi-structured interviews;
• document analysis;
• reconstructing and assessing EDI’s underlying program logic and
• literature review.

The information obtained is largely qualitative and no statistical sampling has taken place.

First key question
The first question is: what EDI activities have been completed in Tanzania and Uganda over the last three to four years?
We have answered this question by using the following methods and techniques:

• Interviews with officials at the World Bank Headquarters to gain their views of the program (see appendix 1 in this report);
• Content analysis of available EDI-proceedings and Back-To-Office (BTO) reports. For a review of the documents used, see appendices a and b (available through EDI’s Evaluation Unit);

We follow GAO’s Methodology Transfer Paper, number l0.1.4 Designing Evaluations, Washington DC, 1991. See also: European Commission, Evaluating EU expenditure programs, a guide (ex post and intermediate evaluation), DG XIV, Budgetary overview and evaluation, Luxembourg, 1997. The relation between ‘design’ and ‘strategy’ is that a strategy ‘embraces several types of design that have certain features in common’ (GAO, 1991: 28).
• **Documenting** participation in the workshops. Which persons and institutions were visitors, presenters and facilitators? We refer to appendix c for more specific information (available through EDI’s Evaluation Unit);

• **Interviews** in Uganda, Tanzania and Washington DC. We refer to appendix 1 for the names of persons interviewed and to appendix 2 (also in this report) for some information on the questions asked.

**Second key question**

The second question is: on what assumptions (“theory”) is the program based? Put differently: why is it assumed that the program activities will help to develop and implement a national integrity system and why is it believed that they can help curb corruption?

In order to understand why policy programs and activities are successful, policy research often pays attention to the assumed (social and behavioral) *premises or mechanisms* that lie behind them. GAO calls this the “construction of underlying models of (proposed) programs” (GAO, 1991: 22) and distinguishes between conceptual and operational reconstruction. A conceptual reconstruction concerns the social and behavioral *logic* behind the program, an operational reconstruction focuses on *why which* actors are assumed to *do what* in order to make the program a success. Leeuw (1991:74) refers to the concept of a policy theory, which is a “system of social and behavioral assumptions that underlie a public policy which have been reformulated in the form of *premises* (or propositions). These premises reflect beliefs of policy makers about the cognition, attitudes and behaviors of the policy’s target groups (…) But they also refer to more structural factors on which policy makers have been making assumptions”. He goes on to show that “there is evidence that knowledge about the content of [policy] theories helps us to understand why policies sometimes turn into failures or disasters”.

In particular, reconstructing and assessing the underlying logic of a program [activity] is important for obtaining information about the future *opportunities* for the program. The more sound the premises on which the program is based, the greater the chance that the program will succeed.

We have used the following “rules of method”:

• Searching in the documents/interviews for statements that would indicate *why* it is believed necessary to solve the corruption problem in a particular (i.e. EDI) way. These statements point to (social/behavioral/economic) *mechanisms* that are believed to be crucial in solving the problem. Statements that have the following form are especially relevant:
  • “it is evident that x…….will work”,
  • “in our opinion the best way to go about this problem is to …”,

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• “the only way to solve this problem is to …”,
• “our institution’s x years of experience tells us that …”
• Compiling a survey of these statements and linking the solutions/approaches/policy instruments with the overall goals of the program under review;
• Reformulating these statements in conditional “if-then”-propositions or propositions of a similar structure (“the more..., the more”);
• Searching for warrants, i.e. missing links through argumentational analysis. According to Toulmin (1958) and Mason & Mitroff (1981) a warrant is the “because” part of an argument: it says that B follows from A because of a (universally) accepted principle. For example: “the market will grow at 7% per annum” follows from “the market has grown by at least 7% a year for each year of the last 10 years”, because of the principle: “past market growth is a good indicator of future market growth”. The “because” part of such an argumentation is often not made explicit. Consequently, these warrants must be inferred by the person performing the analysis (Dunn, 1981);
• Reformulating these warrants in terms of conditional “if-then” (or similar) propositions;
• Assessing the validity of the propositions\textsuperscript{11}.

**Third and fourth key questions**
The third question is: How were EDI’s implemented? The fourth question is: what are their impacts in Tanzania and Uganda?

We have answered these two questions by using the following methods and techniques:
• **Document analysis** of BTO’s and Proceedings;
• **Interviews** with persons/officials in Uganda and Tanzania (see the appendix 1 for the names of persons interviewed). We have followed a semi-structured approach (see appendix 2);
• **Taking stock of** topics which were covered by newspapers during our two-week visit to Uganda and Tanzania (see appendix d, available through EDI’s Evaluation Unit).

**Fifth key question**
The fifth question is: What information exists on the costs of these activities? Basically we have used document analysis on the BTO’s to try to answer this question.

\textsuperscript{11} In this study we do not report on a full-scale triple theory assessment, as suggested and applied by Leeuw (1991).
The following links between key questions and methods can be represented in a matrix.

**Relations between key questions and methods applied**

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**Constraints on the evaluation**

In the aforementioned GAO-paper, GAO encourages evaluators to report on the constraints under which evaluations are carried out. We have encountered two constraints.

At first we had to ensure that the people we interviewed in Uganda and Tanzania were in some way familiar with EDI’s/ TI’s activities and/or involved in fighting corruption. Our “sample” had to be “balanced”, or “stratified”: almost every interviewee was to represent a different angle, interest, view or role. However, to give the reader a “feel” for the importance or weight of opinions expressed, we will at times make up the balance of our “sample” by indicating whether an opinion was held by a (clear) majority, a minority or by a certain number. We should add, however that, given our balanced sample, even an opinion held by a single person might be significant.

A second constraint has been the incomplete documentation by EDI of it’s program (activities). Several times we had to ask for new information (e.g. on BTO’s and Proceedings), while data on the (running) costs of the program have been scarce. We

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12 Key question # 6 has been omitted here.
also noticed that information on goals and mechanisms of the EDI-approach was not documented in a “key report”. Reconstruction of the underlying “theory” of EDI may not therefore be based on all the documents prepared by EDI.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE UNDERLYING PROGRAM LOGIC OF EDI’S ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES

Why reconstruction?
The reconstruction of the logic underlying the different EDI activities will be presented in three different sets.

The first set focuses on the assumptions behind the idea that strengthening institutional capacity and enhancing national integrity (systems) are important in the war against corruption. EDI’s Governance Program is central here. The second set looks into the assumptions underlying the idea that workshops can be an effective instrument for helping to realize this goal. The third set looks into underlying assumptions of the Service Delivery Surveys as a tool.

Since the EDI programs for both countries are essentially the same, we have not distinguished between the activities in each country.

The first set highlights assumptions about causal mechanisms underlying the functioning of national integrity and Good Governance. The second and third sets pertain to the assumptions of EDI’s intervention strategy in countries requesting assistance and focus on ways to implement and institutionalize the program in practice.

Besides this reconstruction of the logic, an assessment of its (scientific / empirical) validity is presented. Such an assessment is necessary because there is no evidence that a policy maker’s (or practitioner, change agent or EDI official’s) assumptions are scientifically grounded. However, by the same token, no a priori assumption can be made to the contrary. We will therefore pay attention to confronting elements of the reconstructed underlying EDI logic with evidence from the social and economic sciences.

First set: why strengthen institutions, integrity pillars, good governance and a civil society?

Reconstructing EDI’s logic underlying the Governance Program

Langseth (1997: 15) holds that “underlying EDI’s Governance Program are the concepts that there should be in the public sector a focus on clients, a results-orientation in the delivery of public services, and enhanced levels of accountability and transparency. [It is believed that] improved governance and public sector
management rests on improvements in three areas: strengthened institutional capacity, improved service delivery and enhanced national integrity.”

In terms of dependent variables, the goal of the (holistic) EDI-program is to implement successful anticorruption activities, carried out by public sector organizations with the help of the civil society in client countries. We will use the shortcut “successful\ effective anticorruption activities,” when describing the dependent variables.

The social and behavioral premises that underlie EDI’s approach are the following:

- **Premise A-1**: To raise awareness of the public is crucial. The more pressures can be brought to bear on a state to listen and respond to the voices of their citizens, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-2**: NIS-pillars must be defined and strengthened and ”good governance” should be instituted (including adequate remuneration of civil servants); the more this is realized, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-3**: There must be a clearly defined government actor responsible and accountable for the program that is developed and executed; this too will enhance the effectiveness of anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-4**: Civil society plays a prominent role in the “war against corruption”; without the active participation of members of the civil society, it will be impossible to win that war;

- **Premise A-5**: There must be a partner in civil society with whom the government is willing to work; the more this partnership realizes local ownership, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-6**: Transparency and accountability are crucial. The more transparent a society and a state and the more clearly defined the concept of accountability, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-7**: Empowerment. The more knowledge that members of society have about causes and consequences of corruption, the more knowledge they have of how to engage in the fight against corruption, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-8**: The more active EDI is in obtaining funds and in opening up new communication channels between institutions and the donor community, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-9**: Action research. Here, the focus is on identifying “questions rather than seeking to impose answers and capturing the process to ensure that lessons learned in one country are available to others (learning by doing)”

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activities are framed in this way, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-10**: Realizing “quick wins” is important. EDI’s activities should have quick results, which encourage others to become involved in the fight against corruption; the more frequent these achievements, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-11**: Helping to establish “islands of integrity” that can have an exemplary function is also important. The more sites within both the public and private sector that are “clean” and capable of serving as a model to be followed, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise A-12**: There must be an exit strategy for the Bank, which must be understood by the clients in both government and civil society. “By maintaining a low profile and taking a facilitative role instead of prescribing solutions, EDI creates space for an exit strategy.”\(^{14}\) The more clearly such a strategy has been seen to be implemented, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities.

Framed in terms of Coleman’s model of micro-macro links (Coleman, 1990), these propositions on the one hand refer to changing institutional constraints and opportunities under which civil servants and other members of society behave and on the other hand refer to the behavioral choices themselves. Introducing decentralization and results-based management, and helping to establish or gear-up “watch dogs” institutions, constitutes reinvigorating institutions at the macro-level. Because institutional arrangements influence the (social and economic) costs and benefits of behaviors, including corrupt behavior, these arrangements should be effective in the fight against corruption since they increase the costs of corruption.

“Empowerment,” “awareness raising,” “action research,” and “quick wins” constitute what Coleman (1990) refers to as micro-activities. They focus on behavioral choices. When people are made aware of causes and consequences of corruption, when they are empowered to do something about it, when they have learned how to raise their complaints, when they notice that earlier approaches have indeed had (quick) results and when they perceive that there are “islands of integrity”, when they have all this, it will make it easier for them to speak out against corruption and to take action against occurring corrupt behavior (voice). The easier it is to “voice”, the more people will become involved in “voicing”. The more people “voice”, the more likely the war on corruption will succeed.

Institutional arrangements influencing the costs and benefits of corrupt behavior and behavioral mechanisms like “empowerment”, “awareness raising”, “learning” and

\(^{14}\) See: Langseth (1998: 20-21) for more information on this strategy. One of the elements he pointed at is the organization of training of trainer Workshops (in Zimbabwe and Venezuela).
“intermittent reinforcement” can in practice only jointly have the intended effects. An example: by assisting in the development of watch dog institutions and a free press, corruption becomes more visible. Knowing that this is the case, the (transaction) costs for the wrong-doer are increased, which may cause him to withdraw from his intended action. Once people within a society have acquired a fair knowledge and developed a concern about the level of corruption in their country (awareness); and once they have been empowered to make their voice heard; and once they have formed civil communities or societies that can be trusted in their fight against corruption (social capital), the more people will be involved in “voicing” against corruption. This will increase the costs of corruption.

In order to reinvigorate institutions, empower people, or create public awareness about corruption, delivery mechanisms are needed. EDI strives to assist by facilitating workshops and by facilitating service delivery surveys. The World Bank Development Report 1997 (p. 117) says:

“Deliberative mechanisms are unlikely to enable governments to be effective in the long run if their policies appear to be illegitimate or unresponsive to crucial societal demands. Efforts to reach out to citizens must reach all the way down. At the very least, reforms and programs [like those concerned with fighting corruption, FLL/GHG] must be made intelligible to the public, for example by encouraging wide spread media coverage” (...) “Specific techniques and mechanisms for consulting users and intended beneficiaries can help to improve the quality of specific public services. (...) Feedback mechanisms such as client or user surveys can provide valuable information about an agency’s performance and the type and quality of services reaching consumers. As more people become aware of the performance of specific agencies and officials, they are more likely to exert collective pressure on the agency to perform better. At the same time public agencies will have less opportunity for arbitrary action” (p. 117).

Second set: why NIS-workshops? EDI’s underlying Workshop-logic reconstructed

Langseth (1996) has spelled out elements of the design and implementation of Workshops. EDI’s roles in the Workshops are those of sponsor, facilitator, and presentator. The role EDI wants to play is not that of “running the (work)shop” but to be an intellectual and organizational facilitator. This is in line with ideas on local ownership and with the idea that each workshops must be specifically adapted to the particular country (“tailor-made”).

It is crucial that the workshops should be seen as a means of establishing policy dialogues focused on developing programs/activities to fight corruption. A workshop is to be a starting point for a series of other activities related to fighting corruption. Members of the “Pillars of Integrity” are invited to sit in with presentations, take part in the discussions on causes and solutions to the corruption
problem and sometimes also make presentations. The workshops are said to be result-oriented: they help identify what needs to be done, how that can be done, what organizational/institutional constraints and opportunities have to be met to achieve this and what can be learned as a result. Workshops often have a hands-on-approach, i.e. try to instruct participants in the best practices of methods and techniques. At the end of some workshops, an Integrity Pledge is drafted and signed by the participants. Plans of Actions are also developed. Political will and commitment are also on the agenda. As said before, the impact of workshops concerns programmatic, social and organizational aspects.

The social and behavioral premises underlying the idea that workshops can be an effective tool to help curb corruption are the following.

- **Premise B-1**: The first premise is that people should be involved in a “sharing and learning process”. Participation by civil society, politics and government is crucial. If one wants to move anti-corruption to the top of the (political) agenda, the political will to fight corruption is crucial. These (policy) dialogues raise the level of “awareness” among participants;

- **Premise B-2**: it is assumed that there will be a trickle down effect to other segments of society. Integrity pledges and Plans of Actions not only create joint efforts but also have an external communication effect in the sense that society at large can see what some of the results of the workshops have been. The larger this effect, the greater the likelihood of effective anticorruption activities;

- **Premise B-3**: The learning process not only concerns general ideas about the evils of corruption and the rewards of anticorruption activities, but also deals with “best practices” and competence. Clearly, the more information on such best practices is available, the greater the likelihood that participants will use that information in their anticorruption activities;

- **Premise B-4**: Workshops are assumed to help participants create partnerships with different stakeholders and to ensure that officials and members from the civil society form networks. The more such networks are developed, the greater the likelihood of anticorruption activities being effective;

- **Premise B-5**: the setting of good examples which can function as role models for others. The more “good examples”/role models there are, the greater the likelihood of anticorruption activities being effective;

- **Premise B-6**: creating an environment where new roles for participants can be tested and practiced, in such a way that they may be replicated in society at large. The

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15 It should be noted that this premise refers to a warrant; in order for workshops to be effective within society, first the program discussed and designed in the workshops must be implemented; but secondly, this program and attitudes toward negative aspects of corruption have to be communicated to society at large. That implies a trickle down effect.
more this opportunity is used, the greater the likelihood of anticorruption activities being effective;

- **Premise B-7**: When workshops are held in series, participants accumulate a knowledge based on experience (tenacity); they can also hold each other accountable to what has been agreed upon during an earlier workshop. The more this type of serial workshop is organized, the greater the chance that these workshops will function as a form of *self-evaluation and self-control*; the more this is realized, the greater the likelihood of anticorruption activities being effective\(^\text{16}\).

- **Premise B-8**\(^\text{17}\): By involving people from different positions, organizations and institutions, by discussing corruption and by knowing who is involved in and committed to anticorruption, *information on reputations* -who is to be *trusted* and who *not*- becomes available. Workshops then are *instruments for gauging trust and social capital*. The more this is realized, the greater the likelihood of anticorruption activities being effective\(^\text{18}\).

**Third set: why Service Delivery Surveys? EDI’s underlying SDS-logic reconstructed.**

One of the key goals of reform in developing countries is to improve governments’ service delivery. This means raising the cost-effectiveness, coverage, and impact of services. When defining service quality, the point of view of *citizens as customers* is taken into account, reinforcing a result orientation. It is believed that the introduction of Results-Oriented-Management (ROM) in government improves service delivery. The reason that EDI stimulates the use of Service Delivery Surveys is because SDS is believed to be an important tool in making ROM effective. It is also believed that publicizing the results of these surveys emphasizes the importance of the “rule of law\(^\text{19}\).”

By documenting problems in service delivery, it is held that the public and political debate on the state’s performance in reform efforts will be further strengthened. The following are the social and behavioral premises underlying the idea that SDS will be an effective tool in the fight against corruption.

- **Premise C-1**: The implementation of SDS provides information essential to the design of reforms, monitoring results and ultimately to making services more

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\(^{16}\) Based on an interview with R. Stapenhurst, Washington DC, August 12, 1997.

\(^{17}\) Based on an interview with P. Miovic, Washington DC, August 13, 1997.

\(^{18}\) The commitment to fight corruption that workshops engender, acquires an almost ‘economic value’ for the Bank. It allows the Bank or other organizations directly to assist those actively involved in the fight against corruption, who have a place in a network and who can be trusted. This concept is based on an interview with P. Miovic, Washington DC, 14 August 1997.

\(^{19}\) Based on an interview with P. Langseth, Washington DC August 12/14, 1997.
responsive to citizens’ demands. “Knowledge is power”. SDS therefore improves governments’ capacity to design and to implement reform programs, and to make service delivery more responsive to the public. The effect of this will be to make anticorruption activities more successful;

- **Premise C-2**: By stimulating dialogue between the public and the service providers SDS may be said to create a consultative medium between government and the public to strengthen the process of democratization and the role of civil society;

- **Premise C-3**: SDS serves to raise citizens’ awareness. Implementation of SDS represents a first step in educating the public that they have a right to expect a certain standard of service from the government. SDS works as a mechanism for raising both awareness and expectations of civil society. SDS data should be “owned” by the public/civil society. It is believed that once such information-oriented “property rights” have been established within society, the state cannot deny them and will therefore need to become pro-active. The more this is the case, the greater the likelihood of anticorruption activities being effective;

- **Premise C-4**: In dealing with government, SDS lays the emphasis on outputs rather than inputs, and therefore will change the mindset of civil servants. Survey findings can be used by reformers within government to show why such a change is necessary. Changing the mindset of civil servants is believed to be crucial in the fight against corruption;

- **Premise C-5**: SDS is not designed to directly effect a reduction in the level of corruption in a country, but it is believed that it can be an effective instrument in the creation of more involvement of civil society and the empowerment of the public. Stapenhurst believes that by conducting surveys and asking the users of government services about their experiences with the way the service is delivered, “pressure is put on the system.” SDS presents the intended allocation of resources and also the ultimate allocation of resources. Where disparities are found, the public will “ask difficult questions which sets the machine in motion”;

- **Premise C-6**: Finally, the very fact of surveys being executed in Uganda and Tanzania is itself an economic asset for these countries because of its relevance in obtaining international funds and investments. It demonstrates to the outside world that the government is actively raising its level of achievement in the public sector.

**Assessing elements of EDI’s program logic**

In total we reconstructed 26 premises underlying the EDI-program activities. Of these, twelve premises concern EDI’s Governance Program in general (A-1 through A-12). The second and third set together constitute the assumptions about EDI’s intervention (or: institutionalization) strategy in countries requesting assistance in

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the fight against corruption. More specifically, the second set of eight premises (B-1 through B-8) concerns EDI’s workshop-logic and the third set concerns six premises underlying the Service Delivery Surveys (C-1 through C-6).

Due to time and financial constraints it is impossible to assess the validity of all 26 premises. We have therefore limited our assessment to the following selection of (sets of) premises:

- those premises which refer to the importance of the civil society, partnerships, networks, trust and local ownership (premises A-4, A-5, B-4, B-8, C-2 and C-3);
- those premises dealing with the importance of transparency and accountability (A-3, A-6; B-7)
- those premises on the importance of service delivery surveys (C-1-C-5);
- those premises on empowerment (A-7; A-9) and
- those premises referring to the importance of workshops as participatory “sharing and learning processes” and as instruments for policy dialogues and awareness raising (A-8, B-1 and B-2);

What we are not able to cover in this report in particular are the premises on “islands of integrity”, on the “exit strategy”, on the effectiveness of “role models” and on the “self-evaluation and self-control” activities.

**Validity of the premises on civil society, partnerships, networks, trust and local ownership**

We refer to these assumptions as EDI’s (implicit) social capital theory. Social capital refers to those stocks of social trust, norms, networks and social relationships that people can draw upon to resolve (common) problems. According to Burt (1997:339), social capital is a quality created between people. Networks of civil engagement, such as neighborhood associations, sports clubs and other intermediary or voluntary organizations are an essential form of social capital, and the denser these networks, the more likely that members of a community will cooperate for mutual benefit. This is so, even in the face of persistent problems of collective action (tragedy of the commons, prisoner’s dilemma etc.), because networks of civil engagement:

- foster norms of generalized reciprocity by creating expectations that favors given now will be returned later;
- facilitate coordination and communication, and thus create channels through which information about the trustworthiness of other individuals and groups can flow, be tested and verified;
• embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration on other kinds of problems;
• increase the potential risks to those who act opportunistically that they will not share in the benefits of current and future transactions.

Social capital is productive, since two persons exchanging tools can get more work done with less physical capital; rotating credit associations can generate pools of financial capital for increased entrepreneurial activity; and job searches can be more efficient if information is circulated in social networks. Social capital also tends to accumulate when it is used, and to be depleted when it is not, thus creating the possibility of both virtuous and vicious cycles that manifest themselves in highly civil and non-civil communities. One could label the social capital of a country also as a country’s “soft infrastructure”. The more social capital there is, the greater this infrastructure.

What can be said about the validity of EDI’s (implicit) social capital theory?

First, this line of thought has a long tradition. De Tocqueville suggested that “if political institutions are weak and/or the existing political regime is perceived to be ineffectual and illegitimate, then civil society activity may become an alternative to politics for dissatisfied citizens. (...) A flourishing civil society under these circumstances signals governmental and institutional failure and bodes ill for political stability and democracy” (cited by Berman, 1997: 569-570).

Second, in its Development Report 1997, the World Bank presents empirical evidence showing how important social capital is. Narayan and Pritchett (1997) found, for example, that in rural Tanzania “households in villages with high levels of social capital (defined in terms of the degree of participation in village-level social organizations) have higher adjusted income per capita than do households in villages with low levels of social capital. When other non social capital determinants are controlled, there also appears to be a strong correlation between a village’s well-being and its level of social capital” (p. 115).

Third, studies referred to by Ostrom (1991) make clear how important investments in social capital are when trying to solve common pool resources problems. One might argue that reducing corruption is realizing a collective good (or doing away with a collective bad).

Fourth, an increasing number of empirical studies within industrialized countries shows the importance of social capital for making organizations and policy efforts

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23 Quoted from the CPN-website on social capital.
effective. Although these studies do not explicitly deal with anti-corruption activities in Africa, the findings are nevertheless important because in order to make anti-corruption activities in Africa successful, effective organizations are necessary (Burt, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Foley and Edwards, 1997; Bulder et al., 1996). A study by Putnam (1993) showed that, for an effective public sector, a “set of institutional mechanisms that enable competition to coexist with cooperation by forestalling opportunism” is essential. “A rich network of private economic associations and political organizations (...) having constructed an environment in which markets prosper by promoting cooperative behavior and by providing small firms with the infrastructural needs that they could not afford alone” (...) Norms of reciprocity and networks of civil engagement were typically singled out as essential for the success of industrial districts in Italy and beyond. “Networks facilitate flows of information about technological developments, about the creditworthiness of would-be entrepreneurs, about the reliability of individual workers, and so on” (Putnam, 1993: 161). Only a civil society that is organized around “horizontal bonds of mutual solidarity” rather than around “vertical bonds of dependency and exploitation” produces trust.

Our first conclusion is that, although we know of no empirical investigations of a direct link between social capital and the effectiveness of an anticorruption approach such as that implemented by EDI, the approach is wise. One cannot rely on the state alone to fight corruption. Therefore emphasizing social capital and reinvigorating social institutions is important. Our second conclusion is that “social capital” will probably work because it creates social control, puts pressure on the implementation of anticorruption activities and helps disseminate ideas why it is important to fight corruption.

Validity of the premises on transparency and accountability mechanisms
With regard to the validity of this premise two points are made. First, there is abundant evidence showing that transparency and accountability open up societies and create pressures on states. These are essential for an effective “war on corruption”. Without transparency and accountability, no progress will be made. However, there is also some evidence challenging this wisdom (OECD, 1996; Power, 1995; Leeuw, 1996; Wisler, 1996; Bromiley and Cummings, 1995). However, these studies refer to auditing and accountability practices in the industrialized world, which considerably reduces their relevance for the evaluation of EDI-programs in Africa. Nevertheless, as the general “good governance program” is related to “new public management” in industrialized countries, with their focus on accountability, “watchdogs institutions”, results-based management and client-responsiveness, it would be wise to take notice of this critique. Being aware of the

24 See any text book on auditing in the public sector.
pitfalls inherent in any pursuit of accountability and transparency, will better enable EDI to reckon with them in any future undertakings.

The unintentional and the negative side-effects that accompany the pursuit of transparency and accountability are far from negligible. One of these side-effects is that “agency costs” within society increase. These costs refer to the formulation, implementation and monitoring of controls, which must be incorporated into contractual arrangements between principals and agents. According to agency theory, monitoring is necessary and effective so long as its benefits exceed their costs. One of these costs are “bonding costs”. Bonding costs refer to the loss of commitment resulting from an (increased) level of control, accountability, transparency and -subsequently- auditing (Bromiley and Cummings, 1995; Leeuw, 1996). This is also linked to the concept of “trust”.

Smith (1995:299) discusses another unintended consequence. He illustrates the way that monitoring and auditing performance can inhibit innovation and lead to ossification: that is, organizational paralysis brought about by the system of performance measurement which is set in place because the overall-goal is to increase accountability and transparency.

When increased transparency and accountability do not go hand in hand with pursuit of the culprits, a society risks creating a discrepancy between risen expectations and actual outcomes. When the judiciary system is not geared to its task, cases of corrupt behavior that have been brought to the light by (local) whistleblowers, may end up on the shelf. Social tensions result. Some social science studies predict the possibility of social unrest and even revolutions if such a situation continues for a longer period (Davis, 1974 ; Lindenberg, 1989).

Our conclusion on this premise is that, apart from the possibility of unintended side-effects, in general the assumption on the importance of accountability and transparency is valid.

**Validity of the SDS-premises**

The intended impact of SDS relies primarily on the assumption that by presenting information on services delivery, mismanagement or fraud, people will actively become involved in putting this topic “on the agenda”. However, there is no reason to assume that there is any automatic progression from awareness to intervention (Oxfam, 1995: 12, Rogers, 1992: 136).

One factor that may lead to a “passive” attitude is described by Haynes (1997) in a study of the relationship between democracy and civil society in the third world. “Many African citizens are disaffected and disillusioned by the falsity of
developmental promises and by the arbitrariness of modes of rule. As a result [...] state-run development programs are ridiculed. (...) The African state, for the most part, functions without the support and trust of a significant proportion of its citizens” (Haynes, 1997:28).

Because civil servants are an important group in making anticorruption activities effective, it is crucial they not only understand the reforms, including SDS, but also “teach what is preached”. To listen to criticism of the public on service delivery, to act upon it and in the future to solve delivery problems constitutes a change of (administrative) cultures. At a Governance Conference held in 1996, Jarquin described his experience with SDS in Nicaragua. On the issue of changing the mindset of civil servants he stated: “[In Nicaragua] SDS has had to work with a high degree of resistance to change, a wide ignorance of the existence of the reform program, and the absence of a performance measurement culture in the public sector, which leads to an underestimation of the value and usefulness of SDS” (Governance Conference, 1996: 20).

In Uganda a similar set of obstacles were encountered: “Because the data showed weak service delivery, the results had not been disseminated across the Ministry for Public Service or civil society. There has been a persistent resistance from civil servants, which resulted in a two-year delay in the implementation of ROM [Results-oriented Management]” (BTO, Nov.19, 1996).

Our first conclusion is that the assumption that information leads to action is scarcely justified. The (social and psychological) costs involved in bridging knowledge, attitude and practices can be rather high. This is demonstrated in many KAP-studies (Knowledge, Attitude, Practice-studies).

A second conclusion is that changing the mindset of civil servants is a problem of rather similar magnitude to changing organizational culture. Changing organizational cultures depends on a great number of factors other than knowledge alone. Moreover, often the power to resist is bigger than the power to command.

Validity of the premises underlying workshops as sharing and learning processes, participation and (policy) dialogue

In our review of the literature we found no empirical studies of the relation between participation/learning processes and a successful fight against corruption. However, several empirical studies do focus on participation and workshops and indeed do say something about the possible impact of such an approach in general. Triegaart (1993) showed that empowerment of participants and reciprocal accountability can be achieved through training modules. However, the number of participants was small (N=8). Ryan et al (1996) showed that workshops for evaluating consultants, technical staff and practitioners that follow a collaborative learning approach benefit the staff and the evaluators by providing a realistic perspective on the program. It
taught practitioners basic principles of evaluation, how to recast their ideas on reporting activities, allowed them to develop alternative assessment mechanisms and gave them a sense of empowerment.

A VIKAS [a centre for development] study described 10 participatory research and training workshops that enabled the poor in India to identify their problems and priorities, develop the means to address them, and to work with other groups to do so. These workshops consisted of a six-month process of research, training, discussion, and information dissemination. VIKAS moved steadily from organizer to facilitator as representatives from low-income groups became more active in organizing and managing the workshops (VIKAS, 1996).

Although strictly only concerned with the fight against AIDS in Uganda, Fredland’s finding (1996) is also interesting: he shows that collaborative policies are more successful than “grudging, conflictual or condemnatory policies”.

As to the importance of participation, Winters (1994) also presents interesting evidence. This study deals with inner-city schools in Africa that face a myriad of problems, including escalating violence and hunger. Winters describes programs which were initiated in inner-city communities and which fostered parent involvement and collaboration between parents, teachers, school professionals, and the community. Participation, it was learned, can bring about safe and academically productive schools. Including minority poor parents in the schools requires clear mechanisms for involvement and necessitates programs to stimulate and capture their participation. Pupil services personnel play a critical role in collaborative efforts. Collaborative models were based on the premise that everyone needs information and support to function effectively. Therefore, everyone in the collaboration was exposed to, and took part in, training and development. Likewise, in order to understand the alienation of parents, aspects of the problem such as “meaninglessness”, “normlessness”, and “powerlessness”, were explored. Accountability was highlighted since previous work had showed that this is a critical component of empowerment. Shared accountability effectively shifted power from the school to include parents. Results showed that the targeted group (mothers) appeared more empowered, indicating that alienation and participation are inversely related.

Another study supporting the idea that participation and partnership is important is presented by Ghafoor and Hara (1987). They report a case study of a social engineering program in the private sector of Karachi that has achieved demonstrable success compared with other development programs. The program is a non-governmental action-oriented social and technical research effort. It is based on the premise that popular participation in social and economic organizations must be a
first step in improving overall living conditions and facilitating development. The Low-Cost Sanitation Program, begun in 1980, is examined in depth, and several factors are identified to account for its success: (1) community organization and resource mobilization, (2) management and maintenance of project activities, (3) political awareness, (4) community self-reliance, (5) demonstration effects, and (6) institutional infrastructure.

Our conclusion therefore is that participatory workshops indeed can be effective. However, we also encountered certain weaknesses in the approach. A first weakness may be that workshops do not satisfy the need for self-regulation. Most of the workshops are developed, organized and evaluated by, or in close cooperation with, EDI staff, and the format of the workshop is more or less fixed. Capacity-building includes more than making resources-money and people-available. It should include helping local organizations to learn to be self-regulatory

A second weakness in this approach is that although it may be an effective instrument in raising knowledge and awareness, there is, as pointed out by Oxfam (1995: 12) and Rogers (1992: 136), “no automatic progression from awareness of an unjust situation to intervening to bring it to an end.” It is Oxfam’s view that “development is concerned with processes that go beyond the scope of any individual project. To facilitate empowerment, skill and patience are needed to listen to what the people themselves see as the principal obstacles to what they want to achieve. [People] become empowered through their own individual and collective efforts, rather than by what other people do for them” (Oxfam, 1995:13).

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25 Kasumba (1997) compared four capacity-building projects in Uganda. He made the following recommendations for improvement of capacity-building projects:

- Involvement of local actors in the planning processes should not be ad hoc. It should be via normal political or administrative institutions and systems.
- In the design of capacity-development programs for local government bodies, more local actors than national government bureaucrats should be included.
- Ready-made capacity-building packages should be avoided when possible; "take-away” solutions create a "McDonalds” effect on local institutions.
- Donors should gradually give local actors more control during implementation, while keeping watch on the project. In other words, donors must learn to trust their local partners.
- Donors should resist the temptation to create parallel institutions at the local level for their programs.
- From the start, capacity-building objectives for local actors should be identified and agreed with them. The worst aspects of inefficiency in local capacity should be addressed when possible and serious note taken of the various linkages involved in producing them.
- More emphasis should be put on developing the local private sector through direct support for infrastructure as well as in the choice of implementation approaches, e.g. by offering contracts to local small contractors and suppliers.
- Donors need to work out common approaches between themselves and should minimize contradicting or conflicting practices.
A third weakness deals with the assumed trickle down effect of the policy dialogues to society at large. This is crucial because the general public is not an entity that can be empowered through workshops. The workshops focus on policy makers, officials, and civil society’s stakeholders, who can be seen as intermediaries serving the public at large. However, in order for knowledge and awareness or concern with corruption to trickle down to regional or district segments of society, an infrastructure in terms of literacy levels and radio, television and telephone facilities is essential.

Data from UNDP (1997) indicate that in both Tanzania and Uganda the illiteracy rate in the districts is very high, while the mass media facilities are extremely limited (UNDP, 1997). Because of these circumstances, it is likely that the results of the workshops do not trickle down to the local populace. Table 1 summarizes the findings.
Table 1 Statistics on the communication infrastructure in Uganda and Tanzania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>adult illiteracy rate</strong></td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>(as % of total population 1995)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female illiteracy rate % 1995</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female rate as % of male rate</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>radio’s</strong></td>
<td>107</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>(per 1,000 persons, 1994)</td>
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<td><strong>televisions</strong></td>
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<td>(.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(per 100 people, 1994)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Daily newspapers</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(copies per 100 people, 1994)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>booktitles published</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(per 100,000 people, 1994 - 96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>printing and writing paper consumed</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(metric tons per 1,000 people 1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>main telephone lines</strong></td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per 100 persons, 1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(. ) less than half the unit shown.

.. data not available.


Radio in Uganda might cover a larger part of population than these UNDP data show. A 1993 Research International Report is said to indicate that Uganda’s eight FM radio stations and the two Radio Uganda stations reach 80% of the Ugandan population.

Our *first conclusion* is that workshops can be an effective instrument both for “sharing and learning” and also for raising awareness among the members of these workshops.

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26 According Langseth (1998: 12). We were not able to track down the investigation ourselves.
Our second conclusion is that we have doubt about the trickle down effect. The communication infrastructure might prevent that this effect will happen. We also noted that the communication infrastructure and its consequences for the success of awareness-raising activities at regional and district levels was often not mentioned in EDI’s documents.  

Validity of the premises concerning empowerment
Empowerment refers to the process of gaining influence over events and outcomes of importance to an individual, group, community or organization. "Empowerment processes are attempts to gain control, obtain needed resources, and critically understand one's social environment. This process is empowering if it helps people develop skills so they can become independent problem solvers and decision makers. Empowerment outcomes refer to operationalization of empowerment so we can study the consequences of citizen attempts to gain greater control or the effects of interventions designed to empower participants” (Fawcett, White et al., 1994, l.i. added).

When one aims at empowering larger groups of people, different levels of empowerment must be taken into account. McMillian et al. (1997:210) refers to a multi-level approach to empowerment and posits three levels at which changes in power may occur:

- the individual level, at which psychological empowerment takes place;
- the intra-organizational level, at which the empowering organization may enable the collective empowering of its members; and
- the extra-organizational level, where the relevant social systems can be seen to be more or less organizationally empowered, that is, successful in influencing their environment.

It was concluded from this research that it is not at all certain that changes at one level will necessarily be related to changes at other levels. Our first conclusion is that we did not notice that EDI explicitly deals with this multi-level problem.

27 EDI is considering the introduction of “social marketing strategies” in the campaign to raise public awareness about the evils of corruption (Kindra & Stapenhurst, 1998). This is a way to disseminate information and messages about corruption in a systematic way often used in public health campaigns. This strategy might make a public awareness campaign more effective. However, information and awareness are not enough. The public must also have “tools to act” available. To pursue the analogy with public health: the social marketing of birth control is of little use, when there are no reliable contraceptives available. In the case of corruption, easy access to legal action is an important tool.

28 See Kenny & LaVoie (1985), who have developed a method to identify the characteristics associated with coalitions that "collectively empower" their members and that also are "organizationally empowered" in the sense that they achieve system-level goals (in: McMillian et al. in Fetterman 1997: 212).
Blanchard (1996) states that there are three keys to achieve empowerment: (1) by sharing information with everyone, because people with knowledge are forced to act responsible; (2) by creating autonomy through giving people clearly defined responsibilities; and (3) by replacing hierarchy by self-regulating teams. He explicitly emphasizes the need to teach a team (community, civil organizations) the necessary skills to handle the new responsibilities. These skills include social and teamworking skills. “Empowerment arises when people learn to be less depended on a leader. Leaders should not undertake actions, but be available.”

EDI contributes to the empowerment process through facilitating workshops, where participants can discuss possible anticorruption activities. Zimmerman (in press) sees the role of the professional in an empowerment approach as "one of collaborator and facilitator rather than expert and counselor. Professionals learn about the participants through their culture, their world view and their life struggles. The professionals work with participants instead of advocating for them. The professional's skills, interest, or plans are not imposed on the community; rather, professionals become a resource for a community. While interpersonal assessment and evaluation skills will be necessary, how, where, and with whom they applied can not be automatically assumed." (cited in Fetterman, 1996).

Our second conclusion is that EDI’s approach to workshops, i.e. to act like a “facilitator”, is backed by these studies. However, empirical evidence is lacking that the more knowledge members of society have about causes and consequences of corruption and the more knowledge they have on how to engage in the fight against corruption, the more indeed they will be empowered to get involved in this “fight” and hence help realizing effective anticorruption activities.

Conclusions based on assessing elements of EDI’s program logic
To assess EDI’s underlying program logic, we first had to reconstruct it. There was no key document in which EDI itself had articulated this underlying logic. For organizational learning, and in particular double loop learning, to take place, we believe that such a reconstruction is necessary (Leeuw, Rist and Sonnichsen, 1994).

Our reconstruction of the program logic shows that the EDI-program is a rich program, defining a number of premises that can claim a measure of validity. This especially holds for the first set of assumptions described, dealing with EDI’s Good Governance program. Although there is a focus on awareness raising and on changing the cognition and “mind sets” of officials, parliamentarians and others,

29 Langseth (1998) paper ‘Building integrity to fight corruption: an integrated approach’ is a very first step, but the focus is primarily on institutional and not on behavioral/social assumptions underlying the program.
several other mechanisms also are referred to. Our assessment of these mechanisms reveals that they have potential. In particular, we believe this is true for reinvigorating social capital and the civil society, the sharing and learning processes, and realizing transparency and accountability.

However, there are also weaker points in the logic. These are mainly to be found in the second and third set of assumptions pertaining to EDI’s intervention strategy.

One such weaker point is the belief in empowerment. We did not encounter evidence that this would indeed be effective.

The second point is that in order to make the program activities successful, a communication infrastructure is needed to disseminate the ideas among districts, regions and communities. UNDP-data show that this infrastructure is not available to date. This reduces the likelihood of the success of the activities and increases the probability that EDI’s impact is primarily to be found in the capital cities (and their surroundings). Put differently, the likelihood of a trickle-down effect to occur may be small indeed.

A third point concerns the assumed importance of the service delivery surveys. Although we do not question their potential significance, again due to the lack of an elaborate communication infrastructure in both countries, their impact probably should not be overestimated. Moreover, social scientists have pointed to discrepancies between attitudes and cognition on the one hand and “behavior” on the other hand. There is “no automatic progression from awareness of an unjust situation to intervening to bring it to an end” (Oxfam, 1995: 12; Rogers, 1992: 136).

In this chapter the program logic underlying EDI’s activities has been reconstructed and, though restricted in scope, has been assessed. In the next chapters, empirical evidence on workshops, service delivery surveys and their impact will be presented. Data were obtained via document analysis and interviews on site.
Introduction
This chapter describes and evaluates the way the workshops that EDI helped organize were conducted. It also pays attention to opinions of respondents in Tanzania and Uganda on SDS. The analysis is based on the proceedings of the Workshops and the opinions of persons we interviewed (question 3). On-site data-collection took place till October 1997.

In Tanzania and Uganda, three types of workshops were organized: National Integrity System Workshops, Integrity workshops for Parliamentarians, and Media Workshops. Although there were differences in content and details of procedure, the format of these workshops was the same in both countries. Therefore, the following analysis does not distinguish between workshops in either country, unless stated otherwise.

The paragraphs on media workshops and service delivery services will also briefly deal with the impact of these activities. Impact of EDI’s main activity, integrity workshops, however, will be dealt with in the chapters on Tanzania and Uganda.

National Integrity (NIS) Workshops
Objectives and program
The most important process objectives are to ensure that the workshop content is focused, and the scope of the content is clearly defined. Secondly, the goal is that the workshop enhances the sharing of information and transfer of knowledge. Other important process objectives are:
• to enable networking, cooperation and to create a partnership between participants from different stakeholders;
• to motivate participants to take initiative for follow-up actions, and
• to create an environment where new roles could be tested and practiced in a fashion that might be replicated.

The content objectives will be dealt with in more detail in the chapters on the individual countries. The key issues, relevant for all the workshops, were incorporated in a number of questions for the facilitators to raise during the discus-

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30 These materials mainly stem from the workshops in Tanzania. Although all interviewees expressed views on the uses of organizing integrity workshops, in Uganda only three of them fully participated in one of the National Integrity Workshops. Others either participated only in workshops for journalists, presented a paper, or did not attend at all. In Tanzania six of our respondents fully participated in at least one of the workshops. Also we have more proceedings of workshops in Tanzania.
sions:
• what can be said about the needs of the country on behalf of building a workable NIS?
• how can society as a whole participate in continuing debate and work on these issues, in order to foster partnerships, action learning and participation?
• how to encourage a results-based orientation?

Following the broad and integrated approach at fighting corruption introduced by EDI, the workshop themes were wide-ranging and included a presentation and explanation of the roles various pillars of the National Integrity System could and should play. The presentations were followed by discussions in small groups on: strengthening accountability through Parliament, monitoring of assets of leaders; strengthening the codes of ethics, and countering corruption in public services and in public procurement.

Organization and facilitation
In organizing and facilitating the workshops, care was taken that the stated objectives were addressed and could be accomplished. Written and oral input into the workshops in the form of documentation, papers and presentations served to focus and sensitize participants during the meetings. The material dealing with each agenda-item discussed the principles underlying the item, the role of the agent involved, some questions for discussion, and suggestions for follow-up. A minimum of time was to be spent in plenary sessions so as to maximize intensive small working group debates. A team of facilitators, consolidators and chairpersons was to ensure that during the workshops the right questions were addressed and the objectives could be accomplished. The instructions of these persons put emphasis on ensuring a proper understanding of the objectives, ensuring proper input into plenary and working group sessions, full participation of participants and consensus building.
Also the formation of working groups and the assignment of topics to the groups was geared to attaining the objectives. For example, in order to foster partnerships, mutual understanding, equal participation and cooperation among participants, a random assignment of participants to the groups was chosen, to achieve a cross-section of interest groups for each of the topics.

Evaluating the NIS-workshops
Materials, personnel and facilities
There were no complaints by our interviewees about the quality of lodging and catering. In fact, for some attendants the opposite is true. Some of them considered the (per diem) fees granted to participants (too) high, and the facilities too luxurious and not conducive to a good working atmosphere. These interviewees point out the danger of perverse incentives for participants and wrong signals to the general
public. According to them, some attendants came to consider the workshops as a "paid vacation" and brought in relatives or friends. These critics suggest that there is room for economies by using more modest accommodations and fees. The cost of the workshops could be lower and the working atmosphere might even improve.

Some attendants made critical remarks about the materials being too distant from local experiences. Some also felt that several of the foreign consultants participating in the workshops were not familiar with African problems and particularities of local politics and corruption. Generally, there is a strong demand for material dealing with recent local cases.

Results of EDI’s evaluations of workshops
At the Parliamentarians workshop in Uganda, a questionnaire was used to ascertain participants’ views on the way the workshop was conducted. Out of 202 parliamentarians present, fifteen filled out the questionnaire. The results indicate that the workshop fulfilled or even (slightly) exceeded expectations in, amongst others, providing better information, introducing new or expanded concepts, and revealing a wider range of policy options.

Interviewees valuation of workshops
In general, our respondents were positive about the workshops. Most interviewees familiar with the workshops were satisfied with the way they were conducted. They considered the sessions effective for at least the people participating in them. Several uses of the workshops were mentioned. Especially in Tanzania, the workshops must have provided for some an almost "counseling-experience". For these people, the workshops showed how corruption is a problem. One interviewee, for example, did not realize how much corruption there was in the judiciary and as a result, did not take the problem all too serious. The publication of the Warioba report and the workshops changed this. This experience would also engender action, according to this interviewee, because “the workshop made clear that every-one is involved, so no one can hide anymore.” This is in line with one of the recommendations of the Warioba report which urged, that leaders cooperate in fighting corrupt practices instead of blaming each other. "Now each of them is blaming the other as the main perpetrator of corruption. (...) Each group passes-the-buck to the other". According to the report, this is the main hurdle in the struggle against corruption.31

To others the workshops were useful mainly because of transfer of knowledge and the opportunity to meet and associate with like-minded people. They valued

31 Arusha II: key recommendations form the Presidential Commissions Report, p. 20-21.
discussion, learning from other people, clarifying their own opinions and position and learning about action tools. We also came across two examples of social-psychological effects expected. At one instance, a new link was formed in a network during a workshop. The IGG and an Ugandan journalist cooperated in researching a story on corruption. Through this cooperation the journalist had access to premises he would have been barred from if he had acted on his own. Also the example was cited of the testing and practicing new roles during a recent judiciary workshop in which participants were said to be openly critical towards each other.

Some of our respondents pointed out that that the workshops served as a catalyst and provided integration, focus and a platform for diverse anti-corruption initiatives. The seminars are important to show that there are linkages and that one can participate in building an Integrity System. There are tangible results and output such as reports, programs of action, and pledges. The discussions and the programs emanating from them provided cognitive tools to discuss and address corruption and ways to fight it in an integrated fashion. As one of the interviewees put it: “corruption has a face now, one can talk about it and it can be addressed”.

There were also critical remarks by participants and co-organizers of workshops, as well as by outsiders committed to fighting corruption but not participating in the workshops. This critique pertained to the way the workshops were conducted, their frequency, output and impact, as well as the opportunity costs involved. Critical remarks were made about the amount of time taken up by general descriptions of corruption, its causes and effects and the time left for the question of “what to do next”. It was also suggested that more actual work should be done on a few selected key-areas, which should be well-prepared and researched. In this view, the workshops are not focused enough, and participation and work in the working groups is not binding or committing. Conducting the workshops was qualified by one interviewee as “shadow-boxing”. Concern was also expressed about the follow-up of the workshops. As someone said: “Who cares to read and take notice of the workshop’s proceedings, who cares to act and implement?”.

In Uganda, a clear majority of interviewees were critical about the workshops’ general impact. Some thought there had been not enough publicity and media coverage of the workshops and their output. One example, that in our view illustrates this point, is that a political key-actor who participated in a National Integrity Workshop was not aware of the existence of an official National Integrity Program emanating from the workshops. Virtually all respondents thought that the workshops were too much “Kampala-driven” and oriented towards Kampala-based actors, while neglecting the parts of the country outside the metropolitan area. A majority of our interviewees held that there is enough awareness of corruption in Kampala now and that sufficient cases
are being uncovered by the media. One participant stated that the most recent Integrity Workshop added nothing to the anti-corruption effort and no progress was made. Similar views were put forward in Tanzania, though less frequently and less strongly. One of the interviewees involved in organizing the workshops implied that the opportunity costs of the workshops might be too high. The interviewee suggested that spending the same amount of money on informing and empowering local people in the villages would be more cost-effective.

**Proceedings of workshops**

Analysis of the workshop proceedings supports some of the points made by interviewees. Most of the papers presented at the workshops had a fairly general content. Many of them discuss definitions, forms, causes and effects of corruption, the role the agency in question could or should play, and review constraints the agencies are facing in their fight against corruption. Only some of the papers touch upon actions or proposals for actions, usually by giving a few brief suggestions in a short concluding paragraph. As a rule, no attention is paid to the question of implementation. The number of papers in which specific proposals are put forward and responsibilities are assigned is very limited.

In the directives for the various sessions, there is not much evidence of an emphasis on planning and preparing follow-up action after the seminars. Only in the plenary sessions, the chairperson is asked to summarize “where appropriate, endeavors to identify follow-up actions which need to be taken.” Even then, the emphasis is on sharing ideas and maximum participation, not so much on selecting and planning implementation of actions or on assigning responsibilities. To achieve results orientation, networking and stronger organization, much is left to the spontaneous interaction of participants and a few formal provisions such as pledges, joint statements and distributing workshop material. The workshops are consultative and “participatory” in their approach rather than “contractual.” They are not sufficiently oriented towards “doing or preparing to do the job.” This approach clearly meets the needs and expectations of a number of people, but it probably also leaves out those who are ready to do more.

**Local ownership**

According to EDI, its role should be limited. Its prime role should be giving support, facilitating and fostering the exchange of ideas. EDI should not be the front-runner. “Local ownership” must be achieved and local actors must drive the process. This is because local people know their own problems best, are the best judges of what is

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possible, and have to bring about necessary reforms. Further, the workshops have one common format, that needs to be adapted to local circumstances. In practice the workshops indeed are jointly organized by local agents, the PCB and the Presidential Commission Against Corruption in Tanzania, and the IGG in Uganda. Local members of TI also participate in organizing and facilitating the workshops. However, a number of critical remarks were made about adapting to the national situation and about local influence. For example, according to one core-member of a local group, the cooperation with EDI does not yet work smoothly. Initiatives for a new workshop are still usually taken by EDI, and the local group frequently has to organize the workshops on short notice. As a result, there is too little time for thorough preparation and proper assessment of the needs for the specific workshop. The local facilitators, according to this interviewee, do not feel they “own” and drive the program. Instead, they feel more to be a local executive committee. The group does not feel to be empowered, but rather “managed by fax.”

**Media workshops**

In both countries, much effort has been concentrated on improving the professional skills and attitudes of journalists. By the fall of 1997, six workshops for journalists had been organized in Tanzania, and in Uganda seven. The workshops form a sequence of courses which is to last five to seven years and which is to ultimately include practically all journalists in the two countries. Between the two countries, approximately 180 journalists have participated in one of the introductory workshops on investigative journalism. In Uganda, approximately thirty journalists participated in an advanced investigative journalism workshop.

We first describe the anti-corruption program for the media. Next, we deal with the question whether the workshops addressed the needs of journalists, and briefly discuss the workshops impact.

**Anti-corruption program for the media**

The media are assigned essential roles in the fight on corruption:

- educate the public about its rights and its duties, and stimulate it to denounce corruption;
- inform the public about responsibilities and programs of (local) government and other public institutions;
- provide opportunities for people to make complaints, and
- provide enforcement agencies with cases to investigate and prosecute.

To attain these goals, workshops are organized that have the following immediate goals:

- to promote the journalists’ professional awareness of corruption and insight into the phenomenon, the institutions fighting it, and their program;
- to promote a sense of commitment and responsibility among journalists, and
• to improve professional techniques for obtaining information ethically, checking references and avoiding litigation in a setting where one can meet with and learn from colleagues and public officials.

A clear majority of our respondents in both countries agreed there is a strong need to increase journalists’ professional skills and ethics. A free and independent press is a new phenomena in both countries. Educational capacity falls short of the rapidly increased need for journalists. The existing schools for journalism have not yet adapted (fully) to the new situation. Many newly recruited journalists lack the education to fully grasp recent political and economic reforms, such as measures to curb corruption.

The anti-corruption programs make clear that besides education, also organizational and legal reforms are needed. Especially, in Tanzania, there are complaints about unnecessary legal restrictions of the press. According to one expert, the Tanzanian press operates under an “authoritarian model” and “the biggest single factor inhibiting the media’s participation in full-scale, investigative work, is the law”. Repeal and reform of laws and regulations pertaining to the press are needed. For example, newspapers should no longer be required to apply for registration, so as to allow more freedom of the press. In both countries reform of the laws regarding defamation and libel is deemed necessary. These laws are judged to be unreasonably harsh and awards of damages prohibitive. Also recognized was the need to strengthen professional bodies and press clubs and equip them with new technical equipment and facilities.

**Evaluating the Media workshops**

**Materials, personnel and facilities**

Our respondents were generally satisfied with the way the workshops were conducted and with their effectiveness. Generally they were judged to be very educational and addressing journalists’ needs. This positive evaluation is reflected in the evaluation at the workshops. For example nearly all participants in the second workshop in Uganda thought the workshop was a success and should be repeated for other journalists.

Still, a number of critical remarks were made. First, there clearly is a need for educational materials and case-studies to suit the situation in developing nations, and Africa in particular. The materials used at the workshops, especially the material on video and the handouts from the World Bank, but also the simulation game Freedonia, are said to contain too many references to “grand corruption.” They

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33 We interviewed six people who were familiar with the journalists workshops, either from second-hand or by actually attending them, and two journalists who participated fully in media workshops. Our sample included two editors of newspapers. Also, we used evaluations of the journalists workshops by questionnaires when available.
concentrated on investigating money-laundering and complicated financial transactions, while neglecting “petty corruption”. This later type of corruption is more prevalent in developing nations, and generally poses different problems for the investigative journalist.

Program and course of the workshops
In general, our respondents were positive about the workshops. Most interviewees familiar with the workshops were satisfied with the way they were conducted. They considered the sessions effective for at least the people participating in them. But also a number of problems were mentioned. The evaluations in the proceedings and our respondents draw attention to a lack of differentiation of the workshops. For example, one of the journalists we interviewed thought, as an experienced journalist, that the workshops were way below level and not much could be learned from them. The report in the proceedings of the third media workshop in Uganda that many of the participants did not have required basic (writing) skills, provides another example. The need for differentiation by professional level is recognized by the organizing parties and now advanced seminars are being organized.

Differentiation is needed in another respect too. The workshop programs were directed solely at the written media and did not address the specific needs of attending radio and TV journalists. However, especially in the rural areas of both countries, radio is the more important and, according to interviewees and some lecturers at the workshops, more effective medium. In Uganda, plans are now being made to organize workshops specifically for journalists of the electronic media and to address the needs of journalists in the rural areas.

Also the observation was made that journalists’ needs are not always taken into account sufficiently. According to the documented evaluations and our interviewees, at a number of workshops too much time was spent by general lectures dealing with the media’s role in fighting corruption. These lectures were judged to be too rhetorical and lacking practical journalistic value. Not enough time was left for the two things journalists value particularly in the workshops: training and enhancement of skills on the one hand, and opportunities for sharing experiences with colleagues on the other. To redress the situation, it is suggested, that the organizers of the workshops first meet the intended participants to assess their needs before structuring the program.

Impact
Workshop participants claim that the workshops raised the quality of articles dealing with corruption. Some interviewees also held that the quantity increased. As we could learn from our own observations during the field visits, newspapers daily carried stories dealing with corruption (see appendix d, available through EDI’s
Evaluation Unit in Washington). Practically each day, there were articles, often front-page, that dealt with new cases or followed-up on cases uncovered earlier. However, there is no more than anecdotal evidence of the workshops’ impact to address this and related questions. A group of Ugandan journalists plan to do a longitudinal evaluation of newspaper’s coverage of corruption by content-analysis. This would provide valuable information on the workshops’ impact.

Other results have been attained. A directory of information sources was developed as a reference tool for journalists. In Uganda a group of (six) local organizers and facilitators have been trained to continue the program of training for the media. In Tanzania the Media Development Trust Fund was instituted as an independent organization operating closely with the Association of Journalists and Media Workers. It is to fund professional training, equipment and technological development of the media.

Still, our interviewees point out that skills are not enough to truly "empower" journalists in Uganda and Tanzania. Resources and state-of-the-art facilities, such as computers or laptops, are not available yet in sufficient quantities. More than this, the legal infrastructure of a free press is still weak, especially in Tanzania. Programs of action in both countries call for a number of legal reforms, such as removal of executive controls, reform libel and slander laws, and the implementation of a Freedom of Information Act. These legal reforms are not forthcoming. We have been told that a Freedom of Information act is in preparation in Uganda. Further, we think that the effects of educating investigative journalists might be seriously mitigated by social and cultural factors. As is evident from table 1 in chapter 4, the rate of illiteracy is rather high in both countries, especially in the rural areas. One copy of a newspaper per 100 people is sold in Tanzania per day, and less than one in 100 in Uganda. Of course, news covered by the media can be disseminated in other ways. For example, we learned that in Uganda, so-called “listeners clubs” are organized which discuss news broadcasted on radio.

Service delivery surveys
To date, one service delivery survey has been conducted in Tanzania and one in Uganda. The surveys are generally not very well known in either country. Those of our interviewees who are not directly involved in organizing activities of the anti-corruption campaign, are not familiar with the surveys. However, when presented with the concept and rationale for the surveys, they are, without exception and reservation, equally positive about the instrument, as are those who are familiar with it.

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34 The articles are generally factual and seem to be well researched. For example, during our visit, there was one particularly interesting story on the theft of bags of rice by hospital staff from donors. As the journalist who wrote the story made clear in an interview, researching and writing the story would not have been possible without the lessons taught at the workshops.
A number of reasons are given for this judgment. The surveys provide information that is deemed necessary for formulation of policy and raising public awareness:

- the surveys provide good evidence of the incidence of corruption, its effects and the forms it can take. They make the general picture of pervasive corruption tangible, and make it a topic for debate;
- the surveys provide information to answer strategic questions of how to deal with corruption;
- the surveys add to the notion that corruption is wrong and that something can be done about it. They testify of corruption and its effects in areas that are of vital interest to the people: health, education for their children, abuse by the police. Exposure and information help to break the silence and isolation and can make people aware, and
- the surveys can effectively assess the impact of anti-corruption initiatives.

However, experiences in Uganda show that effective dissemination and utilization of social delivery survey data cannot be taken for granted. The results of the first Ugandan survey were not disseminated across the Ministry for Public Service or civil society. Civil servants resisted dissemination because the survey results showed weak service delivery (BTO, Nov.19, 1996). Resistance or even (rational) ignorance or lack of interest may seriously hamper any impact the surveys are assumed to have.

Conclusions on workshops and SDS
The National Integrity and Parliamentarians workshops are meticulously prepared and have clear content and process objectives. Specific roles and responsibilities were assigned to various types of “facilitators” to ensure realization of the stated process and content objectives. In general the design and preparation, the logistics and the materials used in both types of workshop are positively reviewed by our respondents. Also, our interviewees were generally positive about the way the workshops were conducted and about the output and immediate results achieved. The workshops made clear to some that corruption is indeed a serious problem and that all should participate in fighting it. The discussions at the workshops and the proceedings and programs of action that were published provided cognitive tools to address the problems associated with corruption. Also the opportunities to meet and associate with like-minded people were valued.

Our interviewees also made a number of critical remarks. According to a substantial number of them, the workshops are focused too much on the metropolitan community. Some think, there is not enough local influence and “local ownership” of the workshops. Further, the broad and participatory approach of the NIS-workshops does not provide the focus and commitment that is needed according to a number of people involved in the “war against corruption”.
Given the careful design and organization of the workshops and their, at least intended, results orientation, we feel that some of the remarks made by interviewees are overly critical. The fact, mentioned earlier in chapter 4, that EDI’s strategy, program and planning are not fully documented and communicated to stakeholders might present a critical problem here. Possibly, subsequent workshops will be more specialized, focused, working on concrete projects and areas, and consequently more binding. For example, in Uganda, regional integrity workshops are now being planned.

Still, our analysis of the proceedings leads us to the conclusion that the workshops are consultative and “participatory” in their approach rather than “contractual.” This supports the critical remarks made that the workshops do not engender commitment and that participation in them is not binding. Awareness-raising always seems to be one of the main objectives of the workshops. Clearly, some people that are likely to be important for the anti-corruption effort are beyond awareness-raising and want to do “actual work” to achieve tangible results.

A clear majority of our respondents in both countries agreed there was a strong need to increase journalists’ professional skills and ethics. Overall, the media workshops do address these needs and were valued as being highly educational by our respondents. Problems mentioned were a lack of differentiation of the workshops by professional level and type of media. Some of the workshops lacked practical journalistic value. The materials used were sometimes too distant from African problems which mainly involve petty corruption. It seems, however, that EDI is aware of these problems, and that initiatives are underway. For example, there are plans to organize separate workshops for electronic media. In Uganda a series of advanced workshops has been started.

Other results have been attained. In Uganda a group of (six) local organizers and facilitators have been trained to continue the program of training for the media. The local journalists involved, however, do not yet feel to actually “own” the program. In Tanzania the Media Development Trust Fund was established which is to fund professional training and facilities for the media.

Still, our interviewees point out that enhancement of journalists’ skills are not sufficient to strengthen the role of the media. The legal environment is a major constraint for a free press, especially in Tanzania. Necessary reforms are not forthcoming. Hardware, such as office computers and laptops, are not available in sufficient quantities. The rate of illiteracy is rather high in the rural areas of both countries. Only limited numbers of people have (direct) access to any of the media.

The Service Delivery Surveys are not very well known, but when introduced, the idea and rationale are highly valued because the information the surveys are
expected to generate for formulation of policy and raising public awareness. Dissemination and utilization of the survey data cannot be taken for granted and might even be resisted by interested parties.
CHAPTER SIX: THE COUNTRY CASE STUDY TANZANIA

Introduction
After presenting some background information on corruption in Tanzania, this chapter addresses the fourth research question about the impact of EDI’s activities in Tanzania. Any impact assessment must be geared to the impact aimed for. The objectives of EDI’s involvement in the Tanzanian anti-corruption activities will therefore be detailed. Next we will look into the question to what extent these objectives have been attained. There we will follow the distinction between programmatic, social and organizational impact. Finally, we also present some information on what we found during our interviews regarding the actual implementation of anti-corruption activities within Tanzanian society. It will be clear that EDI does not carry responsibility for this implementation. However, looking at implementation and its problems is important to assess the prospects of EDI’s activities. On site data-collection took place till October 1997.

Background of EDI’s activities: corruption in Tanzania
According to the report of the Presidential Commission on Corruption, corruption in Tanzania is pervasive and rampant, and has increased substantially since independence. The late 1960’s and mid-1970’s brought the beginnings of a dramatic and costly decline in the efficiency and integrity of Tanzania’s public service. The massive expansion of the public sector and multiplication of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures provided many opportunities for asking and offering bribes. In the same period the costs of living rose at an unprecedented rate, while wages remained static. A culture of survival emerged with public officials. Throughout this period, laws and institutions were in place that were designed to keep corruption in check and to punish the guilty. Also, a number of campaigns against corruption, fraud or economic crime were launched since independence, all to no avail. These efforts have been criticized by EDI, TI and other observers for being piecemeal and uncoordinated, focusing on enforcement against lower officials, failing to deliver quick wins, not involving sustainable institutional reforms, and operating mainly in isolation from the larger public and civil society. In the early 1990’s a number of parliamentary commissions investigated cases of corruption. When reports were issued there was little action taken on them by the government.

36 See for example: Transparency International Tanzania for the Presidential Committee of Inquiry Against Corruption, presented at the Uganda International Conference on Good Governance in Africa, Mweya Lodge, Uganda, April 21 - 25, 1996.
The elections of 1995, which were the first free general and presidential elections in Tanzania, the election of Mr. Mkapa as president on an anti-corruption ticket, and indications that the people at large were ready for change, presented an opportunity for another break with the past. For TI and EDI these developments and indications were important preliminary conditions for their involvement. After his installation, President Mkapa took a number of measures to start an anti-corruption campaign. Following the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act of 1995, new ministers and high ranking public officials are required to declare their assets. A Presidential Committee on Corruption, known as the Warioba Commission, was installed in early 1996. The president also revitalized the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), in existence since 1971, and made it the main agency in the anti-corruption campaign.

**EDI’s involvement: National Integrity Workshops**

After being invited by the Government of Tanzania to support its new efforts to curb corruption, EDI, together with the TI, representatives of TI-T and the PCB, in August 1995 organized the first National Integrity System workshop in Tanzania. The second National Integrity Workshop was held in December 1996. At the close of 1997, preparatory actions were undertaken to organize the Third National Integrity Workshop early 1998. The first National Integrity Workshop was an important first step in launching a new anti-corruption campaign. Subsequent integrity workshops are sequels to the first and build on its output and accomplishments.

Apart from these National Integrity Workshops, a special integrity workshop for parliamentarians was held in August 1996. Also, six media workshops were organized and one Service Delivery Survey was undertaken. Organizing Integrity Workshops involving representatives of all pillars at the district instead of the national level usually forms part of EDI’s strategy. However, we found no evidence that these are actually planned.

EDI participated in the management group of each of these workshops (see appendix a, b and c, available through EDI’s Evaluation Unit in Washington). It also acted as facilitator of the activities taking place at the workshops, helped find funding and, together with TI, provided intellectual input to the workshops by presenting papers on how to build a national integrity system. EDI supported the implementation of the program in other ways too, mainly by soliciting support from donor agencies and giving advice on implementing the national integrity program to the GOT. For example, in September 1997, a meeting took place with key stakeholders in the donor community, government, and civil society to discuss a strategy to build integrity, and implement the Warioba report.

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37 These are discussed in chapter 5.
Objectives of the Integrity Workshops

It is EDI’s mission to help nations develop an anti-corruption program that will be supported in thought and action by government, the public and civil society. The main instrument to accomplish this mission is the Integrity workshop. Integrity workshops are directed at senior officials of government and representatives of civil society and the media. The workshops serve immediate objectives, which can be said to be programmatic: formulating and agreeing upon a program to fight corruption and foster integrity in the delivery of public services. In the process, attendants at the workshops should be made aware about the need and ways to fight corruption and be made ready to support the program. For this reason, the immediate objectives of the workshops can also be said to be cognitive and attitudinal. Next to these immediate programmatic objectives, the workshops are to serve more distant ones, to be accomplished in society at large, i.e. social and organizational objectives.

Programmatic objectives of the workshops were:
- to discuss the need to curb corruption and to build a national integrity system with senior policy officials of the Tanzanian government and with representatives of civil society.
- To formulate and agree with those present upon a program for fighting corruption and building a national integrity system. This program was to be an improvement and advancement on earlier efforts at fighting corruption by applying the “holistic” program developed and introduced by EDI together with TI.

Social objectives were:
- to foster informed public discussion and continuing political debate on the issue of integrity in Tanzanian society, and particularly among the political leadership.

Organizational objectives were:
- to establish ownership of and commitment to the program of building a national integrity system within government circles and civil society, as well as to coordinate various activities.

Assessing programmatic impact not only implies describing the programs emanating from the workshops, but also looking at the reception of the programs by the target groups of the workshops.

Programmatic impact: output of workshops

The first National Integrity Workshop produced two major documents which flagged the start for the new Tanzanian campaign against corruption: the Arusha Integrity pledge and the Arusha action plan. At the parliamentarians workshop in August 1996, the PCB presented a paper outlining the government's National...
Integrity Program (NIP). The NIP draws on the deliberations and action plans of earlier workshops. As such, it is a direct output of the workshops which EDI helped organize. Two more programs play a role in Tanzania’s anti-corruption campaign: the program of the Warioba Commission and the advice of TI-Tanzania to the same commission. Both were presented at workshops. The three programs differ to some extent in the concrete actions singled out for priority and the explanation given, but basically follow the same logic and strategy. To give a balanced picture of the debate on integrity and of the programs operative in Tanzanian society, the following section will draw on all three, but mainly on the NIP.

The many separate action-points share a few general strategic directions, which take their cues from the program logic reconstructed in chapter 4. The program can be said to be “holistic”, “coordinated” or “comprehensive” because the many proposals for action are interdependent and mutually supportive. Together they comprise a reform of Tanzania’s public sector and its dealings with the private sector. The various separate points of action can be summarized under three headings:

- a national public awareness campaign to win general public support and to induce the public to report cases to the designated agencies;
- strengthening the integrity of the élite or decision-makers in general by legal and institutional reforms, generally with a preventive intent. Many of the intended reforms sought to strengthen the pillars of the National Integrity System. For example, the committee system of Parliament would have to be strengthened to ensure it could act as an independent check on the executive.
- intensify enforcement mainly directed at grand corruption involving the country’s leadership

To make the anti-corruption program achievable, TI-T selected a few key areas as a priority, where so-called “quick wins” could be attained. These included: reform of public procurement, reform of the judicial system and civil service, and a law ensuring public access to information. In these areas change could be brought about in the near term and the effectiveness of the reform process could be demonstrated to the public. They all pertained to “grand corruption”.

In the following sections each of these three strategic directions of the program for fighting corruption and promoting integrity will be outlined, followed by a brief review of the reception of these proposals in leading circles of Tanzanian society as reflected by opinions of our respondents.

Public awareness campaign

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38 TI-T’s advice was presented at the Parliamentarians Workshop. Key recommendations of the Warioba Commission were presented at the second National Integrity Workshop.
A public awareness campaign is an important ingredient of the anti-corruption program. What the campaign sets out to do is:

- to raise awareness about the problem of corruption and its adverse effects;
- to make people aware of their rights to public services of good quality free of charge or for a nominal official fee;
- to lead citizens to appropriate channels for “whistle-blowing”, filing complaints, and reporting alleged cases of corruption and;
- to follow-up on complaints and reports made by the public. This will be essential for a public awareness campaign to be effective. At this point the campaign ties in with the campaign to strengthen leadership ethics and cleaning the political and administrative cadres. More enforcement and more convictions are an essential part of a public awareness campaign.

Our interviewees all agree on the importance of a public awareness campaign. In fact, most of them see it as the crucial mechanism in reducing corruption. They agree that only the general public, as end-users of public services can effectively monitor the integrity of public officials and adequate delivery of public services. However, as our interviewees belief, many people in Africa still tend to admire wealth irrespective of the way it was gained. The corrupt are being admired for their smartness, and corrupt acts are condoned rather than denounced. Therefore, people will have to be induced to abandon their attitudes of acquiescence of corruption. Instead, our interviewees think, they must be brought to complain about any misdeeds by officials and the complaints will have to be effectively followed-up by enforcement agencies. In turn, only these actions will convince the public that taking or giving bribes is wrong and that something can be done to put an end to it.

**Enforcement: “cleaning the leadership”**

Concurrent with raising public awareness about the evils of corruption, enforcement will have to be intensified and mechanisms for enforcement have to be reformed and strengthened:

- To gain moral authority and credibility with the public, catching “big fish” and reducing “grand corruption” is deemed necessary;
- more and independent powers of investigation and prosecution should be given to enforcing agencies, such as the PCB, the Permanent Commission of Enquiry and the office of the Ethics Commissioner, which is to enforce the Leadership Code of Ethics. These offices should be made more independent from the Presidency and answerable to Parliament only, and;
- TI-Tanzania was particularly concerned about reliable judiciary capacity. It called for an independent oversight body for the judiciary, and for a system of inexpensive alternative arbitration, to remove the “judicial monopoly” from the courts.

Among our interviewees there is consensus that enforcement and conviction of
corrupt high-ranking officials and politicians is essential to win public support and break through the attitude of the people. All our interviewees agree that much more action against specific persons is needed to identify and prosecute the corrupt. This, they think, will set an example to both the general public which, as explained above, still endorses wealth gained by corruption, and to the corrupt themselves.

**Leadership: preventive measures**

According to the NIP, prevention ought to be the main thrust of the campaign. This part of the program is mainly directed at positions of authority. Legal and institutional reforms are to make holding public office less susceptible to corruption. The following proposals are important examples:

- The Warioba Commission recommended a reform of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act of 1995. The declaration of assets by political leaders, provided for in the code, should be made public, and the distinction between “declarable” and “non-declarable” assets should be removed from the Act;
- The NIP planned a simplification of departmental regulations and procedures to make them more effective and transparent, but also less amenable to corruption. Reform of public procurement procedures was part of this effort, and labeled by TI-Tanzania as one of the possible “quick wins” urgently needed to sustain the campaign and;
- strengthening the pillars of the National Integrity System. For example, the Auditor-General will have to provide the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament with up-to-date information about public expenditures. This will make it possible to call to account those responsible for mismanagement.

A committed and clean leadership was seen by our interviewees as one of the essential prerequisites for the success of the anti-corruption campaign. Among the points for institutional reform, the public declaration of assets drew strong support. Most of our interviewees attached great importance to public declaration of assets as provided for in the proposals for reform of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics and in the Arusha Integrity Pledge. Public declaration of all assets by leaders is seen as an essential instrument to strengthen the leadership’s ethics, and restore its moral authority. Reform of public procurement usually was singled out as a potential and important “quick win”, which might serve as a demonstration of political will and the strength of the anti-corruption campaign. Overall, this part of the program seems to have had a less integral reception than the other parts. Our interviews tended to single out a number of proposals, disregarding others.

**Social impact: follow-up of the workshops**

The workshops decided upon a number of provisions to foster dialogue, continuously informed public discussion, awareness and action. To stimulate informed public discussion in general and eventually spur further practical steps in
promoting national integrity, the proceedings of both National Integrity workshops and the parliamentarians workshop were published and circulated to all relevant parties. Also, EDI helped finance translation of the Warioba report in Ki-Swahili and distribution of the translation. Two instruments were specifically directed at winning the support of the political leadership. These were the Arusha Integrity Pledge and the workshop organized for members of the newly elected Parliament. Signing the Integrity Pledge implied pledging to support the anti-corruption campaign with all possible means. All political parties and candidates for elective office were called upon to do the same. This included publicly disclosing their assets and incomes.

All of our interviewees felt that over the past few years, progress is being made in fostering public debate and raising awareness about the problem of corruption and its effects, especially among the nation’s educated and leading groups. Most our interviewees also claimed that EDI’s workshops and the subsequent distribution of the workshop proceedings did have an impact on informed public opinion and awareness. However, a number of developments and factors contributed to raising awareness of the problem of corruption. Their influence is hard to disentangle. The media have been reporting on corruption now for a number of years. The fact that during the elections the issue of corruption featured prominently on the political agenda, is proof of the importance of the issue in public opinion. Also, some of our interviewees claim, that an important contribution was made by the publication of the Warioba Report at the end of 1996 and coverage of the report in the media.

The two specific instruments used to influence the political leadership thus far did not meet with success. Public declarations of assets have not been forthcoming. Only President Mkapa and the Prime-minister volunteered to declare their assets publicly. The Arusha Integrity Pledge, which provided for a voluntary public declaration of all assets, has not met with general acclaim of the Tanzanian leadership and has been largely unsuccessful in its purposes. A majority of our interviewees are very critical about this failure to provide the desired role-model. They think that it indicates a lack of commitment of the Tanzanian leadership, or at least, might be taken as such by the Tanzanian people. TI-Tanzania asks organizations in the business community and other sectors to sign and adhere to the integrity pledge. One key member of TI-Tanzania thinks there is not enough progress in this venture. An important problem is that a local organization can not put enough pressure on international companies. The Parliamentarians workshop, held in August 1996, failed in its objective to have the attending MP’s agree to a joint statement. This was apparently due to a failure of communication during the preparation of the workshop. When the statement was presented, the Speaker of Parliament objected that the workshop was not the appropriate forum for passing resolutions, and added: “it is not proper for someone to invade us with his things.
already written and tell us it is our proclamation”. He implied that a separate seminar was needed at a parliamentary session. Subsequently it was decided to revise the proposed statement for eventual presentation and endorsement at a formal sitting of Parliament.

**Organizational impact: coalition-building and a coordinated approach**

A third important objective was establishing commitment to and ownership of the adopted integrity program. This implied involvement, cooperation and coordination of various segments of government and society:

- involvement of civil society groups is deemed to be “fundamental” and “crucial” by relevant actors. According to EDI and TI, lessons from the past show that attempts to achieve change by the government alone, without the participation of civil society and the private sector, are likely to fail; and
- therefore, the question how partnership and close working relationships could be established between governmental and civil society organizations was made one of the three key issues addressed during the workshops.

**Public sector**

Tanzanian bureaucrats and policy-makers clearly see a need for more coordination of efforts between various governmental agencies. As one key official stated: “there is a need for much more intermingling and much more communication and exchange (...) Maybe it would be a good idea to organize annual meetings where the actors involved meet each other and discuss visions, missions, intentions, results, etc.”. Another official suggested that more coordination between the PCB and the Attorney-General would be needed to prosecute more cases and more effectively. Neither of them reported any initiatives or plans to bring about the desired coordination. They both thought that EDI could help in bringing together governmental allies and facilitate continued coordination. This suggestion was supported by other respondents. In fact, actual and potential partners in the fight against corruption were badly informed about each other’s program, record, and constraints encountered in fighting corruption. Doubt was voiced about the commitment, competencies, and sometimes even integrity of potential partners. Most of our respondents who participated in the workshops, but did not belong to the group of key-actors actually organizing them, had not participated in any joint activity pertaining to the fight against corruption since their last workshop. They had no sense of direction or of a shared mission and responsibility.
Involvement of Civil society
At the first National Integrity Workshop in Arusha in December 1995, civil society was represented by the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, the National Muslim Council of Tanzania, the Tanzanian Judiciary, the National Board of Accountants and Auditors, the Front Against Corrupt Elements in Tanzania (FACEIT) and members of the local chapter of TI. The Chamber of Commerce announced it would complement government’s efforts in promoting integrity by educating its members on their social responsibilities and demanding adherence to universally accepted business ethics. The Chamber also declared its intention to press the government to fight corruption. There is no available documentation that the progress of the Chamber’s venture was ever reported on in any of the subsequent workshops. The representatives of the National Muslim Council, the Tanzanian Judiciary and the National Board of Accountants and Auditors only spoke in general terms of measures to be taken by “the professions” or “religious bodies” as such, without making clear who would take specifically what measures. FACEIT aims to sensitize, encourage and assist all persons to oppose corruption by arranging meetings and cooperating with other institutions and people. However, FACEIT is hampered in these efforts by the fact that it is still, after almost four years, awaiting official registration as a society. Overall, we think, there is not much evidence of a strong involvement of civil society in the fight against corruption.

Impact at the level of implementation
In judging the anti-corruption program’s progress, we did not check the implementation of the many proposals made in the programs of actions, but concentrated on some prioritized actions and actions labeled as pivotal in executing the country’s general strategy in fighting corruption. We repeat that implementation of the anti-corruption programs falls outside the scope of EDI’s control and responsibility, but is important to identify constraints and opportunities for EDI’s efforts.

Public awareness campaign
The PCB, being the main agency responsible, has taken first steps to launch a public awareness campaign. These steps include: cooperation with TI-Tanzania, weekly systematic radio coverage, sometimes TV coverage, and distribution of calendars and posters with cartoons illustrating instances and effects of corruption. However, a broad and encompassing public awareness campaign still has to be started. All respondents, except one, point out that in the rural areas people are still very much unaware of their basic civil rights and the need and ways to report cases of corruption. This observation is confirmed by the Service Delivery Survey on corruption of April 1996. Most people indicated that they had inadequate information about how to complain about the quality of services. Even most of those
who knew how to complain, did not. They would rather avoid using the services because of the associated corruption.\(^{39}\)

In the rural districts it will be particularly difficult to accomplish the desired effects. The institutions involved are all based in the capital. As far as they have regional offices, they are understaffed and serve a huge area with poor means of transport and communication. Given that the agencies involved in the campaign have no ways of covering the rural areas, systematically building awareness in the near term is considered problematic by our interviewees.

**Enforcement**

The PCB, the major enforcement agency, is now concentrating its investigative efforts on “grand corruption”. Prior to 1995, the agency was not at all focused on catching, what are called “big fish”. After 1995 one case involving grand corruption was successfully brought to court. In November 1997, a number of cases were in the final process of preparation for trial. According to our respondents however, the intended cleaning operation of the nation’s leadership is not taking place. To the contrary, people allegedly involved in corruption are still placed in high posts. Virtually all of our interviewees agreed that not enough cases were brought to trial. As one of them said: “Names are mentioned, but nothing happens.” Part of the problem might be the necessary time-delay for the PCB’s policy shift to materialize and take effect. One of our interviewees suggested, the bureau’s former image still dominates society’s valuation of it.

Capacity to investigate and prosecute is a major problem, especially outside Dar Es Salaam. For example, only four people represent the PCB in the vast Arusha area. As of June 1997, the President has accorded a modest pay raise and an increase of staff with 77 employees. In November 1997 the decision on hiring extra staff still had to be effected.

Another problem is that the enforcement agencies have not been strengthened, nor made more independent and answerable to Parliament. The PCB still is dependent on the Presidency. As one interviewee made clear: “When the president is positive and proactive, the bureau can be too, if it is the other way round, forget it”. In prosecuting cases the bureau is still dependent on the Public Prosecutor’s discretion. The judiciary is still considered unreliable by all interviewees and no reforms have been effected.

**Leadership: prevention by institutional reform**

An important step was taken by the President’s order to all departments and agencies

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to list preventive and repressive actions they plan to take to fight corruption. The recommendations are now being classified, but actual reform still has to start. To the disappointment of many of our respondents no reform of the procedures for public procurement has yet taken place. They agree that tendering is an important area for reform and that action should be taken immediately.

**Conclusions of the country study on Tanzania**

In EDI’s endeavor, we distinguished three sets of objectives: programmatic, social and organizational. At the two National Integrity Workshops, which EDI facilitated and helped organize, an anti-corruption program was formulated and adopted. This program drew on the program of building a National Integrity System as introduced by EDI and TI, and also on intellectual input from participants representing government and civil society. It was endorsed by the government of Tanzania and adopted as the official National Integrity Program. Its main points of action can be summarized under four strategic directions: launching a public awareness campaign, intensifying enforcement, and strengthening the integrity of the nation’s leaders, mainly by the fourth area of activity: institutional reform. The need to fight corruption with this program, the concrete action points and the logic of the program are supported and, in fact, largely “internalized” by a clear majority of our interviewees. Most of them were senior public officials, some represented the professions and civil society. They included both those who participated in the workshops, and those who did not. Especially, the public awareness campaign, the efforts to clean the leadership by intensified enforcement and by a public declaration of assets are clearly distinguished and supported.

When compared to earlier anti-corruption campaigns in Tanzania, the formulation and adoption of the anti-corruption program, its contents and favorable reception by major stakeholders, constitute, we think, a major programmatic innovation.

As to the social objectives, fostering informed public discussion, awareness and active support by Tanzanian society at large, the picture is less clear. Over the past few years, awareness of corruption as a major problem in Tanzanian society and the need to address it have increased. Most interviewees attribute at least part of this progress to the workshops and the subsequent publication of the proceedings. Clearly, however, other factors are involved and the influence of each of these is hard to isolate. Specific efforts of EDI and its Tanzanian counterparts to attain these social objectives and win public support of the Tanzanian political leadership have, so far, met with little success. We refer to the Arusha Integrity Pledge, which provided for a voluntary public declaration of assets, and the workshop for Parliamentarians, which sought to enlist the support of the newly elected Parliament. Declarations of support from political leaders have not been forthcoming. The workshop for parliamentarians failed to agree upon a common declaration concerning corruption.
Limited progress has been made in realizing organizational objectives: the involvement, active support, cooperation and coordination of various organizations in government and civil society. The need for more cooperation and coordination within government is recognized, but no initiatives are reported. Also, we found no evidence of a strong involvement of civil society organizations in the anti-corruption campaign.

*Implementation* of the National Integrity Program is outside EDI’s control and responsibility. However, the record of implementation will be of importance for EDI’s future strategy. A number of initiatives have been taken to implement action points of the National Integrity Program. For example, first steps have been taken to launch a public awareness campaign. Recommendations about ways to fight and prevent corruption have been collected in all government agencies. But overall, progress is limited in this respect. Of course, time is needed to implement the wide-ranging reforms identified by the program and all agencies involved suffer from major limits in capacity. However, the lack of substantial “quick wins” in areas such as enforcement, reform of public procurement, and registration requirements for civil society organizations is not encouraging for the prospects of the Tanzanian anti-corruption campaign.
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE COUNTRY CASE STUDY UGANDA

Introduction
This chapter deals with the results and impact of EDI’s anti-corruption activities in Uganda (question 4). Objectives of EDI’s involvement in the Ugandan anti-corruption campaign at various levels will first be described against the background of corruption and the anti-corruption campaign in the country. Next we will look at the extent to which objectives at each of these levels were accomplished. On site data-collection took place till October 1997.

Corruption in Uganda
In the 1960’s, in the early years of Uganda’s independence, a rapid expansion of the public sector was matched with a rise in corruption. The opinion of the day in developmental economics called for state-directed activities as a way to develop an economy and advance the interests of the people. The powers given to the state and its agencies made them prone to corruption. In the seventies, the Amin regime engaged in outright plunder of the countries resources. The following years of civil unrest and political violence completely undermined the economy and government.

The National Resistance Movement (NRM), which took over power in 1986, made it clear that it viewed corruption as a key obstacle to progress and stability in Uganda. It set out on a course of far-reaching political and economic reform, mainly characterized by democratization and building a vital private sector. A number of specific measures were taken. For example, an Inspector General of Government (IGG) was appointed, whose main task is to receive and investigate complaints of corrupt practices. The Public Accounts Committee of Parliament became active again. The Leadership Code, which provided for the annual declaration of income and assets of leaders, was enacted, but was not put into force before 1996.

Some more general reforms were undertaken, which make the Ugandan anti-corruption campaign broad and encompassing. It has won Uganda international recognition for its efforts. For example, in 1990 the Ugandan Civil Service Reform Program (CRSP)\(^40\) was adopted and reforms were set in motion to improve the efficiency, performance and accountability of the civil service. The size of the civil service and the military was substantially reduced, efficiency reviews of government ministries were undertaken and pay levels were raised approximately 50 percent a year from 1990-1994. Also, economic reforms are undertaken, which include the elimination of monopolies, deregulation and privatization, and a program of decentralization of government was started, which is expected to reduce corruption.

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\(^{40}\) Since 1997 the program is called the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP). Uganda Public Service Reform Programme, Status Report 12, 1 January - 30 June 1997.
The debate on constitutional reform and presidential elections planned for May 1996, combined with a growing economy, suggested that the time was ripe for the Government to intensify its anti-corruption strategy. EDI was invited by the IGG to help restructure the campaign. As a first step, a joint mission by EDI and TI drew up a preliminary analysis and assessment of the ongoing campaign, in December 1994.

**The EDI/TI-mission of December 1994**

The report of the EDI/TI-mission analyzed the anti-corruption campaign and made recommendations for restructuring. It acknowledged the achievements in reforming the public sector. On the other hand, it pointed out two major flaws which needed to be redressed: the lack of public support and the lack of enforcement.

It was imperative for the government, according to the mission, to win support from the general public. To achieve this the government would have to intensify its efforts at enforcement of anti-corruption laws and bring substantially more cases to court. A crucial problem of the ongoing campaign was, according to the mission the “apparent absence of visible convictions of individuals who are demonstrably corrupt”\(^{41}\). The government’s strategy was “too cautious and yielding too few obvious sacrificial lambs to gain the necessary public credit”\(^{42}\). The perception was widely held, according to the mission, that the government was not doing much, and that too few were being successfully prosecuted. As a result, the population at large seemed to be largely resigned to the fact that those holding power are corrupt. The existing enforcement-mechanisms, were thought to be unreliable or lacking power. Other actions that were assigned priority included strengthening the professionalism and integrity of the press, reform of public procurement, and putting into effect the Leadership Code, which had been in existence for over two years.

**National Integrity Workshops**

EDI acted as facilitator of integrity workshops, helped organize them and provided intellectual input by delivering lectures. The integrity workshops are not fully documented, which makes it harder to judge the execution of EDI’s program in Uganda.

The first integrity workshop run by the office of the IGG in collaboration with EDI was organized in December 1994. Two more national integrity workshops followed, respectively in November 1995 and in May 1997, and a fourth is to take place in April 1998. A special integrity workshop for parliamentarians was organized in March 1997. Seven investigative journalism workshops took place, one at an advanced level\(^{43}\).

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\(^{42}\) Idem: 33

\(^{43}\) Media workshops are dealt with in chapter five.
EDI also contributed to a Court Administration Reform workshop, in August 1997, and a Local Integrity System workshop which served as a pilot for a number of workshops to be organized at the regional and district level. In the fall of 1997, a one day seminar with the IGG on strategic planning was organized. In November 1995 a baseline service delivery survey was conducted in the fields covered by the Ministries of Health and of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries.

Objectives
As in the case of Tanzania, we distinguish programmatic, social and organizational objectives of integrity workshops and of EDI’s involvement in the anti-corruption campaign.

1) Programmatic objectives were:
• to develop in general terms an outline of a national integrity system geared to curb corruption\textsuperscript{44};
• to discuss the needs of post-elections Uganda in the context of building a national integrity system.

2) Social objectives:
• determine how Ugandan society as a whole might participate in continuing debate on the issue of integrity and cooperate with like-minded partners. The workshop was organized to initiate a process of constructive dialogue among government agencies concerned with containing corruption, representatives of the media and civil society. Specifically, an outline-document was to be prepared, which could serve as a focus for informed public discussion and political debate in the run-up to the elections.

3) Organizational objectives:
• establish ownership of and commitment to the conclusions and action plan on the part of the participants. For the IGG, the workshop was the first step in broadening and strengthening the anti-corruption coalition by involving civil society. One of the main objectives of the efforts to restructure the Ugandan anti-corruption campaign was to enlist public support, including the support of civil society organizations.

The parliamentarians workshop was organized specifically to win the support and commitment of the country’s political leadership. Parliamentarians met to discuss parliament’s role in building a national integrity system. Objectives were to foster awareness and understanding of parliamentarians of the nature of a national integrity system and their role in it and, to draw up an action plan for parliament to strengthen the country’s integrity system.

\textsuperscript{44} Since there are no proceedings of the first or the third National Integrity Workshop in Uganda, we only have scant information on the objectives or outcomes of these workshops, stemming from BTO’s.
In the following paragraphs we will investigate to what extent these objectives were achieved. We will also take a brief look at the implementation of the program agreed upon. EDI’s involvement and influence diminish as we proceed from the programmatic to the organizational objectives, and further to the question of implementation. Implementation of the anti-corruption program is outside EDI’s influence. Still, we think, looking at implementation and its constraints can identify constraints and prospects for EDI’s involvement in fighting corruption in Uganda.

When we assess programmatic impact we not only describe the programs formulated at the workshops, but also look at the reception of the programs by the target groups of the workshops.

**Programmatic impact: output of the workshops**

At the first integrity workshop in December 1994 parliamentarians, senior civil servants, and members of civil society framed an integrity pledge and devised a four-point action plan to combat corruption. This action plan was approved by the Ugandan government in January 1995. Subsequent workshops were sequels to the first and one of their objectives was always to monitor implementation of the action plan of the campaign.

The second National Integrity Workshop produced the Mukono Integrity Declaration and Action Plan. Supporters of the declaration committed themselves to a program to bring about just and honest governance, national integrity and an end to corruption. They called upon all fellow citizens, and particularly on politicians, to join them in their declaration. The third national integrity workshop also produced an integrity pledge and a revised action plan.

The four major areas of activity defined by the Ugandan integrity program are:

- launching a national public awareness campaign;
- strict enforcement of existing anti-corruption laws and,
- legal and institutional reform with a preventive intent, which is to:
- increase transparency and accountability

The first two areas gained a new emphasis in the restructuring of the anti-corruption campaign. Institutional reform to increase transparency and accountability were already strongly represented in the earlier Ugandan campaign.

**Public awareness**

The integrity program calls for a public awareness campaign to raise public understanding of the damage done by corruption and the role of the public in fighting it.

- The idea of the campaign is to educate ’whistle-blowers’. The campaign will have to induce people to label taking bribes and embezzling public money as corruption and theft, to see it as an affair that concerns them and their families directly and to
direct them to appropriate channels for reporting.

- The main agency responsible, the IGG, also directs the campaign at civil servants. Their attitudes should be changed and they should be made to understand that corruption also affects them, both in their capacity as consumers of public services and as employees of government. They should come to realize, that, on balance, their salaries and benefits are adversely affected by corruption.

- Further, it is expected that the awareness campaign will also have a deterrent effect. Officials will be warned and will take heed.

Our interviewees all agree on the importance of a public awareness campaign to change prevalent attitudes of condoning and acquiescence of corrupt acts. However, public awareness of the problems associated with corruption as such seem to be considered a lesser problem in Uganda. Our interviewees seemed to be more confident, given the longer history of anti-corruption efforts in Uganda, that many people are aware of the problems created by corruption.

**Enforcement**

The Mukono Declaration, the National Integrity Plan and the EDI/TI-mission expressed special concern about law-enforcement and the capacity, integrity and competence of existing enforcement institutions.

The following proposals were put forward:

- Effective enforcement of anti-corruption legislation is needed to restore public confidence, which is deemed to be a crucial variable for an effective anti-corruption campaign.

- Therefore, dependable enforcement-capacity is needed. Increasing the capacity of the IGG and to give it the power to prosecute corruption cases, was proposed as a matter of priority. Also, the Inspector’s office was to be made more independent by making it answerable to Parliament, instead of to the President.

- Examining the way in which enforcement institutions can cooperate more effectively was one of the immediate steps to be taken.

- Cleaning of the judiciary, or by-passing it with special institutions, such as a special court dealing with serious cases of fraud and corruption, was put on the agenda.

All our respondents agreed that prosecution and conviction of officials guilty of corruption is strongly needed now to restore public confidence in the administration and the anti-corruption campaign. Actions should be directed at prosecuting and convicting a sufficient number of preferably high placed corrupt officials, so as to convince the general public that government means business. Also, our interviewees indicate, a mechanism for assessing prior performance and integrity of newly appointed senior officials is needed.

**Prevention**
Preventive measures would include legal and institutional reforms, such as:

- a range of measures taken in the context of decentralization designed to minimize opportunities for corruption;
- reform of public procurement procedures, which was singled out as a matter of priority;
- Constitutional Provisions for leaders to declare their assets: the Public Leadership Act, in existence for some years, needed to be put into effect and,
- to examine the scope for simplification of departmental procedures and regulations to diminish the need to resort to bribery and to ease the transaction of business of all sorts and of people’s access to public services generally.

The NRM-administration seems to be committed to an effective decentralization of government, and the policy is widely supported in Uganda. Decentralization will reduce corruption, so it is expected by government and by our interviewees. It effects a more direct and transparent transfer of funds from center to periphery. It is expected that it will also lead to improved and more transparent public service delivery. The idea is that as decisions about public services are made “closer to home”, awareness of citizens about their rights and the power of their vote will increase and less instances of corrupt practices will go undetected and unpunished. Simplification of departmental procedures and regulations generally draws strong support as an essential measure to limit and prevent corruption in the long run. A simple example might illustrate the problems involved. A resident of Kampala wanting a passport to travel abroad, will have to go to his or her place of birth to apply for it. Several levels of government will process the application and it may easily take a few months and a few journeys out of Kampala before the applicant can go and collect the desired document. An obvious way to match the interests of applicant and officials then, is paying a bribe.

**Social impact: follow-up of the workshops**
The three national integrity workshops produced integrity pledges, which were designed to enlist wider support for anti-corruption activities in Uganda. Only the proceedings of the second national integrity workshop, containing the Mukono Declaration and action plan were widely distributed, particularly to those seeking elective office. It was hoped that distribution would encourage further practical steps to improve governance, transparency and accountability. To enlist the support of the political leadership, a workshop for parliamentarians was organized.

A majority of our interviewees held, that there is enough awareness of corruption in Kampala now and that many cases are being uncovered by the media. They think that now priority should be given to raising awareness of civic rights in the rural communities. For a substantial number of our interviewees this implies that no more national workshops are needed. Instead, efforts should be directed at the level of
local communities. Also suggestions were made about ways of addressing target groups. Instead of or next to integrity workshops on the “Kampala-model”, existing, more informal institutions or groups could be considered as mechanisms to effectively reach local communities. Local “radio listeners clubs”, are an example suggested by one or our interviewees. These clubs engage in discussing and diffusing the news from radio-broadcasting.

There is some disagreement about which goals should be given priority in the local communities, and which instruments should be used. According to a majority of our interviewees, people in rural areas need to be made more aware of the effects of corruption, their civic rights and ways to report corruption. A minority thinks that even in remote rural areas, people are aware of the evils of corruption. They emphasize the importance of empowerment and capacity-building at the lower administrative levels. Citizens, or their representatives, should be given the knowledge and tools to guard and enforce their rights vis-à-vis the officials.

The IGG agrees that the program of workshops should move into new directions and plans are being made to realize this. After a number of general and national workshops the IGG indicates, that it is now time to start operating regionally and per sector. Workshops should be held in all the regions of the country and with the different sectors of society. The IGG will focus on civil servants, local opinion leaders and generally on people that hold influence and respect in the local communities, such as representatives of the church, traditional chiefs, or other persons from civil society.45

We found no evidence that the same importance was attached to integrity pledges such as the Mukono Declaration as an instrument to gather support for the anti-corruption campaign as to the Arusha Integrity Pledge in Tanzania. References to the declaration in the written documentation are scarce, and our interviewees did not refer to it either. Our impression is, that the pledges did not play an important role in the campaign.

The parliamentarians gathered at the parliamentarians’ workshop considered the question whether they as a group, should issue and sign an integrity pledge, but failed to reach an agreement. No pledge emanated from the workshop. An action plan to strengthen parliamentary institutions in Uganda was adopted, consisting of many objectives relating to parliament and other pillars of the national integrity system. However, the plan failed to specify actions, deadlines and responsibilities.

45 According to a BTO of November 1996 by Langseth there are plans to start awareness raising ‘bottom up’. Proposals are being made for 4 joint IGG/ Ministry of Local Government/ TI-U regional workshops to be held.
**Organizational impact: coalition-building and a coordinated approach**

A another important objective of the national integrity workshops an other contributions by EDI was establishing commitment to and ownership of the integrity program. This implied involvement, cooperation and coordination of various actors within government and society. Specifically:

- to ensure sustainability of the campaign. The National Integrity Action Plan stated it was a matter of urgency that a National Coordinating Committee be established, composed of officers or agencies involved in combating corruption;
- a number of proposals emphasize the role civil society should play. For example, the Mukono Integrity Declaration stated it was important to:
- bring about a united front against corruption including the business community, the professions, politicians, the media, educators, the public service, NGO’s and religious leaders
- to support steps taken to foster an enabling environment for civil society to operate in and foster activities in the private sector.

**Public sector**

Pending the establishment of a definitive committee an interim coordinating committee, with a secretariat at the IGG’s office, was established in 1995, at the initiative of the IGG. The committee is to, among other things, develop and implement the national anti-corruption strategy. The committee includes as members representatives of the office of the IGG, the Auditor General, of the Ministries of Public Services, Education, and Information, of the Decentralization Secretariat, the Police, Central Tender Board, the Law Development Center and TI-Uganda. Also, working relationships of the IGG with the DPP, the Auditor-General’s Office and the PAC, have improved to the IGG’s satisfaction. There is mutual contact, coordination and understanding between these major actors in the anti-corruption campaign.

**Civil society**

In a number of cases, cooperation with civil society is equated with cooperation with the local chapter of TI. Local chapters of TI, however, are focused public interest groups with a limited membership and a limited appeal. We think, that TI alone cannot serve the purpose of disseminating the national integrity message to the people. Especially in view of the problem in reaching people in the rural areas, support and involvement of organizations of civil society will be essential.

We found that there are important societal groups that take initiatives to curb corruption within and from their own circles and try to put pressure on government to sustain the anti-corruption campaign. Examples of these are the Roman Catholic Church and the Chamber of Commerce in Uganda. However, these organizations...
have not been actively involved in the national integrity campaign, nor were they invited to take part in it. The Uganda Chamber of Commerce, for example, has instituted an anti-corruption commission, which deals with complaints filed by members and makes recommendations on the prevention of corruption. Recently, a case involving a number of senior officials of the Chamber was investigated and handed over to the authorities which arrested them. The Chamber pursued the case to put pressure on government and to teach it a lesson on enforcement and prosecution. The Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church in Uganda have spoken out about corruption and condemned it in pastoral letters. Institutional reforms are undertaken which are directed both inward and outward. The new Catholic University is training a new administrative elite, invested with the right administrative ethic. Also, the church is striving to be an "island of integrity". This is done by setting up professional (financial) administrations for parishes, the secretariat of the church and the churches' development projects, and by the work of two commissions dealing with integrity and political issues: the social services delivery commission and the justice and peace commission.

Another example involves a potentially important organization: the NGO-forum, whose problems illustrates some of the constraints faced by civil society organizations in Uganda. The forum is a membership body of 600 NGOs which have outreaches in virtually every community in Uganda. The forum is still in its formation phase and so far has been refused official registration. One of our respondents sensed that members of the forum tend to shy away from politically sensitive topics, such as corruption. One reason for this might be that they are hesitant to take a firm stand on political issues, because of the ban on political parties in Uganda.

**Impact at the level of implementation**

**Public awareness campaign**

The IGG is about to launch its Public Awareness Campaign up country. At the time of our visit to Uganda, pilot workshops were being prepared in which the local leaders are consulted on how to ensure that the information and awareness will trickle down to the citizen in the villages. Instruments to raise public awareness are: workshops, weekly radio- and TV-shows, posters, and teacher training. The campaign will be supported by TI-Uganda, and funded by EDI. TI-Uganda has commissioned a play showing how corruption affects citizen’s daily lives. It will be staged up country in ten districts and will be distributed on video. The effectiveness of the campaign will be monitored by surveys and by the number of complaints received. However, in November 1997, the public awareness campaign still had to be effectively launched. Our interviewees point out there are important constraints. The IGG and the Auditor General lack capacity to effectively cover the whole country
and, especially, the rural areas. They are basically confined to Kampala.

**Enforcement**

For virtually all our interviewees, the apparent lack of enforcement in the anti-corruption campaign is still a major concern. Not much progress was made in this area since the first National integrity workshop. There is also concern about the behavior of some members of the country’s inner power-circle and its impact on public opinion. One of the interviewees described their involvement in privatization of major parastatals as follows: “it may not be corruption, but they are surely sailing close to the wind”.

The results of the anti-corruption campaign in terms of enforcement are not convincing. From the start of the new campaign in 1995 till the end of October 1997, three cases have been prosecuted. The record might change in the near future. Some 120 cases are being investigated and awaiting prosecution. Improved enforcement is also dependent on the implementation of the program for legal and institutional reform of enforcement. The record of this program is mixed.

First, progress has been made in strengthening mechanisms for enforcement. The independence and powers of the IGG were increased in 1995. The office now holds the power to prosecute and can not only investigate cases of corruption, but also bring them to trial independent from any other agency. The IGG was also made answerable to Parliament and independent of the Presidency. Second, as mentioned before, working relationships of the IGG with the DPP, the Auditor-General’s Office and the PAC, have improved. Supervision of human rights, which proved to be a substantial burden on the IGG’s capacity, is taken over by a separate body. On the other hand, the administration of some 2000 declarations of assets emanating from the Public Leadership Act has been assigned to the IGG, and this is expected to claim a substantial part of its capacity.

Capacity to prosecute is a major constraint. We were informed, there are only 22 prosecutors available for the whole country and one for Kampala. More capacity will be needed to process complaints from citizens if the planned awareness campaign proves to be effective. Recently, proposals were made to expand the IGG’s staff to 320 people and to institute seven regional offices. These proposals are not in the annual budget for the year 1998.

Other reforms needed to improve enforcement are lacking. For example, there are no legal means to confiscate proceeds from corruption. The planned change in the laws of evidence has not been made yet. The judiciary is still considered by our interviewees to be lacking integrity and competence.

**Institutional reform**

The Public Leadership Act was put to force by the 1995 Constitution. However, the declarations of assets, provided for in the Act, are not made public. This will
probably limit the impact of the Act. Public procurement procedures have not been reformed yet. Presently, the Uganda Civil Service Reform Commission of the Ministry of Public Service is examining the scope for a simplification of departmental procedures, regulations, licenses etc. to reduce opportunities for abuse. Simplification of these regulations and procedures is still in a planning phase. Continued progress is being reported in the area of public service reform, specifically in downsizing the central public service and rescheduling and increasing pay for public servants.\textsuperscript{46}

Decentralization of public administration is proceeding. As explained before, it is expected that decentralization will reduce corruption, at least in the longer run. However, because of the limited capacity of “watchdog agencies” at lower administrative levels, a clear majority of our interviewees is concerned that decentralization is taking place without enough safeguards for accountability. Opportunities for corruption at the local level might, therefore, increase, at least in the short run.

\textsuperscript{46} Uganda Public Service Reform Programme, status report 12, 1 January - 30 June 1997.
Conclusions of the country study on Uganda

As a direct result of the integrity workshops, organized and conducted with the help of EDI since the end of 1994, a comprehensive and integrated program for building a national integrity system was formulated and agreed upon by Ugandan representatives of government, parliament and civil society. This program was endorsed by the Government of Uganda. The program defines four major areas of activity and reform: a public awareness campaign, improving enforcement, institutional reforms, mainly designed to increase transparency and accountability in public administration. The program is not the first anti-corruption program in Uganda. Serious initiatives were taken since 1986. In the new program, the first two of the four areas, receive a stronger emphasis, which makes the Ugandan anti-corruption program a more “holistic” or integrated approach for building a national integrity program. We found that this program of reform was adequately known and supported by our sample of representatives from government and civil society. Our conclusion is that EDI’s programmatic objectives have been largely accomplished in Uganda.

The social impact of EDI’s contributions is harder to evaluate. The effect on public opinion of the renewed campaign and EDI’s involvement is hard to judge, since Uganda has known a longer history of fighting corruption which produced a measure of public awareness of corruption and its effects and the need to fight it. Our interviewees agree that, in the major urban areas and among the more educated, there is enough awareness of the problem of corruption and the need to address it. As to awareness of people in the rest of the country, the picture seems to be less clear, but at least there seems to be agreement that more efforts should be specifically directed at the regional and district level.

Specific instruments were used to attain the social objectives and to win wider political and public support and involvement for anti-corruption activities. Integrity pledges were formulated at the workshops and the proceedings of the third national integrity workshop were distributed among politicians and representatives of government and civil society. A separate workshop for parliamentarians was organized to win the support of the political leadership. We found no evidence that these specific instruments were effective. The integrity pledges received not much public attention nor where they mentioned as important instruments by our interviewees, as they were in Tanzania. The parliamentarians’ workshop agreed on a program of action to strengthen the democratic control functions of parliament, but failed to specify a plan of implementation. The workshop could not agree on the necessity of a separate integrity pledge for parliamentarians to show their commitment to the anti-corruption campaign.

The picture of organizational impact is mixed. The IGG took an important step to improve coordination and cooperation of efforts in the public sector by establishing
an interim National Integrity Committee. Also, working relations between enforcement and “watch dog institutions” have improved. However, the involvement of civil society seems to be lagging behind. Organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Roman Catholic Church, that take interesting initiatives to fight corruption are operating in isolation. We found no evidence that, to date, the support of civil society is being actively sought by governmental agencies. Registration requirements for private organizations and the ban on political parties still seem to be obstacles in the development of strong civil society organizations.

Some progress was made in implementing the national integrity program. The Public Leadership Act was put into force, requiring declaration of income and assets of parliamentarians and top officials. The declarations are not made public, which might limit their effectiveness. The major enforcement agency, the IGG, was made independent of the presidency and answerable only to parliament. It has been granted independent powers of prosecution. Decentralization of public administration is proceeding, and is expected to reduce corruption, at least in the long run.

In other fields progress is limited. A national public awareness campaign still has to be started, but preparations are taking place. Procurement procedures have not been reformed yet. Especially worrying to our interviewees is the fact that enforcement and prosecution has not substantially improved. There still has been no increase in the number of cases prosecuted. Our interviewees fear, that as a result, the IGG is not building a strong public image of itself or of the anti-corruption campaign. This also means, that this major flaw of the earlier, pre 1995, campaign, although it has become part of the anti-corruption program, has not been redressed in practice. Lack of capacity of human and material resources is an all pervasive constraint. The major agencies involved in the anti-corruption campaign are confined to Kampala. According to our respondents, capacity to launch and follow-up on a public awareness-raising campaign covering the whole country, is limited. Also, the capacity to prosecute is insufficient.
CHAPTER EIGHT: COSTS OF THE EDI-INITIATIVES

Findings
All (training and educational) activities involve costs. A first finding is that an overview of costs involved per EDI workshop, SDS and other activity is not available in the documents we analyzed. Maybe this type of information is available when doing a financial audit, but our study did not have that goal. Therefore we can only present information from BTO’s and Proceedings on estimated and realized (running) costs involved in the activities. Tables 2 and 3 present the findings (see the next two pages).

Conclusion
The conclusion is that information on costs of the EDI program activities, as far as BTO’s and Proceedings concern, is very limited. For us, this makes it impossible to assess the relationship between costs of the program involved and its impact, effects and possible side-effects. Financial information on the program appears not to be part and parcel of the management information.

The lack of management information on EDI’s activities is also reflected in the CAS on Uganda where input indicators seem to be confused with output indicators. In the Strategy Mix FY 98-01 the following “performance indicators/benchmarks” are specified that will be used to assess cross-cutting EDI-activities:

- “continue annual national integrity seminars”;
- ministerial reviews to be completed by 7/98” (page 37) and
- “Service Delivery Surveys in all districts” (page 38).

These indicators, however, do not measure the performance of the activities but only their incidence.

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47 When Proceedings are produced, the costs are paid by EDI.
### TABLE 2 Information on running/program costs per workshop, survey and other activities to be found in BTO’s/ proceedings for Uganda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>COSTS MENTIONED?</th>
<th>LEVEL OF COSTS INVOLVED /FUNDED BY..</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Integrity workshop I</td>
<td>No information(^{48})</td>
<td>No information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Integrity workshop II</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Funded by DANIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Integrity workshop III</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Funded by UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Journalism II</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Funded by DANIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Journalism I</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Funded by DANIDA and EDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative journalism IV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Local Cost US$ 35,800, External Cost US$ 34,600, Total US$ 70,400. Funded by DANIDA and the Canadian International Development Assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced investigative journalism</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>No information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Journalism V</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Costs: Local costs 36,172, Total US$ 51,172. EDI $ 10,000, DANIDA $ 41,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative journalism VI</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Only the statement that funding “(by DANIDA) was extremely limited, and EDI could not top-up the budget.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet retreat on integrity</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>No information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament retreat on integrity &quot;good governance and sustainable development&quot;</td>
<td>No information.</td>
<td>Funded by DANIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court administration reform workshop</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>No information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local integrity workshop Uganda/ Mbale</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>No information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Funded by UNICEF &amp; CIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Office of the vice president needed $ 1.2 million to cover the start-up costs</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Not more than $300,00 was paid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{48}\) ‘No information’ must be read as: *no information available through BTO’s and Proceedings documents*
Together with UNDP it was discussed how a joint effort can best help IGG, and other pillars to implement a new action plan. It was concluded that UNDP will assist IGG in the corruption survey (like the Warioba study, costs US $90,000).

Sources: BTO’s and Proceedings from EDI
**TABLE 3** Information on running/program costs per workshop, survey and other activities to be found in BTO’s/ proceedings for Tanzania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>COSTS MENTIONED?</th>
<th>LEVEL OF COSTS INVOLVED / FUNDED BY…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National integrity workshop I</td>
<td>No information⁴⁹</td>
<td>Funded by British Government, Overseas Development Administration (ODA) &amp; EDI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Integrity Workshop II</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Financed by ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Journalism I</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Workshop 1 and II estimated total costs US $ 184,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative journalism II</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Workshop 1 and 2 estimated total costs US$ 184,000 Funded by CIDA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity workshop for Parliamentarians</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Costs: estimated total costs of Cabinet and parliamentary workshops are US$ 61,900. Funded by ODA and DANIDA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Journalism III</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>DANIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Journalism IV/V</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>DANIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Journalism for Editors</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>US $ 191,887. Funded by DANIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery Survey</td>
<td>Costs: estimated total costs US$ 322,000</td>
<td>Funded by EDI; NORAD shows interest in funding SDS in future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A donor meeting (September took place to discuss how to facilitate the implementation of the Warioba report. Concluded was to conduct an annual Integrity/Corruption Survey to monitor the success of fighting corruption.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated costs US$ 150,000. PCB requested EDI to explore funding. EDI also agreed to print and disseminate the Kswahili version of the Warioba report and to facilitate the development of a “people's version”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: BTO’s and Proceedings from EDI.

⁴⁹ ‘No information’ must be read as: *no information available through BTO’s and Proceedings documents*
CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What the evaluation is about

The report is a midterm evaluation of EDI’s efforts to help reduce corruption in Tanzania and Uganda, which form part of a the larger World Bank and EDI program to fight corruption in developing nations. The strategic framework for these activities consists of four levels (World Bank, 1997). The first level is to prevent fraud and corruption within Bank-financed projects. The second level is to help countries that request Bank support to reduce corruption. The third is to take corruption more explicitly into account in national assistance projects and in national lending operations. And the fourth level focuses on adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce corruption. EDI operates at a combination of the second and third level, helping governments that request assistance to design and implement specific anti-corruption programs.

The evaluation

At the three year mark of EDI’s anti-corruption activities in Tanzania and Uganda, this evaluation was commissioned to shed light on their impacts and on their strength and weaknesses. An evaluation is timely since the Bank is expanding the program to include other countries. The following six questions are the main issues in this report.

1. What activities have been completed in Tanzania and Uganda over the last three years?
2. On what assumptions (or logic) about implementing a national integrity system and limiting corruption is the program based?
3. How were EDI’s activities implemented?
4. What are their impacts in both countries?
5. What information exists on the costs of these activities?
6. What recommendations can be formulated concerning EDI’s program?

The methodology applied is that of the case-study, carried out in two countries. We have gathered data through a combination of fieldwork using semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The information obtained is qualitative and no statistical sampling has taken place. Also, EDI’s underlying program logic has been reconstructed and assessed on the basis of a literature review. The report covers the period from the end of 1994, when EDI started the first anti-corruption activities in Uganda, to the end of October 1997, when the field work for this evaluation was completed.

Research question 1: Curbing corruption and building national integrity
EDI helps countries to institute a “national integrity system”, amongst others
designed to increase accountability and transparency in public service delivery,
thereby reducing opportunities for corruption. This constitutes an institutional
approach, concentrating on changing systems, rather than blaming people. Building
a national integrity system requires the support of the general public, civil society
and the government. For that reason raising public awareness and improving
enforcement are important aspects of the strategy of the campaign.

Fighting corruption typically involves all or a number of eight pillars of national
integrity: political will, administrative reforms, watchdog agencies, Parliament,
public awareness, the judiciary, the media and the private sector. These pillars are
interdependent, and require a “holistic” or integrated approach. If one pillar
weakens, an increased load is thrown on to the others. According to Transparency International (TI), this holistic approach is different from
earlier reforms. Prior efforts in these countries were piecemeal and uncoordinated,
no one “owned” the reforms, and no one was committed to them. Efforts at
enforcement were lacking, or overlooked those at the top. Finally, they failed to
deliver “quick wins” and gradually lost public support.

When a national government makes a request, it is EDI’s mission to help develop
and institutionalize an anti-corruption program that will be supported in thought and
action by the public, the government and civil society. It does so mainly by
organizing integrity workshops at the national or regional level or for specific
sectors, such as the media, and by helping to conduct Service Delivery Surveys (SDS).

In this endeavor, we distinguished three sets of objectives: programmatic, social and
organizational. Programmatic objectives refer to the immediate impact of
formulating, agreeing upon and adopting a program to fight corruption, mainly by
those present at the workshops or the organizations and groups they represent. They
include changing the awareness and attitude of attendants. The social impact to be
achieved is to foster informed public discussion and continuing political debate on
the issue of integrity within society at large, and particularly among the political
leadership. And the organizational impact is to foster a sense of ownership and
commitment to a national integrity program within government and civil society
organizations, so as to make implementation of the program a joint, coordinated
effort.. The social and organizational objectives aim at impacts outside the
workshops in society at large.
These three objectives effectively cover EDI’s activities, but they are not clearly
spelled out in EDI’s program, nor is the relationship between means and objectives
specified. Nevertheless, objectives at all these levels need to be attained to
implement an anti-corruption program and to effect the ultimately desired impact: a substantial reduction of corruption by making it a “high risk, low profit” enterprise.

EDI’s influence and responsibility diminish as we proceed from the programmatic to the organizational objectives. EDI, as an educational and training agency, can only directly influence objectives at the programmatic level. Still, it is evident that the integrity workshops organized and facilitated by EDI have social and organizational objectives. For example, it is assumed that participants in the workshops will organize themselves in more formal ways (organizational objectives) and that the workshops will influence people not attending (social objectives). Specific instruments are used to this effect: publication of proceedings, integrity pledges, and special workshops to win support and commitment of certain pivotal groups, such as parliamentarians.

Implementation of the anti-corruption program is outside EDI’s influence, as it should be. Still, looking at implementation and its problems is important to assess the prospects of EDI’s endeavor.

**Research question 2: assessing the logic underlying the EDI-program**

To assess EDI’s underlying program logic, we first had to reconstruct it. There was no key document in which EDI itself had articulated this underlying logic. For organizational learning to take place, we believe that such a reconstruction is necessary. Our reconstruction of the program logic shows that the EDI-program is a rich program, predicated on a set of propositions that can claim a measure of scientific validity. Although there is a focus on awareness raising and on changing the cognition and “mind sets” of officials, parliamentarians and others, several other mechanisms also steer the activities. Our assessment of these mechanisms reveals that they have potential. In particular we believe this is true for reinvigorating social capital and the civic society, the sharing and learning processes, and realizing transparency and accountability. The importance of reinvigorating the civic society can also be found in the World Bank Development Report (1997) on “The State in a Changing World”.

However, there are also weaker points in the logic. One concerns the emphasis on awareness-raising. As our discussion in Chapter Four shows, one can expect “no automatic progression from awareness of an unjust situation to intervening to bring it to an end.” Another is the belief in empowerment. In our review of the research literature, we did not find evidence that this “mechanism” will indeed be effective. Even when individuals are empowered, it is not certain that empowerment at the social or organizational domains will follow. When one aims at empowering larger
groups of people, different levels of empowerment must be taken into account. Empowerment at one level does not necessarily lead to empowerment at another. Finally, it was pointed out that the prospects of trickling down of the contents of the workshops to society at large are not particularly bright. UNDP data show that the communication infrastructure required is not very well developed in Uganda and Tanzania.

As to the Service Delivery Surveys (SDS), we do not question their potential importance. However, we think that, again due to the limited communication infrastructure in both countries, their impact should not be overestimated. Moreover, social scientists have pointed to discrepancies between attitudes and cognition on the one hand and “behavior” on the other hand. In particular, changing the mindset of civil servants is a problem of rather similar magnitude to changing organizational culture which depends on a great number of factors other than knowledge alone.

Summing up, we think that EDI’s program logic is rather strong in its assumptions about causal mechanisms involved in fighting corruption and developing national integrity, i.e. the assumptions underlying its Good Governance program. We found that there is considerably less support in social science research for its assumptions underlying the ways in which this program in practice is institutionalized in countries requesting assistance in the fight against corruption.

Research question 3: Workshops and Service Delivery Surveys
The integrity workshops are meticulously prepared and have clear objectives. They were conducted in ways to ensure that the objectives could be accomplished. In general the design, preparation and execution of the workshops, as well as their output and the immediate results achieved, were positively reviewed by our respondents.

For some attendants the workshops made clear that corruption is indeed a serious national problem and that all should participate in fighting it. The discussions at the workshops and tangible output such as reports, programs of action, and pledges provided cognitive tools to address the problems associated with corruption in an integrated fashion. Also the opportunities to meet and associate with like-minded people were valued.

On the other hand, many people think the workshops focused too much on the metropolitan community. Some of our interviewees indicated there is not enough local influence and local ownership of the workshops. Further, the broad participatory approach of the workshops does not provide the focus and commitment that is needed according to a number of people involved in the “war against corruption”. Awareness-raising always seems to be one of the objectives of the workshops. The workshops seem to be consultative and “participatory” in their
approach rather than “contractual”. This approach clearly meets the needs of a number of people, but it probably also leaves out those who are beyond awareness-raising and are ready to do “actual work”.

The media workshops were generally judged to be addressing the educational needs of journalists. Most interviewees claim that the workshops raised the subsequent quality of newspaper articles dealing with corruption. Some also hold that the quantity increased.

Other results have also been attained. A directory of information sources was developed as a reference tool for journalists. In Uganda a group of (six) local organizers and facilitators have been trained to continue the program of training for the media. In Tanzania the Media Development Trust Fund was established which is to fund professional training and facilities for the media.

Problems reported are a lack of differentiation of the workshops by professional level and type of media. Some of the workshops lacked practical journalistic value. The materials used were sometimes too distant from African problems which mainly involve petty, instead of grand corruption. EDI is taking initiatives to address these problems. Still, our interviewees point out that enhancement of journalists’ skills are not sufficient to strengthen the role of the media. The legal environment is a major constraint for a free press, especially in Tanzania. Necessary reforms are not forthcoming. Also, hardware, such as office computers and laptops, are not available in sufficient quantities.

The Service Delivery Surveys (SDS) are not very well known. Interviewees who are not directly involved in organizing activities of the anti-corruption campaign are not familiar with the surveys or their results. When introduced, the idea and rationale are highly valued because of the information the surveys are expected to generate for formulation of policy and raising public awareness. However, as experiences in Uganda show, civil servants might resist disseminating and using results of SDS, especially when data show weak service delivery. Dissemination and utilization of the survey data, and therefore the impact of service delivery surveys can not be taken for granted.

**Research question 4: impact following the workshops**

The integrity workshops produced integrity programs, contributed to and agreed upon by representatives of the various pillars, such as the civil service, the media, civil society, and the respective governments. The programs defined four major areas of activity: a national public awareness campaign; improved enforcement of anti-corruption laws (mainly aiming at people in leadership positions); institutional reform and increased transparency and accountability. Soliciting support of the public and civil society, as well as improvement of enforcement were relative
innovations in the anti-corruption efforts for the two countries. In fact, the present Tanzanian anti-corruption program is the first of its kind. Also, programs of implementation, or action plans, including a number of “quick wins” were defined. When compared to earlier anti-corruption campaigns in the two countries these strategies constitute, we think, major “programmatic” innovations.

The need to fight corruption with these programs, the concrete action points and the logic of the program are supported and, in fact, largely “internalized” by a clear majority of our interviewees. Most of them were senior public officials, some represented the professions. They included both those who participated in the workshops, and those who did not.

As to the social objectives, fostering informed public discussion, awareness and active support by wider circles of society, the picture is less clear. The workshops decided upon a number of provisions to foster dialogue, continuous informed public discussion, awareness and action. Both countries have known a measure of public awareness and a public debate about the problems of corruption before EDI was invited. Clearly however, other factors were instrumental in this, and the influence of each of these is hard to isolate. Integrity pledges and workshops for parliamentarians, which are specific efforts to win commitment of the political leadership have, so far, met with little success.

There are differences between the two countries in realizing organizational objectives: the involvement, active support, cooperation and coordination of various organizations in government and civil society. In Tanzania, the need for more cooperation and coordination within government is recognized, but no initiatives are reported. In Uganda, an important and interesting initiative was taken by establishing a national integrity working group, bringing together various stakeholders in the anti-corruption campaign. Also, working relations between public agencies represented have improved.

In neither country did we find evidence of a strong involvement of civil society organizations in the anti-corruption campaigns. Still, in Uganda, we found some of these organizations take interesting initiatives of their own, particularly the Ugandan Chamber of Commerce and the Ugandan Catholic Church.

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50 In Tanzania in the early 1990’s a number of parliamentary commissions investigated cases of corruption but when reports were issued there was little action taken on them by the government. In Uganda, the December 1994 mission by EDI / TI drew up a preliminary analysis and assessment of the earlier campaign on corruption, and while acknowledging the achievements in reforming the public sector, it also pointed out two major flaws which needed to be redressed: the lack of public support and the lack of enforcement.
A number of initiatives have been taken to implement action points of the National Integrity Program. For example, in both countries, first steps have been taken to launch a public awareness campaign. Reform of the civil service is underway in both countries (Uganda’s program is more comprehensive and has been implemented since 1990). Also, the decentralization program in that country looks promising. But overall, progress in implementing a specific anti-corruption program is limited in both countries. Of course, time is needed to implement the wide-ranging reforms.

Lack of capacity of human and material resources is an all pervasive constraint. The major agencies involved in the anti-corruption campaign are confined to the capital cities. Capacity to launch a public awareness-raising campaign covering the whole country and to follow it up with investigating and prosecuting cases, is limited. Lack of substantial “quick wins” in areas such as enforcement, reform of public procurement and of registration requirements for private organizations, is, we think, not encouraging for the prospects of the anti-corruption campaigns. The fact that enforcement has not substantially improved, is a major concern for virtually all of our interviewees in both countries. According to them, the necessary reduction in corruption of the nation’s leadership is not taking place. They fear that, as a result, the campaigns are in danger of losing credibility and public support.

**Some other differences between Uganda and Tanzania**

There are a number of important (other) differences between Tanzania and Uganda. First of all, in Uganda the anti-corruption campaign forms part of comprehensive efforts to reform the civil service, liberalize the economy, and decentralize public administration. These efforts are judged to be largely effective by outside observers. Further, in Uganda, more public agencies are participating in the campaign and there seems to be more coordination, at least within government circles. A national integrity working group was established with this specific task. Also, a number of important steps have been taken to make enforcement agencies stronger and more independent. Further, the IGG is developing plans to deploy activities up country and in civil society.

**Research question 5: costs of the program**

Information on costs of the EDI-program activities in BTO’s and Seminar Proceedings is very limited. This makes it impossible to assess the relationship between costs of the program involved and its impact, effects and possible side-effects. Financial information on the program appears not to be part and parcel of ongoing management information. The indicators or benchmarks that are to be used to assess EDI-activities are not targeted at measuring the performance or impact of the activities but only their incidence.
**Overall conclusions**

- EDI’s program logic is rather strong in its assumptions about *causal* mechanisms involved in fighting corruption and developing national integrity. There is considerably less support in social science research for its assumptions underlying the ways in which this program *in practice* is *institutionalized* in the two countries requesting assistance in the fight against corruption.

- EDI’s main role in the fight against corruption is facilitating and helping to organize workshops/SDS. Judging from the materials in the proceedings and from our interviews, the workshops are *well designed* and *organized*, and have a clear *result-orientation*. Overall, the way the workshops are conducted is positively reviewed by our interviewees. Social Delivery Surveys are believed to be important instruments also.

- The new approaches are *positively received* by representatives from government, parliament and civic society we interviewed. However, the flaws of *earlier*, pre-1995 campaigns, e.g. the lack of enforcement, and lack of support and involvement of civil society have not yet been redressed in present practice. The social and organizational impacts of EDI’s activities in the larger society are at present still limited.

- The limited impact of the integrity workshops at the social and organizational level is, we think, at least partially linked to EDI’s program. As stated earlier, there is “no automatic progression from awareness of an unjust situation to intervening to bring it to an end.” Also, there is the multi-level problem of empowerment. Finally, the prospects of trickling down of the contents of the workshops to the larger society are not particularly bright, given the limited communication infrastructure. Follow-up of the workshops is left too much to the spontaneous interaction of participants and a few formal provisions, such as pledges, joint statements and distribution of workshop material. Based on our analysis of the materials and interviews conducted, we think the workshops are *participatory* rather than *contractual*. However, the social marketing approach EDI now is considering might bring improvements in this respect.

**Research question 6: recommendations**

The findings and conclusions summarized above lead us to make the following ten recommendations.

1. Establishing a national integrity committee, similar to the one in Uganda, is an essential step in Tanzania. Unlike the one in Uganda, however, it is also necessary to include major civil society organizations. The committee is to coordinate, monitor and report anti-corruption activities, define priorities and attainable “quick wins”, agreed upon by actors willing and able to participate in its execution. The question of capacity should be an important part of the strategic analysis and
planning.

2. In organizing workshops, seminars and other activities, more use should be made of already existing specific and coherent groups. These activities should take into account their specific problems and potential.

3. Specialized and more targeted workshops or seminars could be a starting-point for more permanent projects or organizations that help sustain the anti-corruption effort in between workshops. Such projects could deal with the design and implementation of effective systems of control, accountability and transparency, a licensed system of public reporting and public procurement. Or they could support an “alertness network against corruption”, involving persons placed in key-positions in public and private organizations. The project and network could provide members with mutual support and information about suspicious practices and ways to deal with them. More generally, the project and network could monitor public service delivery.

4. An explicit communication and utilization strategy is needed to ensure impacts from Service Delivery Surveys. This is to involve public relations, training, and counseling. It might also prove useful to make civil service departments stakeholders in the surveys.

5. An exit-strategy for EDI should be articulated that can be applied both in cases of success and of lack of progress. A general model can be formulated, to be adapted for each specific country in which a program is started. The strategy should be clearly communicated to beneficiaries. Indicators and options should be agreed upon with beneficiary governments.

6. With fifteen countries now involved in the program, we recommend more attention be devoted to the production and utilization of financial information on the costs of EDI activities as a (day-to-day) tool of management.

7. We suggest the transparency of the EDI program be increased using performance indicators. These can be based on the framework of objectives and indicators developed and used in this report.

8. To define more precisely EDI’s intervention strategy, we suggest the program in question produces a key-document defining EDI’s program, objectives, instruments, program logic and performance indicators.

9. EDI’s Good Governance program is in itself an innovation within the World Bank and is quickly developing. Therefore, we think it is wise to conduct, within a few
years, a new evaluation of EDI’s implementation of anti-corruption programs in Uganda and Tanzania, with the focus on the impacts of the programs adopted on the level of corruption within society. The findings reported here can serve as a baseline for such an assessment.

10. We also think it is wise to develop base-line information on the situation within the other countries the program focuses at (or will focus at). Given their social and institutional differences, we recommend comparative institutional analysis of the EDI-program.
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**EDI Working Papers**


**Workshop proceedings**


**Media Workshop proceedings**


**Service Delivery Survey Publications**


EDI, Service Delivery Surveys: Applying the Sentinel Community Surveillance Methodology: Country Overviews, (no date of release).

**BTO’s**

BTO’s (Back to Office Reports): see appendix a and b (available through EDI’s Evaluation Unit)
APPENDIX 1: Persons interviewed during the field work

Washington DC interviews

August 1997

Interviewer: Frans L.Leeuw.

Jim Adams Country director Uganda
Brian Falconer former Resident Representative Uganda
Petter Langseth EDI
Danny Leipziger Division chief EDI
Dick Stapenhurst EDI
Pete Miovic EDI

Uganda interviews

October 1997


A. Aheebwa Chief of Division Training and Staff Development, Decentralization Secretariat, Ministry of Local Government
M. Bazongoza Tumwesigye Director Education and Prevention of Corruption, Office of the IGG
M. Benigna Member of Parliament
W. Byanyima Member of Parliament, vice-chairperson of the Public Accounts Committee,
R.L.P. Harris Resident Representative, World Bank Field Office
Mr. B.M. Katatumba President Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry
F. J. Katusiime Rank Consult (U)Ltd., Computer and Communication Consultants/ TI Local Chapter
S.E. de Lang/ M. Koper Dutch Embassy
Mrs. Sheila Kawamara Chairperson Uganda national NGO Federation
J. Obunga Coordinator of Uganda women’s network

Secretary General Uganda Episcopal
George Okutho

Ch. Onyango-Obbo
E. Opolote
F. Opio
Psomgen, M.
William Pyke

A. Ruzindana

Th. Schjerbeck, J.K. Rasmussen, S. Frederiksen

Tanzania interviews

October 1997

Interviewers: Ger H.C. van Gils and Frans L.Lee

R.P. Brigish

S.J. Chavda

B. Cooksey
E.G. Hoseah
M. J. Malecela
J.E.K. Mburi

N. S. Mwakipunda
G. J. Ngowo

R. M. Shah
I. H. Seushi
N. Visran

Resident Representative, World Bank Mission
Director Design Partnership LTD, Co-Engineers/ Secretary to the “Front Against Corrupt Elements in Tanzania” (FACEIT)
Afro-Aid, Development Consultants Ltd.
Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB)
Attorney General’s Chamber
Foreign Service Officer/ Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
UNIC, former Information Officer, TIS
Assistant Auditor General, Office of the Controller and Auditor General
Consultant/ Training Specialist
Freelance journalist/ financial counselor
APPENDIX 2: Outline of semi-structured list of questions

The topics covered by most of the interviews in Uganda and Tanzania were the following.

- Position and activities of the interviewee / involvement in anti-corruption activities;
- What is the relationship between the interviewed person and the EDI activities?
- What is in your perception the level of corruption within the society/government?
- EDI distinguishes 8 pillars (judiciary, inspector-general, mass media etc.). How important are these pillars in the fight against corruption?
- EDI’s underlying logic is that fighting corruption and vesting NIS is very important for curbing corruption. EDI also believes that their activities (workshops/SDS) can help realize that. What is your opinion?
- Special workshops are organized for people who are working in pillars of integrity. They refer to journalists, parliamentarians and are also held in many other countries.
- Have you yourself been to such a workshop? What are your opinions about logistics, topics and impacts?
- What do you think these workshops contribute to the development of a National Integrity System in Uganda?
- Why do you believe that?
- What do you think these workshops contribute to the level of corruption?
- Why do you believe that?

- In Uganda and Tanzania the Service Delivery Survey has been conducted.
- What do you think the SDS contributes to the development of a National Integrity System in Uganda?
- What do you think the SDS contributes to the level of corruption in Uganda?
- Why do you believe that?

- One of the goals of EDI’s is to help realize local ownership / civic society development on behalf of the ‘fight against corruption’ in your country.
- How important is the civic society in your perception?
- In practice this may imply that EDI no longer will play a role in these workshops. What would the consequences be of such a withdrawal?
- If withdrawal is impossible, according to you, what future role you then see for EDI in the fight against corruption?
- In many documents a tailor-made approach to fighting corruption has been suggested. Do you think that for your country, this goal of EDI has been reached?

- Exit strategy: Can you describe EDI “exit strategy”? How is it designed and proceeding? Which conditions have to be realized before exit option can be discussed ? Is there a time frame?
Apart from this list also topics like the following were asked to particular persons.

- What about the selection processes of persons involved in the workshops? Do you have a stake in that? How is safeguarded that clean persons are involved?
- Do you monitor yourself the Banks/EDI activities? How?
- What is the role of donor organizations like DANIDA role in the fight against corruption?