Report No. 12706-BEN Benin Toward A Poverty Alleviation Strategy August 5, 1994 Population and Human Resources Division Occidental and Central Africa Department FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 'JmA, 00y' Xp-S :, (*- m : a t . <.--. e ; - - . ;-: ',, '' - VV § . v,-,.;.-.,I ....... _,'.-,,- '"'I: -. Jas,tX--.... V . , - :Wa F~~~~~~ , _:t. -J4't' _ j : , _w E, ,, _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ _ ,,, _ . __ . ... . _ _ _ __ I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary .................................................. i 1. A Profile of Poverty 1. A Profile of Poverty ............................................. 1 Background ................................................. I Defining Poverty ............................................. 2 A Poverty Line .............................................. 3 Expenditure Patterns and Poverty ................................... 7 Nutritional Indicators ........................................... 9 Social Indicators .......... 14 2. Poverty And Environment ......................................... 17 Poverty and Environment Linkages .................................. 17 Environmental Issues in Benin ..................................... 18 Ecological Factors and Cultivation Practices. ............................ 19 Population Pressure ............................................ 22 Indigenous Solutions to Environmental Problems .......................... 25 Urban Environrent and Urban Poverty ............................... 26 3. Poverty and Vulnerability ......................................... 28 A Framework for Identifying Vulnerability ............................. 28 Areas at Risk ................................................ 32 Vulnerable Groups ............................................ 34 The Causes of Poverty and Vulnerability .............................. 44 11. Policies and Measures 4. Stimulating Economic Growth ...................................... 48 The Road to Adjustment ......................................... 48 Adjustment and the Poor ......................................... 50 Agriculture ................................................. 53 The Tertiary Sector ............................................ 58 The Labor Market ............................................. 63 Access to Credit .............................................. 66 5. Providing Key Services ........................................... 70 Public Spending in the Social Sectors ................................. 70 Social Services and their Clients ................................... 72 Education ................................................... 73 Health .................................................... 79 Water Supply ............................................... 84 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. l 6. Safety Nets ........................................... 87 Coping and Surviving .......................................... 87 When Everything Else Fails ....................................... 89 Traditional Safety Nets .......................................... 91 Help from the Outside: Government ........... ...................... 94 Help from the Outside: Donors and NGOs ........ ..................... 96 Dealing with Transitory Shocks . ................................... 98 ]]m. Elements of a Poverty Alleviation Strategy 7. A Framework for Poverty Alleviation ........... ...................... 102 The Wider Context ........................................... 102 The Design of Poverty Interventions ........... ...................... 103 Participation ........................................... 104 Governance ............................................ 106 The Importance of Norms and Values ........................... 107 The Institutional Framework ................ 108 The Legal Framework ......................... 111 Gender Inequality ......................... 111 Land Tenure ......................... 112 S. Monitoring Poverty ......................... 114 Existing Data ......................... 114 Monitoring Systems ........................... 117 Capacity-Building for Monitoring Poverty ......... ..................... 118 Summary of Recommendations for Poverty Monitoring ...................... 119 9. Elements of a Poverty Alleviation Strategy ......... ..................... 122 Policies for the Productive Sectors ........... ...................... 122 Sustainable Agricultural Growth ......... ..................... 122 Which Role in the Tertiary Sector? ........ .................... 125 Employment Creation . .................................... 126 Policies for the Social Sectors . .................................... 130 Educating Girls ......................................... 130 Family Planning ................................ 132 Safe Water, Healthier Environments ........................... 134 Targeted Interventions ............................. 135 The Virtuous Circle ............................. 135 LIST OF ANNEXES ANNEX I : Methodological Notes ANNEX II: Additional Statistical Information ANNEX III: Poverty Through the Eyes of Children ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGETUR Public works agency (Agence d'execution des travaux urbains) AGDSD Agency for the management of the social dimension of development (Agence de gestion de la dimension sociale du developpement) CARDER Regional action center for rural development (Centre d 'action regional pour le developpement rural) CATHWELL Catholic Relief Services CEDA Center for Environment and Development in Africa CePEPE Center for promotion of and assistance to small and medium enterprises (Centre de promotion et d 'encadrement des petites et moyennes entreprises) CLCAM Rural savings and loan cooperative (Caisse locale de credit agricole mutuel) COGEC Community management committee (Comite de gestion communal) COGES Sub-prefectoral management committee (Comite de gestion sous-pr4fectoral) CONGAB Council of non-governmental organizations active in Benin (Conseil des organisations non-gouvernementales en actvite au Benin) CPS Center for Social Promotion (Centre de promotion sociale) DANA Food and Applied Nutrition Directorate (Direction de I 'alimentation et de la nutrition appliquie) DANIDA Danish International Development Agency EBC National household budget survey (Enquete budget-consommation) FAIB Assistance fund for community initiatives (Fonds d'appui aux initiatives de base) FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GTZ German technical cooperation agency (Gesellschaftfiir Technische Zusanunenarbeit) ILO International Labor Organization INSAE National institute for statistics and economic analysis (Institut national de la statistique et de I'analyse gconomique) NGO Non-governmental organization OCSD Canadian organization for solidarity and development (OXFAM affiliate) (Organisation canadienne pour la solidarite et le developpement) ONASA National bureau for food security (Office national de securite alimentaire) SAL Structural Adjustment Loan SAN Food and nutrition survey (Surveillance alimentaire et nutritionnelle) SNV Dutch volunteer organization SONACOP Societe nationale pour le conmmerce du petrole UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund Preface This is the first Poverty Assessment for Benin. Its main purpose is to open a policy dialogue with country officials, in order to lay the foundations for a sustained effort to reduce poverty. While the main targets are government officials and World Bank staff, it is hoped that the dialogue will involve a much larger audience, so as to harness all available resources for the fight against poverty. The approach adopted reflects this preoccupation. Representatives of the donor community and of NGOs (local and international) have been consulted to learn from their experience and to ensure that the strategy proposed would be complementary to theirs. A workshop held in April 1994 aimed at reinforcing this participatory approach by asking a group of government, NGO and donor representatives to comment on a draft of the document. Their suggestions have greatly improved the final product. The premise for a fruitful dialogue is a shared understanding of the issues at hand, hence the attention paid to identifying different aspects of poverty and their causes. Because poverty is a multi- dimensional phenomenon, the analysis is based on a wide variety of sources, including both quantitative and qualitative data, and encompasses economic, social, physical and cultural factors. Also, poverty is not simply a state, but an outcome that is produced and continually reproduced through the interplay of economic, social, physical and cultural processes. An attempt has therefore been made to capture its dynamic nature through an analysis of vulnerability. Neither the multi-dimensional nor the dynamic aspects of poverty, however, can be fully understood without considering the point of view of the poor themselves. Fieldwork carried out with two Beninese teams provided the opportunity to learn about the poor's definition of poverty, their problems and their ideas of what would help them most. In order to start a constructive dialogue on poverty alleviation the document adopts a style that leaves ample room to the descriptive and didactic. This choice should be seen as an effort to reach as wide an audience as possible, including officials and colleagues who may have had until now little chance to study poverty, or to concentrate on aspects of poverty which go beyond their specialty sector. It is expected that future updates of the Poverty Assessment will take such background information for granted and adopt a narrower focus. Finally, a caveat is in order. The report had just been drafted when the CFAF devaluation was announced. Although a mission to evaluate the initial impact of the change in parity on the poor was able to gather some useful information, data are too scarce and the situation is still too fluid to allow for any definitive statement. As a result, all monetary figures, including the poverty line, are pre- devaluation. This report was prepared by Maurizia Tovo (Task Manager, AFIPH). Rudo Niemeijer (Consultant) provided much vauable input, especially for Chapters 1 and 2, and led one of the two local research teams. Brenda Juntunen (EDIHR) participated in the fieldwork along with Denise Grimaud Adjanohoun (ocal Research Coordinator), Assouma Abdouramane, Romaine Aguenou, Virginie Codo, Rock Dossou and Pierre Paul Nadjo (local Researchers). Caroline Moser (TWURD) was Lead Advisor. The document was edited by Lauren Ptito and processed by Audrey Noone and Fabrice Bonnaire. Executive Summary A Profile of Poverty 1. Benin is a small country of 5.0 million people with a per capita GNP of US$414 (1992). This per capita income is somewhat below the SSA average (US$530), but when development indicators other than economic are used, Benin's relative position appears even lower. According to the human development index used by UNDP, Benin is one of the ten least developed countries in the world (162nd of 173 countries in 1993). In spite of good potential for agricultural production, malnutrition affects some 18 percent of the population and 40 percent of children under five. Education indicators are well below SSA averages: illiteracy is 71 percent overall and 81 percent for women (1992), while net primary school enrollment is 48 percent and girls' enrollment is only 34 percent (1990). A high population growth rate (2.9 percent) results in high dependency ratios (101 percent) and pressure on the environment, which in many areas is already showing signs of stress. Poverty Indicators 2. A definition of poverty based on economic indicators is likely to produce an underestimate due to the above characteristics. This report used data from the 1986-87 household budget survey to calculate an absolute poverty line, that is, the income needed to satisfy minimal nutritional requirements, given prevailing dietary habits, and other basic expenses (clothing, fuel, household wares). The absolute poverty line was found to be at CFAF 39,286, equivalent to US$131. Fifteen percent of the population fell below it. With the January 1994 devaluation a new poverty line should be estimated, but the instability of post-devaluation prices makes such an estimate impossible. 3. Although only 15 percent of the population can be considered as extremely poor on the basis of the cost of basic needs, nutritional and social indicators suggest a less optimistic picture. Wasting is high among younger children (30 percent), which is to be expected in a developing country, but it continues to be a problem for older children (about 20 percent), especially in the urban South. While Benin produces enough food enough to be self-sufficient, there are pockets of food insecurity throughout the country, and recurrent seasonal shortages. Farmers' stocks are often depleted weeks before harvest, when agricultural work is at its peak and local prices are highest. To make things worse, seasonal hunger tends to coincide with patterns of disease. For example malaria, which is endemic, has the highest incidence in the rainy pre-harvest season. High fertility rates (the total fertility rate is 7.1) compound the problem. Pregnant and lactating women are more likely to suffer from anemia than others (40 percent of women of reproductive age are anemic), with poor women being at a higher risk because of their limited access to proper diets. Because anemia reduces productivity, anemic women and their children tend to enter a vicious circle whereby poor diets result in lower productivity, which makes it impossible to improve diets. 4. Educational indicators are particularly low for primary school (see above), with marked regional and gender differences. Rural areas and the North are the worst performers, while the Mono and Atacora regions have the lowest female enrollment rates. Distance from school, school fees (CFAF 500-4,000 per year), the need for child labor and limited employment opportunities for school leavers keep enrollment rates down, while cultural variables represent an extra obstacle to girls' education. From the parents' point of view, educating a girl is often a net loss: they pay school fees and forego her economic contribution during school time, but after she leaves school any advantage from her education will accrue to her in-laws. Poverty and Environment 5. The Benin Environmental Action Plan estimates that environmental degradation has an economic cost equivalent to 3-5 percent of GDP. While the country as a whole will suffer as a result, the poor are both the main victims and the main perpetrators of environmental degradation. They are the main victimns because they tend to have no choice but to live in poorer environments, i.e., environments which lack resources for economic exploitation such as the arid northeast, or in hazardous environments, such as overcrowded urban areas without proper water, sanitation or waste disposal services. They are the main perpetrators because their lack of assets often leads them to overexploit their environment in an attempt to satisfy their most immediate needs. For example, overfishing is causing a decline in fish stocks, thus endangering the very livelihood of fishermen. 6. Population pressure is closely associated with environmental degradation, and with poverty. Although the North is sparsely populated (12-15 persons per am2), the nature of the soil and of the climate do not allow intensive cultivation, and conflicts over land between pastoralists and cultivators have become more frequent. In the South, with a population density of 150 persons per km2, cultivable land per person does not exceed 1 ha. in any of the 34 sous-prefectures and in 15 of them it is less then 0.5 ha. Households with insufficient access to land (estimated to be 11.5 percent) cannot grow enough food to feed themselves, and therefore have to depend on others for access to extra land or employment. Even assuming that they manage to avoid abject poverty this way, they experience great vulnerability because they lack one of the most fundamental assets in rural societies. Land shortages cause the vicious circle of poverty and environmental degradation. Land-short households will try to maximize food production by reducing the area under fallow; this, in turn, will reduce land fertility and result in lower yields, thus pushing farmers to further reduce fallows. Vulnerability 7. Vulnerability is an important aspect of poverty, because it reflects its dynamic aspects. It refers not to lack or want, but to defenselessness, insecurity and exposure to risk. Because vulnerability is an indicator of the likelihood of becoming poor (or poorer), interventions to decrease it can be seen as poverty preventive measures. The report provides a framework for identifying vulnerability on the basis of assets and groups its causes in factors operating at four levels: national, community, household and individual. This analysis, which is essentially qualitative, leads to the identification of vulnerable groups and estimates the prevalence of relative (as opposed to extreme) poverty at about 30 percent. 8. Vulnerable groups include the following: (a) Female-headed households (20 percent according to the 1979 census, but far more according to recent small-scale studies) are generally worse off than others because of high dependency ratios and because women's inferior condition in Beninese society limits their access to profitable economic activities through lower education, legal discrimination, cultural restrictions, salary distortions, and a socialization process which undermines their self-esteem. Male migration plays an important role in creating defacto female- headed households, but downright neglect, especially in polygamous unions, appears to be even more important. (b) Abandoned old people are a relatively new phenomenon spurred by the replacement of traditional values with individualistic "modern" values, and by young people's migration to urban centers and the land-rich North. No estimates as to their number are available. ii (c) Children in difficult circumstances include street children and "placed" children (vidomegon). The latter are children (mostly girls) from unprivileged backgrounds sent to live in urban areas (sometimes abroad), away from their families. Their number is estimated at about 100,000. In some cases they may find a better life than they would in their own family, but often they are practically slave labor, forced to perform domestic or commercial work in exchange for board and lodging. (d) Fishermen's families have seen their income decrease because of declining fish stocks (mostly due to overfishing) and competition from imported fish. The poorest are those without their own nets (about 10-15 percent), followed by those without pirogues. The rainy season is particularly problematic because the inability to go out fishing makes it hard to find money to treat malaria, which is at its peak. (e) Farmer households with inadequate means are found mostly in the South (see para. 6). They are often forced to enter share-cropping agreements, which in Benin are considered a sign of poverty. (f) Refugees are concentrated in the Mono region and in Cotonou. UNHCR estimates that 88,000 of the approximately 100,000 Togolese refugees in Benin need food assistance. The response of Beninese families has been extremely generous, but the burden represented by a sudden increase in the nurnber of dependents (averaging 7-12 extra people per household, in the border area) makes this "solution" unsustainable, and signs of stress are growing. (g) Retrenched civil servants and unemployed graduates find themselves in a vulnerable position as a result of the economic reforms adopted during the structural adjustrnent process. Retrenched civil servants include voluntary departures (4,200 between 1989 and 1992) and forced dismissals because of liquidation, privatization or personnel reduction (12,000 between 1986 and 1992). Unemployed graduates (about 7,000) constitute a powerful pressure group. 9. For the purpose of poverty alleviation, it is useful to identify the disadvantaged on the basis of geographical location because it facilitates targeting. This was done for rural areas in the context of a food security project by combining eleven parameters related to the causes and effects of food insecurity, including food prices, agricultural production, isolation and malnutrition rates. The analysis highlighted the presence of eleven sous-prefectures facing recurrent food insecurity, and nine sous-prefectures which, although in a less precarious situation, present a number of potentially risky factors. These areas are characterized by low revenues due to insufficient access to land (Mono region), loss of land fertility (Atacora and Borgou regions) and declining fish stock (Atlantique region). Isolation makes market integration difficult, contributes to high food prices during the pre-harvest period, and reduces opportunities for diversifying income sources. Policies and Measures Adjustment 10. Between 1985 and 1988 per capita GDP declined on average by 5.6 percent per year, and the budget deficit remained close to 11 percent of GDP under the burden of a tripling of the wage bill and rising debt service payments. The situation reached an all-time low in 1989, giving the Government no choice but to embark on a structural adjustment process. The first structural adjustment program (SAL I) aimed primarily at raising real GDP growth by about 3 percent annually within a viable macroeconomic context. While growing social unrest made it impossible to pursue far-reaching reforms, the adjustment iii measures adopted had a positive impact on growth, which, although modest, set the country on a new course after years of economic decline. 11. Under a new, democratically elected government, a second structural adjustment program (SAL II) was approved in 1991. It sought to stimulate economic recovery by raising real GDP growth to 4 percent by 1993, generate a primary surplus in the government budget by 1992, contain domestic inflation to 2.5 percent, and improve the balance of payments. Real GDP grew at an average of 4.2 percent in 1990-92 (but estimates for 1993 show growth to have slowed down to 3.3 percent), primary surplus has been positive since 1991, and inflation has been low (2.3 percent). SAL II also contained a component on the social dimensions of adjustment which has been used to finance medicines and textbooks, as well as to set up a labor-intensive public works program to rehabilitate rural social infrastructure. 12. In the absence of large-scale disaggregated data, it is difficult to determine how the poor and the vulnerable have fared under adjustment. Insofar as GDP has grown faster than population, and assuming a more or less equitable distribution of the growth, everybody's standard of living should have improved, including that of the lowest income brackets. The spectacular success of cotton has certainly done a lot to improve living conditions (and therefore alleviate poverty) in cotton-producing areas. Similarly, a more efficient public sector should enable the government to provide better services, hence benefitting everybody. It should be remembered, however, that it is difficult to determine how much of the registered economic growth is due to adjustment and how much is the result of exogenous variables. The resumption of economic growth is certainly a most encouraging sign, but its basis remains fragile because of the dominant role played by the regional context. Devaluation 13. The January 1994 devaluation of the CFAF is expected to produce important long-term benefits, which will support the process of poverty alleviation. The transitional period, however, is likely to entail some short-term costs to the poor. Preliminary research carried out in Cotonou and Porto Novo three months after the devaluation showed that gross nominal incomes of individuals employed in the informal sector declined 30 to 50 percent, mainly due to reduced sales volume and reduced profit margins. However, data for the country as a whole and for the more recent period-which are more relevant-are not available. Agriculture 14. Agriculture accounts for about 40 percent of GDP (1990-92) and provides 70 percent of domestic exports as well as 75 percent of all employment. Much of the economic growth of the country over the past decade has depended on agriculture as a source of exports (cotton) and a supplier of food crops. Cotton is, for all practical purposes, Benin's only export and the sector has experienced spectacular growth thanks to the government support it received (access to inputs, credit, extension, marketing services). As a result, the standard of living of cotton producers has improved dramatically, especially in the Borgou region, and the area under cotton cultivation has been expanding to the point that production has now reached the limit of ginning capacity (200,000 tons/year), and the Government has adopted measures to contain expansion. Given the environmental problems associated with cotton cultivation, the steady decline of world cotton prices and the Government decision to increase prices paid to producers by only about 40 percent. the cotton sector cannot be expected to be the engine of post- devaluation economic growth, at least for the immediate future. iv 15. Food production has been growing in line with population over the past thirty years. This growth has been achieved not by improving productivity but by expanding the area under cultivation- primarily in the North, where most of the sorghum, yam and animal production is located, and where maize and cassava production is increasing. Most agricultural methods remain traditional, and yields remain unstable and low. Traditional agricultural practices combined with increasing population pressure tend to result in fertility loss and soil erosion, especially in the South. In the Mono region, for example, fertility losses have been estimated at 10 percent of the total value of agricultural production, and losses through erosion at 30 percent. Unclear land tenure rights provide no motivation to farmers for investments in natural resource management, and may give rise to disruptive territorial disputes between pastoralists and cultivators. 16. The extension services offered to subsistence farmers do little to increase productivity, as weak research capacity and a top-down approach tend to result in a choice of technical themes that are not suited to soil fertility conditions, consumer preferences or financial conditions. Women are routinely bypassed by extension, in spite of the fact that improvements in food storage and processing (generally women's responsibility) could greatly improve nutritional standards. Lack of credit and very limited access to inputs contribute to low productivity, while the steady decline of food crop prices over the past twenty years and high marketing margins (in part explained by the poor state of rural infrastructure) have acted as a disincentive to increase output. This situation could change thanks to the CFAF change of parity. The substitution of imported food with domestic food documented in urban areas suggests that devaluation should result in higher producer prices and stimulate food production, with a positive impact on the gross incomes of subsistence farmers. If marketing margins throughout the rural areas are contained, producers as well as consumers will benefit. The Tertiary Sector 17. For many years the tertiary sector has been the largest contributor to the Beninese economy, accounting for about 50 percent of GDP (1990-92) with an average annual growth of 3.5 percent, and 30 percent of employment. The geography of the country certainly accounts to a great extent for the extraordinary development of the sector, and in particular the dominant role played by commerce. At the heart of the tertiary sector are informal activities. It is thanks to the dynamism of the informal sector that the majority of urban households (e.g., two thirds of Cotonou households) survive, and it is the informal sector which makes it possible for even quite remote villages to have access to non-food products- and money to buy them. Ease of entry and high flexibility make it the sector of choice for underprivileged groups, especially women. This is why the analysis in the report focuses on the infornal tertiary sector. 18. Broadly speaking, informal service activities can be grouped into two categories: microenterprises and cross-border trade. The majority of the urban poor tend to find employment in microenterprises. A recent census documented 126,605 establishments in the eight main urban areas, dominated by small restaurants and street food vendors, transport (moto-taxis), and small-scale trade (Cotonou's Dantokpa market is one of the largest in West Africa, with almost 19,000 traders). Cross-border trade is so important that Benin's economy is often referred to as a "transit economy". Proximity to Nigeria is at the root of the impressive development of import-export activities, as the successive devaluations of the naira and Nigeria's protectionist policies have provided ample opportunity for profitable illegal trade: import of cheap Nigerian products, especially petroleum products, for the domestic market and re-export of forbidden conimodities (e.g., rice). v 19. The pervasive network of restrictive regulations, heavy taxation and price controls in effect during the 1970s and 1980s played a decisive role in the development of the informal sector. For example, the structure of import taxes provided a built-in incentive to import goods under a transit regime and then sell them through informal channels on the domestic market. Under structural adjustment the Government has undertaken significant initiatives to create an environment more conducive to formal private sector activity, but more remains to be done. Of particular interest to microenterprises is the existing taxation principle which estalishes tax liability on the basis of standard average profit rates (systnme du benefice minimumforfaitaire). In spite of the efforts made within the framework of SAL II to modernize the Code of Commerce, the new legislation is still in draft and chronic lack of resources in the judiciary makes it extremely onerous for anybody (let alone for the poor) to obtain judicial reviews of administrative decisions. 20. The CFAF change of parity could have a major impact on foreign trade, but thus far there is little evidence of significant changes in the traffic at the Nigerian border, and the price of illegal fuel has showed much more sensitivity to events in Nigeria (e.g., tanker strike) than to Benin's policies. On the other hand, service-based microenterprises in urban areas appear to have incurred considerable short-term costs as a result of the loss of purchasing power brought about by the devaluation. The Labor Market 21. Unemployment and underemployment are among the main causes of poverty in Benin. Unemployment in urban areas was estimated at 8.5 percent in 1992, down from 13.2 percent in 1990. Although the negative impact of structural adjustment was contained because the informal sector absorbed many of the retrenched civil servants, a raise in urban unemployment is expected to be a transitional cost of the devaluation. Unfortunately, this time the informal sector is unlikely to be able to soften the blow, as the general loss of purchasing power will probably entail a temporary shrinking of the sector. Underemployment is a far more pervasive problem than unemployment, both in urban and rural areas (the national rate of underemployment is estimated at 30 percent). Lack of off-farm employment opportunities, climatic conditions and land scarcity contribute to make the rural labor force only partially utilized (100-150 days a year of productive labor per worker), and to keep incomes low. 22. A number of NGOs have recently been established to address this problem, through the assistance of donors. CePEPE was created as part of a UNDP-financed project to provide training for redundant civil servants and unemployed graduates, as well as to facilitate the creation of small and medium enterprises, but so far it has had a limited effect. AGDSD was established with funding from various donors as a result of the social dimensions component of SAL II. It handles rural social infrastructure projects (schools, health centers and rural feeder roads) which are to be implemented by local enterprises with labor-intensive methods. AGETUR was created with World Bank financing to provide employment through labor-intensive public works (road building and accompanying sewage works) commissioned to local enterprises in Cotonou and Porto Novo. Thanks to its narrow focus and competent management, AGETUR has managed to carry out its work at a faster pace than expected, and it is widely perceived as one of the most promising ways to alleviate the urban unemployment problem. Access to Credit 23. Access to credit has often been identified as a key instrument for poverty reduction. In Benin, obtaining credit is problematic, and not just for the poor. The five private commnercial banks established when the banking system was restructured in the late 1980s reserve only a small portion of their deposits vi for medium and long-term credits, thus posing a serious obstacle to economic growth. The rural savings and loan banks (CLCAM) are mostly used by cotton growers, as the average subsistence farmer does not have the financial means to participate under the present conditions for access to credit. The only possibility for the poor, therefore, is to obtain financial intermediation through one of the systems set up as NGO and donor projects. Indeed, some of these systems have proved remarkably effective in reaching the poor while maintaining sustainable financial practices. 24. By far the most common source of credit is the informal sector. Traditional savings and loans groups (tontines) are widespread, but they have two disadvantages from the point of view of the poor. One is that money is made available in turn to the members, and therefore not necessarily when it is most needed. The other is that tontines are based on savings, and the very poor are excluded because they have nothing to spare. For them, the only choice tends to be the usuries. Social Sectors 25. The performance of the social sectors in Benin is lower than what could be expected on the basis of its economic indicators, even though the share of expenditures devoted to these sectors is higher than in most Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1988 and 1991, the Government allocated on average about one third of its recurrent budget to social services, with 80 percent of it going to education. Almost all of the social sector allocation is spent on salaries, including those of a bloated bureaucracy, leaving very little for maintenance, equipment and other essential expenditures. Certain sectors of particular interest to the most vulnerable, such as social affairs and rural infrastructure, routinely receive the lowest allocations and see them cut. Human resources have been mismanaged, as evidenced by the number of doctors and teachers holding admninistrative positions in main urban centers (especially Cotonou) in spite of a shortage in rural areas. The problem, therefore, appears to be not so much one of inadequate budgetary allocations, but one of inefficient use of resources, both financial and human. To make things worse, access to whatever social services are available to the poor tends to be made difficult but the lack of effort on behalf of the Government to inform the public about their rights and by the uncooperative attitude of many civil servants. Education 26. Making education more accessible to the poor means concentrating resources on the services the poor are most likely to need: primary school and functional literacy skills. Although the share of the education budget going to primary school has risen from 43 percent in the mid 1980s to 58 percent in 1988, and it is expected to rise further, persistent low enrollment rates and high dropout and repeat rates indicate that this measure alone is not enough. A welcome new policy for the 1993-94 academic year has been the waiving of school fees for girls in rural schools, a measure which addresses one of the main obstacles to making education more accessible to the underprivileged and which promises high returns in the fight agaist poverty. 27. Putting more money into primary education, and using it wisely, is essential to make education more accessible to the poor. But regardless of how much progress is made in this sense, some of the poor will not be able to benefit directly, either because they are too old to go to primary school, or because they live too far from a school and cannot afford the expenses of board and lodging away from home. For these people, the only chance to receive some education is through a non-formal approach. Yet non-formal education appears to receive very little attention from the Government, as evidenced by its meager budget, and only a few NGOs include it among their services. vii Health 28. The 1992-94 plan of the Ministry of Health is articulated around three main objectives: increasing health coverage nationwide, ensuring the viability of the health system, and improving people's health conditions. These objectives imply a marked departure from some of the previous policies, as the total health budget in 1991 was 32 percent lower than in 1987, while the share of the budget going to salaries was 30 percent higher. There has been progress in reaching the lowest income families, but most of the credit should go to donors who almost completely finance the outreach programs for preventive care and health educations, as well as a number of health centers in remote locations. In the end, however, the health care system remains quite centralized and health care remains beyond the reach of the poor. Existing Government health services are significantly under-utilized because of their distance (only 50 percent of the population can reach a health center in one hour using local means of transport), their cost (cash and time), and the quality of the services provided (complaints include language barriers between care providers and patients, over-prescribing, bureaucratic rather than client orientation, and outright rudeness). 29. The establishment of a central medical stores with financial autonomy has made essential drugs available at low cost, and a cost recovery program generated close to one billion CFAF in 1992 to guarantee future drug supplies. Given the high cost of brand medicines sold in private pharmacies (which in any case are all located in urban centers), health centers are the only possible source of modern and reliable drugs for the poor. Hence the decision of the Government to freeze the price of generic medicines after the devaluation. Unfortunately, such an important measure has received very little publicity. Water Supply 30. Only 54 percent of the Beninese population has access to potable water, with urban dwellers being more than twice as likely to have access to safe water than people in the countryside. During the International Decade of Water (1980-1990) an emergency program was successfully implemented, but as of 1991 almost 30 percent of the water pumps were out of order, mostly because communities had not been able to set aside money to pay for maintenance (it is indicative that the lowest breakdown rate was in Borgou, where farmers could pay for maintenance with the profits from cotton). 31. In order to better satisfy the needs of the rural population and ensure water point maintenance, the water works department adopted a new strategy in January 1992. This strategy, which is already being implemented in the Atlantique and Zou regions, includes the following components: (a) improved training of local committee members; (b) capacity building of six different groups involved in rural water supply, including artisans and small-scale enterprises; (c) choice of technologies allowing communities to select low-cost altematives; (d) promotion of alternative technologies; (e) reliable supply of spare parts; and (f) community responsibility for the marketing of hand pumps. Better health education would help change attitudes and behaviors among the rural population. Safety Nets 32. The most important safety nets available to poor people are the traditional ones: the extended family, the community, and various local associations (including tontines). As in the rest of Africa, extended families tend to be synonymous with safety nets, especially in rural areas. But while their pervasiveness and importance is certain, their effectiveness should not be overestimated. Their most viii troublesome limitation is obvious: their effectiveness is related to the means available to their members (and to their generosity, of course). Because people tend to marry in their own social strata, very poor people are likely to have very poor relatives who are not in a position to provide much assistance. This is particularly true for transitory shocks affecting a whole community, such as natural disasters, since poor rural families tend to live within the same geographic area. In addition, modernization poses a significant threat to the effectiveness of the extended family as a safety net, as young people are tempted to embrace an individualistic and materialistic philosophy of life which is the opposite of the principles from which the extended family derives its strength. The emerging phenomenon of abandoned old people is perhaps the saddest manifestation of this trend. 33. Responsibility for assistance to the most vulnerable falls mainly on the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs, and in particular on the Social Affairs Department. Its mandate is wide- ranging, essentially aiming at improving the living conditions of the poor. It includes long-term assistance to the handicapped, lepers, orphans and malnourished children, as well as emergency aid to families in dire straits, such as fire victims. Unfortunately, the Department resources are way below the level required to carry out such an ambitious program: only 2 percent of the public funds allocated to the social sectors during 1988-91 went to Social Affairs, and they were almost completely spent on salaries. The projected CFAF 10 million allocation for emergency assistance has not materialized once since 1988, and were it not for the collaboration of donors and NGOs, the Centers for Social Promotion run by the Department would be basically idle. 34. Food insecurity is a recurrent problem in some areas, and two government institutions have responsibility for addressing it. ONASA deals primarily with the supply side by monitoring food availability and forecasting shortages on the basis of agricultural, climatic and market factors. DANA concentrates on nutritional issues, surveillance and food quality control. The work of the agencies is complemented by a number of donor and NGO activities, including food distribution by the World Food Program (5-6,000 tons a year), a child nutrition program run by the Catholic Relief Services (an NGO) through the Centers for Social Promotion, and an IDA-financed Community-Based Food Security Project implemented by NGOs. While many people have benefitted from such efforts, continued high malnutrition rates suggest that these interventions are not enough. This is why much effort seems to have gone in the past few years into studying and organizing the sector, and a national food security strategy was recently announced. It revolves around three main objectives: (a) ensuring a sustainable domestic food supply by increasing productivity in the South and stopping natural resource degradation in the North; (b) reducing seasonal shortages by developing local markets and improving marketing conditions; and (c) improving access to food and diets by developing income-earning opportunities and introducing nutritional programs. Toward a Strategy for Poverty Alleviation A Framework for Poverty Alleviation 35. Interventions for poverty alleviation are generally conceived and evaluated in terms of an intended output. Focusing on the final outcomes, however, carries the risk of not giving adequate attention to the process of change needed to achieve and sustain them. Thus, a typical pitfall of interventions to reduce poverty is concentrating on the economic and technical aspects, with little or no consideration for the socio-political context with which economic and technical factors interact, and in particular for the way in which the socio-political context will have to evolve to allow for the planned economic and technical ix improvements. Starting from the premise that the process is part of the output, the report identifies three characteristics of an enabling environment for sustainable poverty alleviation. 36. A bottom-up approach should guide the design of interventions to reduce poverty. Trying to see poverty through the eyes of the poor makes it easier to appreciate its multi-dimensionality, thus facilitating the design of interventions that are mindful of how different factors (and sectors) interact with each other to produce or alleviate poverty. A bottom-up approach is also likely to be the most effective in the long run, because unless interventions address the causes of poverty as they are perceived by the target population, there will be little community participation, making interventions more costly and sustainability doubtful. 37. Participation is the natural companion of a bottom-up approach. In Benin, traditional authority is organized along hierarchical lines (patriarchal and patrilinear) that preclude universal participation. This is evident from the lower status of women, who tend to be excluded from much decision making, as well as from the strict hierarchies of many government and non-government agencies, where the opinion of those perceived as inferior seldom counts (even when they are the supposed clients or beneficiaries). 38. The quality of governance tends to determine the form, the extent and the quality of participatory approaches. Benin's newly founded democracy augurs well in this sense, as evidenced by free press, the constitution of opposition parties, the flourishing of Development Associations and the enthusiasm with which a number of NGOs are now adopting empowering strategies. There are, however, unfortunate reminders that true democracy can not be achieved overnight, as the public sector continues to be hampered by the corruption, bureaucratic narrowmindedness and lack of professionalism which had characterized the Marxist-Leninist period. 39. A number of measures can promote a bottom-up approach, participation and good governance. Many of them are likely to have limited financial cost, and may result in savings that more than offset the cost. They include: providing civic education to the masses (through academic curricula, mass media, extension services), establishing individual accountability at all levels, trimming down bureaucratic procedures, decentralizing decision making, training civil servants and NGO officials, and making the legal system accessible to all. However, in the end, the biggest challenge is to change the social norms and values which have generated, and allow to continue, decisions and behaviors which are harmful to equitable development. Three cultural characteristics have been identified as making this task particularly difficult: the tendency among the educated classes to reduce effort to the minimum; the widespread expectation that an all-powerful state will provide an answer to every problem; and the belief in traditional cosmologies which may create a mind-set incompatible with some aspects of poverty alleviation efforts. 40. The institutional framework. The advent of democracy in 1989 set in motion a restructuring process in the public sector which has already produced considerable results. Day-to-day operation of the state bureaucracy has improved, specialized agencies have been created to bypass some of the administrative red-tape (e.g., AGETUR, AGDSD, FAIB, CePEPE), mayors have been elected and a project to reform the local tax system was recently presented to the Parliament. Nevertheless, there are still many aspects of the institutional framework which stand in the way of poverty reduction. Keeping in mind that poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, lack of coordination and collaboration among government institutions is a major obstacle. In addition, public services tend to engage in practices that severely limit their effectiveness: on one hand, the present promotion system for civil servants does not x ensure an optimal fit between the skills needed for a position and the qualifications of the person occupying it; on the other hand, field staff receive neither the motivation nor the supervision necessary to encourage them to take effective steps to assist vulnerable groups. Mayors have been elected, but do not have financial or technical resources at their disposal, thus leaving power effectively in the hands of civil servants nominated by central authorities. Decentralization, however, remains a precondition for ensuring the participation of the poor in both urban and rural communities. 41. It is therefore necessary to create rural and urban districts with clearly-defined powers and resources which guarantee them a modicum of autonomy. This autonomy presupposes a simplified and more efficient system of collecting local taxes, the creation of district-level technical services (perhaps through the secondment of civil servants), capacity building for elected representatives, and a redefinition of the practices of civil servants from central services. The role played by traditional authorities should not be forgotten, especially concerning their relationship with "modern" authorities and their capacity to initiate interventions. Within the civil society, the recent proliferation of various groups, associations and NGOs has given life to a movement whose potential should be better exploited. In this sense, it would be helpful to define a specific legal status for NGOs, different from other types of associations, as well as measures to promote a better collaboration between Government and NGOs, and among NGOs. In addition, an information and sensitization effort should be undertaken, targeting not only the intellectual and political elite but also the general public, so as to create demand for concrete and effective government action, while at the same time stimulating grassroots initiatives. Obviously, committed political leadership could greatly accelerate this process. 42. Removing institutional constraints: gender inequality. Gender-disaggregated statistics and field studies make it clear that women and men do not enjoy equal status, and therefore equal opportunities, in Benin's society. The explanation of women's disadvantaged position lies for the most part in cultural norms and values, which are sanctioned in traditional laws. In theory, traditional law has been superseded by modem law, but in reality this is not always the case, especially for family law. Modern law is not familiar to the average citizen (let alone to the poor), and it is largely inaccessible because of high costs and a hopelessly overburdened legal system. Additionally, the attitude of lawyers and judges is still strongly influenced by traditions which discriminate against women. To make things worse (for women), modern family law has retained some of the discriminatory aspects of traditional law. For example, the traditional polygamous marriage which denies a woman's inheritance rights is still the norm, unless specifically renounced by the couple. 43. The unfairness of family law has long been recognized, along with its potential role as an instrument of women's and children's oppression, and therefore as a cause of vulnerability. But in spite of many speeches and good intentions, a new family code is not yet in effect. The enactment of a new family code should no longer be delayed. It should be accompanied by a widespread and pervasive information and education campaign (through radio, schools, government extension services), so that a change in the law would represent an opportunity to encourage society as a whole to recognize the potential contribution of women to Benin's development and the advantages that would derive from women's empowerment. To facilitate the application of the new family code, legal aides should be crained at the sub-district level and collaborate with the Centers for Social Promotion. 44. Removing institutional constraints: land tenure. Land tenure practices tend to be regulated by custom, especially at the village level. According to customary law. land belongs to the community and its heritage is managed by village authorities. Lacking secure land rights, villagers have little incentive for medium and long-term measures to preserve land quality. Coupled with population xi pressure, the present confusion with regard to land tenure is certain to have a negative impact on economic development, natural resource management and social stability (e.g., contiguity disputes and individualistic behavior forms becoming increasingly common in the overcrowded South). While, in the long run, all Beninese are likely to be affected, it is the vulnerable groups who are likely to suffer the most, by being conned or pushed out of "their" land, and by being unable to use land (often their only asset) as collateral to obtain credit. 45. Fortunately, there is evidence that both the Government and donors are aware of the urgent need to resolve land tenure problems, and are committed to finding a solution. The report urges the Government to intensify its efforts in this sense by expanding field experiments presently being carried out to identify different land tenure situations, so as to cover a variety of representative sites within one year or so. An interministerial conmmission should monitor such experiments, evaluate their findings and, with appropriate outside assistance, draft a land tenure code. While land tenure rights should be established following customary practices to the greatest possible extent, respect for tradition should be tempered by the preoccupation for protecting vulnerable groups; for example, by making provisions to give women land tenure rights. Monitoring 46. Compared to most Sub-Saharan African countries, the amount of poverty-related information available in Benin from official sources appears superior. A closer look, however, reveals that the same data sets have been recycled with small variations in a number of studies, and that many of the more policy-oriented studies have relied on unrealistically small samples and less than rigorous analytical methods. A review of existing data gathering systems has revealed three main gaps: (a) lack of information on household consumption levels and intra-household allocations (essential for calculating a poverty line); (b) lack of reliable malnutrition data at the national level; and (c) lack of information on the coping mechanisms of the poor. These gaps represent a serious impediment to monitoring poverty and the success of efforts to alleviate it, as well as to designing effective interventions. Especially in light of the recent CFAF devaluation, it is essential that Benin and its partners in the development process are able to keep a close watch on the evolving situation, so as to detect the first signs of any negative impact on the welfare of the most vulnerable- and also to record improvements, of course. 47. Because knowledge is a pre-requisite for action, the following recommendations should be carried out in the short term, i.e., within a year. (a) A comprehensive household budget survey should be carried out to obtain data on household consumption and intra-household allocations, using a multi-disciplinary approach. Substantial financial and technical assistance will be needed and should be actively pursued (estimated cost: US$600,000). This survey should be repeated every five years. (b) National-level nutritional indicators should be collected regularly, possibly through a collaboration between the Department of Human Nutrition at the university and the Ministry of Health. (c) Light and focused surveys should be carried out at least once a year to update findings from the household budget survey using both quantitative and qualitative data. Execution could be the joint responsibility of the Technical Unit on the Social Dimensions of Development and INSAE (estimated yearly cost: USS70,000). xii (d) Socio-economic analysis should be complemented by the analysis of cultural variables which are likely to play a major role in shaping vulnerability as well as determining the appropriatness and effectiveness of poverty alleviation interventions. The Social Sciences Departments of the university could play an important role, but capacity building may be needed (estimated yearly cost: US$70,000). (e) Given the limited resources and capacity for data gathering and analysis, the opportunity for twinning arrangements should be explored. (f) A yearly poverty monitoring report should be produced by the Technical Unit on the Social Dimensions of Development, summarizing all available information (NGO reports, ad-hoc surveys, academic papers, ministerial documents, etc.). The Technical Unit should also organize regular informal meetings of Government, donor and NGO representatives to share information and discuss frankly the effectiveness of various interventions to alleviate poverty (estimated yearly cost: US$10,000). Elements of a Strategy 48. This report does not pretend to present a comprehensive and detailed poverty alleviation strategy. That can only be obtained through pervasive and repeated consultations with the poor themselves and the intermediary institutions who work with them (NGOs, churches, local government services). What follows, therefore, is only a selection of key interventions. 49. Agriculture. Because the majority of the poor are farmers, interventions that accelerate the growth of the agricultural sector are likely to be particularly beneficial to the poor. These interventions should have three characteristics: (a) they should aim at slowing down (and hopefully reversing) environmental degradation, so as to make growth sustainable; (b) they should strive to increase returns to labor for the most vulnerable farmers, so as to raise incomes; and (c) they should create employment opportunities, so as to contain urbanization and make better use of human resources. Although cotton has been the main source of growth for agriculture during the past few years, declining world prices, environmental concerns and limited ginning capacity make it an unlikely source of growth for the immediate future. Fortunately, the devaluation has opened new opportunities for expansion in the food crops sector, both for import substitution and for export. 50. Interventions to stimulate equitable agricultural growth must address the key constraints faced by poor farmers; i.e., lack of information, limited marketing opportunities, and insufficient access to inputs. Because women face greater constraints to increased productivity than men, interventions must be particularly mindful of ways to increase women's opportunities to contribute to agricultural growth as well as to the welfare of their families. 51. A concerted effort should go into identifying and promoting export possibilities for food crops, and opportunities for import substitution of processed food (import substitution of unprocessed food is expected to take place because of the price changes following devaluation). Appropriate studies should be carried out within the next six to twelve months, and their results made widely known to extension officers and farmers. In addition, farmers should be kept informed of price changes, so as to enable them to respond to market stimuli. Information on new prices and opportunities should be coupled with the provision of appropriate technical assistance. Hence, the Government should adopt, as a medium-term policy goal. a greater client orientation of its extension services by providing training in participatory xiii approaches, setting targets, motivating change and monitoring effectiveness in assisting vulnerable farmers. Technical training should also be provided to enable extension agents to respond to farmers' needs, giving special attention to the needs of female farmers (e.g., by providing time-saving devices for women). 52. Increased access to credit would help farmers to obtain the inputs needed to increase productivity and make them less vulnerable to middlemen. Short-term measures toward this objective include making CLCAMs accessible to smallholders and assisting/expanding existing successful savings and loans systems operated by NGOs. An evaluation of such systems should be the basis for a medium-term effort to replicate promising approaches throughout the country. Present marketing systems for food crops should also be studied in view of diminishing marketing margins and ensuring that farmers in remote locations do not fall prey to defacto private marketing monopolies. Improving rural road infrastructure through proper maintenance and construction of feeder roads would facilitate market integration and provide off- farm employment. While road construction may require considerable financial and human resources, and therefore be possible only in the medium to long run, steps toward better maintenance should be taken immediately. 53. The tertiary sector and employment creation. As the fastest-growing sector of the economy, the tertiary sector appears the most promising in terms of securing jobs and income-earning opportunities to the poor, even though excessive penalties, heavy taxation and a high level of protection have long inhibited the development of the private sector. A simplification of the tariff system and of the regulations governing formal businesses is already planned and should be implemented in the near future. The poor, however, tend to find employment in the informal sector, so the extent to which they would benefit directly from an expansion of the formal sector is not clear. This is why the report focuses on support to microenterprises. 54. Assistance to microenterprises can be seen both as a measure to create employment and as a measure to prevent greater unemployment. In view of the growth in urban unemployment resulting from the devaluation, the latter goal appears to be the most urgent. The proposed approach aims at building on existing mechanisms through a collaboration with NGOs having a track record of successful microenterprise assistance. As informal financial intermediation systems appear to have been disrupted by the devaluation, it is expected that help will be needed in making credit available to informal operators. In the longer run, training programs in business and marketing skills should be designed, making sure that they are accessible to illiterate people, and made available at little or no cost (especially to women). 55. However successful interventions to support microenterprises can be, it is unlikely that they will create large-scale employment in the short run. This can only be achieved through labor-intensive public works. Although interventions of this nature may not represent a long-term solution, their role is to bridge the poor over difficult times, so as to give them the opportunity to identify income-generating activities which are sustainable in the post-devaluation economy. Moreover, given the dreadful state of the infrastructure, there is no doubt that investing in its improvement and maintenance would have significant social and economic benefits. 56. Two options for labor-intensive public works are considered. The first focuses on AGETUR and AGDSD, which are presently subcontracting labor-intensive public works to local enterprises. While the capacity of these two agencies to generate employment is relatively small (300-500 jobs each), their positive role in developing local small-scale enterprises will produce long-tern benefits. Therefore, xiv inmmediate steps should be taken to allow them to work to capacity. In addition, serious consideration should be given to the creation of satellite AGETURs so as to expand operations bevond the present limits of Cotonou and Port Novo, while keeping an agile administrative structure. 57. The other option is to intensify both routine and preventive road maintenance. Preventive road maintenance, rather than periodic rehabilitation, would result in the use of labor-based methods which would create a large number of jobs accessible to unskilled labor both in urban and rural areas. To meet road maintenance needs, costs would increase by about CFAF 2 billion (pre-devaluation) which, at least initially, could be partly financed through the restructuring of the Road Fund and partly through external financing. The Ministry of Public Works and Transport would need outside assistance to be able to manage an enlarged maintenance program. 58. Education. Because female education appears to have the greatest impact on poverty and Benin's performance on the subject is particularly disappointing, this is where efforts should be concentrated. The three most important goals to pursue are: (1) improving educational levels for females; (2) increasing primary school enrollment rates (especially in rural areas and in the North); and (3) lowering repetition rates. The Government has already shown its commitment to these goals, as evidenced by the increasing share of the education budget devoted to primary education and the decision to abolish school fees for girls in rural areas. But more remains to be done. The education budget still suffers from misallocations that, in the end, are a detriment to the poor, such as excessive shares going to salaries. A greater share should go to operating expenses and investments necessary to improve the quality of education (books, school maintenance), and some of the teachers in administrative positions should be redeployed. 59. Improving the effectiveness of the Ministry is only part of the answer. It is also necessary to address the cultural and economic factors which act as disincentives in parents' decisions to send children to school. Measures dealing with economic obstacles include doing away with the requirement for elementary school uniforms, building new schools in remote or overcrowded areas, offering transport to school, and lessening the opportunity cost of girls' schooling by providing time-saving devices to their mothers. All these measures should be tried in the short to medium run on a pilot basis. To address cultural obstacles, a mass media campaign encouraging schooling should be organized, possibly focusing on sites already chosen for water supply or intermediate technology projects (i.e., projects that allow women to save time). Encouraging greater parent and community involvement in the school and providing functional literacy training for women should also be tried on a pilot basis (the latter could be used for nutrition and health education, or basic business and accounting training). 60. Family planning. In spite of the evidence as to the negative consequences of high population growth rates on Benin's economic progress and environmental sustainability, the country has no population policy and only a very limited child spacing program. However politically difficult it may prove, it is imperative that the Government take immediate and strong action to decrease the population growth rate. While sizable results cannot be expected in the immediate future, any delay would allow the situation to deteriorate further. 61. The first step should be the formulation of an official family planning policy, thus providing a strategy for action as well as a coherent framework for interventions. This should be accompanied by the creation of a Family Planning Directorate in the Ministry of Health, with appropriate budget shifts. Pilot interventions to address unmet demands in urban centers and overcrowded rural areas should get underway as soon as possible, along with a pervasive information and education campaign. A better understanding of the factors determining fertility decisions would be needed to maximize effectiveness, xv and studies on this subject should be carried out within a year. The bottom-up approach adopted by the African Agenda for Action could provide precious lessons. 62. Targeted interventions. Thus far, poverty alleviation interventions have been discussed by sector. The poor, however, do not think in terms of sectors, so the approach advocated (bottom-up, participatory, empowering) may prove difficult to implement if the traditional division of responsibilities among sectors is maintained. In addition, at present, there is no institutional set-up capable of responding quickly and effectively to requests for assistance coming from the grassroots. The process of decentralization recommended above would be a step in this direction, but it should be complemented by a targeted intervention. Such an intervention should take the form of a social fund, whereby an independent agency is set up to provide funding and, if needed, limited technical assistance to implement small-scale projects conceived by poor communities or groups of disadvantaged people within a community. Intermediary organizations, such as NGOs and development associations, provide direct assistance to the target groups by helping them to diagnose problems, devise sustainable solutions and implement them. The experience of other African countries and the interest already shown by the Government would play a major role in ensuring a successful implementation. 63. The virtuous circle. The priority interventions discussed above have been selected because they address some of the causes of poverty and vulnerability, but they make no pretense of being exhaustive. While each recommended intervention is justified on its own merit, it should be recognized that there is a synergistic effect, meaning that the contribution of each intervention in alleviating poverty will increase with the implementation of other interventions. Because poverty and vulnerability result from the interaction of a number of factors, an effective alleviation strategy should be based on the interaction of measures to change these factors. In other words, if poverty is a vicious circle, getting out of poverty requires a virtuous circle. xvi 1. A Profile of Poverty 1 A Profile of Poverty Background 1.1 Benin is a small country of 4.9 million people and a per capita income of US$390 (1991). This per capita income puts Benin slightly above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (US$340), but when development indicators other than economic are used, Benin's relative position is lower than one might expect. According to the human development index used by UNDP, Benin is one of the ten least developed countries in the world (162nd of 173 countries in 1993). Although it produces enough food to be self-sufficient and has good potential for agricultural production, malnutrition affects some 18 percent of the population and 40 percent of children under five. Education indicators are well below SSA averages: in 1992, net primary school enrollment was 48 percent and girls' enrollment was only 34 percent', while illiteracy was 71 percent overall and 81 percent for women according to the 1992 census. A high population growth rate (2.9 percent, according to the same census) results in high dependency ratios (101 percent)2 and pressure on the environment, which in many areas is already showing signs of stress. 1.2 The country's recent economic history can largely be explained by the political choices made, and the associated policy failures. Between 1972 and 1989, a Marxist-Leninist orientation resulted in massive nationalization, the creation of public enterprises and the encouragement of cooperative farming. The expansion of the state's role was associated with a tripling in size of the civil service, which absorbed the large numbers of higher education graduates being created. Initially GDP grew by 5 percent, but by 1983 the economic structure was saddled with low-return investments, heavy external debt service, inadequate incentives and a poorly managed state-dominated modern sector. The situation deteriorated rapidly to an all-time low in 1989 when, amidst growing popular discontent, the Government decided to embark on a structural adjustment process. 1.3 A first structural adjustment loan (SAL 1) was introduced with a view to raising real GDP growth to about three percent annually within a viable macroeconomic framework. However, discontent with the political system and the mismanagement of the economy was exacerbated by further delays in paying civil servants' salaries and the perception that the burden of adjustment was not fairly shared. By the end of 1989 anti-government demonstrations reached crisis proportions, bringing the government apparatus to a virtual standstill. One and a half years later, transition to multi-party democracy was successfully accomplished, giving further irnpetus to the shift toward economic liberalization, but also highlighting the importance of pursuing economic growth within a framnework of social equity. As a result, the objectives of the second structural adjustment loan (SAL II) are "to create the conditions for a sustainable 'Ministcre de Vt6ducation nationale. 'Analysc des statistiques de 1'enseignement primaire pour la ptriode 1988-1992". Cotonou, February 1994. -'Me dependency ratio is the ratio of persons aged 0-14 and 65 + to those aged 15-64 (The Population Council, Fawvly Planning and Population: A comnpndiun of international statistcs. New York: UNFPA, 1993). recovery of economic activity, leading to a growth rate of close to four percent by 1993, and to improve the provision of basic social services while protecting vulnerable groups".' 1.4 Despite the progress made in restoring GDP growth under the structural adjustment program (4.2 percent in 1990-91), the Beninese economy remains fragile. The primary sector accounts for about 40 percent of GDP, more than 70 percent of domestic exports (primarily from cotton and palm oil) and 75 percent of employment. While the average annual rate of growth in agricultural production has managed to maintain itself above the rate of demographic growth for the past decade, this has been achieved mainly through more extensive utilization of available land, often resulting in conditions that are environmentally unsustainable. Private investment and employment opportunities continue to be limited, and the performance of the tertiary sector (a key source of growth in the past three years) is highly dependent on uncertain developments in neighboring countries, notably Togo and Nigeria. The 50 percent (in foreign exchange terms) devaluation announced in January 1994 holds much promise for restructuring Benin's competitiveness, but it is still too early to determine if inflationary pressure will be kept under control and the economy will be able to take advantage of this unique growth opportunity. Benin's development potential is also constrained by the still substantial weight (and relative inefficiency) of the public sector, and by inadequate administrative capacity and human resources. Defuning Poverty 1.5 A widely accepted definition of extreme poverty is that the extremely poor are those who can not secure enough nutrition to perform adequately. People who are undernourished are more vulnerable to disease, tend to develop anthropometric deficiencies, may become brain-damaged and lethargic and, in general, are less able to lead a healthy life with sufficient energy to carry out productive tasks (i.e., labor market, domestic or educational activities) in a satisfactory manner. In this sense, extreme poverty is absolute and, in principle, individual-specific, as the nutritional needs of individuals change with age, sex and life conditions. The measurement of extreme poverty is best done through indicators of nutritional status, such as the incidence of nutritional illnesses (e.g., marasmus), chronic malnutrition (e.g., stunting) or low birth weights. 1.6 Beyond this rock-bottom definition, poverty becomes difficult to determine, and therefore to measure, since poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which can not easily be reduced to a few quantitative indicators. Debates on poverty tend to be conducted in terms of material deprivation as measured by income, consumption or expenditure. Such measures have the advantage of enabling comparison between individuals and households, but poverty as experienced in poor rural and urban communities is not simply a matter of low incomes and expenditures. For example, Chambers' model of the "deprivation trap" distinguishes five clusters of disadvantage: physical weakness, isolation, poverty (in the narrower sense of consumption levels), vulnerability and powerlessness4. Field work recently conducted in Benin confirms that the poor tend to perceive their disadvantage along similar lines. Hence, an assessment of poverty should take into account lack of access to basic social services and 'World Bank, 'Republic of Benin - Second Structural Adjustment Credit, Credit and Program Sumrnaiy', Report No. P-5570- BEN. June 3, 1991. 'Chambers, R., Rural Development: Putting the Last First. London, New York: Longman, 1983. 2 infrastructure, the inability to secure a minimum consumption basket, as well as the social and political mechanisms which contribute to vulnerability and powerlessness. 1.7 The analysis presented here starts by identifying the poor through the use of a poverty line derived from household consumption levels, but goes on to discuss the other aspects of poverty as well. While an effort is made to quantify indicators to the greatest possible extent, qualitative information plays an important role in filling some of the gaps left open by quantitative data and in contributing to an understanding of the socio-cultural aspects of poverty. The following chapters complete the analysis by examining the causes of poverty, with a particular focus on the link between poverty and environment, and by presenting a topology of the poor, which takes into consideration the dynamic aspects of poverty. Throughout the analysis, an effort is made to give voice to the poor by including their own assessment of their situation. Table 1.1: Cost of Basic Staple Foods* To maintain 2,056 cal. per capita per day (including other foods) Region Popul.suze 1992 Food needs covered Weight Stapls per Price per kg Coat staples per by staples capita per year (CFAF) capita per year (%) (kg) (CFAF) North Urban 37,064 78.6 253.1 91.5 23,150 North Rural 1,094,004 80.0 247.5 81.5 20,180 Central Urban 146,846 80.0 243.1 83.9 20,397 Central Rural 667,139 80.0 272.9 78.3 21,365 South Urban 294,637 76.1 166.0 86.8 14,411 South Rural 1,748,907 77.4 181.0 66.7 12,073 Cotonou 533,212 75.0 132.1 85.9 14,986 Benin 4.855349 78.2 208.8 79.9 16.677 * Cereals. ros antd ua. legumes. NOTE: All pnices cowerm staple food package rpepresng local cainoumpoon ponmee. Price infomrmaui a pwckage were by d;-tict, an die regiAl avange were calculared afrr weighkig by fteir respective poplalami sizes (laken from 199 caini data). Source: Staff calcuanm frxm: (1) Poje plate de scuri ire Celbk de sutvi-ae aw}kre et raritiomelk du Bldio-Ddarmhadmi des zor es rss.' Cotumi, May 1992 (this doat uses food cmicp models developed in FAO, MlUir, de stcawv aiinkW, a de conuallstm a Min, ESC/BENI, vol I and [I, 1957); (2) Prices for some urba uau wer esdmLted from 1990 dam a mruket prce at die rasn dlstbfl mukets (DCCP md ONC) as availabe i ONCVGrZ, *Cum de s6curiid alane du P o.' Coeam, July 1992. A Poverty Line 1.8 In order to estimate the distribution and depth of poverty, it is generally considered acceptable to use real per capita expenditure as a proxy for income. A yardstick is then needed to determine who is poor and who is not and, for this purpose, a poverty line is drawn as a cutoff point in the expenditure distribution below which individuals are considered poor. The choice of a poverty line is a matter of preference. An absolute poverty line can be calculated on the basis of the income needed to satisfy 3 minimal nutritional requirements given prevailing dietary habits and other basic expenses, e.g., clothing, fuel, household wares. Because this is a complex (and often controversial) task, a relative poverty line may be used, whereby individuals below an arbitrarily determined consumption level are classified as poor; while not ideal, a relative poverty line can still provide essential information for policy action and targeting special programs. To further assist decision makers in their work, two poverty lines may be determined: one to identify the poor, and a lower one to identify the extremely poor. 1.9 Because reliable income or expenditure distributions were not available', it was decided to obtain an absolute poverty line on the basis of nutritional data, which appeared reasonably reliable. The lack of an income or expenditure distribution meant that much of the quantitative information generally presented with poverty profiles (e.g., expenditure patterns of the poor) could not be obtained. Even the calculation of poverty indicators (the so-called P alpha indicators) was based on the distribution of per capita caloric intake. This is a somewhat unusual approach for poverty indicators, which are generally calculated from monetary measures (expenditures or income), but it was deemed preferable to use fairly reliable data on food intakes rather than dubious budget estimates without a detailed enough distribution6. 1.10 The first step in the calculation of an absolute poverty line was estimating a minimum caloric intake per capita, taking into consideration the specific population structure of Benin. This was necessary because the basic nutritional needs of an individual vary according to age, sex, weight, activity patterns and health status; for women, additional factors are pregnancy and lactation. A minimum energy intake of about 2,056 calories per day is what the average person in Benin would require to maintain reasonable health and performance standards, using the widely accepted 1985 World Health Organization recommnendations'. The cost of purchasing this amount of calories was then calculated, making the necessary adjustments to reflect different dietary habits in different parts of the country8, as shown in Table 1.1. To obtain a poverty line, the cost of the minimum caloric requirement was augmented by 30 percent, so as to account for other necessary basic expenditures. Using the data of the 1986/87 household budget survey (Enquete budget-consommation or EBC), the poverty line falls at CFAF 39,286 or US$13 1, which is about 50 percent of the mean per capita yearly income (CFAF 78,677or US$262). 1.11 A minimum per capita yearly income of CFAF 39,286 or US$131 is therefore necessary to cover expenditures for a daily food intake of 2,056 calories plus some minimal non-food expenditures (e.g., clothing, housing, cooking fuel, etc). Incomes below this amount are not enough to satisfy basic 5See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the data available. 6Because nutritional data were presented using a Lorenz curve with points for each 5 % of the population, P alpha indicators could be calculated with relative precision. Income data, on the other hand, were only available in tables with 70% of the population being lumped together in the bottom category (see INSAE, Enquire budgel-consommaion, vol. 1-9, 1992). 'Annex I contains methodological notes on the calculations of a poverty line, including details regarding the method of calculation of energy requirements. 5The main difference is that the primary staple food in the South is maize, which is gradually replaced by manioc and sorghum going north. The price of one calorie is lower in the South than in the North, because sorghum is more expensive than maize but has a similar caloric value. For a more detailed discussion on this issue see: Projet pilote de s6curitd alimentaire, Cellule de suivi- evaluation, 'Carte alimentaire et nutritionnelle du Benin". Cotonou, May 1992. 'The exchange rate used is CFAF 300 = US$I, which was the rate in 1987. 4 requirements, meaning that people living at this level will have to face very hard choices such as obtaining treatment for a sick child or having enough to feed the family in the evening. But being above the absolute poverty line is not synonymous with not being poor. As the key social indicators discussed below illustrate, access to social services is low throughout the country, implying that some of the people with incomes above the poverty line could still be considered poor on the basis of their inability to afford basic social services. In addition, a considerable portion of those above the poverty line find themselves in a precarious situation whereby they are able to keep afloat under "normal" circumstances, but their lack of assets to protect them against external shocks, such as diseases or crop failures, makes them extremely vulnerable. The role of the absolute poverty line, therefore, is not so much to set aside those who do not need poverty alleviation interventions as to identify those who absolutely need such interventions. Table 1.2: Poverty Indicators for Benin, 1986-1987 Headcount Index Poverty Gap Index Weighted Poverty Gap (PO) (P,) (P2) Poverty line at 39,286 CFAF 0.15 0.044 0.019 (2,056 cal per capita per day) Source: Staff calculations based on EBC (1986-1987). 1.12 Table 1.2 presents estimates of the P-alpha indicators for the absolute poverty line established on the basis of food consumption data. With a poverty line at CFAF 39,286 per capita per year, 15 percent of the population (or 728,300 persons) can be considered absolutely poor. This figure, however, is likely to be an underestimate for two reasons. One is that 1986-87 was an exceptionally good harvest year (agricultural production increased by 20 percent), and therefore some farmers generally falling below the poverty line temporarily rose above it. The other is that many people are likely to have inadequate access to food only during the pre-harvest time, which may last, depending on the year, from a few weeks to a few months. Because the "hungry season" varies throughout the country, it is likely that some of the individuals making up the 15 percent of the population found poor are replaced by others as crops are harvested in one area of the country and exhausted in another. This means that, while at any one point in time during 1986-87 15 percent of the people were unable to provide for their most basic necessities, the total number of people who experienced poverty at some time during that year could have been higher. 1.13 For policy purposes, it is important to know not only how many people are poor (i.e., the poverty headcount index or P0), but how poor they are. The poverty gap index (P,) is used for this purpose, that is, to measure both the incidence and the depth of poverty. In other words, the poverty gap index estimates the distance between per capita expenditure and the poverty line for each individual (the so- called proportional shortfall). Unlike the headcount index, it is not a figure which lends itself to an immediately intuitive interpretation, but it provides the basis for other interesting calculations'". By 'OThe poverty gap index is very valuable for comparing the relative poverty of different groups or geographic areas, thus making it possible to target interventions toward those in the greatest need, but unfortunately the nature of the data available made it impossible to calculate separate P, indicators for sub-samples. 5 dividing P, by P0, for example, one obtains the average distance of the poor from the poverty line. In our case, the average poor person has an income which is 29 percent below the poverty line, which means that the average yearly income of the absolutely poor in 1986-87 was CFAF 27,867 (US$93). On the basis of the poverty gap index it is also possible to calculate how much money would be needed to bring everybody up to the poverty line, by adding up the difference between each poor person's income and the poverty line. In this case that amounts to CFAF 8,462 million. This figure should be taken with caution, however. First of all, it presumes perfect targeting, meaning that all allocations intended for the poor would actually reach the poor and nobody else. Second, this figure only takes into consideration the very minimal requirements, assuming no interaction among the different dimensions of poverty. Thus, CFAF 8.4 billion would be sufficient to provide everybody with enough calories to carry out normal activities, but it would no longer suffice if, because of disease, nutrient retention were lowered. And it would not be sufficient to pay for medical attention or health education either. In other words, CFAF 8.4 billion should be interpreted not as what would be needed to eliminate poverty in one fell swoop, but what would be required at the very least to allow the poorest people to satisfy their most basic necessities in the absence of external shocks. 1.14 It is clear that the absolute poverty line defined above is useful for identifying the most desperately poor, but by no means includes all poor. In spite of the considerable attention given to food security in Benin in the past few years", under normal circumstances food security is only a localized problem (the country as a whole is self-sufficient). For this reason, measuring poverty on the basis of access to food results in a relatively low incidence. For many low-income people the real problem is not so much securing sufficient calories on a daily basis, but having enough resources to be able to cope with unexpected downturns. Disease is probably the most common of these, and its impact is all the more devastating when it strikes the most productive members of the household. Extreme climatic variations may cause harvest failures, thus exacerbating seasonal fluctuations to the point of extreme hardship, as reflected in the high acute malnutrition rates (30-40 percent) of toddlers found by a number of small local surveys. 1.15 While absolute poverty is characterized by inadequate caloric intake, moderate poverty is probably best understood in terms of vulnerability, access to social services and lack of opportunities. Inadequate water supply and sanitation, limited access to education and health care, insufficient means of production and constrained productivity are typical of the moderately poor. Unfortunately, a quantifiable definition of moderate poverty using such indicators is bound to be debatable, because of the inevitable arbitrary choices in measurement (e.g., at which distance does an elementary school or health center become unaccessible? should type of terrain be given a weight?). Hence, the choice was made to rely primarily on qualitative assessments, by analyzing the causes of vulnerability and identifying the groups most likely to suffer from moderate poverty- and therefore at risk for absolute poverty (see next two chapters). This course of action does not make it possible to identify a poverty line for the moderately poor, but in the absence of distributional data for household expenditures, such a line would have little practical value. A tentative estimate of the number of vulnerable people will be presented in Chapter 3. "Projects related to food security include the Early Warning Project with FAO support, the GTZ-financed Food Security Project, and a pilot project on Community-Based Food Security Project financed by IDA (soon to be continued and expanded). 6 Expenditure Patterns and Poverty 1.16 Prices are much higher in the North (Atacora and Borgou) than in the South (Mono, Atlantique, and Ou6me). These differences are reflected in the expenditure patterns presented in Table 1.3. Household expenditures are highest in Cotonou, to be followed by the northern urban areas. In general, the households in the urban areas spend more than those in the rural areas. These higher expenditures may reflect a more expensive way of life, and the spending patterns of the better-off urban population. Nevertheless, just considering basic food prices (maize, sorghum, rice, cassava, yam, and legumes) the differences between the North and the South remain. In the North, the cost of living tends to be higher because of the relatively poor road system and large distances, which, combined with seasonal scarcities, push up prices most of the year. Table 1.3: Selected Characteristics of Households, 1986 - 1987 North North Central Central South South Cotonou Benin Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Avcrage household size 8.8 9.1 6.3 6.0 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.6 % Children under 15 41.0 40.0 46.0 43.0 38.0 45.0 37.0 41.0 % Expenditures Food, drinks, tobacco 80.0 79.0 72.0 76.0 79.0 79.0 68.0 76.0 Clothes/shoes 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 6.0 3.0 7.0 5.0 Housing 4.0 3.0 10.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 Equipment 0.2 2.0 4.0 4.0 0.5 5.0 1.0 0.7 Health 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.7 Transp. & communic. 3.0 2.0 0.9 2.0 2.0 0.8 4.0 2.0 Education/leisure* 0.2 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 Domestic aid 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.7 2.0 0.5 1.0 0.8 Traditional ceremonies 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 Taxes 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.7 Miscellaneous 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 3.0 Total exp./yr (CFAF) 531,011 436,512 493,684 403,631 448,814 421,414 582,818 475,166 (Total without own food (416,078) (204,699) (459,224) (269,017) (442,230) (282,125) (575,560) (352,564) production) Average expenditure per 60,342 47,968 78,362 67,272 83,114 73,932 98,783 71,995 capita/yr (CFAF) Cost basic staple food 23,150 20,180 20,397 21,365 14,411 12,073 14,986 16,677 requirement per capita (see Table 1.1) I Excludes schoDl fees, which are couned under taxes. Source: EBC (19867) and stiff calcaumt. 7 1.17 Without breakdowns distinguishing the poor from the non-poor, it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the expenditure patterns of the poor. By far the largest expenditure category is food, drinks and tobacco. It is unfortunate that these three items have been lumped together in presenting findings from the household budget survey, because they make it impossible to determine how large a portion of the household budget is used for food- which is in general a good indication of the standard of living and how much is spent for "luxury" consumption, especially alcoholic beverages. Drinking is a widespread problem recognized by many. Wealthier people may drink mostly as a status symbol, while poorer people, especially men, may drink to "cheat their hunger" - primarily sodabi (locally made palm tree wine) in the South and choukoutou (locally made beer from sorghum and millet) in the North. Alcohol has a very important role in traditional social interactions. It is commonly used for paying for the services of traditional healers, as part of the bride price, and in a number of other exchanges. Particularly in the remote (and poor) areas where cash is hard to come by, alcohol may replace money in commercial transactions. 1.18 Average health and education expenditures, on the other hand, are very low. If Box 1.1: The Funeral Money access to social services were satisfactory, there would be no reason for concern. But the "There was the case of a man who let his father following sections will make it clear that this is die to save the money for his funeral. He coul not the case and that spending little on health and have spent the money to take his father to the education means having little (or no) health and doctor, but then he would not have had enough education. The extremely low share of household money for a good funeral, and that would never budgets going to education is certainly worrisome, do. At the same time, his son fell ill. But again as.it indicates not only a lacko means, but also he wouldn't spend the money for the doctor, as lt incdcates not only a lack of means, but also because he needed the money for the funeral. The a lack of incentives. A comparison with expenses l child died. The father died too. But he was too for traditional ceremonies is most telling. The afraid that people could come one day to him and average household is willing to spend 5 percent of say 'When your father died, what were you able its budget on them, making it the second largest to do?'. People ruin themselves for the budget expenditure together with clothes, but ceremonies, they want to do better than their almost nothing is spent on education. Keeping in neighbors. They even have children for a question mind that probably a fair amount of what has of prestige, so people will be able to say 'he had been counted in the "food, drinks and tobacco" so many children', and each child will have to pay category was also used for traditional ceremonies, for a ceremony.' it becomes clear why a number of NGOs have s identified the traditional ceremonies as one of the o main causes of poverty. Tradition and social pressure combine to make conspicuous consumption at ceremonies not a luxury for the very rich, but a duty even for the poor. The cost of funerals and marriages has apparently gone up, following a trend opposite to that of the country's economy. In an effort to "keep up with the Joneses", families will routinely go into debt to finance the best funeral yet in the village, going to such excesses as hiring a generator for the wake, offering abundant food and drinks to everybody, even sewing uniforms for those attending. Anecdotes of the excesses, and their sad consequences, abound (see Box 1.1). 8 Nutritional Indicators 1.19 Nutritional indicators are particularly good measures of the general level of well-being of a population. They reflect the ability of the population to feed itself and to lead a relatively healthy life. Actually, they provide insight into the end result of many different factors that influence the quality of life: access to food, access to proper health care facilities, and, in general, the quality of the living environment. Nutritional indicators are often more objective than indicators based on income characteristics alone, because they reflect not only the income level, but also its buying power with regard to the most elementary needs of the human organism. This becomes particularly clear when one realizes that nutritional indicators do not only relate to the purchasing power of income as such, but also to the spending choices made by the population (high incomes have a great purchasing power, and, as very well known in richer countries, may buy us obesity). Further, indicators based on incomes are often biased towards the monetary sector of the economy, which is precisely the area in which the poor tend to participate less than their richer counterparts. Nutritional indicators also have the advantage of being relatively sensitive: changing conditions almost immediately show in the level of nutritional indicators. The weights of children and adults may go up or down within a period of weeks, and changes in long-term indicators, such as faltering physical growth rates of small children due to the cumulative effect of under nourishment, are often visible within a period of a year. 1.20 Most nutritional surveys employ two or three basic indicators. Height-for-age, which reflects the more chronic aspects of malnutrition, is most useful in evaluating the impact of poverty. If children grow up in a poor environment, get ill very often, and have too little to eat to make up for the energy lost, growth will tend to slow down. This in turn is a completely functional adaptation to circumstances, because short and lean children need more food than their bigger counterparts and to reduce growth is a way of economizing on future food intake. The process of faltering growth is called stunting and is usually measured by looking at the attained growth of young children.12 Weight-for-height is a measurement of acute malnutrition caused by inadequate intakes due to food shortage or by poor food absorption due to disease (often accompanied by a lack of appetite). During such episodes children stop increasing their weight and, if this condition persists over some time, existing body tissue may be affected too, a process which is called wasting. A third measure, which was common in older nutrition surveys, is weight-for-age. This indicator combines both aspects and is therefore more difficult to interpret: low weight may simply result from small stature, i.e., from previous stunting, or it may indicate an acute shortage of food. In either case, there is a need for intervention, but not necessarily the same type of intervention. This makes weight-for-age a less suitable indicator for policy-oriented poverty assessments or nutrition surveys. 1.21 There have been a number of nutrition surveys in Benin. The largest, the household budget survey (EBC) of 1986-87, is also the only survey on a national scale. Unfortunately, it reports only the weight-for-height of the sampled children, because the age data were not properly recorded, thus preventing the calculation of any other indicator. There exist therefore no national figures for stunting3. 'The growth rate of stature itself, while a more sensitive indicator, rquims measurement on more than one occasion and it is therefore less suitable for mnajor national surveys. It is also a less stable indicator as grwth mtes may vary according to seasn, which also reduces its value for poverty assesment. '3SmaU local studies indicate that stunting is a serious problem in some of the rural area of Benin. The data on weight-for-age collected by CathweU (See Annex 2) repot large percentages of underweight children under five, most likely due to stunting. For a summary of anthropometric indicators, see: Enqu&e de surveilance nutritionneUe, 'Apercu nutritionnel'. Cotonou: FAO, 1990. 9 The results presented in Table 1.4 show that about 23.4 percent of all children between 12 and 36 months were moderately wasted (i.e., their weight/height ratio was more than two standard deviations below the mean for the reference population) while some 4.5 percent were seriously wasted (more than three standard deviations below the mean). While the reliability of the weight-for-height results obtained by the EBC is questionable because the data still contain coding errors and only half of the data were analyzed (see also Chapter 7), findings of other smaller surveys confirm that wasting is a significant problem in Benin." 1.22 As can be seen from Table A2.4 in Annex 2, wasting is not only serious among younger children (which is the case in nearly all developing countries), but continues to be a problem for children at older ages. Breastfed babies usually grow well, but with the introduction of solid foods, so-called weanling diarrhea (due to poor sanitary conditions) takes its toll. After the age of two, circumstances normally improve"' and wasting tends to disappear, at least as a widespread condition. The situation in Benin is clearly different. Although figures indicate a decreasing rate of wasting among older children, rates remain unusually high, (about 20 percent in children below ten years of age). 1.23 One reason for these high levels of wasting are the recurrent seasonal shortages which affect the nutritional status of children. In the South there are two rainy seasons: the long rains normally start in March and last until mid-June; the short rains are in September and October. There are also two harvests each year, but in many areas the quantity harvested in December is not enough to last until the next harvest after the long rains, in July. This results in a yearly period of food shortage. In northern Benin, there is only one wet season, from May to mid-September, followed by a single and very long dry season. The interval between one harvest and the next is in this case much longer than in the South, but by planting early varieties farmers try to shorten the food shortage period. In normal years this is a relatively successful strategy and the duration of the hungry season is not longer than in the South. When a harvest is poor, however, or when the early crops fail, the system breaks down and a period of hunger follows. To make things worse, the seasonal pattern of food availability is reinforced by a correlating seasonal pattern of disease. Malaria, for instance, has a strong seasonal variation, with a high incidence of the disease from early May to the end of September, followed by significantly lower numbers during the remainder of the year." 1.24 Nutritional levels are also affected by fertility rates. The total fertility rate is 7.1 and has remained practically unchanged for the past two decades. This means that, especially in rural areas where fertility rates are higher than the average, almost all women of reproductive age are either pregnant or lactating, and birth intervals tend to be short. The impact on nutrition is felt in a number of ways. Pregnant and lactating women are more likely to suffer from anemia (caused by iron deficiency) than others, with poor women being at a higher risk because of their limited access to proper diets. According to UNICEF, 40 percent of women of reproductive age are anemic and anemia accounts for 15 percent of maternal mortality."' Because anemia diminishes productivity, pregnant and lactating women enter 4See Enqu8te de surveilance nutritionneUe, op.cit. "$Wasting tends to decrease because of adaptation to low food intakes, which serves to reduce the need for energy-rich food, sad because of increased resistance to the poor sanitary conditions of the environrnent. 1Ministmre de la sante, Service des etudes de strmtngie et de la prevision, Swahistques sanitaires, Annee 1991. Cotonou, 1992. "7UNICEF, Enfants etfemmes, Avenir du Benmn. Cotonou, 1991. 10 a vicious circle whereby poor diets result in lower productivity, which makes it impossible to improve diets. Children are caught in this vicious circle as well, as they depend on their mothers for nutrition either from breastfeeding or from cooked food. The more young children in the household, the less likely their mother will be to have the time and energy to ensure that they are properly fed. 1.25 Even when the average food intake is enough to cover the basic requirement of 2,056 calories per capita per day, the instability caused by the seasonal fluctuations is a matter of concern. It means that a much larger number of people is below the poverty line during part of the year. And, worse, it has lasting consequences, as it is a typical part of the poverty trap: due to the seasonal scarcity farmers have a lower capacity for heavy labor at the time when the need for heavy labor is highest. As explained in Box 1.3, this may not cause them to reduce labor output during a season of food shortage; rather they may use the energy stores in the body and lose weight. While such weight losses may not have serious consequences if kept within a certain acceptable range, there are limits to what can be managed without lasting effects. They certainly explain why harvesting time is a period of great festivities with many ceremonies and significantly higher consumption of food. This increased consumption serves not only to bring consumption up to normal levels, but also to restore necessary reserves, which will be needed in the next agricultural season. The human body is probably a better storage facility for such energy than the granaries, which often have losses of up to 25 percent." 1.26 The seasonal variations of food supply have important consequences for policy development. Any interventions that aim at alleviating poverty through improvements of agricultural techniques or through income-generating activities have to take into account the balance of seasonal food shortages and labor requirements. The agricultural system depends on activities of both men and women, and unless adequate food supply for both is guaranteed, there is no room for expanding labor efforts, however great the deriving benefits could be. Further, the system as it exists now seems to be in a precarious balance. Even relatively small fluctuations may upset the system and cause considerable problems. What may seem a minor intervention may suddenly turn into a major disaster when combined with the negative effects of, say, too little rain. 1.27 Given the lack of reliable data and the strong seasonal variations, little can be said about regional variations of nutritional indicators. Table A2.4 (Annex 2) summarizes the findings of the EBC 1986/87 survey, which show that the prevalence rate of acute malnutrition is particularly high in the urban areas of the South (including Cotonou), while the rural areas in general show lower levels."9 Local studies indicate that some Districts show seriously high rates of acute malnutrition in some years or during some seasons. The regional data, while reflecting some of this variation, are not detailed enough to provide a more systematic overview of the nutritional conditions. "2FAO, 'Mission de s6curitc aizrnntsire et de ia comrrnemialisation au Benin," vol. 11. Rome, May 1987. "'Some of the rnor local evidence indicates that this pattem rray be related to a higher level of stunting in the rumral areas than in the urban areas, due to adaptation. 11 Box 1.2: Seasonal distres of the active population (1) Although seasonal hunger is a widespread phenomenon in West Africa, often little is known about its effects on the population. Two recent studies in Benin document the situation of farming households quite well. The first study covered two rural communities in Benin, both communities with known food security problems. The second study was concerned with only one of these two communities, but expanded the range of material covered. The graph below illustrates the seasonal fluctuation of the weight growth of the childreu of Manta, which is a village in the Atacora Region. Mana has a single rainy season per year, and consequently the yearly harvest, which takes place between December and March, has to provide sufficient food to last for a fiull year. This, however, is seldom the case, and food intakes are lower during the pre-harvest season. weight changes (kg) 2- e Men 0 -2X ' ... -3- Rains Harvest Rains Harvest Rains Harvest 1989 199 1991 1992 AS J F M ii iA S1 0N 0IJ'F'M'AM' J1 Ji A'SIOINID0 months . -~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~. . ............. .- .- . . . F..................... : -: . 0 0 :: tV 0:0..,-,. i-0-.X .;::.:--.,;-..ti..-. . .. . . ... ' , '' ''. .0 . - - 7.................. .... ... ......... ......... ... . - - - - - - -................ ................. -.... . As the inldcates, the a t season, to rse again durin harvIg te.- - e rah te ta chi e y aeto obta goo growth rates durinjg DOecember, anua rebnia and March (even these rates&are relatively low grow - .ii d P -.,... -b am - - J. -. - .h compared to the NCCH£ efence standard).l Thi example jllustrates the importae of collectng nutritiona data during s tobta a ibe picre ofBen's ntritioal situation. Sourac: Ategbb, E.D., -FoW andNut6d6n tnmuzity Nsthm BniMiBni Imnpact oaswth prfonmncae of childzn and ow year to year nritional stahm of adiula.k Univeity ofWqgeningen enid), 1993. WHO, Measurng Owngt ins Narao,mz Saw.: Cuddeliws for asswssing thw nutrtional inyact qf soipplimenary feeig ! programs for vudirable gros. Geneva, 1983. 12 Box 13: Seasonal distress of the active population (II) The graph below shows the weight changes during the agricultural cycle experienced by adults in Manta (the same vilLage that was mentioned in Box 1.2) and Dogbo (a community in the Mono Region). As mentioned, Manta has a single rainy season per year, while Dogbo has two periods of rain, and consequently has also two harvests per year. Usually the pre-harvest is a time of intensive work-, including land preparation, planting and weeding. It is also a period when food stocks are at their lowest. Because agricultural activities have to be performed regardless of the amount of food available, adults in both Manta and Dogbo go through a regular cycle of weight loss; they simply consume the available reserves of energy in the body without being able to keep. them up through food. intake. After the harvest, 1od is relatively abundant and they will consume enough to return the energy stores in their body to the previous levels. Weight changes (kg) MAINTA rains - harvest :- DOGBO . '' - _ - _ _ - ':. ":,0 ''- "-','' ~~~~~~~. .. . .... ', Graph-Ashowsthatmen domen,expenenceabout t- :: -o.' . t , -e .p'-,,:- -*' 2'., sIghl les thn me.: ,athf as ca be sic Atn : W' (Grap ) thr. a.. - -g -. : : .I - :. 1. . ~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~month . [~~~~~~~~~- : , : -::- a., ::: 2-:-:- ::j-: -,,-. :- 1Graph A shows tha men and:.women experilence-:about the s-ame seasonal :stress, women possibly slightylessthan me. Futer, a cn e snfrom the popuaio n b, (Grap B), tere ar |also yearlyvaiations. Durig 1989,.adultsi D-gbower wegh abu oe--kg more thnn 1988. A second study in.MaWta,: cofnducted :sevea: ..months latr:- sl tat als> the. seasonal variation may differ from year to year. In 1988Mamaadl. ts experi o the average about. 5 lkg differece beeen h lowest and eir h w g . Ti s..epad in 1989, but in 1990 seasonal differences- were far less; in 1991this pattern continued..:- Soures: Schultink 1.W., Seaond changm in energ balance odf . Benine. womu~. Uriverity of Wageingen. 199 - Ategbo, E.D., 'Food and mitridoo inaccurity in northern Bamn,- op. ciL. 13 Social Indicators 1.28 To understand the nature of poverty, it is also imnportant to look at indicators other than per capita incomes, expenditures, and nutritional conditions. Access to sufficient food is only one of the primary needs that should be considered when describing poverty. Other aspects, such as access to health services and access to education, are key indicators, because they measure people's opportunity to improve their living conditions by using the services provided in their country. Table 1.4: Benin Social Indicators Poverty Lines: Absolute (extreme) Poverty Line (1987) US$131 (CFAF 39,286) Headcount Index 15% GNP Per Capita (1992) US$414 Social Indicators Gross Enrollment Ratios Primary, Male (1990) ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75% Primary, Female (1990) ....................... 42% Total Fertility Rate (1991) ........................... 7.1 Coverage of deliveries ............................. 38% Infant mortality (1990) ............................. 131/1000' Under 5 mortality (1992) ........................... 147/1000 Immunization Measles ............................. 66% Immunization DPT ............................... 75% Child Malnutrition Severe Wasting (1986) ........................ 4.7% Moderate Wasting (1990) ...................... 23.4% Birthweight under 2500g ...... ................ 11% Life Expectancy Male (1991) ............................... 49 years Female (1991) ............................. 51 years Female/Male Ratio .......................... 1.03 This is likely to be an overestimate due to self-selection bias in the sanple. Source: Tableau de bord social; Statistiques sauitaires 1991; UNDP Human Dev. Report; EBC. 1.29 The educational system of Benin has particularly low primary school enrollment rates. The national gross enrollment rate was only 59 percent in 1992, down from approximately 63 percent in 1985. Since 1983, Benin's primary school enrollment rates have been below SSA standards. Four main factors can be identified to explain such low enrollment rates. First is the breakdown of the school system in 1989, when teacher salaries were not paid for several months. Second, the school fees to be paid by 14 parents vary from CFAF 500 per year in most rural schools to as much as CFAF 4,000 in the larger centers; although children may be allowed to start school without having their fees completely paid, school fees are clearly a considerable obstacle for the poorest families. Third, the distance many poor children have to travel to go to school adds to the cost of schooling; either children will have less time and energy available for farm and domestic labor or they will have to be sent to live away from home (this factor is even more important at the secondary level). Fourth, the limited opportunities for regular employment available to school leavers demotivate parents from investing in their children's education. 1.30 Primary school enrollment of girls is about half that of boys. This situation Box 1.4: Schooling Decisions has been fairly stable over the past few years (there has even been a marginal In many primary schools in North-West Atacora one may improvement since 1985). However, the find only two or three girls in a class of more than fifty national average hides considerable pupils. Questioned about this obvious discrepancy, the regional differences. Primary school parents state: enrollment of girls, compared to that of 'Why would we send our daughters to school? boys, is particularly low in Mono and Once they marry they go to their husband, they no longer Atacora. Both are areas with overall low belong to us.' levels of primary school enrollment, 'If we send them to school, they will not be willing to marry. which means that the young girls in these 'No husband will want an educated wife, who will not areas are particularly disadvantaged. want to work for him.' Low levels of primary school enrollment 'School spoils girls." for girls can be explained by a 'School is for city people.' combination of economic and cultural Women are perceived as leaving the family, which is factors. Girls are needed to perform defined in strictly patrilineal terms, so to educate a woman domestic chores (especially care of is to invest money in another man's family. This is also younger siblings) or to help their mothers the explanation given for denying women the right to carry produce to the market, and these inherit from their parents. activities take priority over education. It Soumrc: Rapid Poverty Appraisal, May 1993. is difficult for parents to see much value in educating girls. From the parents' point of view, educating a girl is a net loss: while she is in school, they forego her economic contribution to the household and have to pay for school-related expenses; after she leaves school, the advantages deriving from her education will accrue to her husband's family, who in most cases will not even pay a higher bride price for an educated bride (see Box 1.4). 1.31 As low as they are, official enrollment rates for primary school give an optimistic picture. Most children primary school will drop out before completion, and a large number of these will leave before becoming literate or numerate.' In addition, enrollment rates may be higher than actual attendance because they represent the maximum attendance and do not show the variation from month to month (if children are enrolled at the beginning of the school year, they will be counted as attending school for the whole year, even if they are withdrawn after a few days). In rural areas temporary dropouts during the peak agricultural season are reportedly high, as the children's labor is needed in the fields. °World Bank Staff Appraisal Report. Republic of Benin Education Development Project, 1993. 15 1.32 Access to health services is one of the most important determinants of the quality of life. As it stands, Benin has a crude death rate of 15.8 per 1,000 and an infant mortality rate of 131 per 1,000. These figures are high, and reflect the meager health system facilities of the country. The major diseases reported are malaria (24 per 1,000) and infections of the respiratory tract (21 per 1,000); diarrhea, with a reported incidence of 14.5 per 1,000, ranks third. Among children these rates are muct higher: the reported malaria rate for children under one year of age is 80 per 1,000, while diarrhea is second in importance with an incidence rate of 38.1 per 1,000. AIDS, while still reported as relatively insignificant in Benin as compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries, has been increasing rapidly (the number of cases tripled every year between 1985 and 1989). In 1991 a total of 247 cases had been officially reported to WHO2t. In most cases (87 percent) the disease~ had been heterosexually transmitted. 1.33 The official counts based on the statistical records of outpatients and hospital admissions underestimate the true morbidity and mortality figures, which are not really known because Benin has a strong parallel system of traditional healers, while markets abound with cheap medicines imported from Nigeria. Some indication of the actual coverage rates of the official medical system can be obtained for assisted deliveries and attendance of pre-natal care. In this respect Benin rates close to the SSA average with a 38 percent coverage of deliveries and 60 percent coverage of pre-natal care'. However, these figures hide considerable regional variations. In Borgou, which in general shows the lowest coverage rates for all medical services, assisted deliveries are 19 percent of the total, while the pre-natal care coverage rate is only 26 percent. 2"Ministire de la sante, 1991, op.cit. 2UNDP, Human Development Report 1993. New York, 1993. 16 2 Poverty And Environment Poverty and Environment Linkages 2.1 Poverty is often closely linked to the environment in which people live. This relationship is present at three different levels. First, poor people tend to live in poor environments, that is, in environments that lack resources for economic exploitation or that do not allow important forms of exploitation. This may be due to physical conditions, such as poor soils or unreliable precipitation limiting the cultivation of crops, or poor infrastructure limiting access to markets. It may also be the result of social conditions, such as a high crime rate or civil unrest, which make exploitation of whatever resources are available hazardous or costly. 2.2 Second, poor people, even if they live in environments presenting certain economic opportunities, may have little access to these opportunities, because they lack the entitlement to make use of the available environmental resources, or because they do not have the necessary means to exploit the resources which they control. This lack of means, in turn, may be due to insufficient skills (and limited access to the educational institutions that teach these skills) or to lack of capital to finance crucial necessities, such as farm inputs or tools needed to do the job. 2.3 Third, some environments present greater hazards than others, and the poor are more likely to live in such environments because they can not afford anything better. For instance, low-income people tend to have no choice but to live in environments that are less healthy than the local average: areas with endemic diseases, with poor sanitation and inadequate waste disposal facilities, or lacking important services (e.g., health care) which may help alleviate the problems caused by an unhealthy environment. 2.4 Finally, the direction of the relationship between poverty and environment may run both ways, in the sense that poor people are more likely to be forced to take actions that further deteriorate their environment. This is because the primary needs of the poor- to feed and clothe themselves, or to cover important expenses in crisis situations (e.g., a sick child or tax payments)-immediately exhaust all available resources and can seldom be met from savings or by borrowing. Under such circumstances, the poor cannot generate the necessary capital or labor power to make investments in their environment, even if to do so would bring them higher returns at a later date. This greatly reduces the capacity of the poor to exploit their environment in a sustainable manner, a situation which is best described as a vicious circle: the poverty of the environment forces the poor into actions that will further impoverish the environment, thus creating more povertv. 2.5 As is evident from this short introduction, the relationship between poverty and environment is complex. This chapter does not pretend to unravel this complexity in all its aspects. That would require a detailed study of the subject, for which most of the necessary data are as yet unavailable. Nevertheless, an effort is made to highlight some of the characteristics of the environment-poverty nexus in Benin, because it is necessary for the understanding of the characteristics and the dynamics of poverty itself. Environmental ssues in Benin 2.6 A few general statistics concerning environmental problems in Benin clearly illustrate the importance of environmental issues. The overall economic growth rate for 1994 is projected at 4 percent, while the Environmental Action Plan (PAE)3 estimates the economic cost of the environmental degradation in the country to be between 3 and 5 percent of GDP (see Table 2.1). Although this estimate has a wide range of imprecision and it is not as worrisome as that of some other SSA countries (e g., 5 to 15 percent for Madagascar), it could easily move to much higher rates, as the growth rate of degradation is generally not linear. This suggests that the benefits of economic growth could be offset by environmental costs. 2.7 Degradation of natural resources is proceeding at an alarming rate throughout the country due to a combination of natural and human factors (see Box 2.1). Table 2.1 shows that of all types of environmental degradation identified in Benin, only two are not related to agriculture: "other costs of floods" (5b), which refers to costs in terms of destroyed houses, furniture or roads, and "pollution" (7), which refers to urban and industrial pollution. While erosion is a process which occurs naturally regardless of human interference, agricultural activities-present and past-are responsible for a large share of environmental problems. What's more, these activities are affected by nearly all types of degradation (i.e., those accounting for 82 percent of costs due to degradation). Farmers are therefore both the main perpetrators and the main victims of environmental damage. 2.8 The estimates in Table 2.1 suggest that the dominant patterns of agricultural activities can be considered a form of soil mining, meaning that nutrient "exports" (uptake by crops plus losses to processes such as leaching, erosion, volatilization and denitrification) are not balanced by "imports" (supplied, for example, by fertilization), resulting in the mining of nutrients from the soil'. Annual rates of environmental degradation equivalent to 3 percent to 5 percent of GDP translate into an annual loss of 6 percent to 10 percent of the total production of the agricultural sector, a figure about 50 percent higher than the sector growth rate. Thus, in its present form, agricultural development seems far from sustainable, and, what is most relevant to the discussion of poverty, chances are that the environmental problems confronting the rural population will only increase in coming years. 2.9 Of course, there is no prior reason to consider all forms of soil mining as necessarily negative. If the proceeds of soil mining were to be used to finance changes in the agricultural system that would bring about future sustainability, soil mining could be justifiable. Whether these changes are underway in the affected areas of Benin is therefore an important issue. One way or the other, the scale of degradation requires a detailed analysis of its effect on the rural population and on the rural poor in particular, for there is no automatic guarantee that the development of such a new sustainable system, with its special requirements of land and labor, would not be acceptable (or even beneficial) to the poor. 2.10 There are large regional differences with regard to the type and severity of environmental problems, depending on three main factors: ecology, population, and agricultural production systems. The 2Ministhre de l'environnement de l'habitat et de l'urbanisme, 'Plan d'action environnemental du B]nin" (final draft). Cotonou, 1993. "'Van der Pol uses the concept of soil mining to draw attention to the hidden costs of unbalanced cultivation. When no attention is paid to these costs, some forms of land use may appear more profitable than they are. See: Van der Pol, F., "Soil Mining: An unseen contributor to farm income in southern Mali", Royal Tropical Insntwe Bulktin, vol. 325. 18 ecological situation (i.e., the combined effects of soils and rainfall) defines the Table 2.1: Estimated Costs of Environmental sensitivity of the environrment to Degradation (million/CFAF/year) interventions by farmers, mainly in terms of the fertility restorative powers of the soil, its capacity to produce biomass, and Source Miimum Maximum (%) its susceptibility to erosion. Population 1. Erosion 6,100 11,100 41.9 density, or, more precisely, rural population density, is a good indicator of 2. Loss of soil the amount of pressure put on the fertilty 2,000 3,000 12.2 available land resources. However, 3. Bush clearing 1,700 5,400 17.3 because population spread evenly over a land surface may be far less 4. Bush fires 355 355 1.7 environmentally harmful than a simnilar 5. Inundations population distributed more unevenly over the same area, general population (a) crop losses 990 1,490 6.0 density measures should be used (b) other 800 800 3.9 carefully. Finally, the agricultural production system refers to how the 6. Over-fishing 572 572 2.8 environment is exploited by the farming 7. Pollution 2,900 2,900 14.1 population, including activities such as the use of fertilizer or draft animals, the collection of firewood, or, in more Total 15,417 25,617 100 general terms, the difference between Source: PAE, 1993. sedentary farmers and transhumant pastoralists. Ecological Factors and Cultivation Practices 2.11 Although Benin's surface is only 112,622 km2, it has considerable ecological variation, as it stretches from the humid coastal areas in the South to semi-arid areas in the North. Rainfall varies from approximately 1,400 mmiyear in the southeast comer along the coastal strip to a mere 800 mm/year in the far North where the country borders with Niger. In the South, the climate is bi-modal, with one long and one short wet season allowing for two yearly crops; in the North, rainfall follows a uni-modal pattem with one dry and one wet season. The north-south dimension present in the climatic division also exists in the distribution of soil types, which, roughly, are initially of better agronomic quality in the South. 2.12 Taken together, climate and soils are responsible for a clear gradient of agricultural potential going from South to North. The best soils, and a long growing period divided over two rainy seasons, make for better potential in the South (Mono, Atlantique, Ouemd, and the most southern part of Zou), with an intermediate zone in the center of the country (southern Atacora, Zou, and southern Borgou), and a far less suitable zone in the North (the remainder of Atacora and Borgou). In practice, however, this differential is not always that clear. Human settlement in the more suitable areas has had an important impact on the present state of the environment and, due to factors such as erosion and fertility loss, the soils in the South have lost much of their original qualities. 19 Box 2.1: Major Causes of Degradation of Natural Resources in Benin Reduced rainfall: Although the drought has had only a limited direct effect on Benin, the prolonged drought periods in the Sahel have speeded up the process of concentration of transhumant herds in the country's North and Center. Farning encroachment on the forests: In the coastal area of the South, the original forests have already almost all been destroyed and replaced by grassed fallow through expansion of cultivation zones and poor pastures in the uncultivable and overgrazed areas. Further north, farmers 'nibble away' an estimated 100,000 ha of forest cover every year (including part of the classified forests). At this rate the forests will have disappeared within about thirty years. Farming practices: Soil nutrients lost through crop exports would need nearly 120,000 tons of simple fertilizer to be restored, i.e., six times more than the actual restitutions relating to these crops. Animal husbandry practices: In order to meet their animal fodder needs, especially during the dry season, herders resort to setting fires, lopping branches, pollarding and even felling trees, particularly in the Center and North. Brush fires: The causes of this scourge are mainly of human origin: preparation of farmland, hunting, pasture renewal and some carelessness and foul play. The damage done comprises destruction of plant cover, erosion and water losses. Flrewood and charcoal production: Firewood is lacking in the South, and a large proportion of energy - wood is today hauled for distances of well over 100 km in increasingly dry areas, involving the risk of. aggravating the process of decertification. Classical ring deforestation is observable around the cities all over the country. Erosion: Studies conducted in Borgou on gentle cultivated slopes (3-4%) have shown that annnal soiEl-0 losses canl be as high as 20 tons/hectare, equivalent to a 3 mm layer. Oi steepa andd longer' slopes,,... erosion can carry off the entire arablc stratum (20-30 cm) in a single year. Animal-powered cultivation across contours also accelerates erosion. Flshing. pctices: Fish stock resources are declining due to over-fishing, often practiced with illegail fine-meshed nets. The resulting economic impact has been estimated, on the basis of increased fish imports, to amount to 572 million CPAF per year. Source: Adapted from Woodd Bank, &nB 4g,'crlutra1Secwr Rwew. Washington DC, 1992. 2.13 Erosion, which is dependent on such factors as slope, rainfall (amount and type: heavy rains carry away more topsoil than drizzles) and plant cover, is an important factor throughout the country. In the South and Center heavy rainfall is associated with higher losses through erosion than in the North. But in the North, where annual rainfall is lower, slow plant growth offers limited protection from all types of erosion, which makes the soil more vulnerable to farmers' actions. 2.14 The actual danger of erosion is to a large extent dependent on land use and soil conditions. Cultivation practices, which are often determined by the requirements of particular crops, play an important role, to the point that it is possible to estimate the erodibility factor associated with each crop 20 (see Box 2.2). Given the cropping pattern of 1990, estimates were made of the total cost of erosion in Box 2.2: Erodibility Factors different parts of the country and are reported in Table 2.2. These estimates are based on an The erodibility factors associated with evaluation of the interaction of the current plant different land uses (and therefore different coverage, rainfall and soil conditions, with the crops) are summarized in the table below. cropping pattern of each region, taking into account Factors higher than I mean that a crop causes (i.e., multiplying by) the erosion effects pertaining to more than average erosion, factors below I the various crops. These figures are high, but they mean that the crop causes less than average ' . ~~erosion. These factors are relative, meaning are an underestimate because they do not yet take into that These used ase merse o tea account the effect of other land use activities, such as average eosion propensity, as caused by soil grazing and firewood collection. The collection of and climate. If, for examnple, land which was firewood, if exceeding the reproductive capacity of previously savannah is cleared for maize the soil, destroys tree coverage and greatly increases cultivation, erodibility will increase by a the danger of erosion. Grazing by cattle, particularly factor of 2.8. if accompanied by deliberate bushfires to produce young grass for the herds, also tends to destroy the Tree Plantation 0.33 tree coverage. The frequent passage of herds destroys Savannah 0.5 the surface of the soil, increasing its erodibility by Pigeon Pea 0.5 wind or rain. Pepper 15 Cotton 1.1 2.15 Fertility loss through excessive or unbalanced Millet/Fonio 0.85 use of soil nutrients is another important problem. Maize 1.4 Most soils, as elsewhere in tropical Africa, have a Manioc withm 1.25 low capacity for retaining nutrients. This means that Groundauts 0.85 fallows are essential to maintain soil fertility. If land Voandzou 0.85 is kept fallow sufficiently long for bush growth to re- Yam 1.1-1.35 establish (e.g., 15 years), the land is said to be under forest fallow. This type of fallow is essential to Soue: PA!, 1993, restore the organic content in the topsoil, thus -_ - _ L _:- improving its retention characteristics. It is also a necessary component in farming systems because this land can be used for firewood collection and for grazing, especially in Atacora and Borgou. Short-term fallows occur in the course of land use by cultivators, who try to intersperse crop cultivation with one or more years of fallow, to improve yields during the years following the fallow. 2.16 If, because of lack of suitable farming land, fallow periods become infrequent, or even disappear, fertility loss occurs. Losses also occur when the fallows are overexploited for firewood or grazing, because the function of fallow (i.e., to restore fertility and to improve the retention capabilities of the soil) is hampered when too much organic matter is removed. Grazing by cattle or small ruminants, which in theory may seem less problematic than firewood collection, may contribute to fertility loss because the beneficial effect of animal dung tends to diminish when animals stay near villages (rather than on fallow land) during the night. In extreme cases, the net effect of fallow may become negative, meaning that the soil will be in a worse condition after the fallow period than it was before. 2.17 Poor farmers have generally little choice but to use all the land they have at their disposal. This is the most common way for the vicious circle of poverty and environmental degradation to start. Having been completely planted with staple food crops, such as maize or cassava, their plots will have a higher 21 propensity to fertility loss and erosion than land used by richer farners, who Table 2.2: Estimated Erosion with Current will be able to set aside some of their Cultivation Pattern land for fallows or less erosion-prone crops. In this way, yields in poor and Erosion Yearly total loss impoverished areas tend to get into a (tons/ha/yr) (million tons) downward spiral, until the better topsoils have washed away, and the fertility of the remaining areas has been reduced almost 12.3 2.3 to the limits of possible cultivation. A Atacora situation like this exists in some of the Borgou 8.0 3.0 very densely populated areas of Benin, Zou 23.0 7.2 such as Mono, Atlantique, Oueme, parts of north-west Atacora, the southern part Atlantique 23.8 3.5 of Zou, and the most northern part of Mono 37.0 5.6 Borgou. Particularly in some areas of northern Benin, a continuation of this Oueme 24.5 5.9 process may easily lead to desertification due to the slow regeneration of plant coverage- a development which, once it Total Soil Loss 27.5 has occurred, is very difficult to reverse. In terms of poverty, this means that the downward spiral caused by the interaction Source: PAE, 1993. between poverty and environmental degradation has run to its conclusion. Population Pressure 2.18 The above discussion makes it clear that pressure on land resources plays a major role in causing erosion and fertility loss. But is such pressure a significant problem in Benin? Population density differs enormously between the North (12 to 15 persons per km2) and the South (150 persons per kni2). In the South, documented land shortages and increasing landlessness make it clear that land pressure is a significant problem (unfortunately no reliable statistics exist). The fact that many people live in abject poverty as a result (whether they remain in the countryside or go to town in search of work) makes the problem urgent. On the other hand, low rural densities in the North create the impression of a vast empty space open to agricultural exploitation, hence representing some sort of safety valve for the overcrowded South. The concentration of population in a few relatively small areas in northwest Atacora and northern Borgou (where the situation is at least as bad if not worse than in the South), reinforces the notion that Benin has important untapped land resources with ample space for further development.' While it is true that large parts of the North have a very low population density and are not cultivated, it should be taken into account that, within the current system of land use, uncultivated areas are not unused, but serve for grazing, fuelwood collection, hunting, and, not the least important, as forest 2This notion is also evident in the Environmental Action Plan with regard to Borgou. It is stated that Borgou is the region 'that has the largest area of unoccupied land. which may give it a crucial role in the future strategies of agricultural developmnent' (Ministere de l'environnement. op. cit., 29). 22 fallows. To put these areas to other more intensive forms of use does have consequences, both in terms of increased pressure on the environment (by reducing fallows) and in terms of interferences with the economic activities presently practiced in these areas (pastoralism, hunting, fuelwood gathering). 2.19 Not all land can be used for agriculture. Large tracts, particularly in the northem regions, are unsuitable for any agricultural use, whether for arable cultivation or for animal husbandry. Furthermnore, some land has been set aside for non-agricultural uses including national parks, hunting zones, protected forests, or re-afforestation areas (see Annex 2, Table A2.6). Although some of this protected land would in theory be cultivable, or at least suitable for grazing, a considerable portion of the protected areas consists of classified land that should be left in its natural state2. Table 2.3: Population Density and Pressure on Land Region Cultivable area Cultivated in 1990 Density on Sustainably Cultivated In 200S km2 (% of area) cultivated land cultivable* (% of area) persons/km2 (% of area) Atacora 13410 13 241 40 23 Borgou 27500 13 182 40 29 Zou 12300 27 280 47 49 Atlantique 2350 52 579 57 80 Mono 2810 48 636 57 88 9ueme 3480 60 494 57 96 Total 61850 21 321 50 61 Source: Staff calculations. See also Annex 2.1 to 2.3 Notes: (i) To calculate the total area needed for cultivation, given the present technology and crop production - the amount of faDlow land necasry to maintain soil fertility should be added to the percentage cultivated. Agronomists estimnate these anounts as 150% of the cultivated area in the North. as 112.5% in Zou and 75% in the South. (ii) The amount of land needed for fuelwood only is theoretical. The PAE notes that the sustainable production of fuelwood stays behind the fuelwood demand. The land aea needed for fuelwood is calculated as the area theoretically needed to produce the required fuelwood without damaging tree coverage (according to the calculations preseated in the PAE). (iii) The amount of land needed for grazing is calculated on the basis of dry season requirements, when catle from Niger and Burkina Faso enter Benin in search of fodder. The calculations are based on an estimate of 7.2 ha per Tropical Livestock Unit (a weighted aerage of all livestock). The requirments are much lower during the wet smaon. 2.20 Table 2.3 clarifies the fact that land resources are not sufficient to cover the farming needs of the population in a sustainable manner. In 1990, the regions of Atlantique and Ou6nme had already exploited their land beyond its regenerative capacity. If the current trends in population growth and land use continue, the situation will have radically deteriorated by the year 2005, and only the Borgou and Atacora regions will be able to use their land continuously. The greatest pressure on land, however, is due to fuelwood needs and not to the need to expand cultivated land area. In 1990, the sustainable (i.e. not causing deforestation) fuelwood supply was sufficient only in Borgou; the greatest shortages were in the 26See also World Bank, Agricultural Sector Review, 1992. 23 South (in Atlantique, demand exceeded supply by 977,200 tons per year). By 2005, demand will exceed supply on the national level by over 2 million tons per year, causing widespread deforestation. Grazing also has a negative effect on the environment, especially in the North. 2.21 Arable cultivation in large parts of the country has been stretched to its limits, while the demand for fuelwood and grazing areas has resulted in a rapid degradation of the available land resources. This degradation has important consequences for the poor of today, who are being confronted with a scarcity of arable land of sufficient quality in their immediate enviromnent and with important costs in terms of either cash or iabor for cooking fuel. It also has important implications for future generation of the poor whose lives are likely to become increasingly difficult as population pressure grows and natural resource degradation accelerates; with the current population growth rate of 3. 1, population will double every year. Figure 2.1: Land shortages and rural poverty reduce wild food and hunting dependence on others for wo high cost of cooking fuel loss of organic matter Land Shortages deforestation soil erosion fnruffiClent food crops lower yieldg no tallow fertiflty loas 2.22 Figure 2.1 sums up how Benin's land shortage influences rural poverty. The most immediate effects are experienced in the South and in a few northern districts. Households with insufficient (or no) land cannot grow enough food to feed themselves, and therefore have to depend on others for access to extra land or employment. Even assuming that they mnanage to avoid abject poverty this way, which is not always the case, they experience great vulnerability because they lack one of the most fundamental assets in rural societies (more on this in the following chapter). To make things worse, in overpopulated areas tree coverage is greatly reduced (since land tends to be cleared for cultivation), making it more difficult for poor people to cope with food shortages in traditional ways, such as collecting wild food or hunting', and making the search for cooking fuel more costly. Because tree coverage is greatly reduced, soil erosion accelerates (no protection against rain and wind from trees) and fertility is reduced (no fallen foliage or fruits to act as organic fertilizers). This in turn, feeds into the vicious circle described earlier in this chapter: low fertility causes low yields, hence land-short households cannot afford to leave some land fallow, which leads to further loss of fertility and even lower yields. "Collecting wild food on other people's land is generally tolerated; the main problem is that there is not much wild food left. 24 Indigenous Solutions to Environmental Problems 2.23 Thus far the discussion of the environrment-poverty relationship has identified a cause-and-effect chain in which the poor appear to play at best the victims and at worst the offenders- however unwillingly or unknowingly. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that they have a purely passive/aggressive role. In many cases, farmers are aware of the environmental processes that are taking place and would love nothing more than to stop degradationr5. The problem is that most environmental measures require relatively long-term investments, while the poor are necessarily concerned with the present. 2.24 Nevertheless, a short-term horizon has not resulted in passivity. Especially in areas where the effect of environmental degradation is becoming visible, people are actively seeking (and implementing) measures to protect the environment. In the South, for instance, farmers are known to experiment with different crops, mixing varieties or interplanting, and such experiments may even take on quasi-scientific forms29. Below are examples of how rural people have found answers to some environmental problems. 2.25 The Palm Agro-Forestry System. This system, which is particularly well developed in Mono and southern Zou, represents a response of smallholder farmers to the increasing land scarcity experienced since the 1960s. The palm agro-forestry system centers around the interplanting of palm trees with food crops. When the palm trees grow, the area available for food crops becomes too small, and the trees are left as a forest fallow crop until they are cut to restart the cycle. The palm trees restore the fertility of the soil, in particular through the decaying foliage, which improves soil capacity to retain nutrients. This part of the cycle is made productive by the collection of palm kernels and palm wine which can be sold or used as raw material for the production of palm oil and alcohol (sodabi). The palm tree foliage also serves as fodder for livestock (mostly small ruminants and pigs) but, as noted earlier, this hampers fertility restoration on the fields, as the animals are kept on village land overnighte. 2.26 Household Waste as Fertilizer. Village studies in Mono and south Zou indicate that the villagers often make use of household waste to return fertility to their fields. Although the use of household refuse as fertilizer is not new (it was mentioned by late nineteenth century authors as common near Ouidah and Abomey), its application shows considerable variation, depending on characteristics such as cultural tradition, the system of land tenure, and the economic position of individuals. Gender and poverty play an important role in this respect. Women are more likely to use this type of fertilizer because they handle most household refuse, so that where women have less access to land near the village, less use is made 28For example, efforts in contour plowing to reduce erosion in Cobly (Atacora) clearly indicate that farmers are aware of the problem and interested in solving it. See: PADES-Cobly, Les caracteristiques, potentalites et contraintes de la sous-prfecture de Cobly (Benin): Resultats d'un rapid rural appraisal. Tanguieta, 1992. 29Dangbegnon, C., Degradation des terres au sud-Benin: Tentative de solutions durables dans une perspecntve des connaissances endogenas. Cotonou/Amsterdam: Universite nationale du B6nin/University of Amsterdam, 1993. 30Fertility loss caused by small ruminants is estimated at about 10%. If manure is used on land near the vilages, fertility on far-off fields is reduced while fertility on nearby fields increases. There is an important gender issue here. Women often receive lesser-quality land, exhausted because of the crops grown by the men before the field is left to the women, or land which is further from the village, which due to its function as grazing area. may have been slowly deteriorating even under the agro-forestry system. See: Van den Broek. A., and I.T. Gbego. Contributions des petits ruminants a la degradation des sols dans le Sud-Benin: Cas du plareau Adja. Cotonou/Amsterdam: Universite nationale du Benin/University of Amsterdam, 1993. 25 of household waste. Sometimes men may instruct their wives to fertilize particular fields, but in practice most domestic waste is utilized by women for themselves. Poor women may even collect household waste from their neighbors for use on their own fields. But in areas where soil fertility problems are of such magnitude that household waste becomes marketable, the poor are mrore often inclined to sell their refuse and use less on their own fields". 2.27 Changing Land Tenure. Growing pressure on land, together with more permanent patterns of land use, has an important effect on land tenure systems. In general, those who are landless or do not have enough land to maintain a household obtain land through contracts with landowners. When land is cultivated by tenants or sharecroppers, incentives to improve the condition of the soil are small'. In fact, many anti-erosion measures are out of the question if control over land is not clearly defined, because such measures involve the planting of tree-crops. In most cases, this requires permission by the traditional landowners, who will not grant it for fear of losing their claims on the land. Counteracting this tendency, a new form of long- term tenancy contract has become common in parts of Mono, in which the tenant is bound to interplant food crops with palms, thus being forced to return the land in fertile condition when the palms have matured33. 2.28 Semi-Permanent Land Use. In the North, agricultural changes are strongly linked to cotton cultivation. Cotton cultivation, which is based on the use of fertilizer input and animal traction, enables the farmers to lengthen the cycle of exploitation of their land, reducing the need for fallows. In this way, agriculture becomes based on a semi-permanent land use system, with cotton as the fertilizing element of the rotatioef. Although the solution of semi-permanent land use has some of the required characteristics for reducing land pressure, investments and working capital allow farmers to choose land-extensive cultivation methods, so that in the end land shortages increase rather than diminish. Urban Environment and Urban Poverty 2.29 In urban areas, environmental problems tend to manifest themselves primarily in the form of health hazards. The most widespread problem is inadequate sanitation and water supply, which is linked to intestinal infections (one of the leading causes of death and disease) and other debilitating illnesses. Needless to say, the poorer the neighborhood, the worse the condition of the water supply and sanitation. The typical overcrowding of slum areas, especially in the quartiersperipheniques of Cotonou, exacerbates the problem. In addition, solid waste disposal leaves much to be desired and in low-income areas is practically nil. Safe water may be available within the neighborhood from wells either privately owned or belonging to the community, but it costs between 10 and 20 CFAF a bucket, which puts it beyond the 3"Wartera, D., La fumure aux dechers menagers dans 6 villages Adja et 6 villages Fon. Cotonou/Amsterdam: Universite nationale du Benin/University of Amsterdam, 1993. '2This has been documented in different parts of Benin. See, for instance: Biauo, G., 'Regime foncier et gestion des expioitations agricoles sur le plateau Adja (Benin)" (Thesis). Abidjan: Universite nationale de C6te d'lvoire, 1991. 11Biaou, G., "Fonctionnement du regime foncier sur le plateau Adja, Benin." Bulletin de la recherche agronomique du B&nin, no. 5, 1992. ;4Bruntrup, M.. Cotton production and the environment - Some consideranons for the Northern Borgou. Cotonou/Amsterdam: Universite nationale du Benin/University of Amsterdam. 1993. 26 reach of the poorest. As a result, poor urban neighborhoods tend to be highly unsanitary places where niumerous infectious diseases are endemic. While there are no statistics relating environmental health hazards, morbidity, and socio-economic status, anecdotal evidence suggests that poorer people are more likely to suffer from environmentally-related health problems because they are the least likely to be able to afford safe water, soap or good nutrition- all of which reduce risk. 2.30 Another environmental problem which affects all of the urban population, but is harder on the poor, is air pollution (which is also one of the leading causes of death and disease). The reason it is harder on the poor is that they often live in close quarters with insufficient ventilation. A notable high- risk group are street hawkers who spend most of their time walking or sitting in busy streets, and are thus exposed to vehicular pollution. Particularly in Cotonou, it is a common experience to be approached by petty traders while waiting at a traffic light. Again, there are no reliable statistics measuring the relationship between air pollution and respiratory tract diseases among street hawkers, but it is not difficult to guess at one. 2.31 An environmental prob;em specific to Box 2.3: We just sit on the bed Cotonou, and, to a lesser extent, to Porto Novo, is periodic flooding. For a few months a year, 'When it rains, it's terrible. The children get during the long rainy season, large areas of the sick, and so do 1. We have water up to our city are under several centimeters of water. It has ankles, sometimes for more than a month, and been estimated that some 10,000 houses in there is nothing we can do. I can not sdl my Cotonou (about 10 percent of the total) and 300 in thing at the. doorstep, because it is all water and Porto Novo (1 percent of the total) are vulnerable in any case nobody would come. That's why I to flooding, and related annual losses amnount to had to take one of the children to the feeding,: to foodig, ad reatedannul loses moun to center at Sainte C6cile - we may go for days:1 CFAF 410 million"5. In principle, nobody cne tSit Ee-w a ofrdy ; with hardly anything to eat. We are lucky we should live in these marshy areas, because it is have a bed when it's l that. We all Just sit on well known that they are unhealthy. But the poor thec bed and try to meep dry". have no choice. Rents and land plots are priced, among othe. things, according to their likelihood Sourcc; Rapid Povery Apprisl, May 1993. of flooding, so in many cases the poor can only - _-_n afford housing that will have them living with water up to their ankles for three months a year. As a result diarrheas and respiratory tract infections (acute and chronic) are rampant, thus affecting productivity; mobility is made very difficult, again affecting productivity; street trade is almost impossible, thus pushing prices up and depriving many petty traders of an income; and houses and household items are damaged, thus requiring new investments every year (see Box 2.3). This way, people are easily caught in a downward spiral, whereby the flood made them poorer, which in tum ensures that they will have no other place to go but where the flooding happens, hence making them even poorer. "Ministere de lenvironnement. op.cit. 27 3 Poverty and Vulnerability 3.1 Vulnerability is an important aspect of poverty, because it reflects its dynamic nature. It refers not to lack or want, but to defenselessness, insecurity and exposure to risk. Poor people are usually among the most vulnerable, but not all vulnerable persons are poor. Poverty, in the sense of low income or lack of food, can be reduced by borrowing, but such debt makes a household more vulnerable. Thus, many Beninese may prefer short-term poverty, such as an untreated illness or insufficient food intake, to an increased vulnerability derived from selling an asset or borrowing from neighbors'. This chapter is devoted to the various groups of people who are particularly vulnerable, not only because of their sheer lack of means but also because of their position in society and/or the specific circumstances of their lives. A Framework for Identifying Vulnerability 3.2 To understand what makes people in Benin vulnerable it is useful to conceive of vulnerability as a function of assets: the more assets people have, the less vulnerable they are. In this context, assets should be considered in broad terms, as a wide range of tangible and intangible stores of value or claims to assistance which can be mobilized in a crisis"7. Thus assets include stores (e.g., jewelry, money, granaries), concrete productive investments (e.g., farming and fishing equipment, animals, tools, land), human investments (education and health), collective assets (irrigation systems, wells), and clains on others for assistance (friendships, kinship networks, tontines, patrons). An awareness of the diverse nature of assets, and of their hierarchy, is essential for meaningful policy action. It helps to identify the most vulnerable individuals and communities. It makes it possible to plan interventions before vulnerability turns into absolute poverty, therefore using a preventive rather than reactive approach. It provides guidance on how to organize assistance in a way that builds on the assets of the recipients, so as to minimize the need for future interventions (more on this in Chapter 8). 3.3 The causes of vulnerability can be found in factors operating at four levels: national, community, household and individual. They can therefore be grouped in four categories. Each of them is briefly illustrated below. (a) National-level factors represent a common denominator of all poor in a given country. They have to do with general geographical and political conditions, as well as with macro-economic policies and laws. For example, being a small country with limnited natural resources severely limits the opportunities for economic growth which could allow the poor to get out of poverty. A public sector dominated by political patronage makes those without good contacts more vulnerable. '6For a discussion on vulnerability see: Chambers, R., 'Vulnerability: How the Poor Cope", Institue of Developmnent Studies Bulletin, vol.20 no.2. April 1989. "This definition is based on Swift, J.. 'Why are rural people vulnerable to famine?', IDS Bulletin, vol 20 no 2. 1989. Along similar lines see also: Sen. A., Poverty and Fanine: An Essay on Enutitement and Deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Note, however, that Sen sees vulnerability-and therefore relative poverty-as a direct function a household's ownership of tangible resources and endowments, but does not include claims on assistance from others in his analysis. Macro-economic policies may determine vulnerability through their impact on the accessibility of social services and financial intermediation services, the establishment of regressive taxes (e.g., the so-ralled imp6t capitaire), the adoption of monetary policies hurting certain groups, etc. The legal system may create vulnerability by its inability (or refusal) to safeguard the rights of certain groups. A case in point is the lack of a clear land tenure system, which inherently favors the most influential individuals in a given dispute. (b) Community-level factors are shared by whole communities, and are primnarily determined by ecological and infrastructural conditions. The massive soil degradation and the decreasing fish stocks described in the previous chapter are probably the two greatest ecological causes of vulncrability, as they lower the productivity of entire villages, thus affecting not only the tangible assets of individual households, but also many of the claims that poorer households can lay on other members of the community (as a fisherman put it, "these days nobody gets enough fish, so it's no use to expect your brother or neighbor to help you out: he doesn't have enough either"). Poor road conditions result in isolation for entire villages, which sometimes cannot be reached tor several months a year. In these cases, household assets may be an effective buffer against the inflated prices caused by a lack of supply, but sometimes there is no supply to speak of. In addition, isolation makes it difficult to market goods and services available in the village and to obtain social services, thus limiting people's capacity to accumulate assets. Exchange rate fiuctuations increase the vulnerability of border communities surviving on trade. (c) Household-level factors relate to household structure and composition, and to its socio-economic characteristics. Other things being equal, the higher the ratio of healthy (productive) adults to ch.ldren, the more likely the household to be able to keep out of poverty. Loss of a productive adult-whether due to disease, death, divorce or neglect-drastically reduces a household's capacity to overcome external shocks and is one of the main causes of destitution (see Figure 3.1)38. More generally, limited access to means of production at the household level (including labor) results in low stores and therefore greater vulnerability. In fishing communities, for example, families without boats are in a far more vulnerable position than families with boats, not only because boats allow fishermen to go further at sea for larger catches, but also because boats can be rented should the household be unable or unwilling to use them (e.g., in case of diseases or social obligations). Average-sized households disposing of less than one hectare of arable land, such as can be found in Mono, may not be absolutely poor but are certainly in a very vulnerable position, because they tend to depend on employment from richer farmers, who may not always be in a position to hire outside labor. In urban areas, uncertain employment conditions make a multitude of informal sector operators (and their families) highly vulnerable to the slightest market changes. Civil servants, until recently considered the most privileged members of society because of their secure jobs, have seen their security decline with the adoption of structural adjustment measures. (d) Individual-level factors determine the vulnerability of a person beyond the characteristics of the household or the community. Human assets such as health and education, for example, affect the degree of vulnerability of the whole household in as much as the household is a social and economic unit, but more than anything else they determine individual vulnerability. In a country 3'High fertility rates. however, should not be seen as totally irrational behavior on behalf of the parents, for children represent not only future sources of labor but also a way to expand the family's claims on others through an expanded kinship network. 29 where there is practically no form of social security, illness or handicap have devastating effects on an individual's self-reliance. Much individual vulnerability, however, is the result of socio- cultural norms which assign different values to ascribed characteristics like age and gender. Such differences often find expression in intrahousehold inequality, meaning that within the household resources and assets are unequally distributed according to the perceived desirability of certain characteristics. Women and children are more vulnerable because tradition gives them less decisional power (including legally binding power) and less control over assets than men, while at the same time their opportunities to engage in productive activities and therefore to build their own assets are more limited. Customary law, as codified in Le coutumier du Dahomey (1931), makes it clear that children are the property of their family, and as such have no individual rights. Women, because of the "weakness of their gender", are considered as legally incapable and therefore kept under the authority of a male figure (father, husband, brother or son); they cannot inherit, but their patrimonial value (because of the bride price) makes it possible to inherit them along with the rest of their deceased husband's estate39. Although the new constitution adopted in 1990 recognizes all citizens as equal before the law, century-old traditions are difficult to change. 3.4 Because individuals are generally part of a household and live in a community, their personal level of vulnerability will be determined by the interaction among the four categories of factors identified above. This is why any attempt to identify vulnerable groups will not produce mutually exclusive categories. In the remainder of the chapter, a number of vulnerable groups are described. Each group has been identified as vulnerable (and therefore relatively poor), primarily on the basis of particular characteristics linked to vulnerability, some at the community level, some at the household level and others at the individual level. This does not mean that each member of the groups identified as vulnerable suffers from relative poverty. Some might have been able to build enough assets to find themselves relatively well buffeted in case of downturns; others will have already experienced external shocks which have put them on a downward road quickly leading to absolute poverty. 3.5 The list proposed here is along the lines of other analyses of vulnerability and poverty recently carried out in Benin by the government and the donor community, indicating that there is now considerable agreement as to where interventions for poverty alleviation should be targeted4. Unfortunately, while this provides an answer to the who and why, and at least a partial answer to the where, it is difficult to estimnate how many. Following a classification similar to the one presented below, the Unit on the Social Dimension of Adjustment of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Restructuring put the proportion of vulnerable people in Benin at 30 percent. On the other hand, FAO estimated that about 22 percent of the population was vulnerable, but it identified vulnerability exclusively on the basis of community and household factors. In the absence of precise quantitative indicators, therefore, 30 percent appears to be a reasonable estimate of the level of relative poverty in Benin. 39For further discussion on this issue see: Djikui, C.Y., 'Les droits successoraux de la femme en droit b6ninois' (Thesis). Abomey-Calvi: Ecole nationale d'administration, Universite nationale du Benin, 1990. See also: UNICEF, Enfants er femmes, Avenir du Binin, op.cit. 'Ministere du plan et de la restructuration economique, Cellule technique de la dimension sociale du developpement. 'Projet de document de base pour la concertation sur la dimension sociale du d6veloppement (DSD)'. Cotonou. July 1993. FAO, Programme national complet de securit6 alimentaire (PNCSA). Cotonou, May 1993. 30 Figure 3.1: lhousehold Impact of River Blindness over a 15-year Period 1i1i (AOMI'M)'IMI1, CON'; AIlNI AC(IIVE I)DFPFIII) 101) (il 11 rO-()I PIIOCIl111(i I101II'il()1) VIA1I11 11 Y 3 IIII {~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~1115 | *li-* s|} lr LA) I 10J11 JU i IIIII llAllO I'llOI) AC I IVI lIII 5 v :l'.sll | - FOIlilE SU 1- -- -. jEjJ 5'.vCr~ly CUs Ails CUs monllis diy sale wild 9va ,,,,1 15 -4 ago Alls httiU seasoln ol lool .0 * Iii, d 4 I- -> IICaIII,/OIII sl;,lt,S fish mggl lil .lig(li l b u alIl Fouid Clolhluijg !Sllel. , 3s 26 9 'I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~r 26', 3S 35 il > K z IU 2{ t|-l 26 , I 4 3 A 1.8 2.5 9 1L 31 28 I I 9 1 2 31 28 31 3/ 3/ 2b 11 .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c .I .V8 Ill IAS,I: I O n ii1 Visia2ly 47 || 4r7 |_|. Iiiipai(Cdl 40 31 14 12 10 5 403 1 0 4.7 6 - -1 - dad p m-dead * Fo hdpoucfiwstufiiec I'IIASI' 4 AA A\ 36 A 6 6 --A1A' 42 el ii A 4 o 42 13 16 14 12 7 ~~~~33 14 14 .ii 14 I13 i 5uI0 If Iuf lele lilou Sou :Evslil T., aI Di I Rn IDS Buln p A I ] A2-2 A 0.3 T.:i 3 -- A A so 4 22 20 IS IS Is IS, de.d p..n - - S Consuming Units * Food production sufficiency Soune: Evans, T., 'Impact of Permanent Disability on Rumi Households: River blindness in GJuinea', IDS Bulletin, vol 20 no.2, 1989. 31 Areas at Risk 3.6 For the purpose of poverty alleviation interventions, it is useful to identify the disadvantaged on the basis of their geographical location because it facilitates program targeting. In countries with widespread poverty and limited administrative capacity, focusing interventions on a few key geographic areas may indeed be the most practical approach to poverty reduction, provided such key areas are relatively small (to contain budgetary expenses) and the great majority of their inhabitants are truly in need (to minimize leakages). The preparatory work done by the FAO and the World Bank for a food security project reflects this philosophy. It is reported below because it is an example of poverty identification (since food security is essentially a poverty problem) which takes into consideration different aspects of poverty, including its dynamic aspect, and which leads to immediate action". 3.7 Areas at risk are defined as areas where a majority of households face food security problems, that is, they do not have access at all times to enough food to lead a healthy and active life42. Such households are generally characterized by insufficient means of production (e.g., land, agricultural or fishing tools, labor force), lack of opportunities to find paid employment, and weak assets (e.g., food stocks and savings). The characteristics of the areas also play an important role in determining food insecurity, and vulnerability in general. Erratic weather patterns, land degradation and lack of infrastructure (especially roads) are among the factors that would put households at risk. 3.8 Eleven parameters related to the causes and effects of food insecurity were gathered over a period of ten years for the 77 sous-pr4yectures of the country. Parameters related to causes include: low agricultural production (measured both in terms of calories and of monetary value), variation in agricultural production, production constraints (measured by access to arable land), high price of staple foods, and isolation (measured by accessibility during the rainy season). The parameters related to the effects of food insecurity are average malnutrition rates and seasonal variations in malnutrition rates. Data were then treated both manually and mechanically to identify the sous-prfectures with the highest concentration of negative factors. A sensitivity analysis was also carried out on the basis of different combinations of indicators and different weights showing the robustness of the conclusions. The results were further confirmed by empirical knowledge, field visits and available literature. 3.9 The analysis highlighted the presence of eleven areas at risk, i.e., facing recurrent food insecurity, and nine areas which, although in a less precarious situation, present a number of potentially risky factors (see map next page). Urban areas were excluded from the analysis because not all parameters used would have been meaningful, but it is conceivable that a similar methodology could be applied to identify vulnerable urban areas by using appropriate parameters (e.g., minimum wages, unemployment rates). The rural areas identified are characterized by low revenues from either agricultural or fishing activities. Such low revenues, in tum, are mostly due to insufficient access to land (e.g., Mono region), loss of land fertility (e.g., Atacora region) and declining fish stock (e.g., Atlantique region). Isolation due to imnpassable roads during the rainy season makes market integration difficult, contributes to high food prices during the pre-harvest period, and reduces opportunities for diversifying income sources. 41See: Projet pilote de securite alimentaire, Cellule de suivi-evaluation, "Carte alimentaire et nutritionnelle du B6nin- Determination des zones a risques'. Cotonou, May 1992. 42Note that this definition takes into consideration seasonal variations which, as explained in the previous chapters, are a very important aspect of poverty. 32 A -AC::IPA~~- : 3rfu7o _ ' *1" touar<4 ' 5. *t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~alss ........ .'.... > 6 *4et_ la k.ipI I ,.,, ptr / \ i *."1W"l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~, 'Ik IZ. S#qm 13 II..mw ~~~~~~~~~~~A lns\ 1..0N0 I AP ~ ~ ~ AESATRS : Aquwqn iPROBEM REA 3. 90'.a|A oA \ s 5 C,@- , .nre-Nekr n/ d I 7. 0jI-'jjS\ - Ill. _t_ _ A)f I I- so.-IO3 I AnY.st L ImJ 1.AthJ@ . / ;Oontt _< |Mi < _me o t_t 't""° ATANX PRBE AREAS TLNIUEW;) ! ftx~~~y-Zslavi~3 3.10 Further analysis has been carried out by ONASA, resulting in the production of a large number of maps on different factors related to food security and poverty (trade routes, migration patterns, ecology, etc.)43. Following the initial mapping of vulnerable areas, a general typology of zones at risk has been obtained". They are: (a) river, lake and coastal areas, where fishermen find it increasingly difficult to survive on their traditional trade mostly because of decreasing fish stocks (see following section); (b) areas in the south with degraded laterite soil, including palm tree plantations near Porto Novo, the southern part of the Zou region and parts of the Mono region; (c) black lands in the Tchi area (Mono and Atlantique regions), which have a high clay content and, although fertile, are easily inundated, making the area inaccessible during the rainy season; (d) north-west Atacora, where pressure on land is very high, resulting in poor soils with low productivity, and high migration rates; (e) the northern part of the Borgou region (Karirama district), where the disadvantages of very difficult access are made worse by ecological problems and pockets of land pressure; (f) peri-urban zones, with high unemployment and under-employment rates, unhealthy living conditions and disrupted traditional safety nets. Vulnerable Groups 3.11 Female-Headed Households. In Benin, as in most other countries, the burden of poverty weighs heaviest on women (see Box 3.1). Cultural norms and legal practices assume that husband and wife will collaborate for the well-being of the household, with the husband having the primary responsibility for all productive activities (i.e., the economic sphere) and the wife having the primary responsibility for all reproductive activities (i.e., the domestic sphere). In reality, women have the obligation to feed the family and care for the children, both materially and emotionally, regardless of the contribution of their husband- and in many cases such contribution is woefully wanting. It is therefore difficult to draw a clear line between female-headed and mnale-headed households, especially if the definition used refers to the actual responsibilities carried out for family survival rather than to a theoretical legal right. 3.12 According to the 1979 census (the last one for which complete figures are available), only 20 percent of households were headed by women, up from 14 percent ten years earlier. However, this is likely to be an underestimate. For example, a monograph on Kandi (Borgou region) found that 41 percent of the women were solely responsible for the support of themselves and their children4. There 43ONCIGTZ, "Cartes de securite alimentaire du B6nin." Cotonou: Laboratoire d'analyse et d'expertise sociale (LARES), 1992. "Personal communication with Mr. Alapini, ONASA director. Publication forthcoming. "Van den Boogerd, L., T. Kjedjebi and M. File, Description de la situason actuelle et recomnendations pour le programme d'appui PADEC-Kandi. Amsterdam: SNV/Institute of Humnan Geography, University of Amsterdan, July 1991. 34 are two main ways in which women may become de facto heads of their households. Box 3.1: Women are the Typical Poor One is through the death of their husband, the other is through abandonment. Male 'If you want to find out who are the typical poor, look migration, often only seasonal but at times for at the women and their children. There's a good periods of several years, usually means that example close by. The man has four wives and 19 the wife has to fend for herself and her children, but he does not give any support to anyone. children, becoming solely responsible for the Nothing. And on top of it, when he comes home he upkeep of her household. At best, the expects to be fed. Each mother has to take care of her husband wleown children, and even if they all live in the sme husband will send small amounts of money. and will take on his share of responsibilities house, they eat from different pots. There are lots of problems between wives and between children of after returning home. Frequently, however, different wives -lots of envy between brothers. The such visits home are short and the husband children are basically on their own, without any will be more concerned with his social status education and not even the proper respect for the expenditures and his ceremonial duties vis-a- elderly: they're like street children. They can't eat vis his lineage than with daily household regularly, health care is out of question, and they expenses. rarely have real clothes. The girls have no choice but to prostitute themselves, starting at 14, even at 12. 3.13 Another form of abandonment, that of They do it for 50 francs, or just for dinner.' remaining at home but neglecting women and l children, tends to be particularly common in sOurce: Rapid Poverty Appaisal, May 1993 (Cotooou). polygamous households4. The general level of impoverishment makes it quite difficult for all but the richest men to provide adequate financial support to more than one family, while there are strong pressures on men to increase their domestic labor force (and status) through additional wives and children (see Box 3.2). As a result, polygamous men tend to support their wives and children in a sequential order, whereby the newest family replaces the previous one. Women in such households, on top of being principally responsible for the welfare of their children, often face the additional burden of having to provide domestic and agricultural labor for their husbands. 3.14 The are two main reasons why female-headed households are generally worse off than others. One is the high dependency ratio, as women heads of households tend to be the only adults in the family and have a large number of dependents (e.g., six or seven children). This situation is made more problematic by the fact that certain essential crops, such as yams and sorghum, and certain agricultural tasks, such as land clearing, tend to be the domain of men. This puts women without adult males in the household at a disaavantage because, being unable to participate in the labor exchange system of working parties for these tasks, they will have to pay men to do the work for them. The other reason is women's inferior condition in Beninese society which limits their access to profitable economic activities. This happens through a combination of factors, including lower education (e.g., the literacy rate for women is 18 percent, against 39 percent for men), legal discrimination (e.g., women cannot inherit), cultural '61n 1979, 31% of married men were polygamous. Men tend to acquire a second wife when they are about 30 years old, and by 43 years of age. 50% of the men are polygamous. See: Klissou, P.. 'La polygamie au Benin", paper presented at the National Seminar to Disseminate the Results of Population Research in Bdnin, Cotonou, 27-30 April, 1993. 35 restrictions (e.g., lucrative cash crops such as cotton are the domain of men47), salary distortions (e.g., weeding, a typically female job, tends to be paid half as much as planting, a typically male job), and a socialization process which undermines women's self-esteem and inhibits initiative. Especially in rural areas, female heads of households find their efforts to support their families hampered by socio-cuitural constraints limiting their access to land, information, credit, training, extension and labor'. 3.15 Widowed and divorced women are probably the most vulnerable because legal and Box 3.2: Labor and Polygamy cultural traditions in many cases deny them access to the resources once controlled by the household. 'The heads of the polygenic households are gradu- In case of divorce, the ex-husband will generally ally moving towards a form of accumulation in take everything with him, including the which they are using their dependents as a cheap children- while the parents of the wife still have non-commoditized labor force wiich makes per- to refund the bride price. If the children are very sonal accumulation of wealth and investments young, they will remain with the mother until possible... On the side of the sons and other they become potentially productive, i.e., until dependents there is more and more the feeling that they becoe pixotseventieall proldui, i.e., util they are exploited... Wives are now more and they are six or seven years old. Payment of child more important as producers of focd for the support is a rare exception, although modern household while the men grow cash crops like courts (only accessible to a small minority) tend cotton. But how can they get the desired money to protect the children's interests, thus for their own financial needs and, partly, for those occasionally granting custody to the mother or of their children?". requesting a family support payment from the father. In the case of widows, relatives of the Source: den Ouden, H.B., The Management of Labor in husband (generally his brothers) will claim rights the Process of Accumulation - The Adja Plateau,' on household property unless the male children (mimeograph). Agricultural University, Wageningen are old enough to inherit, taking away means of production and transport. In some areas in the South, widows are supposed to stay inside their house for a whole year, thus being practically forced to abandon whatever income-generating activity they had and to depend on charity49. The custom whereby brothers-in-law "inherit" widows along with property represents one of the best outcomes, as it affords women the possibility to maintain the usufruct of their household property and provides them the protection and status deriving from a husband. One must wonder, however, what will become of this custom with the spectre of AIDS looming in the ffiture°. 4'There are documented cases showing that when activities become remunerative, they are taken over by men. This has happened, for example, in some Atacora villages where the cultivation of rice was taken over by men when it became possible to market it for a good profit. 4sSNV, "Travaux du groupe IEP-Femmes", Cotonou, 1990-1991-1992. See also: SNV, 'Etude sur ia situatioll des femmes au Bsnin et les objectifs de la politique de ia SNV-Bsnin a P'egard des femmes rurales avec le plan d'operation pour ia periode 1989- 1992". Cotonou, 1988. 491f their children are old enough, they will be in charge of finding food for the family, otherwise women relatives and neighbors will help. If there is already a man who wants to marry the widow, he will take over the responsibility of supporting her family. 50Evidence from Uganda, where AIDS has reached pandemic proportions, indicates that the practice is likely to become !ess common as AIDS awareness among the general population increases (see World Bank, "Uganda: Growing out of Poverty'. Report No. 11380-UG. March 1993). 36 Box 3.3: An old man is the poorest person I know When he finished drawing, the 10-year-old boy explained: 'This is an old man who lives by himself. He has a little field that he manages to cultivate by himself with the hoe, but the cow of a rich man in the village ate all his corn, and he only got a little money for it, because his field is small. That's all he has, so he can't always buy food. He only eats porridge anyhow, unless they invite him to a ceremony; in those cases he might even eat meat, but it would not be more than once a year. His clothes are dirty and torn, and he is dirty too. You see, he can't buy soap. Sometimes, when he is really hungry, he goes to his neighbors to ask for food. So, if we have enough, we give him something. because his children all left and there is nobody to help him. I drew an old man because he is the poorest person I know." "I also know an old man who is poor' said the girl sitting next to him. 'He used to make calabashes with his wife. Then his wife died, and he continued to make calabashes. That's all he does, I think. But nobody wants to buy a calabash these days, he just can't sell them. So he is very poor, and his children have all gone away or died, so they can't help him. I drew him with a hat, but it's not true: he does not have a hat, he barely has a shirt with holes and a pair of pants." Soure: Rapid Povery ApprAisal, May 1993 (school in Tiffi, Ou6me). See Annex 3 for drawings. 3.16 Abandoned Old People. According to African custom, old age signifies dignity and respect. Ideally, it also confers greater decisional power, and therefore control, over both household and community matters. There is reason to believe, however, that such a custom is losing ground and the elderly can now be found in disproportionate numbers among the most destitute members of society. Rural schoolchildren surveyed during the rapid poverty appraisal routinely drew old people as a symbol of poverty (see Box 3.3), while adults living in poor communities (e.g., in areas at risk, as defined earlier in this chapter) often reported that the poorest people in the village were women alone with their children, and elderly persons without family support. Scattered evidence from nutritional studies confirms this impression. For example, an unusually large percentage of severely malnourished old people was reported in the Ze district, in spite of the fact that the area is generally considered Cotonou's granary5". 3.17 In the absence of targeted studies, it is difficult to determine how many old people are at risk, as counting all heads of household above a certain age would undoubtedly produce an overestimate. It appears, however, that it is not a negligibly small group and that its size is growing. The main reason is probably migration, spurred by difficult access to fertile land as well as by the attraction of economic opportunities in the cities or abroad. More in general, the opening to western values has contributed to the weakening of the extended family and greater individualism, thus making it easier for people to ignore their filial duties. 3.18 "Placed" Children (vidomegon) and street children. The economic situation in Benin led to the development of household-level coping strategies which, unfortunately, involve children, most of whom must contribute to their household's upkeep by working (informal sector, petty trade, unskilled assembly 'F de Koning, Department of Nutrition, Universite nationale du B6nin, personal communication. 37 work, etc.). One such strategy is unregulated placement in host families; "placed" children (commonly called vidomegon52), and street children53 are considered the two most vulnerable groups of children due to their separation from their biological family. This phenomenon is not exclusive to Benin; placed children are found across West Africa. While there are no data on the number of "placed" children in Benin, a study of this phenomenon in Cotonou estimated that about half of the capital's families employ the services of a vidomegon54; adding children in other urban areas would put their number at around 100,000. The number of street children has not been estimated, but is growing constantly. 3.19 In some cases, these children are placed with relatives, in others with friends or friends of relatives, and in others still with total strangers. The link between the child's family and the host family tends to determine the living conditions of the child: the closer the link, the more likely the child is to be treated like the host family's own children, that is, sent to school and properly cared for55. Indeed, many children are "placed" to enable them to be schooled and possibly to live a better life in the care of richer relations. Often, however, vidomAgon are simply unwanted children, either because their families are too poor or because they come from broken families and the traditional safety net is unable to absorb them. A survey of vidomegon girls in Cotonou, for example, found that all of their parents mentioned poverty as the main reason for sending their daughters away, often accompanied by polygamy (i.e., a high dependency ratio)'. These tend to be the cases where children end up in families unknown to their own relatives, either through a chain of relationships or through professional intermediaries. Children from the rural South tend to be found in Cotonou or Porto Novo, while children from the North are more likely to be sent to Nigeria. 3.20 Generally, it is the girls who are taken from the villages at eight or ten years of age, when they are considered still "malleable", to work as domestic aides for middle class families, who may also use them for lucrative activities (see Box 3.4). They may or may not receive a small salary, but in any case it tends to be pocketed by the intermediary and is certainly never seen by the girls. Boys are more likely to be used as shop assistants, with traders "employing" as many as five or six of them, and they may be given the chance to learn a trade. In this sense, it may be difficult in some cases to distinguish between vidomWgon and apprentices, thus complicating efforts to regulate the phenomenon. Although in theory vidomEgon should be properly clothed and nourished, and with some arrangements even sent to school, this is often not the case. In addition, they are likely to be overworked, sometirmes receiving assignments beyond their physical capabilities, such as walking all day in the streets with a heavy load of merchandise to peddle and no food in their stomach. Corporal punishment is not out of the ordinary, 52Vtdom8gon is the termn for 'placed' children in Fon. Other terms comunonly used are vilamegbo or amenongbovi in Mina and binenebu in Dendi. 53Street children have been defined as children whose primary residence, workplace, and playground is the street. The majority are boys (70%) and girls aged 8-15. and. in 53% of cases, have not been orphaned (by either parent). See: Ministere du plan et de la restructuration economique, 'Programme national d'action en faveur de l'enfant et de la fernme.' Cotonou, October 1993. 5'Comran, E., "Le travail des enfants en R6publique Populaire du Benin; le cas des filles vidomegon de Cotonou' (Thesis). Cotonou: Universite nationale du Benin, Ju!y 1987. "The INSAE/UNDP survey (ELAM II), found that in Cotonou in 1992 the enrollment rate for children living in households headed by a close relative (parents. aunts, uncles) was 86.2, against 25 for children living in households headed by non-relatives. 56ComIan, op. cit. 38 and according to Terre des Hommes (an NGO working with vidomegon), beatings-or fear of Box 3.4: A Girl Called Ayaba then-are the main remason bdi run-away episodes. Ayaba is 12 years old and has been a vidomigon for 3.21 While for some lucky children being 3 years. Her parents are farmers in Atogon and have placed is a blessing that affords them a much 16 children. Typically, she gets up at 5 am to do the better life than the one they would face by house chores and get the eight children of her 'host staying in their village, for many it is a family" ready for the day. Then she prepares rice, traumatic experience that creates vulnerable which she sells at the neighborhood school until 11 adults. In addition to the inevitable deep am. Back at home, she prepares lunch for the adultsiona scadditi toese children arenotgiven family. In the afternoon, she peddles cookies pre- emotional scars, these children are not given pared by her employer's mother. In the evening, she the opportunity to learn the basic skills required cooks dinner and cleans up the kitchen. She goes to for survival in a rural setting; yet most of sleep at around 11 pm, after her employer has added them, and especially the girls, will go back to up the day's transactions. Ayaba brings in between their village to be married and will have to 1,500 and 1,800 CFAF per day; in exchange, she is provide for themselves with agricultural work. fed, housed and clothed. Thus, vidomAgon may be robbed both of their present, by being used basically as slave labor, SouTce: Adapted from Comlan, E., 'Le ravail des enfants en and of their future, by being deprived of the Rtpublique Populaire du Binin', op. cit., 101. chance to learn the survival skills they will need when they grow up. 3.22 Fishermen's Families. Not all fishermen are poor, but most of them are. Those who are not poor are the owners of fine-meshed nets or boats with a motor, because they are able to keep up the size of their daily catch. But buying an engine on credit from the Fisheries Department takes CFAF 40,000 a month, and a net with small holes costs CFAF 20,000-25,000, so very few can afford them. Fine nets, often owned by the Toffin ethnic group, catch even the smallest fish, leaving little for other fishermen and depleting the fish stocke. Before the arrival of the fine nets (late 1980s), lagoon fishermnen could easily fish daily catches worth CFAF 500, but now they feel lucky if their catch is worth CFAF 300. Fishermen living on the ocean may have catches somewhat bigger catches, but they have to go further and further out to find fish; some have chosen to go fish in the waters of Ghana, where fish are more plentiful. 3.23 Fishing communities identified the poorest families as those without a pirogue and without a net or shrimp traps; those without pirogue may be as many as 50 percent, but those who do not even have a net or a trap are much fewer (10-15 percent). Pirogues, nets and traps can be rented, but most frequently fishermen without equipment will go on somebody else's boat in exchange for one third of the catch- which, given the declining fish stock, may amount to less than CFAF 200. The problem is that it is not always possible to find room on somebody else's boat, especially in the poorest villages. In these cases, those who have nets may rent a pirogue for some CFAF 100 and go shrimp fishing at night. 3.24 Fishermen sell their catch to women (often, but not exclusively, their wives), who then smoke the fish or sell it fresh. The fish tends to be bought from the fishermen on credit, and has to be repaid within two weeks; in the dry season, when fish are more plentiful, the competition is such that women may not be able to make a profit or may actually go into debt. During the rainy season, the weather may 57The name given to the nets by the Toffins is medokpokonou. which literally means "only one ought to laugh". 39 be too bad to go out fishing, so men stay home and their wives have to find a way to feed the famnily (see Box 3.5). This is the time when most fishermen's households will only have two meals a day (ust cereals, no sauce) or even one meal a day. It is also the time when malaria is most prevalent, but there is no money to treat it. Box 3.5: A Fisherman's Wife in Quartier Menontin (Cotonou) "The worst time is when it rains and the men cannot go out to fish. They stay around to repair nets, but more than anything else, they drink sodabi. In a way, I understand them, it's a way to cheat their hunger. But I have to feed my children, so I have to find ways to earn some money. Today I went to work as a porter and I was able to earn 200 franc, which will be enough to feed my four children twice, and even buy some ingredients for a sauce. We have been lucky, because I know there are many who wiU only eat once; we would like to help them, but everybody here is poor. If I have money left after eating, I use it to pay for health care. I'm sick and my daughter is sick, but God knows when we'll have enough money to see a guerisseur. We were told that the water makes the children sick, but I can't afford 10 francs for a bucket of good water. Besides, what kills children here is malaria; with our houses regularly inundated, mosquitoes prosper and there isn't much we can do. Fishing used to be good, but not anymore. That's why the old people say they don't want their sons to grow up to be fishermen. But what are they to do? That's all they know. Now the most important thing is petroleum trade, without that we would not be able to survive. Most women know apiroguier from whom they buy fuel, which they then resell. Men could not do that, because they can't be seen carrying weights on their head- the men you see carrying weights on their head at the port or in the streets are not from here. It is up to us women to support the family." Soume Rapid Povery Appraisat, May 1993. 3.25 Farmer Households with Inadequate Means. Poor soil, insufficient land, and lack of agricultural equipment and inputs are among the greatest constraints to productivity. Farmers having insufficient means of production find themselves in a vicious circle of poverty and low productivity. High population density in the South is resulting in increasingly small family plots. Cultivable land per person does not exceed 1 ha, in any of the 34 sous-prefectures of the South, and in 15 of them it is less than 0.5 ha58. To make things worse, some of the land is being bought by the urban middle class, thus creating a monetized land market which excludes the poor and gives control over land to individuals rather than households or communities. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to obtain reliable estimates of the magnitude of land shortage problems. The Technical Unit on the Social Dimensions of Adjustment in the Ministry of Planning estimates that at present some 11.5 percent of the rural population in the South suffers from land shortages; along the same lines, a study conducted in 1985 on the Adja Plateau estimated that about 14 percent of the households had to either rent land or enter sharecropping agreements because their own land was not enough to survive. Lack of land titles and of any systematic "SCultivable land per person :s less than 0.5 ha in the following sous-prefecrures: Adjara, Avrankou, Ifangni. Aguegue, Akpro- Misserete. Adjohoun and Dangbo (Oueme): Allada, Kpomasse and Ouidah (Atlantique); Come, HoudyogbM, Djakotorm6, Klouekanme and Lalo (Mono). 40 way of determining access to land makes it hard to distinguish between those who may not formally own land but have sufficient access to it, such as migrants to the North, and those who do not formally own land and are unable to grow sufficient food as result, such as farmer households with less than 0.5 ha (0.5-1 ha. is considered the minimum amount of land on which a family of six can survive). 3.26 When land is not enough, farmers have three options: they may rent it, enter into a sharecropping agreement, or migrate. Rental agreements are generally not possible for the poor, who lack the necessary money. As a result, sharecropping is now a commnon arrangement throughout the South (see Box 3.6). The conditions under which sharecropping takes place vary enormously, so it can not be concluded that all sharecroppers are necessarily poor. Indeed, in areas where there is concentration of land ownership but not Box 3.6: Poverty is Having to overall land shortages, the contribution expected from Sharecrop the sharecropper may be reduced to a symbolic present given at harvest time. But regardless of the 'In this village, the only people left with land terms of the sharecropping agreement, sharecroppers are the old people. There's five of them. But are very vulnerable because they lack a most basic they have too many children and don't want to asset in an agrarian society (land) and depend on split the land up, so they give the land to only a couple of their children and the others have others for a chance to gain their livelihood. In areas to get it some other way. They can rent it at where land shortages are acute, it is possible that 30,000 francs per ha. If they have no money, there simply is not enough land for everybody, they do like the rest of us: they sharecrop -- however willing to rent or share crops. In such cases, you keep two thirds and give one third. Ttat vulnerability and poverty coincide. doesn't leave us with enough food, though. Last year nobody had enough maize to spare 3.27 Refugees (and their Host Families). some to sell, and now we have three months Togolese refugees are presently the most important to go before the next harvest and our grana- refugee group in Benin. UNHCR estimates that about ries are empty. That's what we call to be 100,000 Togolese have sought refuge in Benin as a poor having to sharecrop." result of the recent political turmoil in their country, with some 88,000 needing food assistance. According Suse: Raim A Mm to a study conducted by Caritas (a religious NGO assisting the refugees), there are six categories of refugees: (1) the wealthy ones who came at the beginning, and who have bought houses and/or land; (2) those who had enough money to rent a house, many of whom are now running out of money; (3) those who have Beninese relatives with whom they are staying; (4) those who have friends who have relatives in Benin, and are staying with their friends' relatives; (5) those who have no links and no money, thus depending completely on public assistance (these were few in number and have mostly left the country); and (6) street children, who have chosen to cross the border because earning a living in the streets of Lome has become more difficult or risky. 3.28 The refugees tend to be urban dwellers, many of them with a trade and/or an education, and they are mostly in the third and fourth category above. About half are in Cotonou, with some 1,200 sheltered at the Maison du Peuple, while the great majority of the others are in the Mono region, close to the Togolese border. The highest concentration is in Agoue district (sous-prgfecture), where there are three to four times as many refugees as local residents. 3.29 The response to the refugee crisis could not have been more generous (see Box 3.7). The Beninese opened their doors, taking in as many refugees as they could. Most families in Agoue host 41 between seven and twelve people, but households with twenty or even forty refugees are not at all unusual. Box 3.7: Hosting Refugees While this is certainly the least traumatic outcome for the Togolese, there are increasing signs of stress '1 am a widow and a trader. My son who which cast doubts on the sustainability of such an works in Abidjan built me this house, and arrangement. The sudden large influx of people in an now I have 23 refugees living in it. They are area already poor and overpopulated has made it all not my relatives, but they are friends of the more difficult to care for everybody, even in the relatives, so I had to take them in. I am able presence of fairly reliable food assistance59. In the to feed nine of them; the others have to cope words of a resident, "before my family used to eat by themselves. three times a day, but with the arrival of the refugees L h Life has become more difficult for everybodyi it is not possible: we cannot eat in front of the with the refugees. For example, we only refugees who are hungry, and we certainly don't have have one Health Center, and one must get up enough to feed everybody." Many families who have at 5 to get in line, because of the refugees." been sharing the little they had with their guests are feeling worn out and resent the refugees for taking Souse: Rapid Povery Appraisal, May IM. advantage of their hospitality; some refugees, on the other hand, have started behaving as if the Beninese were responsible for their problems and accuse local authorities of siphoning off assistance. 3.30 As is typical of overcrowded conditions, sanitation and health problems require inunediate attention. Latrines are sorely missing and potable water is at a premium, while refugees denounce high morbidity rates (especially gastro-intestinal disorders, as evidenced by refugee children's insistent drawings of people throwing up!) and very difficult access to treatment. Agoue's mayor fears a cholera epidemic if the situation does not improve quickly. Providing education is another important concern. A number of refugees have been absorbed by public schools, mostly through the establishment of double shifts whereby the Togolese provide their own teachers and are given use of the school premises during recess time, that is, between 12 and 3 p.m. and after 5 p.m. A few rudimentary refugee schools have been built by the Togolese themselves, generally with church assistance. Educational material is lacking. 3.31 Retrenched Civil Servants and Unemployed Graduates. Those most obviously vulnerable to adjustment measures are those who have lost their jobs as a result of the mandated public sector down- sizing, and those who were not able to find a job for the same reason'. The civil service voluntary departure program introduced in 1989 as part of SAL I resulted in the departure of 1,590 public servants, contributing to a 4 percent decline in the wage bill. Compensation packages were generous (they cost an average CFAF 2.5 million per departee), and as a result many of those first departees were able to build houses or buy land. By 1992 voluntary departures amounted to some 4,200 (about one-third of those envisaged under SAL II), while about 12,000 employees of public and para-statal enterprises had been fired as a result of liquidations, privatizations and personnel reductions between 1986 and 1992. Voluntary departees received somewhat less costly packages, but those who were let go because of the 59Presently, food assistance is provided by Caritas and the Red Cross. Overall, the World Bank mission heardpositive renarks, but Agoue residents reported that in May no food assistance was delivered for a whole week, and there was literally nothing to eat for days. wlt should be recalled that the automatic absorption of graduates into the civil service was ended in 1987. before the structural adjustment process began. 42 restructuring of state enterprises in many cases had yet to receive any compensation at all several months after losing their job6". 3.32 Three "light surveys" were carried out in Cotonou and Parakou by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis (INSAE) with UNDP to monitor the impact of structural adjustmnent on the groups considered most vulnerable, which included retrenched civil servants (d'flates) and unemployed graduates (jeunes diplomes sans emploi) in 1990, 1992 and 199362. Table 3.1 below compares their employment situation in both years (using independent samples), while Table A2.5 in Annex 2 contains a summary of the survey results. It should be noted that samples were obtained from official lists, and therefore in principle all jeunes diplomes sans emploi should have been unemployed- and young. Nevertheless, in 1992 only one-third of them were actually unemployed and 83 percent were in the 30-39 age cohort. It is also interesting that both the real unemployment rate and the percentage of retrenched civil servants and unemployed graduates who report holding an unacceptable job has decreased between 1990 and 1993. The fact that the majority of those with some sort of employment are in the informal sector without a stable position, and that the decline in real unemployment has been accompanied by a rise in informal sector employment, suggests that these two categories have lowered their expectations (especially the unemployed graduates) and have resorted to a multitude of informal sector activities which, although not secure, allow them to earn an income. Table 3.2: Employment Characteristics of Registered Retrenched Civil Servants and Unemployed Graduates Retrenched Civil Servants Unemployed Graduates 1990 1992 1993 1990 1992 1993 Real Unemployment 47.6% 43.0% 25.0% 46.3% 31.7% 30.0% Acceptable Employment 23.3% 22.0% 32.6% 16.8% 23.3% 40.0% Unacceptable Employment 22.3% 16.0% 5.8% 15.8% 10.0% 13.3% Formal Sector: (salaried) 15.5% 15.0% 5.8% 11.6% 13.6% 23.3% Informal Sector: (salaried)' 9.7% 7.0% 26.9% 8.4% 8.5% 16.7% Informal Sector: (odd jobs)2 27.2% 36.0% 42.3% 33.7% 45.8% 30.0% Toml Informal Sector'"2) 36.9% 43.0% 69.2% 42.1% 54.2% 46.7% Note: Perages do not add up to 100 because of missing values. Source: INSAE/UNDP, ELAM 1. nI. and m1, 1990. 1992, 1993. 'Self-employed, unsalried family workers, and salried aeployees. XInoome-gerring aciviies not rcagnied as employmen. WAttolou, A., 'Les pauvres et les programmes de lutte contre la pauvrete du Benin", paper prepared for the EDI Regional Seminar on the Design and Management of Programs Targeted for the Poor in Francophone Africa, Ouagadougou, November 1992. 62INSAE, 'Caractdristiques et comportements des menages et des groupes vuln6rables en situation d'ajustement structurel". UNDP: Cotonou, 1990; 'Suivi des caracteristiques et comportements des m6nages et des groupes vulnerables en situation d'ajustement structurel 1990-1993'. UNDP: Cotonou, November 1993. 43 3.33 But how difficult was it to find (or set up) income-generating activities? According to the INSAE/UNDP 1992 survey, the majority were unemployed for over two years before finding a job, with the jeunes dipl6mes sans emploi faring worse than the retrenched civil servants (75 percent waited two years or more). It is hard to say whether such long periods of unemployment are due to distortions in the labor market or to lack of effort on behalf of the job-seekers. It can be argued, for example, that former state employees may wait until their severance pay runs out, while many of the unemployed graduates are likely to come from relatively privileged households and therefore feel little pressure to bring home a salary at all costs. The fact that retrenched civil servants tend to be people with family responsibilities may help explain their shorter periods of joblessness: they need a job and will accept anything as long as it helps them put food on the table. The Causes of Poverty and Vulnerability 3.34 As mentioned before, poverty and vulnerability are conditions resulting from the interaction of a number of factors operating at four levels to produce different groups of vulnerable people. This section is meant to provide an overview of the causes of poverty and vulnerability in Benin. First the factors operating at the individual and household levels will be examined, then those operating at the community level, and finally those at the national level. The factors are grouped into three categories-social, economic and natural-according to their main sphere of influence. Needless to say, distinctions between levels (micro, meso, macro) and between categories (social, economic and natural) are not always clear-cut, and the classification is not meant, to be exhaustive or definitive. 3.35 Individual and Household Levels. These are the factors that are identified as directly related to poverty as it is experienced at the micro-level. The poor rarely have enough understanding of their wider socio-economic environment to identify higher-level causes of poverty, but they tend to have a pretty good idea of what makes their particular position difficult. It will be these factors, therefore, that would need to be addressed by projects which aim at providing immediate relief to the most vulnerable. Social factors: * poor health, including disease, handicaps and old age; * high dependency ratio, mainly as a result of high fertility rates (resulting in many dependents) and the often perfunctory contributions from male "breadwinners" (resulting in few providers); * intra-household inequality, whereby women are often denied equal access to household resources and children are treated as property of their father's family; * low education, seldom mentioned by the poor as a cause of poverty, but included in this list because it magnifies the negative effect of the three factors aboved. 63Note that because low education is not a factor readily recognized by most people as a cause of poverty or vulnerability, projects to address this problem are likely to find it difficult to obtain the level of paiticipation needed for sustainability (more on this in Chapter 9). 44 Economic factors: * low returns to labor, whereby individuals work long hours for very little profit- in rural areas the problems are low yields and low or unreliable producer prices, in urban areas the problems are low wages or low margins of profit in informal activities; * lack of employment, in both rural and urban areas, whereby individuals work on a reduced schedule or are unable to find employment altogether. * inter-household inequality, whereby some households are given (or inherit) fewer assets than others, especially in terms of entitlement derived from social standing in the community. Natural factors: * natural disasters, including floods, droughts and parasites, which may affect an entire region or just a few households (e.g., those living close to a swamp). 3.36 Community Level. Individual and household factors are often the result of conditions shared by a whole community or by a group of communities within a certain area. For example, lack of health care services within a reasonable distance ( that is, reasonable from the point of view of a person without access to modern transport) may be the main reason behind a debilitating illness which has plunged a family into misery. Community factors do not affect all members of the community in the same way, of course, because they interact with micro-level factors. Individuals with greater assets (in a broad sense, as they were defined earlier in this chapter) are likely to be better able to cope with potentially negative factors. In the example given above, distant health care services are less of a problem for households able to afford good nutrition, and therefore less likely to fall ill, or households who own a means of transport. Social factors: * insufficient access to health services, primarily in terms of excessive cost or distance, but also related to lack of health education programs; inadequate water supply and sanitation, which create the conditions for some of the most common diseases in Benin (e.g., diarrhea, Guinea worm); * limited access to education, primarily in terms of excessive cost and distance; * lack offamily planning services, which make it difficult even for those interested in limiting their family size to maintain a sustainable dependency ratio; * cultural values and tradition which are particularly important in determining intra-household inequality and dependency ratios (e.g., through beliefs about gender differences and the role of 45 children), and inter-household inequality (mostly through the attribution of prestige and authority)". Economic factors: * poor rural infrastructure, which makes it difficult for farmers to market their products and lowers the farm gate prices paid in remote villages; * lack of employment opportunities, both in urban and rural areas, which not only causes under- and unemployment, but also keeps urban revenues low because of the very high competition in the informal sector; * land shortages in the South, whereby the land available is not enough to allow full employment (this is considered a problem at the community level, because in land-rich communities all households tend to have access to enough land); * environmental degradation, manifesting itself primarily in erosion and loss of soil fertility followed by decreased yields, hence contributing to low returns to rural labor; * agricultural production systems, including land use, agricultural practices and access to agricultural inputs, which determine returns to rural labor. Natural factors: * natural disasters, including floods, droughts and parasites. 3.37 National Level. The causes of poverty and vulnerability at the community level often reflect the characteristics of the country as a whole. In this sense, sectoral and macro policies play a key role as they determine to a large extent the environment in which communities have to find opportunities for development and answers to their problems. Social factors: * insufficient and inefficient funding for primary education, resulting, among other things, in low investments, low quality of education and inadequate maintenance of school buildings; * timid family planning policy and prograns, which make it all the more difficult to reduce population pressure and contain environmental degradation; * insufficient funding for primary health care services, resulting in shortage of medical equipment and drugs, poor quality care, and excessive cost of services; * discriminatory family and labor law whereby customary law sanctions women's very limited inheritance rights and does not adequately protect children against exploitation. 'dTo some extent, cultural values and traditions are shared by a whole nation. They have been listed at the community level because it is within a community (or tribe) that they have the strongest influence on behavior. 46 Economic factors: * poorly integrated marketforfoodproducts, which makes marketing difficult for farmers, caues high seasonal variations in prices, and keeps producer prices lower and consumer prices higher than necessary; * poor rural infrastructure, whereby many villages are isolated either permanently or during the rainy season, thus exacerbating difficulty in marketing, limiting employment opportnities and lowering access to social services; * unclear land tenuresystem, which contributes to environmental degradation by negating incentives to sustainable agricultural practices, and makes it difficult for farmers to obtain credit using land as a collateral. 47 I -I. Policies and Measures I 4 Stimulating Economic Growth 4.1 Experience shows that successful poverty alleviation strategies are generally based on a two- pronged approach which (a) stimulates economic growth, thus increasing the overall size of the pie to be shared, and (b) improves the delivery of key social services, thus increasing the poor's opportunity to have a more equitable share of the pie. This chapter is devoted to economic growth. After reviewing the macro-economic context and the experience of adjustment, it focuses on the two sectors that have the greatest potential for growth: agriculture and the tertiary sector'. Because efficient labor markets and access to credit are essential pre-requisites for a vigorous economy, the performance of the labor market and credit availability are reviewed. Economic growth, however, will have a limited effect on poverty reduction if it is not accompanied by a reduction in income inequality. Hence the analysis will try to assess how different policies affect not just the rate but also the pattern of growth. The Road to Adjustinent 4.2 During the past twenty years almost all Sub-Saharan African countries have experienced limited growth, if not outright decline'. Benin fared relatively well in the 1970s, but GDP growth slowed in the early 1980s after the completion of major public investments (in petroleum, cement and sugar) and the end of the oil and uranium booms in Niger and Nigeria. External debt service obligations and the current account deficit approached unsustainable levels, public finances deteriorated and the losses experienced by two-thirds of the public enterprises threatened the solvency of state-owned banks. 4.3 With the Government unable to generate the political consensus needed to start a comprehensive overhauling of the economy, the situation kept worsening. Between 1985 and 1988 per capita GDP declined on average by 5.6 percent per year, and the budget deficit remained close to 11 percent of GDP under the burden of a tripling of the wage bill and rising debt service payments (the external debt service ratio averaged 47 percent during this period). The situation reached an all-time low in 1989, giving the Government no choice but to embark on a structural adjustment process. 4.4 Adjustment can be defined as the implementation of comprehensive policy reforms, both macro and micro, to rectify inappropriate existing policies and restore sustainable economic growth. It generally consists of a blend of two types of corrective measures: those to stabilize internal and external disequilibria by realigning domestic absorption with domestic supply, and those to stimulate economic growth. In most African countries, adjustment programs have included varying degrees of reduction in government spending, liberalization of domestic product markets, bringing domestic prices in line with world prices, trade and exchange liberalization, currency devaluation, and rationalization of public sector institutions67. 6"The secondary sector accounts for about 8 percent of GDP, producing mostly consumable goods, (e.g., beverages, soap and sugar) and a few basic commodities (textiles and cement). Only a small portion of economic activity takes place in the modemn sector (total workcforce is 5,000). A fragile technological base, low productivity and competition and products smuggled in from Nigeria severely limit growth opportunities in the short to medium term. 6The exceptions are Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Lesotho and Mauritius. Botswana and Mauritius have done particularly well, virtually doubling per capita output in just a decade. 6TWorld Bank, Making Adjustment Workfor the Poor. Washington DC, 1990. Table 4.1: Benin Macroeconomic Indicators, 1989-1996 Estimate Actual Prolections 1989 199O 1991 1992 1993 1994 19 1996 Annual Rates of Growth (%) GDP at Market Price -2.8 3.6 4.7 4.2 3.3 2.2 5.0 5.8 GDY -4.4 5.2 5.4 1.5 2.7 1.4 3.7 5.5 GDY per Capita -7.3 2.0 2.2 -1.7 -0.5 -1.4 0.8 2.5 Total Consumption per Capita -8.2 0.8 3.6 -2.3 -0.1 -6.3 -2.4 0.0 Private Consump. per Capita -8.2 0.8 3.6 -2.3 0.4 -6.6 -1.6 0.7 External Debt: Total DOD (in USS million) 801.6 833.9 881.4 1367.0 1471.0 1558.0 1605.0 1619.0 DOD/[mport of G&S 172.0 138.6 135.2 243.8 260.5 312.9 302.6 283.4 DOD/GDP 53.9 45.6 46.7 63.1 68.9 120.9 109.1 102.3 Total Debt Service 132.9 79.6 64.5 177.2 79.2 79.7 74.6 73.0 Debt Service/GDP 8.9 4.4 3.4 8.1 3.7 6.2 5.1 4.6 National Accounts: Gross Investment/GDP 12.4 13.5 13.7 13.3 13.9 19.0 19.5 19.5 Domestic Savings/GDP 3.6 5.5 5.6 3.9 3.2 6.5 6.5 6.8 National Savings/GDP 6.3 8.1 8.6 5.7 5.4 7.0 7.0 7.5 Public Investments/GDP 7.9 7.5 7.6 6.7 7.4 10.6 10.9 10.6 Public SavingslGDP -4.9 -4.1 -1.8 -2.1 0.1 -1.6 0.3 1.1 Private Investments/GDP 3.8 4.4 4.3 6.6 6.4 8.1 9.0 9.7 Private Savings/GDP 4.5 6.0 6.1 6.6 6.5 8.3 8.6 8.91 Public Finance (% of GDP): Government Revenue* 9.4 9.9 11.5 12.2 12.6 13.3 12.9 12.8 o/w: Fiscal Revenue 7.2 7.9 8.8 10.0 10.7 11.7 11.3 11.4 Total Expenditures 20.2 19.9 18.7 19.9 17.0 24.1 21.8 20.9 o/w: Primary 11.5 11.4 10.9 12.1 10.2 11.4 9.5 8.8 Primary Deficit/Surplus -2.0 -1.4 0.5 1.2 2.2 0.7 2.2 2.9 Overall Deficit/Surplus -10.6 -10.0 -7.2 -7.9 -4.7 -10.8 -8.9 -8.1 Other Economic Indicators: Implicit GDP Deflator (1992-100) 91.2 94.1 97.1 100.0 103.1 128.6 141.2 145.6 Annual Percentage change 3.2 3.2% 3.1 3.0 3.1 24.7 9.8 3.1 Exports Growth Rate -25.7 1.1 7.5 12.9 -2.2 2.2 6.8 6.9 Exports/GDP (Incl. Re-Exp.) 20.5 22.0 24.0 23.3 23.3 21.8 34.0 33.1 Imports Growth Rate -32.6 8.9 11.9 4.4 3.1 -8.7 4.6 5.5 Imnports/GDP 31.3 32.9 34.6 33.2 33.8 49.0 45.9 45.8 Current Account Balance -95.2 -130.1 -130.4 -176.8 -209.7 -185.0 -175.9 Current Account/GDP -5.5 -6.2 -5.9 -8.2 -9.8 -14.4 -12.0 -11.5 External Terms of Trade (1992-100) -12.2 135.7 116.7 100.0 97.1 93.7 88.5 87.5 ' Excluding official grams. Sources: Official dga. staff msama and pmjeuons 1994196 (prepared for PMP). 49 4.5 The first structural adjustment program (SAL I), embraced by Benin in 1989, aimed primarily at raising real GDP growth by about 3 percent annually within a viable macroeconomic framework by: (a) reducing the role of the public sector; (b) improving its efficiency in the provision of core public services; (c) restructuring the banking system; and (d) reforming incentive policies to promote private sector activity. During the first six months of the program (June-December 1989) the economic and financial context continued to deteriorate, and by the end of 1989, growing social unrest made it clear that pursuing far-reaching structural reforms would have been unwise, if not impossible. Nevertheless, some very encouraging progress was achieved, such as an improved balance of payments, a reduced wage bill (by 4 percent), the liquidation or privatization of a number of public enterprises (from 60 at end-1988 to 29 at end-1990), the creation of a Banking Supervision Commission, and the adoption of a new investment code. Adjustment measures had a positive impact on growth, which, although modest, set the country on a new course after years of economic declined. 4.6 With a new Government in place, a second structural adjustment program (SAL II) was approved in June 1991. It aimed at (a) stimulating economic recovery, leading to a real growth rate of 4 percent by 1993; (b) generating a balanced government budget in 1991 and a primary surplus thereafter; (c) containing domestic inflation to 2.5 percent; and (d) improving the balance of payments. It also included a component on the social dimensions of adjustment to protect the most vulnerable groups from the transitional costs of reforms and to improve the provision of basic social services. This component was to pursue a phased approach. In the short term, it was to address areas of known social distress by providing resources to finance priority health and education sector supplies, implement a labor-intensive public works program, and rehabilitate infrastructure essential for to the improved delivery of priority health and education services. In the medium term, the component was to focus on reforming and strengthening the institutions in charge of providing and monitoring social indicators. Adjustment and the Poor 4.7 In the absence of large-scale disaggregated data, it is difficult to determine how the poor and vulnerable have fared under adjustment. Insofar as GDP has grown by an average of 4.2 percent per year for 1990-92 and inflation has been low (2.3 percent for 1990-92), and assuming a more or less equitable distribution of the growth, everybody's standard of living should have improved, including that of the lowest income brackets. For 1993, GDP growth rate is estimated to have been higher than population growth rate, hence improvements should have been maintained. Similarly, a more efficient public sector should enable the Government to provide better services, hence benefiting everybody. The spectacular success of cotton has certainly done a lot to improve living conditions (and therefore alleviate poverty) in cotton-producing areas. Two comments, however, are in order. One is that it is difficult to determine to which extent the registered GDP growth is due to the policies pursued under adjustment and how much is the result of exogenous variables, in particular events in neighboring Togo and Nigeria. The other is that, while there has been a considerable improvement in public finance management and additional progress can be expected, the execution of the investment program has been disappointing. The average rate of execution for 1991-1992 was 65 percent, for 1993 it is expected to be 67 percent. This disappointing performance can be attributed primarily to the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Planning and technical ministries, and overly optimistic projections. Education has 'On the negative side, revenue targets could not be met, a significant part of the public investment program could not be executed as planned, and little headway was made in reimbursing depositors whose accounts were frozen in the banking system. 50 consistently showed the lowest rate of execution (it is expected to be a mere 48 percent in 1993), suggesting that this vital sector for the poor may have benefited less than the others from improved public finance management. While there is no way to know how the execution of the investment program would have been in the absence of a structural adjustment, it is clear that further improvement is needed. 4.8 An overvalued currency has long been considered an impediment to sustained economic growth. Therefore the January 1994 devaluation of the CFAF is expected to produce important long-term benefits, which will support the process of poverty alleviation. The transitional period, however, is likely to entail short-term costs, especially to some of the poor. Comprehensive data on the short-term impact of devaluation on the poor are not available. 4.9 A field study carried out in March-April 1994 made a first attempt at estimating the nature and magnitude of such short-term impacts. Using rapid poverty assessment techniques, data were collected from 574 households in Cotonou and Porto Novo, two secondary towns, and five villages. The preliminary results of the study showed that gross nominal incomes of persons employed in the informal sector (artisans, traders, food sellers, and fishermen) declined 30 to 50 percent between January and March, mainly due to reduced sales volume and smaller profit margins. Food crop farmers, on the other hand, experienced a rise in gross income (20 to 30 percent). The proportion of respondents in the lowest income group (less than CFAF 500 per day) increased dramatically after devaluation, from from 44 percent to 72 percent. At the same time, consumer prices increased not only for imported goods (70-100 percent), but for domestic goods as well (about 25 percent). It was estimated that the cost of staple foods for a family of six increased on average by 40 percent (from CFAF 500-700 per day) between January and April. While effective measures were taken to prevent increases in the cost of basic medical care in the public sector, existing rigidities in the private sector contributed to substantial increases in the cost of care. For example, private pharmaceutical suppliers raised prices way beyond levels set through mutual agreement with the Government. 4.10 The plight of the urban poor can be explained by the fact that their income largely depends on discretionary expenditures made by upper- and middle-income urban residents. As expected, such expenditures appear to have contracted immediately following the devaluation. Investment in new construction also slowed, with consequent impacts on the incomes of casual laborers. Recent reports indicate that informal border trade with Nigeria was only temporarily disrupted, thus protecting the livelihood of small traders, who were to a large extent poor. 4.11 The limited information provided by the survey indicates that the rural poor, who are predominantly subsistence farmers, were relatively unaffected by the devaluation. However, because even the rural poor have to buy some imported goods, there was likely a short-term negative impact on household welfare. In the longer run, this effect may be offset by increasing revenues from agricultural production. The 40 percent increase in cotton producer prices associated with the devaluation and the bumper crop of cotton harvested in 1994 suggest that more resources are now circulating in the rural economy. The extent to which these benefits reach the rural poor is an empirical question which will be investigated through the long-term poverty monitoring program. 4.12 Since the majority of the poor are in rural areas, it is unclear what the net effect of the devaluation on poverty in the country may be. In any case, what has been measured here is a short-term effect, that may be counterbalanced in the longer run by growth in food production, export earnings, and employment benefits. 51 4.13 Even before the devaluation, employment had been affected by structural adjustment because of the restructuring of the public sector which entailed a reduction of the labor force through voluntary retirement or forced dismissal'. Those leaving have been mostly lower-grade employees (which accounts for the lower-than-expected reduction in the government wage bill), and therefore potentially quite vulnerable to the shock of unemployment. A relatively generous compensation package appears to have softened the blow for many (44 percent received more than CFAF 500,000), especially those who have used their compensation to set themselves up in business. For example, a survey of retrenched civil servants conducted in 1993 in Cotonou and Parakou revealed that 12 percent had bought a means of transport (see Table 4.2); the spectacular increase in the number of moto-taxis circulating in the streets of Cotonou (about 700 new registrations a month) indicates that many of the purchased vehicles are being used as an income source'°. Table 4.2: Distribution and Use of Compensation Packages for Retrenched Civil Servants Compensation 1992 1990 Use of compensation 1992 1990 (in CFAF) (several answers possible) < 100.000 16.6% 11.6% Household expenses 83.3% 66.0% 100.000 < 500.000 39.4% 31.2% Purchase urban plot 21.1% 19.2% 500.000 < 1 million 24.2% 18.2% Transportation 12.1% 19.1% > i million 19.7% 18.2% Purchase of land 3.0% 2.1% Waiting for compensation 39.0% Source: INSAE-UNDP, ELAM I and 2, 1990 and 1992. 4.14 Much of the hardship caused by the retrenchment of civil servants is felt in urban areas, because this is where they live. But it should be kept in mind that it is not only the household of the retrenched individual who suffers. In many cases, public employees represent a safety net for their extended family back at the village''. Having reliable access to cash gives them the responsibility for providing money for school fees or for unexpected expenses such as health care or funerals. While there is also a flow of goods from rural people to urban relatives, the urban to rural flow is much greater, as shown in Table 4.3. The fact that retrenched civil servants can manage to send considerably less to the rural areas than the average urban household suggests that the negative impact of their unemployment is also felt in the villages. 691n all, about 4,500 people left the civil service between 1989 and 1992, and a further 2,000 are scheduled to leave during 1993. Additional discussion on their characteristics and their fate can be found in Chapter 6. '°In another study it is actually claimed that the majority of the retrenched civil servants have invested at least part of their severance pay in the purchase of a taxi. See Igue, J., 'Le r6le du secteur informel dans l'6conomie beninoise", background paper for the World Bank's Country Economic Memorandum. Cotonou, July 1993. "See Chapter 6. 52 4.15 Measures to protect vulnerable groups during adjustment have had a mixed record of effectiveness. A labor-intensive public works program in Cotonou and Porto Novo (AGETUR) has provided temporary work for over 1,500 individuals as well as an encouraging environment for local public works firms, retrenched employees of the Ministry. The Social Fund created under SAL 11 established a successful distribution system for essential drugs and basic medical material to primary health care centers, and, although with some delay, managed to distribute 578 cases of textbooks to elementary schools. On the other hand, a program to assist redundant civil servants and unemployed graduates in the creation of small-scale enterprises (CePEPE) has had somewhat disappointing resultsP, while a fund set aside to help Rural Development will provide grant money to finance productive investments and the Emergency Program approved under SAL II for infrastructure works of particular importance to the poor (i.e., rural roads, primary schools and community health centers) took over a year to start operating. Table 4.3: Rural-Urban Flow of Assistance for Urban Households during 12 months Average Urban Household Retrenched Civil Servants 1992 1990 1992 1990 Received assistance worth CFAF 5,000 or more 7.5% 7.3% 7.0% 8.6% Sent assistance worth CFAF 5,000 or more 39.0% 38.7% 16.0% 31.0% Source: INSAE-UNDP, ELAM I and n1. 1990 and 1992. 4.16 On the basis of the evidence reviewed, it is impossible to deternine the extent to which the Government has succeeded in giving adjustment a human face. The resumption of economic growth is certainly a most encouraging sign, but its basis remains fragile because of the dominant role played by the regional context. In addition, high population growth and high unemployment pose a formidable challenge. Unless the economic growth rate accelerates beyond the levels of 1990-92, it is difficult to see how substantial progress can be achieved in the struggle against poverty. Agriculture 4.17 Agriculture is the mainstay of Benin's economy: it accounts for approximately 40 percent of GDP (1990-92) and provides 70 percent of domestic exports and 67 percent of all employment. Much of the economic growth of the country over the past decades has depended on agriculture as a source of exports and a supplier of food crops. This situation is likely to continue in the near future, which makes the performance of the agricultural sector central to any strategy for economic growth. Because most of the country's poor find employment in agriculture, changes in the sector have immediate effects on rural poverty, and, through rural-urban migration and resource flows, on urban poverty as well. In addition, 7'Further discussion on the organization and performance of AGETUR and CePEPE can be found in the section on safety nets for transitory shocks in Chapter 6. 53 problems in the agricultural sector have an impact on the tertiary sector because they determine rural demand for services and products, and because a large part of the tertiary sector centers around the handling of agricultural produce- transport, marketing, processing and export. 4.18 Food production by and large has been growing in line with population over the past thirty years (see Table 4.4). Cotton, which for all practical purposes is Benin's only export crop, has expanded rapidly in the last 10 years. Almost all growth in the agricultural sector has occurred in the North, where most of the sorghum, yam, cotton and animal production is located. Increasing dependency on the North for agricultural growth is even more evident when looking at the production of maize and cassava which before were mostly produced in the South but are now increasingly produced in the Center and North, implying that a growing part of food crop production is becoming commercialized in the three northern regions to satisfy urban demands3. If this trend continues, and production levels in the three southern regions continue to decline, the North may become a supplier of food crops to the rural population in the South as well. Table 4.4: Agriculture Production, 1970/71 - 1992/93 (main crops only) Maize Cassava Groundnuts Beans Sorghum Yam Cotton Prod. Area Prod. Area Prod. Area Prod. Area Prod. Area Prod. Area Prod. Area i97on71 224 379 329 116 47 94 28 92 43 88 515 60 35 39 1979/80 307 424 735 112 56 96 37 80 53 28 599 67 26 32 1988/89 432 481 907 114 72 98 46 86 103 133 944 88 123 98 1992/93 460 460 1041 124 74 95 62 99 110 110 112 106 162 140 Annual Growth Rate 1970/79 4.3 0.6 4.1 0.8 3.3 -0.1 4.5 1.7 9.0 11.1 7.6 3.6 23.6 12.0 1979/92 3.2 0.9 2.7 0.3 2.2 0.1 4.1 0.3 5.8 1.0 5.0 2.6 15.1 6.0 Note: For comfparison, narional populaion figures are given for selected years. Source: MDRACfDEP, CARDER (preliminary results 92/93), INSAE. 4.19 Although the agricultural sector as a whole has expanded considerably over the past decades, this expansion has been mainly due to increases in the cultivated area rather than to improvements in productivity (see Table 4.4). With the exception of cotton cultivation, which is characterized by the adoption of draft animals and the use of fertilizers, little progress has been made in technological terms. Most agricultural methods remain traditional, and yields remain unstable and low (see Box 4.1). Livestock keeping, which accounts for about 20 percent of agricultural production, tends to use traditional 73See Annex 2. 10, which presents more detailed production figures for these crops by region. 54 methods as well, with a strong emphasis on quantity of animals rather than on quality. Especially in the North, herds have been increasing due to cattle movements from neighboring countries and to investments by cotton farmers (a recent survey in Banikoara, Borgou, indicated that about 14 percent of the earnings from cotton cultivation are invested this way74). Continental fishing accounts for only 5 percent of agricultural production. However, its contribution in terms of animal protein production is considerable, providing some 50 percent of the population requirements. Fishing is experiencing a steady decline, to a large extent because of environrmental degradation of fish waters and extensive over-exploitation in the past, so that fishermen's families are now considered among the most vulnerable people in the country (see Chapter 3). Box 4.1: True and Reported Yields Yields reported in the CARDER statistics below show a slight upward trend on a yearly basis, although with considerable variation due to rainfall conditions. This trend, however, can not be readily interpreted as the result of improved productivity per hectare. First, precipitation was relatively low during most of the seventies and at more normal (i.e., higher) levels since. The upward trend in yields may well result from this factor. Second, the rapid expansion of the cultivated areas in the Center and the North has resulted in the breaking in of bush fallow soils, which are more fertile in the first years of exploitation. This may inflate production figures without any fundamental change in productivity. Finally, the recorded yield statistics are not always reliable because of the difficulty of obtaining data for remote areas. As production figures serve also to evaluate the extension activities of CARDER, which has been responsible for collecting the relevant data, some of these figures-in particular those collected under the past regime-should be interpreted with considerable caution, because the need to appear a successful provider of extension services may have exaggerated yield estimates. Interestingly, the opposite bias was also noted in some field studies whereby by leaning heavily on yield figures from poorly managed state farms, some statistics may in fact have been too low. Reported yields 1970/71 - 1992/93 in kg/ha (main crops only) Season Maize Cassava Groundnuts Beans Sorghum Yam Cotton 1970171 600 7140 500 290 430 8600 920 1974/75 750 5930 710 320 630 10200 630 1979/80 720 5490 630 460 720 10400 300 1984/85 300 5940 720 330 790 t0100 1530 1987/88 590 5600 520 400 830 10200 350 1988/89 900 7900 740 530 730 10700 1250 1992/93 980 8380 780 630 770 10600 1200 Source: MDRACIDEP, CARDER (preliminary results). 4.20 Over the last thirty years, rural development policies have approached the agricultural sector in different ways. Between 1960 and 1975 agricultural policy focused on the main export crops, cotton and palm oil. After 1975 attention shifted to self-sufficiency, with greater emphasis placed on food crops and Ton, P.. Coton: Culture centrale au d6veloppement de I'agriculture durable. mimeograph, Amsterdam. 1993. 55 products that could be locally transformed; a decline of export crop production followed. A revised policy in 1983 retained food self-sufficiency as an important element, but also stressed stock formation of food crops, food imports to satisfy the growing needs of the urban population, and the production of export crops to finance public expenditures75. In 1990 a further reformulation of agricultural policy aimed at improving the standard of living of the population by creating better marketing opportunities and increasing the competitivity of Benin's farmers, rather than concentrating directly on regional or national self-sufficiency. The main orientation was towards reducing the role of the state, increasing its efficiency and lowering the cost of government services. Other important priorities were to improve the rural infrastructure, to increase profitability and diversification, to resolve regional food security problems, and to protect the environment. 4.21 Benin's changing agricultural policies reflect the struggle to Table 4.5: Estimated Numbers of Livestock reconcile the need to encourage by Region (in thousands) exports crop to earn foreign currencies with the responsibility for Region Cattle Small Ruminants Pigs ensuring the welfare of all farmers regardless of their potential to bring Mono 9 183 112 in foreign exchange. Efforts to Atlantique 30 134 97 achieve the first objective have Oueme 25 129 118 undoubtedly yielded good results. Zou 52 216 84 The efficient organization of the Atacora 289 254 45 cotton sub-sector has brought Borgou 675 564 6 enormous benefits to cotton-growing Source: Annual Report of the Direction de l'elevage, Cotonou, 1992. farmers and to the country as a whole, certainly reducing the prevalence of poverty in Borgou and in other cotton-producing areas76. Ironically, it is the very success of this export-oriented policy that has come to represent a problem, as responsive farmers keep extending the area under cotton cultivation regardless of the risk of environmental damage. In addition, high levels of cotton production have stretched the industrial capacity of the sub-sector to its limit, so that greater production may not necessarily mean greater gains. As a result, the government is trying to contain cotton production by restricting availability of seeds and fertilizers. 4.22 Improving the rural population's standard of living is proving a more elusive objective to reach. An over-valued currency and the lack of a marketing system have made export of crops other than cotton almost impossible until now, while the domestic market offers little opportunity for profit earning. The strong seasonality in most of the country generates periodic local shortages when rural demand for food is high and most farmers become buyers in a market with little supply. Yet transport difficulties and lack of organization limit movement of food between regions with (seasonal) surpluses and those with shortages. This results in very unstable prices and makes it difficult to motivate farmers to adopt methods 75PNCSA. "Rapport principal". Cotonou, 1993. 6For example, official health statistics in 1990 and 1991 report a malnutrition rate among children five and under in Borgou. which is less than half of the national average. 56 that increase productivity through either investments or more intensive labor. As one farmer put it, "Why should I work hard to produce more, if in any case nobody would buy my surplus? We all grow the same crops here, and we never know when a trader from outside will come". The steady decline of food crop prices in constant francs over the past twenty years had acted as a further disincentive for farmers to increase output, or indeed for the government to facilitate access to inputs, and has widened the gap between cotton producers and other farmers. The recent devaluation should help reverse this trend, as the substitution of imported food with domestic food recorded in Cotonou and Parakou in February 1994 should result in higher consumer prices and higher food production. 4.23 Because agricultural activities are both the main culprits and the main victims of environmental damage, the environmental degradation documented throughout the country is cause for concern. Traditional agricultural practices combined with increasing population pressure tend to result in fertility loss, especially in the South. On the basis of evidence from Mono, fertility losses in the South can be estimated at some 10 percent of the total value of agricultural production, and losses through erosioni have been calculated at a value threefold that of fertility losses'. Migration of farmers to new settlement areas is taking place in an uncontrolled fashion, rapidly exporting agricultural methods that cause erosion and soil depletion. Transhumant stockraising leads to bushfires and to tree lopping and pollarding, thus contributing to deforestation and soil erosion. Cotton cultivation is associated with increased erosion, deforestation and fertility loss78. 4.24 Livestock keeping has become an increasing source of tension between farmers and pastoralists'. In the South, land shortages make it almost inevitable for livestock to trample over cultivated areas, often causing real hardship (i.e., hunger) to local farmers. In the North, tension between farmers and pastoralists is mainly the result of current agricultural policies encouraging the use of draft animals. First, the introduction of draft animals has increased the area under cultivation, thereby reducing the areas that can be used as corridors for trans-humance or for daily movement of cattle to grazing areas, and conflicts arise when animals stray into areas with planted crops. Second, while farmers once invested in cattle to be cared for by the pastoralists, they now tend to integrate animal husbandry with cultivation (and are actually encouraged to do so because manure is seen as an important contribution to counter soil depletion), which means that both groups become competitors for the grazing land close to villages. 4.25 Further development of the agricultural sector depends on how well the two main problems mentioned above will be solved: the processes of erosion and soil depletion, and the competition between farmers and pastoralists. Whatever solutions may be envisaged to overcome these problems, a reform of the land tenure system will have to be part of them. Secure rights over land will encourage good management of land resources, while the settlement of competing territorial claims should put an end to destructive conflicts and possibly accelerate the sedentarization of pastoralists- a process which economic 77Van der Pol. F., L 'epuisement des sols et sa valeur economique dans le departement du Mono, Benin. Amsterdam: KIT, 1993. 7ACotton cultivation is associated with environmental damage in three ways: (a) erosion, as the profitabiiity of cotton encourages farmers to plant it on lands that would otherwise be left as long-terrn bush fallows (in this sense cotton may be just as damaging as some other crops); (b! deforestation, as cotton cultivation leads to a lengthening of the productive cycle, resulting in greater damage to trees because of the annual burning of fields, and plowing makes the removal of trees look efficient; (c) fertility loss, as cotton is grown with fertilizers which increase production but do not restore organic matter. wCCE/DGD, Rapport entre agnculteurs et eleveurs au Nord du Benin. ecologie et interdependance rransformees (final report). AmsterdamlCotonou: University of Amsterdam/Universitd nationale du B6nin, 1993. 57 modernization and the need for social services make inevitable in the long run'. In addition, a formal recognition of land rights can facilitate access to rural credit, often a prerequisite for growth. 4.26 Agricultural extension and research also have an important role to play in facilitating sector growth, and in alleviating poverty in particular. Although there has been remarkable success with cotton, the impact on food crops has been disappointing. Weak research capacity and a top-down approach have resulted in a choice of technical themes that are not suited to soil fertility conditions, consumer preferences or financial conditions resulting from the nature of the market and lack of agricultural credit. Women are routinely bypassed by extension, in spite of the fact that improvements in food storage and processing (generally the responsibility of women) could greatly improve food security and nutritional standards among subsistence farmers. 4.27 At the current level of technology, the growth potential of the agricultural sector is limited in most of the overpopulated southem regions. This means that in the future most growth will have to be generated in the North: Atacora, Borgou, and the northern parts of Zou. This limitation has serious consequences for the poor in the overpopulated farming areas, where poverty tends to result from lack of access to good agricultural land. For the poor to participate in the benefits of agricultural growth, many will have to migrate. But the effect of migration is often the creation of a very vulnerable group which is left behind: women with young children, widows, handicapped, and the elderly. Unless opportunities are created near native villages, enabling families to move together, this migration will keep on destroying an essential part of the traditional safety nets. The Tertiary Sector 4.28 The tertiary sector has been, for many years, the largest contributor to the Beninese Table 4.6: Structure of GDP, 1985 and 1991 economy, accounting for about 50 percent of GDP in 1990-92 with an average annual growth of 3.5 percent (see Table 4.6). The geography of Sctor % of GDP % of jobs the country-a narrow territory, limited natural 1985 1991 1991 resources and a large neighbor-certainly accounts to a great extent for the extraordinary Primary 35 37 61 development of the sector, and in particular for Secondary 18 14 9 the dominant role played by commerce. At the Tertiary 48 49 30 heart of the tertiary sector are informal activities. It is thanks to the dynamism of the informal sector that the majority of urban households survive, and it is the informal sector that makes it possible for even quite remote villages to have access to non-food products- and the money to buy them. Evidence from throughout Africa indicates that the informal sector is both more efficient in reacting to changed economic conditions, including new opportunities, and better able to generate much-needed employment. In addition, ease of entry and high flexibility make it the sector of choice for 'Olt is recognized that settling the dispute between pastoralists and cultivators on the basis of the strength of their territorial ciaims may not produce an equitable outcome, because pastoralists tend to be nomads (generally Peuhl) without proper territorial claims. If tenure were to he awarded purely on the basis of territorial claims, the pastoralists would lose. 58 underprivileged groups, especially women. This is why this section focuses on the informal tertiary sector. 4.29 Two inter-related phenomena have been identified as the root of informal sector development8". One is the failure of efforts, by colonial powers first and national authorities later, to make agriculture a highly profitable activity capable of monetizing rural economies. Faced with a growing need for cash and the impossibility of satisfying it through agricultural activities, farmers had little choice but to add informal activities to agricultural production. The other phenomenon is the persistent low level of public salaries, which have to be complemented by profits obtained from informal activities. In both cases, the proximity of Nigeria represented a unique opportunity for lucrative trade, made all the more attractive by differences in tariff policies and exchange rates. Urban areas offered also the opportunity for service- related activities, resulting in myriads of microenterprises. 4.30 While insufficient monetary returns from agricultural activities or public employment may be considered the principal causes of informal sector development, a decisive role was also played by the pervasive network of restrictive regulations, heavy taxation and price controls in effect during the 1970s and 1980s. Under structural adjustment, the Government has undertaken significant initiatives to create an environment more conducive to formal private sector activity, including the reduction of the effective corporate tax rate from 63 percent to 35 percent and the lifting of almost all price controls. But more remains to be done. Of particular interest to microenterprises is the existing taxation principle which establishes tax liability on the basis of standard average profit rates for various types of activities (systame du benefice minimum forfaitaire). Although understandable as a means of simplifying tax collection, this system is likely to penalize the poor, as their microenterprises tend to be less profitable that the average (if their microenterprises were as profitable as the average, they would not be poor). Nor is there easy recourse against arbitrary tax assessments. In spite of the efforts made within the framework of SAL II to modernize the Code of Commerce, the new legislation is still in draft and chronic lack of resources in the judiciary makes it extremely onerous for anybody (let alone for the poor) to obtain judicial reviews of administrative decisions. 4.31 Service-Based Microenterprises. A recent census of microenterprises in Benin documented 126,605 establishments in the eight main urban areas (see Table 4.7). In Cotonou alone, 73,739 microenterprises were counted. Considering that the total number of households was estimated at about 90,375 and allowing for the fact that a number of individuals are likely to be involved in more than one business, it can be concluded that at least two-thirds of Cotonou's households run at least one informal business12. While in rural centers these activities are not as prevalent, it should be recognized that they are by no means limited to urban areas. In total, it is estimated that some 500,000 people are involved in informal service enterprises'. Three activities dominate this sub-sector: small restaurants and street food vendors, urban transport, and small-scale trade. The first two provide an essential service to those who work far from their homes, to men who have migrated alone to towns and to low-income families who may not be able to afford the time or cost of a full meal for the whole family. As a mother put it, "If I don't have enough to cook a good meal for everybody, I just give a little bit of money to the "iSee Igue. op.cit. Much of the following discussion is based on this paper. 82The assumption of one microenterprise per household produces an estimate of 81 percent of households running a microenterprise. "World Bank, Private Sector Development Project (PSDP), Staff Appraisal Report (draft), 1993. 59 children and tell them to find something; it would not be worth it to start a fire, and I prefer to use that time working". Urban transport has experienced a remarkable growth in the past few years, largely as a result of the investments made by retrenched civil servants. "Moto-taxis" (zemidjans) are by far the most common means of transport, and their annual turnover has been estimated at around CFAF 15 billion84. 4.32 The most widespread type of microenterprise is small-scale trade, which is believed to be practiced, in one form or another, by about 60 percent of urban dwellers. Cotonou's Dantokpa market is one of the largest in West Africa, with almost 19,000 traders and an annual turnover estimated at over CFAF 91 billion5. Dantokpa is the heart of small-scale commerce, with traders coming from all over the country to buy goods (mostly imported) and resell them at other markets. Because of the minimal requirements for start-up capital, small-scale trade attracts large numbers of low-income individuals, who may manage to keep a steady trade or may drift in and out of it, depending on their access to capital, their needs and their opportunities for other employment. Women are traditionally found at the lower end of the spectrum, often trading minute quantities of goods at the door of their homes, so as to combine commerce with childcare86. Table 4.7: Informal Enterprises in the Eight Main Urban Centers Towns Sendentary Activities Semi-Sedentary Itinerants Total number of Activities Informal Enterprises Cotonou 13,464 (18%) 28,484 (36%) 31,791 (43%) 73,739 (100%) Porto-Novo 4,606 (18%) 9,249 (37%) 10,955 (44%) 24,810 (100%) Parakou 1,810 (18%) 3,232 (33%) 4,687 (48%) 9,727 (100%) Abomey 1,650 (21%) 3,424 (44%) 2,652 (34%) 7,726 (100%) Lokossa 461 (20%) 1,306 (59%) 444 (20%) 2,201 (100%) Djougou 1,066 (20%) 2,583 (49%) 1,591 (30%) 5,240 (100%) Natitingou 361 (28%) 1,025 (64%) 201 (12%) 1,587 (100%) Kandi 433 (27%) 701 (44%) 441 (28%) 1,575 (100%) Total 52,762 (41%) 23,851 (18%) 50,004 (39%) 126,605 (100%) Source: PEESI Survey, 1993. 4.33 Foreign Trade. In spite of the former dirigiste approach and rather strict tariff policies, commerce has always thrived in Benin. Given the country's limited natural resources, there was little doubt that it had to rely on the wealth of other countries for its own economic growth. Hence the pursuit "Igue, op.cit. "5Caisse francaise de developpement, "Dantokpa: Etude pr6liminaire sur le marche central de Cotonou", June 1992. "Some women, however, occupy positions of great influence (and profitability) in informal trade. The revendeuses de tissus (cloth sellers) in Dantokpa. for example, effectively control the textile trade. 60 of policies to facilitate the development of what has been called a "transit economy", where re-export is the pillar. These policies take two primary forms. One is the ready availability of credit to national importers; between 1980 and 1989, for example, Benin Commerce Bank granted credits for a total of CFAF 25,657 billion just to import rice and wheat flour'7. The other is a special tariff regime, whereby goods destined to Niger and Burkina Faso are exempt from import taxes. As import taxes on consumption goods for the domestic market are on average 5.5 percent, and those on intermediary goods are on average 12.3 percent, there is built-in incentive to import goods under a transit regime and then sell them through informal channels on the domestic market. 4.34 Proximity to Nigeria is at the root of the impressive development of import-export activities in Benin. Three factors in particular account for it: (a) as a large and densely populated country (120 million inhabitants), Nigeria has an internal market which allows important economies of scale; (b) the Nigerian naira has undergone successive devaluations during the country's structural adjustment process, making Nigerian products relatively cheaper for CFAF holders; and (c) Nigeria's protectionist policies forbid import of a number of commodities, such as rice, which are imported using Cotonou's port and then introduced illegally.5' Table 4.8: Foreign Trade: Ofricial and Unofficial Trade Balance, 1977 - 1988 Trade Balance (CFAF billions) Import Coveraee Ratio (%) Official Trade Unofficial Trade Overall Trade Official Trade Official and Balance Balance Balance only Unofficial Trade 1977 - 55.7 24.8 - 30.8 15.4 57.4 1978 - 64.1 25.5 - 34.6 8.7 54.8 1979 - 58.3 34.6 - 23.7 14.4 68.6 1980 - 56.7 27.7 - 29.0 19.0 62.2 1981 - 138.4 37.0 - 98.4 6.2 49.1 1982 - 144.7 82.1 - 62.6 5.1 62.9 1983 - 86.7 22.0 - 64.7 22.6 42.3 1984 - 48.1 5.8 - 47.3 52.1 63.2 1985 - 50.8 5.7 - 40.3 53.7 68.4 1986 - 84.6 7.0 - 77.6 26.5 45.6 1987 - 87.8 8.8 - 79.0 28.4 49.8 1988 - 97.3 8.4 - 89.8 20.9 42.5 Source: Staff calculations based on Igue and Soul*. op.cit.. 1992. '1gue, J., and Soule, B., L'Erat-entrepot au Benin. Paris: Karthala,1992. gI8t should be noted that Nigeria's protectionist policies are changing. For example, in 1992 it removed some quantitive restrictions on the importation of wheat and textiles. 61 4.35 The permeability of borders makes the temptation to engage in illegal trade hard to resist- and monitoring by the Government almost impossible. Indeed, official trade balance statistics tell only part of the story. When estimates of unofficial trade are taken into account, the trade deficit is considerably reduced (see first three columns of Table 4.8). Informal/illegal foreign trade activities (i.e., re- export/smuggling of prohibited goods into Nigeria) do create substantial value added. In fact, when illegal trade is taken into account, the import coverage ratio improves considerably (see last two columns of Table 4.8). 4.36 Opinions on the desirability of such a large informal trade sector differ. On the negative side missed revenues on custom duties and the use of foreign exchange reserves to finance Nigerian consumption can be counted, not to mention the costs incurred by the informal enterprises themselves to avoid regulations. On the positive side, it is pointed out that informal trade greatly improves the trade balance thus contributing to foreign exchange reserves89. From the point of view of the poor, illegal trade is generally a blessing. One reason is that it makes consumable goods available at much lower prices than in the formal sector. Housewares, medicines, clothes and agricultural tools-arguably the main items in the purchased portion of most poor people's commodity basket-often could not be afforded if they did not come illegally from Nigeria. The other reason is that informal trade offers ample employment opportunities. Especially in the South, it is common to make a trip to Nigeria as soon as some savings have been put aside, and come back with an assortment of merchandise to sell. Those who cannot afford the trip to Nigeria may entrust their savings to somebody else for a commission, or buy the merchandise to retail after it has arrived in Cotonou. 4.37 While wealthier traders tend to engage in re-export activities, the poor are concentrated in importation. As of 1992 petroleum products occupied a central position in illegal import activities, and represented a major income source for almost 15,000 individuals. Large price differences between Nigeria and Benin make this traffic particularly profitable on both sides of the border, generating an annual turnover estimated at some CFAF 24 billion, with about CFAF 14 billion worth of profit. Buying fuel from SONACOP was unthinkable for the average Beninese, to the point that the informal sector controlled close to 90 percent of the sales'. The non-convertibility of the CFAF, declared in August 1993 and the devaluation of January 1994 are likely to have greatly reduced the volume and profitability of illegal fuel trade, but no data is yet available to allow for an estimate of the impact on the poor. Petroleum products are typically brought into the country in 50-liter drums, which are then sold to retailers. While those trading large quantities tend to be men, women take over as the quantities diminish. In terms of sheer numbers, women dominate the sub-sector. The reason given (by them) is that men cannot carry weights on their head or sell at the market. Another reason is that women feel ultimately responsible for their children's welfare, and engaging in fuel trade allows them to make up for their husbands' insufficient revenues (see Box 4.2). "91guu and Soule, op.cit.. 176. 'DIgue, op.cil. 62 The Labor Market Box 4.2: The Illegal Fuel Trade in Quartier Ste. Cecile 4.38 T h e S t r u c t u r e o f 'Fishing used to be the big thing in this neighborhood, but now Employment. Because the final it's contraband. Everybody does it. Profits are higher than results of the 1992 census are not yet from fishing, but it isn't easy to enter the business. There are available, estimates on the distribution many piroguiers who come with fuel tanks, but there are also of labor have to be based on the 1982 lots of women who want to sell fuel. So you have to befriend demographic study and should the piroguiers to ensure your supply, and they take advantage therefore be taken with caution9'. of it. There are women who end up sleeping with them to keep AsTherefe be4 taken showit 672percenttheir supply coming, and I have heard of a few who have even As Table 4.9 shows, 67.2 percent of left their husband for a piroguier. If I stay in the neighborhood the active population (comprised of I earn about 150 francs on a 50 liter drum but if I walk around those between 10 and 64 years of downtown I can make 400 francs. It depends a lot on the age) is engaged in agriculture, clientele one has; those with a very good clientele sell a lot, and predominantly as smallholders make up to 10,000 francs a week. I don't like doing this --the growing food crops. The typical smell is everywhere, and it's bard work. But we women are agricultural productive unit is responsible for the children, and without illegal fuel there would composed of a household head, be no food or clothing for them". generally a man, his spouse(s), and their children; apprentices and Source: Rapid Povery Appraisal. May 1993. salaried workers are very rare (about I percent). Women make up the majority of the agricultural labor force (about 60 percent), and according to a 1983 survey they head 20 percent of the rural households92. A growing number of rural women are undertaking food processing activities in addition to their agricultural labor. 4.39 Employment in the secondary sector has been estimated at less than 5 percent, almost all in the infornal sector. Two-thirds are self-employed and only 9 percent are salaried employees. In traditional activities, such as pottery or food processing, family labor tends to be used instead of salaried employees, while in "modern" activities, such as metal work and construction, cheap (or free) labor is obtained from apprentices. About one-fourth of the secondary sector works in the clothing industry, causing fierce competition among tailors93. 4.40 The tertiary sector employs about 30 percent of the population. As mentioned earlier, this sector operates almost completely through informal arrangements and is dominated by commerce. Individuals with a secondary or post-secondary education tend to be employed in the formal tertiary sector, but outside commerce (public and private administration, banks, etc.). As one would expect, employment 91An Employment Module was included in the second passage of the National Demographic Survey; 4,467 households were contacted between May and October 1982. The results are presented in: Ministere du travail et des affaires sociales, "L'emploi dans les menages du Benin". Cotonou, November 1983. Data on employment were also gathered by the EBC in 1986-87, but only the profession of the household head is reported, thus making it impossible to obtain a comprehensive picture of the structure of empioyment. In addition, the categories used are not always clear and an unusually large percentage (e.g., 33 percent in the urban south) is not classified at all. 9-UNICEF. Enfants etjemnmes.... op.cit. 'PEESI, survev, op.cit. 63 in the tertiary sector is far more common in urban areas than in rural areas, and employment in the Table 4.9: Distribution of Active formal tertiary sector is only available in urban Population by Primary Activity areas. Women make up a small percentage of the formal labor force (in 1986, 21 percent of the Agriculture: 67.2% civil servants and 10 percent of other categories); they tend to be concentrated at the lowest levels Mainly food crops 58.5% and in the "feminine" sectors, such as health, Mainly cash crops 1.0% education and social affairs. There are, however, Mainly stockraising 3.5% women traders with considerable means and Mainly fishing 1.9% power, who are organized in very influential associations. Industries: 4.8% 4.41 The Dynamics of Employment. In Formal 0.3% general, employment is shifting from the primary Informal 4.5% to the tertiary sector. This movement is apparent from urban migration, both temporary and Services: 30.7% permanent, resulting in urban population growth rates much higher than for the country as a whole Infornal Trade 25.6%- (4.4 percent against 2.9 percent)94, and from the growth of informal activities, which are No other reliable breakdown information available. predominantly in the service and commerce area. Source: Lachaud, 1985, op.cit and staff calculations. The main reason behind the rural exodus is the persistent low level of revenues for rural labor, accompanied by increasing land shortages (especially in the South) and environmental degradation. There are also social causes for this exodus, such as young people's desire to break free from parental authority and the educated's refusal to do agricultural work. With the rural labor force only partially utilized (100 to 150 days of productive labor per worker) and remuneration at about CFAF 450-600 per day", it is not surprising that people are attracted by the promise of quick earnings in the informal sector and by the city lights. 4.42 Although a shift away from the primary sector is often associated with economic development, it is too early to say whether this is the case in Benin. People are leaving the countryside not so much because they have better opportunities waiting for them in town, but because they feel they have no opportunities in their villages. Unless there is a concerted effort to develop profitable farm-related activities in rural areas so as to satisfy employment demands, rural people will have little choice but to turn to the other sectors- or simply swell the ranks of the unemployed. Thus far, the informal sector has guaranteed a certain flexibility in the labor market. It is an almost mandatory move in the shift from "'These population growth rates are reported in the preliminary results of the 1992 census. It should be noted that the rate of urbanization (4.4 percent) is considerably lower that the estimate universally used in past reports (about 8 percent). "'World Bank, Benin Agricultural Sector Review, 1992. A review conducted by SODETEC for the Ministry of Rural Development in 1989 reports slightly different figures: 99 to 159 work days and salaries between CFAF 454 and CFAF 589 per day. Findings from the Rapid Poverty Assessment, however, indicate that the salaries quoted apply to men only, while women are generally paid much less (about halt as much) because the work given to them is considered less arduous. (On the same basis, women are also expected to contribute half the amount in community projects.) 64 agricultural work to other activities, as well as a temporary arrangement for employees of the formal sector waiting for a new position. It is also thanks to the informal sector that the cost of unemployment is contained. 4.43 Unemployment in urban areas has been estimated at 8.5 percent in 1992, down from 13.2 percent in 1990 9. Although this is a relatively low figure, it does not warrant optimistic interpretations. As indicated by the low utilization of the agricultural labor force mentioned earlier, underemployment is a widespread problem. In the country as a whole, it has been estimated at about 30 percent, and 18 percent of those currently engaged in income-earning activities have a monthly income of less than CFAF 10,000. In addition, the country's high population growth rate means that increasingly high numbers of young people with a minimum of education and no qualifications appear on the job market every year. 4.44 Structural adjustment measures have had a significant impact on unemployment: some 4,200 civil servants were retrenched between 1989 and 1992 (with more retrenchments planned for 1993), and recruitment into the civil service has been practically nonexistent, making it all the more difficult for young graduates to find jobs in line with their expectations. Many of the retrenched civil servants have been absorbed by the informal sector, but the transition has seldom been easy. In 1990, 73 percent declared themselves to be unemployed (although only 18 percent had no income), and by 1992 still 61 percent of the same sample remained unemployed. Among those who managed to find a job, 66 percent had been out of work for at least 24 months before finding employment, and only 14 percent had found a job in less than 6 months. 4.45 Labor costs in the formal sector appear to be quite competitive with respect to other countries of the CFAF zone. The minimum wage is at CFAF 13,909 per month compared to CFAF 20,000 or 30,000 CFAF for other CFAF countries, and although indirect labor costs are higher in proportion, the total cost to modem enterprises remains competitive'. It is believed, however, that these labor costs are still too high for many enterprises in the informal sector, which choose not to register their salaried employees as a consequence. Efforts to keep labor costs low result in two widespread practices. One is the integration of formal and informal business, whereby modern enterprises sub-contract to informal enterprises or use undeclared daily laborers for unskilled tasks. The other is the use of apprentices, who are either unpaid or paid very little. Table 4.10 shows the results of a longitudinal study of a small sample of Cotonou households. In 1990 self-employment was the most common occupation, but between 1990 and 1992 there has been a shift from self-employment and salaried employment in favor of largely unpaid apprenticeship (which went from 31 to 43 percent). nTNSAEIUNDP. Suivi des caracrtristiques et comporrements des menages er des groupes vulnerables en situation d 'Ajustement Srructurel,(ELAM II). Cotonou, February 1993. 97The minimum wage (Salaire minimwn interprofessionel garanri or SMIG) has not been increased since 1983. so that it is now well below the poverty line. 65 Table 4.10: Changes in occupation and monthly income of urban population, 1990 - 1992' Self-emploved ApDrentices Family labor Salaried Total Income (in CFAF) 1990 192 1990 1992 1990 1992 1990 1992 1990 1992 No income - 2% 85% 86% 53% 85% - I% 32% 44% < 5,000 23% 33% 13% 6% 36% 11% - - 16% 13% 5- 10,000 24% 24% 1% 4% - - 5% 1% 10% 9% 10 - 20,000 24% 9% 1% 2% 5% - 17% 19% 13% 8% 20- 30,000 13% 5% - 1% 5% 4% 29% 22% 12% 7% 30 - 40,000 8% 8% - - - 10% 18% 5% 6% 40 - 50,000 3% 5% 1- - - 4% 8% 4% 3% > 50,000 5% 13% - - - - 24% 30% 7% 10% TOTAL 29% 29% 31% 43% 10% 7% 24% 20% 100% 100% Source: INSAE-UNDP. ELAM 11. '1990: N-361; 1992: N-375 Ondy active poplation icluded. 4.46 The basic parameters controlling the use of labor are set out in the Labor Code of 1967 and a Collective Labor Agreement of 1983. The Labor Code is presently under revision, and planned changes include a liberalization of the conditions for hiring and firing98 and the establishment of much-needed Labor Courts. In any case, official regulations are only followed by a minority of employers and therefore leave the vast majority of the workforce unaffected. Labor relationships are commonly governed by tradition and change according to the location, especially for agricultural labor. Vocational training is the domain of informal apprenticeship agreements typical of different guilds, often under draconian conditions. Apprentices may have to work as house servants as well, pay for their training, and even for their "liberation" ceremony. At the end, there is no guarantee of paid employment. There are, however, positive aspects to apprenticeship; it famniliarizes young people with the work environment and prepares them for self-employment (unlike the formal education system), and combines traditional ways with modern ones, to name two. This positive side explains the increase, in recent years, in the number of apprentices. Access to Credit 4.47 Access to credit is important for financing investment and, in turn, for boosting the productivity and income of the poor. In addition, it is an essential element of vulnerability reduction because it may help the poor cope with unexpected crises (death, disease, crop failure). Credit, however, has a price (the interest rate) and involves transaction costs and the risk of non-repayment. These costs and risks are at the core of the problems the poor face in obtaining credit. Indeed, in the case of Benin, obtaining credit is problematic not just for the poor. After liquidation of the former state banks in the late 1980s, 9"These conditions were already considerably liberalized by Law no. 90-004 of May 1990, but the requirement of a carte de presentation for employment remained. 66 the banking system was restructured and five private commercial banks were established'. They have all adopted prudent investment policies whereby only a small portion of their deposits is being reserved for medium and long-term credit to private entrepreneurs. While this practice is justified by the short- term maturity of deposits and the difficulty in identifying viable projects, the fact remains that commercial banks presently are not fulfilling their financial intermediation role, hence posing a serious obstacle to economic growth'00. 4.48 Having excluded the availability of credit from commercial banks, it is possible to distinguish four forms of credit which, in theory at least, can be accessed by the poor. They are briefly discussed below'. (a) Rural savings and loan banks (or CLCAM) are part of a network of 51 local savings banks spread throughout the country which provide credit to finance agricultural activities, generally on a one-year term. Although CLCAMs are in principle open to all farmers, traders and artisans, in reality only the wealthiest (cotton growers in particular'") tend to have access to them. Coverage rate among farmers has been estimated to be less than 5 percent, and women represent less than 10 percent of beneficiaries. Three main obstacles prevent the poor from taking advantage of this credit: (1) distance, as villages in the most remote and disadvantaged areas are 3040 km on average from the nearest CLCAM office; (2) psychological barriers, as poor and uneducated people are intimidated and/or suspicious of formal institutions; and especially (3) economic constraints, as beneficiaries must pay membership fees (minimum CFAF 6,000) and have to open a savings account (minimum CFAF 5,000) six months before obtaining access to credit. Also, although lower than that charged by usuries, the interest rate charged by CLCAN4s is 24 percent, which is quite prohibitive. (b) Savings and loans cooperatives, generally set up by or with NGOs, are proliferating both in urban and rural areas, often in the form of networks (e.g., PADUC, CBDIBA, the Bank of the Poor, Sasakawa Global 2000) 13. Although they employ different approaches and they appear to have quite uneven results, they have two characteristics in common: they build on traditional mechanisms and they aim for long-term sustainability through the mobilization of local savings. In many cases, credit conditions are decided by the communities themselves. "The Financial Bank, the Bank of Africa (BOA), the Banque internationale du Benin (BIBE), Ecobank and Credit Lyonnais. '°°This problem is readily recognized by the Government, who expressed its intention to address it in a draft Declaration on Development Policies for the Private Sector (D&clarauion relative a la politique de diveloppement du secteur prive). '°'The following discussion is based on Thierry, P., "Etude sur le developpement des micro-entreprises feminines" (first draft), mimeograph prepared for the World Bank, November 1993. '"The are two main reasons why cotton growers are disproportionately represented among CLCAM clients. One is that they are usually wealthier than other farmers. The other is that they have an extremely low risk factor because SONAPRA, who purchases their cotton, guarantees repayments by withholding part of the profits from the sale of cotton. As a result, repayment rates are close to 100 percent. '03PADUC has five women's savings and loans associations in Cotonou; CBDIBA has 45 centers working with women's groups; Sasakawa Global 2000 has a network of about twenty rural savings and loan banks (CREP) which work in close collaboration with CARDER and the Ministry of Rural Development; under the World Bank/FAO pilot project on food security, OCSD has helped establish women's savings and credit groups in Dassa (Zou) with repayment rates close to 100 percent. 67 (c) Direct credits from projects or NGOs have been made available as a response to the demand unsatisfied by formal sources. Their approaches and their results are very heterogeneous, encompassing well-organized and locally adapted systems with high repayment rates as well as poorly managed and adapted schemes which end up reinforcing opportunism or dependence among the "beneficiaries". The fact that money borrowed from these schemes is "cold" money (coming from the outside) rather than "hot" money (coming from within the community) tends to make reimbursement problematic. In addition, a major limitation of direct credit schemes available through specific projects or NGOs is their doubtful sustainability when outside assistance is no longer available. (d) Informal systerns (usuries. savings clubs or tontines, advances from traders, etc.) are very widespread and represent the most readily available credit for poor people, especially in rural areas (e.g., it has been estimated than 75 percent of women are members of a tontine)'04. But they have important limitations. The very poor are unlikely to be able to contribute to savings clubs, and therefore to take advantage of them, and will find it very difficult to obtain credit from traders or even from usuries. In addition, money from the tontine is made available in turn to all members, and therefore not necessarily when it is most needed. Usuries play a crucial role in desperate moments, but their high interest rates (sometimes over 100 percent) and feared ruthlessness often trap poor people in a vicious circle of debts. Box 4.3: The Experience of CLCAM in Cove (Zou) 'Fearing the imminent closing of his branch due to low results, and therefore the threat of losing his job, the CLCAM manager in Cove presented to the board of directors a proposal to extend small individual credits to women, with a minimum savings requirement and reimbursable in the short term (three to six months). A large information campaign made it possible for women to hear about this opportunity, and results were quick to come. The amount of credits sky-rocketed and, having established a contact, women started coming to deposit their savings without any fear. While deposits had long hit a ceiling at CFAF 4 niillion, they suddenly picked up, reaching CFAF 15 rnillion in a short time. As a result, the manager could keep his job." Source: Perrau, T.. Etude sur le developpement des nucro-entreprises fbninines, op. cit. 4.49 Field work indicates that having quick access to cash in emergency cases and having access to "regular" credit is a priority for most people in Benin. As vulnerability tends to be highest among the poor, it is not surprising that the poor are particularly insistent in voicing their demand for this type of service. CLCAM is often perceived to be an elite system available only to rich cotton growers, thus reinforcing the impression among farmers that cotton growers are the object of special attention from the government. In practice, however. there is nothing to prevent CLCAMs from lending to vulnerable people, and new CLCAM policy states their intention of making a greater effort to extend service in this "Traditional credit sstems are discussed in .-reater detail under Safety Nets in Chapter 6. 68 direction. The Cove (Zou) branch offers an example of how it is possible to put this intention into practice without endangering financial solvency (see Box 4.3). 4.50 A study conducted in Borgou on the savings and loans systems available at the village level lends credibility to farmers' perception of a gap in access to credit between cotton growers and the others'05. This gap, however, does not appear to be purely deternined by the uneven distribution of outside interventions: (male) cotton growers have access to credit from CLCAMs but have also organized themselves into informal savings and loans associations (in cotton-growing regions, the credit is managed by groups called groupements villageois), while other (male) farmers who do not have access to formal credit have failed to create their own associations. Women, on the other hand, have no access to formal credit but are members of informal savings and loans associations. The explanation offered for this phenomenon is that non-cotton growers cannot rely on the regular revenues necessary for contributions to an informal association, and may not even be familiar with this type of organization (unlike cotton growers who have experience with CLCAM). Women tend to engage in trade, which makes it more likely that they will dispose of cash for regular contributions to the tontine. 4.51 The growing availability of credit through decentralized savings and loans cooperatives or through direct credit lines provided by donors (mostly NGOs) has certainly made it easier for the poor to have access to cash which, at least in principle, should boost productivity and income. But such credit is far from satisfying existing demand and there is evidence that the devaluation has greatly disrupted the functioning of savings and loans systems, as members are no longer able to contribute any savings or to repay their loans. In addition, it tends to depend on outside assistance, as decentralized savings and loans cooperatives require organizational and financial skills seldom found at the local level-hence requiring technical assistance- and direct credit lines provided by donors are only likely to survive as long as the donor is present. Other ways of improving the poor's access to credit should therefore be explored. Broadening the focus of CLCAMs could be a possibility, as the example in Box 4.3. illustrates. Building on informal systems is another possibility. Itinerant bankers, for example, appear to have the dynamism and flexibility typical of the informal sector and to be quite numerous in the main urban areas, but relatively unknown in smaller centers. It would certainly be worthwhile to explore how their role could be expanded (see Chapter 9). '(5Rijnierse. E.. 'Les systemes d'epargne et du credit formels et informels dans quatre villages dans la province du Borgou' (mimeograph). University of Amsterdam/Universite nationale du Benin. February 1991. 69 5 Providing Key Services 5.1 The most important goal of economic development is to improve human welfare. Economic growth plays an important role in improving human welfare, but unless social services grow as well- that is, are expanded and improved it may take a long time before the economy of poor households grows. As the World Development Report 1990 stressed, economic growth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the reduction of poverty. It is imperative to ensure that the poorest segments of society are able to participate productively in such growth. This requires substantial investment in human capital (education and health care) and in supporting infrastructure (clean water supply, sanitation, rural feeder roads). The development of human resources is both a means and an end in the development process. It is a means because it is a prerequisite for increasing productivity and expanding income- earning opportunities. It is an end because those with a well-developed human capital base can ensure a better quality of life for themselves and their children. 5.2 The following sections review government efforts to provide key services to the poor, focusing on education, health and water supply. Public Spending in the Social Sectors 5.3 The performance of the social sectors in Benin is lower than what could be expected on the basis of its economic indicators. According to the human development index used by UNDP, for example, Benin is one of the 10 least developed countries in the world (162nd out of 173), although its per capita income is slightly above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (126th out of 160). This is a somewhat surprising situation, because the share of expenditures devoted to social services tends to be consistently high, and higher than most other Sub-Saharan African countries. For example, in 1988 (the last year for which meaningful comparisons are possible), education expenditures were 35 percent of total government expenditures in Benin, against 16 for the average SSA country. 5.4 The data in Table 5.1 show that between 1988 and 1991, the Beninese Government allocated on average about one-third of its recurrent budget to social services, with the greatest share going to formal education. Such high shares allocated to the social sectors appear to be a tangible sign of commitment, at least in principle, to providing access to social services to all citizens. To be sure, there have been criticisms of the Government's budget decisions with regard to the social sectors. To begin with, most of the allocation is used to pay salaries, including those of a bloated bureaucracy, leaving almost nothing for maintenance, equipment and other essential expenditures. In addition, according to a report issued by the Technical Unit on the Social Dimensions of Development (Ministry of Planning), Government commnitment leaves much to be desired as only 2.3 percent of the estimated cost of projects in the social sectors in 1992-1994 (CFAF 830 million out of a total of CFAF 35.6 billion) is expected-to be covered by the national budget. In terms of the investment budget for 1992-94, social sectors have been allocated 16 percent, even though they are expected to absorb an overall 19.2 percent. Presumably, the difference is to be made up by donor contributions'0". Table 5.1: Relative Weight of Social Sector Expenditures (Average 1988-1991) Recurrent Bud,eet Investments National Within Soc.Sec. National Within Soc. Sec. Education (Formal) 26.0% 80.0% 3.4% 14.0% Literacy & Handicrafts - 0.3% 0.3% 1.3 % Public Health 6.0% 1.8% 7.4% 30.0% Social Affairs 0.4% 1.4% 3.6% 14.7% Water Supply & Sanitation - 0.3% 6.5% 28.0% Rural Feeder Roads - - 2.9% 12.0% Source: MPRE/DSD. 5.5 In view of Benin's persistent budgetary deficit, the difficulty in improving tax revenues, and the budgetary restraints imposed by the structural adjustment process, it would be unreasonable to fault the Government for not spending more. The problem appears to be not so much one of inadequate budgetary allocations as one of inefficient use of resources, both budgetary and human. Intra-sectoral allocations, especially in the education sector, have not been directed to priority areas, namely primary education (see next section). Moreover, certain sectors of particular interest to the most vulnerable, such as social affairs and rural infrastructure, routinely receive the lowest allocations, as shown in Table 5.2. Human resources have also been mismanaged, as evidenced by the number of doctors and teachers holding administrative positions in main urban centers (especially in Cotonou), in spite of a shortage in rural areas and the dubious need for many of their administrative tasks. 5.6 In theory, it is possible to determine what fraction of government expenditure in any given sector actually reaches the poor. Such analysis, however, requires rather precise information on the poor, including their gender and age, where they live, their source of income, their level of education and the types of disease which afflict them. Usually this information can be obtained from detailed household surveys which contain the relevant questions to enable a complete incidence analysis. In the case of Benin, these data do not exist, so the analysis will have to infer the degree to which the poor benefit from public expenditures from a variety of sources, both quantitative and qualitative. '06CePEPE, 'Impact des d6penses publiques d'investissements dans les secteurs sociaux. ' Cotonou: Cellule technique sur la dimension sociale du developpement, Ministere du plan et de la restructuration economique, July 1992. 71 Social Services and their Clients 5.7 Basic social services (education, health, rural development) are made available to people mostly at the district level (sous-preecture) and sometimes at the sub-district level (commune). This means that individuals living in (hard-to-reach) villages, or simply far from the sub-district capital, will find it more difficult to benefit from such social services. The difficulty comes from two types of distance: physical and social. Going to the health center, for example, may be a trip that takes several hours and hard- earned money. To this must be added the hours spent waiting before gaining access to a health professional, which, for those who live from hand to mouth, have an enormous cost. In addition, poor people's lack of education (and therefore of self-confidence) on the one hand, and the superior attitude of many civil servants on the other, may discourage the underprivileged from requesting services to which they are entitled. It is indicative that the Employment Directorate, which offers services to the unemployed, is widely perceived as a service available only to individuals with a formal education or technical qualifications, and not to the average person. Table 5.2: Recurrent Budget for Social Services 1989-1994 (in CFAF millions) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Budget Budget Sectors Proj. Expen. Proj. Expen. Proj. Expen. ProJ. ProJ. Proj. Education 17,574 7,624 17,196 14,437 17,766 13,372 19,317 19.218 19,183 (Formal) Lieracy andHandicrafts 68 9 78 69 76 27 76 74 73 Public Heath 2,661 966 3,384 2,356 4,349 2,539 4,603 4,574 5,047 Social Affairs 293 76 294 208 331 206 251 250 251 Water Supply & Sanitation 79 17 79 72 80 55 103 101 100 Rural Feeder - - - - - - - - Roads - - - - - - Total Social Sec. 2675 8.694 2103 17143 22602 16200 24351 24.217 24.64 Somarc: DTCP/MP (1988-1991). 5.8 Access to public services is particularly difficult for women because of their higher level of illiteracy and the heavy demands on their time. To make things worse, they may be the object of unwelcome propositions from civil servants who use their position of real or pretended power in helping them find a job, obtain a scholarship or gain access to tax information. Generally speaking, however, it is not only women who are not treated with due respect. As public services are part of a social network, those who have few contacts in the "right place", which is likely to be the case for the poor, run the risk of being treated in an offhand manner or even being denied services to which they have a right. 72 Education 5.9 Evidence from cross-country comparisons Box 5.1: We Flsh to Go to School shows that an educated population is critical to long- term growth. A country may grow for some time by "I live with my parents, but I have to take mining its natural resources, but to sustain the growth care of myself I pay for my own clothes, process there is no substitute for educated people. my own food, the books, the school fees, The private rate of return to primary and secondary anything I need. My parents can't pay for all education in developing countries is at or above 18 that. Soafterlgetoutofschoolintheafter- percent, and just four years of education have been noon, I go fishing. There are seven of us in this class who do it [out of eleven]. We don't shown to increase small-farm productivity by 7 h o u n w m i percent across 13 developing countries and by 10 to get a lot of fish because we can't go out to percent in countries where new agricultural techniques sea. Without boats catches are small and' were being introduced"'7. Returns on expenditures when we sell the fish to the women, we get for educating women are higher than for men, very little money. Often we stay out until 1 because of the positive association between education am. In the morning I would like to sleep in,s on one side, and health and nutrition on the othere. but school starts at 8 am and I have to get up. Indeed, it has been convincingly argued that educating Still, there are days that I'm just too tired to. women is the best investment a country can make. go, and I go late or I don't go at all. 5.10 The government of Benin has long Sourcc: Rapid Poverty AppraisaL1 Azizakouc vilae99 recognized the importance of education, gaining for (M) May 1993. its country a reputation for intellectual leadership in West Africa'09 and showing its commitment with consistently high budget allocations. Formal education receives about one-third of the national recurrent budget, which compares favorably with the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (16 percent). However, a significant portion of it is allocated to higher education and performance at the primary level has been disappointing. After a period of growth from 1975 to 1983, when net primary school enrollment went from 39 percent to 62 percent, enrollment rates started declining and by 1992 they were 52 percent and 11 percent at the primary and secondary levels, respectively, well below Sub-Saharan African standards. Primary education reaches Beninese children unevenly: the North (Atacora and Borgou) which comprises 30 percent of the school-age population, and the Mono region feature the lowest enrollment rates. The highest rates are found in Oueme and in large cities. But girls, primarily, are at a disadvantage, with a net rate of enrollment in primary school declining to 36 percent for the 1992-1993 school year (compared to 45 percent in SSA). Moreover, for the past several years, the number of girls enrolled has been only half that of boys. 5.11 There are no clear data on the relationships between enrollment in school and success rates on the one hand, and level of family income on the other. It is known, however, that the three departments where enrollment is lowest are also those with the lowest incomes, despite monetary revenues from cotton 'InSee among others: Barro, R., 'Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries'. Quarterly Journal of Econonmcs, vol. 106, May 1991 and World Bank, 'Primary Education: A World Bank Paper'. Washington, DC 1990. '°See, for example, Summers, L., "Investing in all the People: Educating Women in Developing Countries", remarks prepared for a Development Economic Seminar at the World Bank, Washington DC. September 1992. '09Benin is nicknamed the Quarrier Latin of West Africa. 73 Box 5.2: The Evolution of Benin's Education Policies The evolution of Benin's education policieg may help understand the reasons for these discouraging treads.' With the adoption of a Manist-Leninist ideology in 1975, the Government sought to redress the inequitabl. distribution of educadonl opportnities inherited from cotonial time by promoting uanversal education A. policy of co-financing between the state and communities was adopted for pimary and secondary education,. whereby paents financed most no-wage costs of education. Higher education was comptely state - (including students' living expenses and overseas scholarships) to develop the personnel needed o manag.o th expanding publi scWr. Bu when the economy slowed down sy maintained. Parents found it: ncresgly difficult to pay their cntribions thus leaing a 7 5 pec. finncing gap for owe n s reste gerl edra o-f scony mi . poorest areas, whero parent contibutions fell thei most. At the same time, thegove could no Ing afford to foot the entire bill for bigher-leve educaion, and the:public sect cud no longe" aborb, ., . in Borgou. Empirical data show furthermore that poor families find it difficult to meet school-related expenses, some parents complaining for instance of the added burden of the cost of uniforms and school fees bearing on family expenditures. 5.12 The three main reasons why the poor do not send their children to school are cost, distance and perceived benefits (the latter applies especially to girls' education). Cost is the obstacle mentioned most commonly, as school fees may go from CFAF 500 to CFAF 4,000 per year (equivalent to about US$2 to US$16). Keeping in mind that most poor children are productively employed from age 6 or 7, just doing without the child's labor has a significant cost to the family, to which the cost of school fees must be added. For the poorest families this is too heavy a burden, and only some may manage to find a way to strike a balance between surviving and educating their children. An example are cases of boys who can go to school as long as they put no extra demands on their family, meaning that they will be allowed to sleep in their parents' house, but they will have to support themselves completely- and pay their school fees, of course (see Box 5.1). This compromise is unlikely to be open to girls because their domestic labor is too valuable and because, in any case, "educating girls is just a waste of money, because they leave". 5.13 Children lucky enough to be sent to school-slightly more than half of them-find themselves on a difficult path. Repeat and dropout rates vary depending the year of study, but are consistently high and increasing dramatically"0. One study has estimated that out of a cohort of 1,000 initially enrolled, 319 children complete the primary school cycle and only 164 pass the Primary Certificate (CEP) examination"'. The cost of producing one graduate is equivalent to 26.6 years, a very low level of efficiency by any standard. Overall, it is a bleak picture for children: 26 percent of them never attend school, 50 percent leave school before the completion of their studies, and only 24 percent finish the primary cycle, without necessarily passing the final exam. About 30 percent of children entering primary "' Between 1970 and 1976 aversgc repetition rates increased from 19 percent to 27 percent in primary school, and from 12 percent to 32 percent in secondazy general school. "'Republic of Benin. 'D6clamtion de politique educative et de stratdgie sectorielle", Januazy 1991. 74 school do not reach the end of the four years deemed necessary to acquire permanent reading and writing skills. It is estimated, then, that only 24 percent of all children (16 percent of the girls, 35 percent of the boys) learn to read and write through primary schooling. These two percentages are not much different from present illiteracy rates, and will translate into stagnating adult illiteracy rates. Primary School System Performance 12% 20% 12% /fdCu b.tw.. 4ti and > *or attead Wool LUve w ol w~~~~~~ - __ V 0 5.14 Causes of the system's poor performance are diverse. For those children who attend school, the language of instruction is not the one spoken at home, a serious drawback for children of people who have never been to school themselves: most poor families are in this situation. Textbook availability is extremely limited and school materials are scarce. Since parents must pay for school supplies or even contribute to building maintenance and repair, the poorer communities have the most difficulty in -aintaining these at an acceptable level. Large towns and cities feature overcrowded classes which dampen teacher motivation. "Voluntary" quitting by teachers, as suggested by the PAS, all but improve the situation. 5.15 Besides issues of weak performance, of costs, and of discrimination along geographic, sexual, social and economic lines, those of quality and of relevance to the poor should be explored as well. For a number of families indeed, there is no connection between real adult life and primary education. Education and teaching have little social or economic prestige (school "is useless", "produces unemployed people"). Schooling is not deemed useful by many parents or even children; this is due to ill-adapted programs and teaching methods, but it stems mostly from a discrepancy between expectations and results. Primary education no longer carries with it the promise of a permanent job for boys. For girls, it is tantamount to a waste both of money and effort in the eyes of many parents and even of girls themselves. However, the meager success encountered by various attempts to reconcile school and life (the production-oriented schools, for instance) does not entail that the search for solutions and alternatives should be forsaken. 75 Table 5.3: Education Indicators for Benin and Sub-Sabaran Africa (SSA) for 1988' Indicator Benin SSA Literacy Rate Adult Literacy 23% 48% Female Literacy 16% 36% Gross Enrollment Rates Primary (Overall) 59% 68% Male 83% 75% Female 43% 60% Secondary (Overall) 11% 18% Male 21% 22% Female 8% 14% Transition Rates Primary to Secondary 38% 40% Repetition Rates Primary 27% 23% Secondary 32% 27% Education Recurrent Budget Personnel 90% 73% Teaching Materials 1% 6% Scholarships 8.5% 8% Primary 58% 42% Secondary 27% 34% University 15% 20% As % of GNP 4% 4.5% As % of Total Gov. Spending 35% 16% Source: UNESCO, Statistical Year Book, 1991; World Bank Social Indicators of Development 1991- 1992; Beninese Government Official Data; Statistical Review - 6th Conference of Ministers of Education for Economic Planning in African Member States, 1991. * Most recent year for which comparison is possible. 5.16 From the point of view of the poor, the most important policy issue is increasing access to education. The Government shares this concern and is committed to a medium-term goal of increasing enrollment rates by one percentage point per annum at the primary school level and maintaining secondary enrollment at its current level of 11 percent. Given the documented importance of educating women, a priority has been put on increasing their primary school enrollment rates from 32 percent in 76 1993 to 44 percent by 1997 and beginning with the 1993-94 school year, rural schools are no longer requesting school fees for girls. The second issue of importance to the poor is the quality of primary school education. Attending school has an opportunity cost which tends to rise as family incomes decline (poor children's labor is an integral part of their household survival system), so going to school but learning little has a double cost. The Government gives a clear priority to quality improvement, as evidenced by a number of initiatives which will be discussed later. 5.17 With 80 percent of the recurrent education budget going to salaries, it is clear that parental contributions are needed if a minimum of quality (both in terms of infrastructure and teaching) is to be maintained. Making education more accessible to the poor, therefore, means first and foremost a change in budget allocations. More money must go to primary education (the only schooling most of the poor can hope to get), and of that money, more must be spent on inputs, so as to make school fees lower. For the past few years, the Government has been moving in this direction. While until the mid-1980s the typical budget distribution was 43 percent primary, 30 percent secondary and 28 percent university, by 1988 the share of primary had risen to 58 percent and in 1993 was expected to be 66 percent. As shown in Table 5.4, cost containment of salaries and university subsidies has enabled the Government to allocate more resources to primary schools and to non-salary inputs consistent with the new policy and strategy for the sector. Accordingly, the Government aims at lowering the share of salary expenditures to 68 percent by 1997, while non-salary expenditures (including school materials and supplies, teacher in-service training and school supervision) would take up 22 percent' . 5.18 Putting more money into primary education and using it wisely is essential to making education more accessible to the poor. But regardless of the progress made in this sense, some of the poor will not be able to benefit directly, either because they are too old to go to primary school, or because they live too far from a school and cannot afford the expenses of board and lodging away from home. For these people, the only chance to receive some education is through a non-formal approach. Table 5.4: Evolution of National Education Expenditures (millions CFAF) 1991 1992 1993 Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Projection Expenditure Projection Expenditure Projection Salaries 14.3 (78%) 13.9 (86%) 14.8 (75%) 16.0 (80%) 14.7 (73%) Other operating expenses 0.4 (2%) 0.1 (.01%) 0.9 (4%) 0.5 (2%) 0.9 (4%) Other expenses 3.7 (20%) 2.2 (14%) 4.0 (20%) 3.2 (18%) 4.5 (22%) Total 18.4 (100%) 16.2 (100%) 19.8 (100%) 19.8 (100%) 20.2 (100%) Primary education share 8.9 (48%) 8.4 (52%) 9.3 (47%) 10.7 (54%) 11.5 (57%) Source: Ministy of Education. "2The remaining 10 percent would go toward transfers. 77 5.19 Few children pursue a secondary education: 11 percent of the age group in 1992, which, like primary enrollement ratios, falls below the SSA average. Technical education is availed of by only a minority of children, that is 6 percent of all those enrolled in secondary schools"3, or less than 1 percent of that age group. Yet, it is their having been trained for the practice of a trade that best enables youngsters to face economic problems and poverty. 5.20 The informal education of children occurs mostly through work within the family, a practice often decried by international organizations such as the ILO and UNICEF because it is closely linked to family poverty and often damnages children's health, including their mental health when they are being exploited. While the process of acquiring agricultural skills remains less formalized and more familial for younger and older children, apprenticeship is the most widespread form of job-training. The conditions of apprenticeship are often stipulated in contracts developed on the basis of tradition, in economically important trades ( for example, auto mechanics, sheet metal trade, welding, masonry, carpentry, radio repair, hairdressing, sewing, etc.). These contracts bind the master craftsman to the parents, the latter paying a fee (CFAF 40,000 for construction-related jobs; CFAF 160,000 for electronics) and the youngsters sometimes keeping a copy of the contract for themselves. Girls are represented mostly in occupations such as sewing, hairdressing, street-vending of foods and shopkeeping, but they are now starting to be found in more "masculine" occupations: auto repair and painting, printing, etc. Once hired, apprentices endure harsh living and working conditions: 10 hours of work a day, 6 days a week'14. According to one study"', a third of them eat just one full meal a day. Fourteen is the minimum legal age to begin apprenticeship, but needy parents unhesitatingly place their 12-, 9-, or even 6-year-old children"6. Again, this type of training was not envisaged in systemic terms, and global costs are unknown. It could be promoted, however, in combination with part-time courses bearing on the more abstract and theoretical aspects of the trade, or on management techniques in the craft industries. 5.21 Given the high levels of illiteracy (71 percent among all adults and 81 percent among women), functional literacy programs, especially those targeting women, should be prime targets for support in a poverty alleviation strategy. Not only would they provide valuable literacy skills, but they could be a vehicle for community development by teaching subjects such as health and nutrition. Yet no large- scale system has been developed for adult basic education. Despite very ambitious goals and a sound effort from public services to produce pedagogic materials (syllabaries for 22 of the 24 languages taught), literacy courses are conducted by 776 agents only, working in a little over 600 literacy centers and 235 reading clubs, and are scantly supported by public finances (see Table 5.2). Only a minute portion of illiterate adults participates: 123,000 in 15 years, or an average of about 8,200 persons a year"7. This represents less than 10 percent of new illiterates, indicating an annual increase in the total number of illiterates. "3UNDP, Human Development Report 1993. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. "4Ministere du plan et de la restructuration economique, 'Programme national d'action en faveur de l'enfant et de la femme,' op. cit. "'Dossou, A.S., "La pratique de l'apprentissage au B6nin: r6alitts et perspectives", Cotonou (undated). "6See also para. 3.18. "'Ministere du plan et de la restructuration economique, 'Programme national...", op. cit. 78 5.22 As with primary education, it is essential to mobilize additional resources for adult education, and to use them efficiently to broaden access of the poor to education. But more is needed than money: initiative and innovation are in order, as well as an unbiased approach using endogenous popular knowledge to seek concrete answers to the problems actually encountered by the poor. For example, although women are the keepers of their families' health and, therefore, educating them in this respect would have an indirect impact on the economy, they also are economic operators "par excellence" and are in dire need of training in the creation and management of income-generating activities. Similarly, while it is women who directly affect feeding and thus children's nutritional status, men are the ones who furnish the daily depense (household cash), and educating them would indeed contribute to providing good nutrition for the children. 5.23 Before identifying the training needs of youngsters, women and men with a background of poverty, the problems these groups experience must first be isolated and examined, and survival as well as income- and knowledge-sustaining strategies must be analyzed. Training activities would gain from being tied to community-development interventions so as to avoid a hiatus between training and social and economic activities, the former being provided by request, as needed. It is just as imperative to consider training needs and modalities in urban areas, through a collaborative effort between newly decentralized municipal authorities, neighborhood associations frequently involved in improving the environment, several NGOs presently active in this area, and existing training institutions. Health 5.24 Health status and poverty are directly related in at least two ways: (1) poor health reduces productivity and therefore constrains the ability to increase income; and (2) health conditions affect children's capacity to learn and their school enrollment (see Box 5.3). The impact of ill health is greatest on poor people, mostly because poor people are sick more often and because their income depends exclusively on physical labor"8. When illness strikes, they have no savings to make up for lost income and to pay for needed treatment. Field work revealed that disease-sometimes followed by premature death-was often the root cause of the most desperate situations. Investments to reduce health risks among the poor and to make health care accessible even to those with little financial means, therefore, are an important element in a poverty reduction strategy. 5.25 In 1970 Benin's health care system was still conceived to satisfy the needs of urban dwellers at the expense of rural areas. Conscious of the importance of health services for the social and economic development of the country, the government embraced a health policy aiming at providing basic health care to all of its citizens. Between 1972 and 1980, a number of regional and district health centers were created, with health receiving 10 percent of budget allocations. In the early 1980s, in view of budget cuts which reduced health share of allocations to 6 percent, and widespread mismanagement, the government adopted a more rigorous policy, facilitating the decentralization of health services. A district health system was established, with small rural hospitals or health centers at its top (Centres de sante du district or CSD), small rural health centers at the intermediate level (Complexes cornmunaux de sante or CCS), and voluntary commnunity health workers in village health units (Unites villageoises de sante or WVS). "t'he poor tend to have poorer health status because they are more exposed to disease-causing agents, have poorer housing, less adequate nutrition and limited access to available curative and preventive health services. 79 Box 5.3: Health for Leaming Health and nutrition problems affect a child's ability to lean. In early life, iron-deficiency ane.mia:.- reduces cognitive functions, iodine deficiency causes irreversible mental retardation, and vitamin. A... deficiency is the major cause of blindness. Girls are particularly liable to suffer from iodine aad iron deficiencies, which is one of the reasons why fewer of them complete primary school. It has been estimated that on the average the Beninese receive only 37% of thear iron requirent and as little."'as 0.7 % of their vitnmin A requirement, with both deficiencies being more pronounced in the rural sout. In the Atacora, the raue of goiter (a disease caused by iodine deficiency) aming-12 old children i 30% forgirls and 24% for boys. Protein energy malnutrition experienced at school age affects a child's ibility to atend 'to tas. Temporary hunger, often a condition of children not being fed before going to school, also interferes ith concentration abilities, while iron-deficient schoolaged. children.ar less attentive thadnthe averg.' Severe worm infections, common among poorchildre:, contribute to. irn-deficicy, ane" ' nd malnutrition. Guinea worm, which affects 33% of children, causes long absences from schooland, contributes to Benin's high repetition rates. SOUtce. WDR 1993; INSAE, Enqpat hdges Coesommnasdo,,,vol.S SNV, op.CIL X" 5.26 As Table 5.5 shows, since 1987 the relative share of budget allocations for health has been declining steadily. The per capita share of the budget has followed a similar trend, and has been equivalent to about US$2 since 1989. The 1992-1994 three-year plan of the Health Ministry is articulated on the basis of three general objectives: increasing health coverage in both rural and urban areas, ensuring the viability of the health system, and improving people's health conditions"9. As the poor are disproportionately represented among those not covered by various preventive and educational programs, and have higher morbidity rates than the average, they should be the main beneficiaries of policies and interventions enacted to carry out such intentions. But are they? 5.27 One way to determine to what extent the Government is following words with action is to look at how the Health Ministry uses its budget. In 1987, 70 percent of the budget allocations for health went to urban areas, where per capita expenditures were CFAF 2,830 (equivalent to US$9.40), as compared to a mere CFAF 380 per rural dweller (equivalent to US$1.27)1". While it can be argued that some of the expenses at the urban level are actually for rural people (e.g., rural people also use the main hospitals), their total share is certain to amount to very little. Such imbalance reflects both the high share of the budget going to pay salaries and benefits (see Table 5.5), as most personnel are located in urban centers, and the allocation of non-salary expenditures, which went primarily to health facilities at the intermediate and central levels. '"Ministmre de la sante, Plan trienial de developpement a l'horizon glissant pour la periode 1992-1994 (draft), July 1992. 12'Ministare de la santA, La nouvelle stralegie sanitaire nationak de la R*publique Populaire du Binin- Les grandes orientatior, piriode 1989-1993. 80 Table 5.5: Evolution of National Health Expenditures Total Health Budget % for Health Budget per As % of (million CFAF) Personnel capita (CFAF) National Budget 1987 4,047 58.7% 997 8.8% 1988 3,201 68.5% 788 6.0% 1989 2,436 78.3% 600 4.9% 1990 2,482 77.6% 523 3.7% 1991 2,743 74.4% 561 3.4% Source: Ministere de la sante, Staotisques sawutaires, August 1992. 5.28 This does not necessarily mean, however, that the Government is acting inconsistently with its goals. On the one hand, there have been consistent efforts to redress the imbalance between rural and urban areas, as illustrated by the recent redeployment of personnel to achieve a more equitable distribution over the national territory (see Annex 2, Table A2.14). On the other hand, the limited government funding for health resulting from the structural adjustment process has been more than offset by substantial funding by donors (e.g., in 1990 they contributed 40.8 percent of the total) and by the institution and expansion of cost sharing in curative care. In 1992, the cost recovery program generated close to CFAF one billion to guarantee future drug supplies. In practice much of the credit for a greater effort in reaching the lowest income families goes to donors and NGOs, who are presently almost completely financing the outreach programs for preventive care and health education, as well as the costs of running a number of health centers in remote rural areas (especially in the North). Unfortunately, in spite of the demonstrated need for the interventions financed by the donors, only 46 percent of their contributions were actually disbursed. The reason lies primarily with the limited capacity of the Ministry of Health to organize, manage and coordinate programs, as recognized by the Ministry itself21. One of the main obstacles is the excessive centralization of many tasks, especially operational tasks, which results in excessive workloads for officials in headquarters and insufficient time devoted to analysis, coordination and supervision. 5.29 Another way to assess the effectiveness of health services in reaching the poor is to look at the demand side, that is, at the behavior and opinions of the intended beneficiaries. Health problems are consistently mentioned by people living in poor communities as one of their main concerns, hence the frequent requests for health centers. It is therefore surprising that existing health services appear to be significantly under-utilized'". Field research suggests three reasons: distance, cost and acceptability. Although accessibility to public health care services has greatly improved over the past fifteen years, it is still well below Sub-Saharan African standards. Defining accessibility as the possibility of reaching the closest health center in one hour either walking or using a local means of transport (bicycle or pirogue "'ibid. 122Bichfmnn. W., H.J. Diesfeld, Y. Agboton, E. Gbaguidi, and U. Simshauser, 'District health systems: users' preferences for services in Benin". Health Policy and Planning 6(4):361-370, 1991. 81 in this case), UNDP estimated that between 1987 and 1989 only 18 percent of the Beninese had access to health services, as opposed to 48 percent for the average Sub-Saharan African country; for the period 1987-1990 it had gone up to 50 percent, compared to an average of 60 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa"u. Furthermore, there are considerable regional differences, with the North lagging behind. 5.30 Distance and cost tend to be directly related. The farther a patient has to travel, the higher the cost in transport and, especially, in lost labor opportunity. To this must be added the long waiting time (i.e., additional opportunity cost), the cost of the consultation and the price of medicines. Primary health care is relatively cheap, with initial consultation prices as low as CFAF 100 in rural areas, but when all the other costs incurred are included, it is clear that the decision to visit a health center will not be taken lightly by low-income people. Attitudes matter as well (see Box 5.4). Patients from modest back- grounds frequently complain about the rudeness of health officials who seem more interested in following appropriate procedures than in treating the patient. For example, it was reported that a woman from a Box 5.4: The Cost of Health remote village in Ouem6 had died in childbirth because the nurse had insisted that she wash before "There is no health center in this village. The assisting her. While the low morale typical of public closest is two hours away on foot, but if it health personnel may be an explanation, it cannot be rains, it's better to use a pirogue. Wben we a valid excuse. In addition, the fact that medical go, we have to pay for everything. We personnel are frequently deployed away from their understand one must pay for a doctor or for persnnelarefreqenty deloyd awy fom teir medicines, but we feel the money we pay area of origin puts the poor at a disadvantage, as gedioinefit te oeel th is isnpt goes to benefit the other village, and this isn't generally the poor will only speak their native fair. So, we only go in extreme cases; then vernacular, and therefore will be unable to we all contribut somethig, because nobody communicate with the health provider. A study in the here would be rich enough -prescriptions Zou and Atlantique regions, for instance, found that may cost more than 2,000 francs, and one half of the patients did not speak the language of the must eat something while waiting. Normally, consulting nurse'24. we prefer a local gudrisseur: it way not be cheaper, but he's here and takes an interest in 5.31 Attitudes about traditional versus modem us. Otherwise,.wemayjustbuysomepills at medicine have an important bearing on the decision to the market. There are 'guMsseur iElnesses' use public health services. In urban areas, 16 to 20 and 'pill illnessest. Pil illnesses are tose percent of poor households use traditional medicine. which don't go-away with leaves. Among those people who were affected the most by Source RpidPoveny Apprsal, ZU district, May 1993. the adjustmnent, retrenched civil servants report doing so on econonic grounds, but the reason most frequently mentioned is the ineffectiveness of modem medicine (62 percent of households)'". Typically, when disease strikes, the poor will first resort to self-medication, using remedies concocted at home or bought at the market. The advantage with the latter is that they can be purchased per unit, but they obviously also involve a risk. Should self-medication fail, a traditional healer is consulted. The most common illnesses, such as diarrhea, measles and chicken pox, "'UNDP, Human Development Report 1992. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; UNDP, Human Development Report 1993, op.cit. The main source for health data presented in these reports is WHO. '24Bichmann et al.. op.cit. '`UNDP/MPRE 82 tend to be considered the domain of traditional medicine. Modem medicine is mostly seen as a last resort both because of its perceived "specialization" in serious illnesses and because of its cost. Traditional healers are not only generally cheaper, but they also accept credit-a crucial factor for poor people-and, in contrast to public health services, the fee need not be paid in advance. Given the large number of traditional healers (up to 5,000 according to a recent census by the Health Ministry'm), and their greater capacity to reach the urban and rural poor, it is unfortunate that interventions to integrate traditional and modem medicine remain at the planning stage. 5.32 Implementing the Bamako Initiative in Benin aimed at restoring confidence in public health services, by ensuring a regular supply of low-cost medication in order to bring in patients, and thus recover costs to sustain supply and finance preventive actions. The Initiative is in effect in over 400 health centers in Benin, with decentralized and participatory management exerted through management committees at the "sous-prefecture" and "commune" level (COGES and COGEC, respectively). Systematic use of generic medication and bulk-purchasing by a central medical store has dramatically reduced drug prices, compared to those of private pharmacies. But confidence has not quite been restored, in part because of travel time and the forbidding attitudes of medical personnel, and in part because drugs are diverted, allowing market vendors to partially supply themselves, hence creating new shortages at the health centers. Furthermore, although it was stipulated in the Bamako Initiative, none of the COGEC or COGES has taken steps to make health care more accessible to poor families through the provision of special payment terms (reduced or waived charges). 5.33 It thus appears that health centers do not address all of the health concerns of the poorest, which should be part of basic health care. Basic health care does call for an integrated, multi-sectoral approach as set forth in "Health for All in the Year 2000", and decentralized at the district level. In addition, despite vaccination efforts and their very satisfactory results (70 to 81 percent in 1992), preventive medicine-which is most beneficial to the poor-has not been sufficiently emphasized yet. Almost all of the most common diseases are preventible at a very low cost. When combined with the monitoring of children's weight and nutritional education, vaccination has a directly observable impact on child survival and development. Diarrhea yields to simple inexpensive, home-made treatments, such as oral rehydration and above all, exclusive use of breastfeeding during the first six months of a child's life. Malaria is preventable (repellent-treated mosquito nets), and so are intestinal parasitoses (personal hygiene). Assisted deliveries require a retraining of traditional midwives, the identification of difficult pregnancies and deliveries, and the implementation of a referral system at a cost affordable by the poor. Thanks to profits derived from pharmaceutical sales, health centers should then cover pre-and post-natal care, health education, child-weighing, nutritional education and counseling in family planning. The identification of difficult deliveries could be extended to the identification of groups, families and individuals in each community who are at risk in general health terms. In addition, socio-cultural and psychological factors, which presently reduce poor people's access to health services, will be better acknowledged. 5.34 In conclusion, it appears that, although much has been done to make health care more accessible to the poor, much more remains to be done. And not all of it will require large investments. Accessibility is low, but under-utilization makes things worse. The insufficient use of available health services is due as much to poor quality service (from the users' point of view) as to the often-expressed dislike of modern medicine. Unacceptable ways of treating the patients (especially the poor), inefficient '"Minist6re de la Sant6. Stanstiques sanataires, op.cit., 101 83 management of the services (as evidenced by long waiting periods) and ill-advised practices in the assignment of medical personnel (lack of ethnic integration) must be added to the enormous obstacle represented by the required cost-sharing and travel time. Traditional medicine plays a significant role in health care for a large majority of Beninese, but its strengths and weaknesses remain largely undocumented. A step forward in this sense could open promising avenues for intervention. Box 5.5: The Community-Based Information System Some interesting initiatives have been launched which should be generalized. The current process of decentralized decision-making must be coupled with one of decentralized data-gathering and processing, im order to promote local analyses of the health situation and thus facilitate identification of the health prblems of the poor. Hence a community-based information system has been initiated in the Zou region, which closely associates the commnmunity to the process by setting up health observatories in villages. In these centers, volunteers register all children 3 and under, check and record their weight, and compile data on. births, deaths, new cases of polio, neonatal tetanus, Guinea worm, malnutrition, etc. The information- collected is discussed every three months in a village assembly, and a Village Decision Committee must monitor the implementation of the assembly's decisions. Also the Zou region, 250 water points are managed- by socio-sanitary development committees which are not only responsible for water point management and pump repair, but also oversee hygiene matters, health education, and monitoring of school playgrounds, etc. The lack of a permanent govemnmental backup institution has so far impeded the dissemination of this pilot-- project to rural water projects in other departments, but water management committees have been systematically created for each of the water points installed since 1986. Water Supply 5.35 According to UNICEF, only 54 percent of the Beninese have access to potable water"V, while in 1985, this was true of only 15 percent of rural and 26 percent of urban dwellersel. As one would expect, water supply in urban areas is far better than in rural areas; urban dwellers are more than twice as likely to have access to safe water than people in the countryside. Assuming a norm of 20 liters per day per person, the Water Works Department (Direction de Il'hydraulique) calculated that in 1992 the global rate of coverage was 49 percent. Since 1985, operating expenses of the water points have been progressively covered by the comnmunity, either through contributions or by charging consumers by the bucket. In addition to the already mentioned rural/urban differences, Table 5.6 shows that there exist considerable regional differences, with the South having much lower coverage than the North. These differences can be explained by two factors. One is that because the North has traditionally experienced difficulties in obtaining access to water (any water), a onajor effort has gone into improving the situation. The other is that southern populations often prefer to use unsafe surface water, because doing so is easier and cheaper than going to the water point. '-7UNICEF, Enfants erfemmes.... op.cit. '2"PAE. op. cit. 84 5.36 During the International Decade of Water (1980-90), it had been decided to provide all villages of at least 500 inhabitants with a water point. As a result, the long-term plan of the Water Works Department is to establish a total of 9,447 water points throughout the country. Although an initial emergency program aiming at the installation of 2,400 water points by 1990 surpassed its goal by a large margin, progress in water supply may not be as fast as expected. Access to groundwater is made difficult by rock formation and the depth of aquifers. In the South aquifers are often deeper than 50 meters and particularly in Mono and Borgou, it is often necessary to drill deeper and deeper to find water. In addition, many of the water points are not in proper working condition. By 1991, 29 percent of the water pumps were out of order, and 13 percent of the wells had dried up (see Table 5.7). The poor performance of water pumps was found to be due to lack of maintenance because of economic, technical and cultural reasons, along with a want of adequate managerial capacity. Table 5.6: Water Points in Rural areas (as of 31/12/91) Region Water Points Water Points Established Available water Rate of needed In 1990' per person (i/day) Coverage (%) Boreholes Wells Total Atacora 1,111 688 150 838 15 75% Atlantique 1,520 190 174 364 25 24% Borgou 1,365 750 373 1,124 16 82% Mono 1,733 241 86 327 4 19% 016m6 1,788 393 18 411 5 23% Zou 1,930 835 177 1,102 10 53% Total 9,477 3,097 979 4,076 9 43% Esmia based on 20 litres per day per person Source: MPRElDirection de 1'hydrmlique. Table 5.7: Conditions of Water Points (as of 30/06/91) Region Boreholes Equipped Breakdown Rate of Completed Depletion rate of with pumps Water Pumps Wells Completed Wells Atacora 615 24% 150 15% Atlantique 223 30% 174 12% Borgou 943 19% 374 12.5% Mono 428 35% 18 16.6% Ou6mn 284 44% 86 12.7% Zou 907 37% 177 13.5% Total 3,300 29.3% 979 13.0% Source: MPRE(Direction de I'hydnuhque. 85 5.37 Wells were drilled and pumps were installed free of charge to the community. Since 1985, however, the community has been financing operating costs. Before setting up a water point, it must contribute CFAF 60,000 to cover maintenance expenses during the first year, and to constitute the first installment of a fund for the replacement of the pump. In addition, it must provide materials, labor, and a contribution for the layout of water point surroundings. Yet spare parts are expensive and not always available, and contributions are sometimes difficult to collect (hence the payment-by-the-bucket scheme). It is not surprising, therefore, that the region recording the lowest breakdown rate is Borgou, where farrners are able to pay for needed maintenance thanks to the profits from cotton and to the existence of traditional forms of organization which facilitate management. Conversely, the poorest rural communities can be expected to have the highest breakdown rates, as not only are they less likely to have money available for maintenance, but their maintenance costs are probably made higher by their remote location. To make things worse, several different types of pumps have been installed (reflecting the involvement of several different donors), thus making it more difficult to obtain needed spare parts. 5.38 Cultural attitudes also play a significant role. For most Beninese "water is a gift from God and a symbol of peace and friendship""'9. It is therefore difficult to understand why one should spend money for it, and to some it may even seem sacrilegious ("selling water is both against traditions and against divine laws"). In any case, poor households can hardly afford to pay between CFAF 3,600 and 28,800 a year for water (depending on the location), which is what would be required for year-round access to clean water bought by the bucket (CFAF 5-10 CFAF per bucket in Cotonou). To this it must be added that going to the manrgot to fetch water serves an important social function, as it is a unique opportunity for women to be with each other and to discuss their problems ("the water pump is certainly very practical, but it doesn't have a soul, it's not alive"). 5.39 In order to sustain water point viability and to better meet the demand of rural populations, the Government has adopted a new hydrologic strategy in January 1992. It was introduced in two departments (Atlantique and Zou) and includes: a) improving training of local committee members through community outreach activities undertaken with NGOs; b) providing technical training to six categories of agents in rural hydrology, artisans and small enterprises in particular; c) presenting comiunities with an array of technologies allowing them to select least-cost alternatives; d) promoting alternative technologies (upgraded family wells, rainwater reservoirs, protected springs, large-diameter wells, locally-built water filters); e) establishing reliable routing networks for spare parts, including by limiting types of pump models; and f) having communities assume the marketing costs of hand pumps. Finally, health education remains to be enhanced, to help change rural attitudes and behaviors in this domain. 5.40 While these policy guidelines hold much promise in terms of solving the maintenance problem, it is clear that the requirement of a contribution-which will most likely be revised upwards with the recent devaluation-will make it very difficult for the poorest to qualify for a water pump. Similarly, access to safe water for the poorest members within each community will prove problematic under a payment-by-the-bucket scheme. Alternative ways to encourage cost-sharing and community ownership should therefore be explored. '29Quotations in this paragraph are from UNICEF, Enfants et femmes... op.cit., 65 86 6 Safety Nets 6.1 Among the poor there are those who need special assistance because they cannot take advantage of "regular" poverty alleviation measures or because these measures are inadequate. Social safety nets are intended to fill this gap. They include assistance to those whose poverty derives from a prolonged inability to work because of age or health conditions (older people, children and the handicapped). They also include temporary assistance to those affected by economic recession or natural disasters. By their very nature, therefore, safety nets must be targeted. But targeting may be difficult and expensive, as it requires careful monitoring to ensure that the assistance provided reaches all of those for whom it is intended, and nobody else. The administrative cost of targeting may be so high as to make it unjustifiable. This is why building on indigenous safety nets may be the most promising option: assuming they prove to be reasonably effective, the targeting is already done. 6.2 Broadly speaking, all people falling in the category of the extremely poor are likely to be in need of special assistance, as they are unable to secure adequate nutrition and access to basic social services. In some cases, appropriate interventions may help them break the cycle of poverty relatively quickly. For example, peasants cultivating arid soil may be helped to develop and maintain small-scale irrigation systems, thus becoming self-sufficient within a couple of (good) cropping seasons; similarly, appropriate assistance to retrenched civil servants may help them find new ways of earning a living. In other instances, however, the assistance may need to last longer or even be permanent, as in the case of the severely disabled. 6.3 This chapter starts by examining survival strategies, which are defined as behaviors adopted by poor households or individuals to cope with critical situations and, strictly speaking, differ from safety nets, which may be beyond the control of those who need them. This is followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of the safety nets most widely available to the poor, the traditional ones. The assistance provided from the outside (Government, donors and NGOs) is then reviewed. Finally, safety nets for transitory shocks are examined. Coping and Surviving 6.4 All poor people are forced, as a matter of routine survival, to devise their own coping strategies. This is particularly true of situations of increased stress and risk, such as those faced by the groups described in Chapter 3. There are also behaviors which are adopted by individuals or households only in times of acute crisis, such as during the pre-harvest season when it becomes difficult to find food. Everyday coping strategies and crisis behaviors may not differ much, as a situation perceived by the poor as an acute crisis may be the daily reality for the core poor. Therefore, they will both be described here without attempting a classification. 6.5 Probably the most developed coping strategies are those used to deal with extended periods of food insecurity, either by minimizing risk, by finding alternative calorie sources, or by containing energy 87 _------- -,-- - ----- - expenditures (see Boxes 1.2 and 1.3). The strategies chosen depend on the usual mode of production of the household (fishing, farming, transhumant herding), as well as on socio-cultural factors, and therefore vary greatly even within a small geographical area. Research in the Atacora, for example, found that a high percentage of households cultivated early crops (such as hungry rice, early millet and maize), although production of early millet and maize was hardly sufficient for a few meals'". Farmers in the Tchi area (Mono) reported harvesting their maize one month early and selling it as soon as it dried. In addition, rural households may try to spread their risk by planting the same crop at intervals in the face of unreliable rains. Bad experiences with cash crops (falling prices, late or failing payments, breakdown of the collecting system) may cause farmers to contain risks by concentrating on marketable food crops. Fishermen, on the other hand, may go out to sea twice a day rather than once, or go out at different hours. 6.6 Because in most ethnic groups the ultimate responsibility for feeding the family rests on women's shoulders, women tend to have the most diversified-and therefore most effective-survival strategies. One of the most common is gathering wild food, which is done more or less all year, but intensifies considerably during the pre-harvest season. Research on the Adja plateau (Mono), for instance, found that during the pre-harvest season consumption of cnn-cnn (a wild leaf) more than doubled"'. Wild food may then be consumed directly, sold at the market in exchange for grains, or processed and sold. Men may contribute by gathering and selling wood'32 or hunting, but it would not be conceivable for them to go to the bush to look for wild food (see box 6.1). Women also engage in a variety of other income-generating activities, although most commonly it is small trade. The problem, of course, is start-up capital, however small that capital may be; the solutions Box 6.1: Wild Food are to buy little quantities of merchandise on credit or to get the merchandise for free, as in the case of wild fruits. "To find money to eat, we wome he to The Atacora study mentioned above, for example, found pick the leaves from a bush tree whic Whas that many more women than men had off-farm income- thoms. To do- it,, we mst -wear generating activities, but that this income was marginal. truse ust. lik0e _men-o vie our It must be added, however, that women spent such legs would be covered with:bloodbeae income mostly on food for household members, while the the thoms arm v sharp. But our u - off-farm income of men was often used for luxury would neverddo it, evenif rtheyrh products, agricultural tools, construction materials or ones normallyweariog rumser The w livestock. walk to the mrket in the nextillage. and we sell the leaves. For two days wothofi- 6.7 Migration. A relatively frequent survival picking we get 50-francs-- strategy is migration, both internal and external. Internal Souie:RapiPoveyApp.Wwea'sGroupii migration takes two forms: (a) from one rural area to a village nar Oudah n.by 1995. another, mostly from the infertile lands of northwest Atacora and from the overcrowded rural communities in the South toward the Center; and (b) from rural areas to 'NM. Van Liere, personal communication, May 1993. '311jff, A., A. den Hartog, G. Dalode, and F. de Koning, "Alimentation et nutrition sur le plateau Adja, avec un accent particulier aux enfants et aux femmes." University of Wageningen, 1993. '12Note that in the Nonh, although it may be the men gathering the wood, it is the women who have to carry it. In the South, whenever possible, men would transport wood to market by pirogue. 88 urban centers (see map), with Cotonou being the main pole of attraction. External migration used to be toward Togo, Niger and especially Nigeria (during the oil boom), but political and economic changes have greatly reduced the flux. More recently, therefore, migrants have also gone to Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and Cameroon'33. 6.8 Most migration is seasonal, with men going away at the beginning of the rains after field preparation, and coming back in time for the harvest. The main reason behind seasonal migration is dwindling food stocks. When the granaries are empty and the next harvest is months away, men will leave their villages and go look for agricultural work, primarily in northern Zou and southern Borgou. Others go to the cities, sometimes as far as Nigeria, where they take up jobs they would not lower themselves to do in their own environment, such as shoe-shining or pushing carts (pousse-pousse). It should be recalled that carrying loads is primnarily a woman's task in most of rural Benin (see Box 3.5). 6.9 In principle, mnigrants should send remittances regularly (e.g., every two weeks), but this is seldom the case. Even when they come back, they may not have much to contribute to the household because of the difficulty in finding any work-let alone well-paid work-and because of the tendency to buy prestigious items for self-consumption such as bicycles. In the meantime, the women left behind are solely responsible for the agricultural work, and for all other chores of course. A reduced human input, in turn, may have a negative impact on food production, thus perpetuating the need for men to migrate in search of wage labor. But migration may also have a very positive impact in getting people out of poverty. Frequently, the richest households in the village are those who have members who went to work abroad. When Everting Else Fails 6.10 While people will do what they can to take proper care of their family, there are cases in which the common survival strategies described above either fail or are not possible. And there are cases when calamity strikes, such as disease or inundations, and the poor find themselves in desperate need of food or cash. In these cases, the most common answer is borrowing; food borrowed from neighbors is generally to be repaid at the subsequent harvest without interest, but borrowed money has to be repaid with interests around 40-50 percent within one or two months and creditors are seldom lenient. The case of an eight-year old girl who was given to the creditor as a servant because the mother could not repay a CFAF 47,000 debt illustrates how far can creditors go to claim their debts'3". 6.11 Borrowing is never an easy choice: on the one hand, dignity may prevent people from asking unless the situation is really critical; on the other, becoming a debtor increases vulnerability because it lessens social standing and, perhaps more importantly, the likelihood of obtaining another loan. Indeed, it appears that those in low standing, with unpaid debts or simply unlikely to be able to pay back (i.e., the poorest), can seldom resort to this survival strategy. This is one of the reasons why people will do all they can to repay their debts promptly, including selling their crops when they are still in the field, '3Migration to Ghana is nothing new; people from nothem Zou and southem Atacora have been migrating there since the colonial period. '34Comian. E., op.cit. In this particular case there is a happy ending. The girl in question was adopted by the creditor and sent to school 89 for whatever price the creditor is willing to give them. Although this appears to be quite a grim picture, it should be kept in mind that having the opportunity to borrow is considered a luxury in the poorest and most remote communities, where no matter how desperate the situation is, nobody has anything to spare for credit to the others. Internal Rural Milgratory Trends 6.12 Other ways of raising quick cash are typically found in the more populated areas, where land has become a commodity. A whole range of contract types exists for different forms of renting out, pawning, or leasing land. In particular, in the South and Center the "palm contract" is a way to raise a large sum whereby the owner grants the usufruct of his land for a period of approximately twenty years (the production cycle of the palm trees) for a lump sum. Outright sales of land have also been frequent in 90 some parts of the country'35. Selling their land robs the poor of their last protection, increasing the growing legion of landless in the rural areas. 6.13 Another survival strategy of last resort is prostitution. It is more common in the cities, where women charge CFAF 200 per client on average, but it is practiced in the rural areas as well. For example, in a village in Mono it was reported that a number of women heads of households managed to survive only thanks to some "special friends" of theirs, who would give them 8 kg of maize and some CFAF 100-200 for the night. People in the village knew that when these women visited their friends, they had a "big problem", and there seemed to be more compassion than stigma attached to their actions. The incidence and profitability of prostitution can also be an indicator of the level of stress in the community. In the South near the border with Togo, for instance, prices have gone down to CFAF 150 because of the competition coming from the refugee women, obviously desperate to find means to support their families. 6.14 The last-resort strategy for men is simply to leave the family behind and never return. Although sporadic cases were observed in different parts of the country during the rapid poverty appraisal, it is clear that this is a reaction dictated by desperation and only enacted in extreme circumstances. When the burden of dependency becomes too heavy, the able-bodied may just give up and cut their losses by leaving. Needless to say, this way out makes the situation of those who stay behind even more miserable. Traditional Safety Nets 6.15 In line with African tradition, extended families tend to be synonymous with safety nets. This safety net is most efficient in the rural areas, where family ties are strongest, but it also reaches into the urban areas thanks to well-developed rural-urban links. Examples of the importance of the role played by the extended family in securing survival abound. When food is scarce, relatives will donate some food or invite the children for a meal (if not for whole weeks). Orphans are taken in by the extended family as a matter of course. Widows are generally "inherited" by a brother of the deceased husband, in principle to provide them with needed protection. Civil servants are frequent benefactors to their relatives who remained in the village, sending occasional presents but also cash to pay for food, ceremonies, or school and medical fees. Families with members who migrated abroad (especially to France) are often envied by the others because of their superior "social security system". 6.16 While there is no doubt that the extended family is a powerful safety net, its effectiveness should not be overestimated. Its most troublesome limitation is obvious: its effectiveness is related to the means available to its members (and to their generosity, of course). Because people tend to marry within their own social strata, very poor people are likely to have relatives who are also very poor, and therefore will be unlikely to be in a position to provide much assistance. This is particularly true for transitory shocks affecting a whole community, such as natural disasters, since poor rural families tend to live within the same geographic area (see Box 6.2). In addition, should help be available from a lucky relative who moved away, the fact that the very poor tend to live in remote and inaccessible villages makes it difficult '35Land as a commodity is a common phenomenon in the Adja Plateau; see Biaou. G., 'Fonctionnement du regime foncier...", op.cit. During the Rapid Poverty Appraisal similar arrangements were recorded in the southern part of Zou. In Atacora, where sharecropping is increasingly common, outright sales were not mentioned as yet. 91 for the help to reach them. In urban areas, households are physically separated from their larger Box 6.2: Nobody could help families, and difficulties in communication and traveling may be daunting. Should distance not be a 'Three years ago it was a very bad year. The problem, highly unreliable sources of income translate flood washed away all of our crops, and there. into unreliable assistance. Hence the acute sense of was a lot of hunger around here. To the poiat vulnerability felt by the urban poor. As one of them that many people actually died of hunger; they put it, "those who have the courage to remain in the must have been at least a dozen, mostly: village will always find help and a way to feed children and old people. Nobody could help themselves; but for us in the city, there is nowhere tO thed ther nltv,i he villge hod no food either; nobody had enough food for hLis own chilren, let alone for the children of his brother or cousin. And very few had a richer 6.17 Modernization poses a significant threat to the relative somewher else who could help." effectiveness of the extended family as a safety net. As Western values make their way into the country, Sou=e: Rapid Poverty Apprisal, Z2 disric, May 1993.: young people are tempted to embrace an individualistic and materialistic philosophy of life which is the opposite of the principles from which the extended family derives its strength. The emerging phenomenon of old people abandoned by their children (see Chapter 3) is perhaps the saddest manifestation of this trend. Because urban areas are more exposed to new ideas and outside influence, it is to be expected that extended families will progressively lose their importance, both as a safety net and as a reference point, for urban dwellers. Cotonou is already witnessing the emergence of neighborhood-based support groups to compensate, at least in part, for the breakup of the extended family. 6.18 The assistance provided by extended families is often complemented by community-based associations. The most common are the tontines, which may function either as systems of labor sharing or as savings clubs. An example of the former are the tontines des champs ("field associations") whereby a group of farmers, generally of the same sex, will organize themselves to work together on the field of each member in turn. In the absence of in-depth studies, it is difficult to quantify the contribution of these arrangements to indigenous social security systems"3. It appears, however, that communal labor systems play an important role, because they enable poorer families to share not only labor and possibly agricultural tools, but also food (often "superior" food, such as fish sauce) with richer farmers. For the core poor, being members of a tonnne des charnps may well be their only chance to secure regular access to proteins. In addition to playing a redistributive role, labor-sharing clubs are also a form of insurance against illness or other forms of incapacitation, because they guarantee continued agricultural production-and therefore survival-for their members. In this sense, their existence is especially valuable for older people, who might not otherwise be able to cultivate their land. 6.19 As reported in Chapter 4, savings clubs are common both in rural and urban areas, especially among women. They are a time-honored tradition throughout much of Africa, but in Benin they mushroomed to replace the collapsing banking system, to the point that they are now competitors of fledgling savings banks. Typically, members contribute an agreed amount at regular intervals (most '3'For a quantification of "labor transfers" and a discussion of their implications in an African context, see von Braum, J., "Social Secunty in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reflections on Policy Challenges" in E. Ahmad et al., Social Security in Developing Countnes. London: Oxford University Prea, 1991. 92 commonly, once a week or once a month'37), and each member in turn collects the whole amount. The sum contributed varies greatly, from just CFAF 100 a month to over a CFAF 1,000 a week, and discipline tends to be strict. Should a member find herself in difficult circumstances, she can have access to cash this way. Box 6.3: Tontines 'We have two tontines in this village, one for 250 francs and the other for 500 francs. I started as a member of the one for 250 francs, there are twelve of us. At the beginning it was very difficult to find the money each week, but I really wanted to be part of the tontine, so I would work very hard to make sure I had enough money for my contribution. It wasn't easy, but I had to, because those who don't pay regularly are thrown out and who knows when they will be accepted again. I paid and I got my reward. When my turn to collect came, I travelled all the way to Nigeria with a woman relative and bought all sorts of things: soap, clothes, plastic containers. That way, I began doing small trade (le petit commerce). The next time I collected, I went again to Nigeria, but some of the merchandise I bought, I used it for my children. I was so proud to see them with their new shirts and dresses! Now I'm thinking of joining the other tonnne as well. I know that it will not be easy at first, but we women always have to struggle and we can't afford to be lazy. You see, my daughter is getting older, and I want to be able to give her a nice dowry. I could buy her so many things in Nigeria with all that money, and still have plenty to sell. rjust hope that things keep going well, that nobody in the family faUs sick. If that should happen, I don't know if I'11 be able to stay in the tontine, because all my money would go to health care. I pray I can stay in a tontine until all my children are married." Soume: Rapid Poveny Appraisal. May 1993. 6.20 Tontines cover three main functions: (a) they are sources of initial capital for economic ventures, such as buying contraband (gasoline) to be retailed; (b) they allow members to make 'big" purchases, such as clothing for their children; and (c) they are a form of social security, in that they may be used as an emergency fund (see Box 6.3). The first two functions are dominant, because the very reason of existence for the tontines is to enable their members to have regular access to large (relatively speaking) amounts of cash. Their social security function is more often by default than by design, when a member is in desperate need and the others decide to rescue her out of a sense of group solidarity. And it could hardly be otherwise, because using a tontine primarily as an emergency fund would make it impossible to keep the needed discipline and follow an equitable schedule of allocations. 6.21 But the most serious limitation to the usefulness of tontines as a safety net lies in their source of financing. They depend on the contributions of their members and can only be successful if members pay their dues regularly. Persons with reasonably reliable incomes are often members of more than one tontine and may count on several potential emergency funds. The poor will struggle to be in at least one tontine. The problem is that, as one woman put it, "if you are as poor as I am and can't contribute regularly, you can't participate". Thus, tontines can be an effective safety net only for those who can afford them, that is, who manage to have something, however little, to spare. The poorer the person, the smaller her contribution- and her safety net. The extremely poor are excluded. 137There are also "day rontines". which have members contributing daily, but they are not common. 93 Help from the Outside: Government 6.22 Responsibility for assistance to the most vulnerable groups falls mainly on the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs, and in particular on the Social Affairs Department. Its mandate is wide- ranging, essentially aiming at improving the living conditions of the poor. It includes long-term assistance to the handicapped, lepers, orphans and malnourished children, as well as emergency aid to families in dire straits, such as fire victims. The intended philosophy is not to provide assistance in the form of hand-outs but to encourage self-sufficiency, for example by providing start-up capital to an abandoned woman rather than food for her children. The Department resources, unfortunately, are way below the level required to carry out such an ambitious program. Of all the public funds allocated to the social sectors during the period 1988-91, only 2 percent went to social affairs, and 90 percent of this allocation was used to cover personnel expenditures (see Table 6.1). In 1991, the amount earmarked for the centers for the handicapped was CFAF 1.7 million, but less than half of it was actually made available; during the previous three years, no budget allocation of the sort had been made. Over the past five years, the only time in which the operational budget came to more than half the planned allocation was in 1991, when almost the whole budget was spent for the organization of exams and competitions (concours). 6.23 As Table 6.2 suggests, when budget cuts are unavoidable, Social Affairs is one of the first victims. A case in point is the fate of the Assistance Fund, which should be used to provide material help to persons in need, for example wheelchairs and prostheses for the handicapped or "survival kits" for fire victims. For the past few years, the approved national budget showed a CFAF 10 million allocation for the Fund, but the money never materialized. The irony is that, on the basis of the allocation promised by the National Aid Commission (Commission nationale de secours), field personnel had been asked to provide the needed documentation, which had then been reviewed at various levels of the government to select the cases to be assisted'38. Thus, the budget cut not only made it impossible to provide needed assistance, but resulted in a waste of time (civil servants' and requesting parties'); what is worse, vulnerable people's hopes were raised and crushed. 6.24 The Social Affairs Department is staffed primarily by social workers, and works through the Centers for Social Promotion located at the district level. The problem is that the Centers have almost no operating budgets. Lack of transport makes it difficult to carry out outreach programs in the rural areas, so only the villages close to district capitals benefit from a community development program, which is aimed at organizing villagers (mostly women) into productive cooperatives or learning groups. Because it is generally known that the Centers have little material assistance to offer, few bother to visit them'39. Those who do are often people living in the district capital, or in a village close by, who have exhausted all other possible avenues. One social worker in Grand Popo (Mono) summed up the situation as follows: "we seldom receive visits, only old abandoned people come to see us when they hear there may be something for them, or just to beg; sometimes we feel so sorry for them that we give them our own money, 10-50 francs". '3A list of the cases approved in 1992 gives an idea of the assistance that would be provided: 29 wheelchairs, aid to 21 fire victims and 37 indigents, support to 9 leper colonies, 10 orphanages and a neuro-psychiatric center, and purchase of medecines. '"9According to the activity report of the Department, in 1988 the Centers for Social Promotion were visited by 4,042 people, 1,385 of whom received some sort of assistance. 94 Table 6.1: Recurrent Budget of the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs, 1988-1994 (in thousands CFAF) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sectors Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Budget Budget Proj. Expen. Proj. Expen. Proj. Expen. Proj. Expen. Proj. Proj. Proj. Salaries 260,067 154,165 245,115 68,679 252,090 205,610 290,473 179,575 168,653 163,593 161,957 Transport of gifts 9,396 - 4,402 704 4,402 2,946 - 587 - - - Medicines and milk 2,396 - 1,263 202 1,263 657 300 320 - - - Handicapped centers - - - - - - 1,700 99 - - Emergency assistance 10,000 - 10,000 - 10,000 - 12,500 - - - Exams and concours' 32,000 16,000 32,000 6,400 26,000 - 26,000 26,000 26,000 15,000 - (Total non-salary) 53,792 16,000 47,665 7,306 41,665 3,606 40,500 26,986 81,963 86,061 88,643 Total 313,859 170,165 292,780 75,985 293,755 208,555 330,973 206,415 250,616 249,655 250,601 * Note: A separate Ministry of Civil Service and Administrative Reforn was established in 1992. Source: Codjia, B., 'Analyse des de,penses publiques dans lea seteurs sociaux en Republique du Benin'. Cotonou: Ministy of Planning and Economic Restructuring, 1992; personal communication with Ministry of Finance, May 1994. 6.25 With no operational budget to speak of, if it were not for the collaboration of donors and NGOs, the impact of the Social Affairs Department on the lives of its target beneficiaries would be less than minimal'". It is indicative that, with the exclusions of the allocations to exams and concours, the largest item in the operational budget is the cost of transporting gifts. In a number of Centers for Social Promotion, monthly activities in direct assistance (as opposed to administrative tasks) are limited to the nutrition program run with the Catholic Relief Services (locally known as Cathwell, an international NGO). The program, which has national coverage, consists mainly of monthly nutrition education sessions and distribution of food at minimal prices to mothers with small children. After the "Cathwell day", there is little left to do but wait for clients to come. 6.26 It appears therefore that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is the classic "Cinderella" ministry, in theory with an extremely important mandate to alleviate the misery of the most unfortunate members of society, but in reality with no power and no means to do it. It is often up to the resourcefulness of individual social workers to find ways to provide effective assistance; that is, it is a question of contacts with NGOs, churches or donors who can provide the needed support. 6.27 Because the operational budget comes almost entirely from outside sources, the activities undertaken by the Department of Social Affairs tend to be donor-driven. This is not necessarily a bad situation, as donors are motivated by the best intentions and tend to have logistical and organizational "'the main contributors to the Department of Social Affairs are: UNDP, UNICEF, the US Peace Corps, SNV (Dutch volunteer organization), OCSD (Canadian volunteer organization), WFP, USAID for community development activities; UNFPA for family planning; and UNICEF and Cathwell for nutritional programs. 95 capabilities superior to the public sector. It means, however, that the government is effectively abdicating its responsibilities toward its weakest citizens. In view of the financial straits in which the country finds itself and of the willingness of the donor community to fill (at least in part) the gap, it may well be decided that the Government should concentrate its limited resources elsewhere. But keeping the mandate of the Department of Social Affairs as ambitious as it presently is, while denying the appropriate resources to implement it, is likely to produce frustration and disillusionment. The mandate or the budget should change.'4' Help from the Outside: Donors and NGOs 6.28 During the years of the one-party system, local development NGOs were practically non-existent as they would have run the risk of being viewed by the Government as dangerous breeding grounds of subversion. The only NGOs operating tended to be the voluntary services linked to bilateral donors (France, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands) and religious entities, mainly of Catholic affiliation. The democratization process resulted in a proliferation of local initiatives, and NGOs are now in the hundreds. As is typical of developing countries, there is no precise record of how many there are, much less of how many communities they serve and how effectively. Given the high birth and death rates of private development initiatives (the vast majority are less than three years old, with most not yet operational'42), and the dubious character of some of them (see below), it is not surprising that this is the case. 6.29 Although associations are required to register with the Ministry of the Interior, Security and Territorial Administration, there appears to be no legal decree regulating the formation and operation of NGOs, let alone a serious government effort to actually monitor and coordinate their activities'43. The consequence is that local NGOs are gaining a bad name because a number of them have turned out to be fronts for personal gain- political or financial. The main reason is that the founders of NGOs are often the victims of economic recession, who see the establishment of an NGO as the solution to their own financial and employment problems. During a regional NGO meeting in July 1992, one of the speakers summarized this problem as follows: "Those who have taken the initiative are essentially the retrenched civil servants and the unemployed graduates, precisely those who would need the assistance of real NGOs to start over and take responsibility for themselves... There are several associations who see an NGO as an institution to provide employment to its members, an easy solution to earn money or do some tourism. " '44 6.30 A somewhat different phenomenon are the Development Associations created by civil servants wishing to promote development in their own areas of origin (generally with a district focus), sometimes 4''An audit of the Ministry is to be initiated shortly within the framework of SAL II. This should provide the Goverment with elements to make a decision on its future mandate. "2Mongbo, R. and D., 'Peasants and Bureaucrats in the Old and New Benin", Forth European Congress of Rural Sociology, Giessen, July 1992. '43The past regime had created a Beninese Committee for the Coordination of NGO Activities in May 1989. but in practice the committee has never functioned. '"Gbegnovi, R., quoted by SNV, op.cit. 96 for genuinely humanitarian reasons, but also to gain social recognition or political clout. At times these associations have been able to mobilize local and outside resources to implement small infrastructure projects (schools, wells, health centers), but such potential to act as agents of development has to be considered in the light of its political connotations. The founders/directors of development associations are confronted with the inevitable ambivalence of being both representatives of the interests of their community, and in this sense expressions of the civil society, as well as representatives of the central state power because of their position as public servants'4. 6.31 Church-affiliated entities represent probably the most visible and far-reaching safety net presently operating in Benin. The majority of the orphanages are run by Catholic sisters, the only country-wide nutritional program is managed by Cathwell, and several programs to assist the sick, the abandoned and the destitute have been set up by nuns and priests. In Cotonou, the Catholic church is arguably the strongest presence helping the most vulnerable. Three characteristics contribute to the important place Box 6.4: The Sisters of the Service of Charity The mission of the Sisters of the Service of Charity (Mother Theresa's order) is to assist the poorest of the poor, and to this end they operate a nutritional center for children in one of Cotonou's poorest neighborhoods. The center is open to all, but because of limited space there must be a rigorous selection. There are however no set criteria for selection: a sister will visit the requesting household and determine its eligibility on the basis of whether 'they look really poor" and 'God's sign". The majority of assisted families are characterized by many children and unemployed parents, but assistance is limited to providing food and medicine to the youngest children. Helping parents find income-aing activities so as to become self-sufficient is considered by the sisters totally beyond their mission, even if it means that the: same child will come back to the center a few moaths after being discre ( in fa happens). As for limiting the number of births, it is considered a far worse evil than mnutition. Souxwe Papid Poverty AppWsl, May 1993. held by religious organizations as providers of safety nets: their superior financial means compared to local NGOs (thanks to contributions from industrialized countries), their wide distribution throughout the country, and their sincerely altruistic motivation. But while there is no doubt as to their generous intentions in some cases, their interventions may not always be the result of well thought-out poverty alleviation strategies, and therefore may result in a less than optimnal allocation of resources. The example in Box 6.4 illustrates how charitable assistance may bring immediate relief but fail to address the root causes of problems, thus unwillingly contributing to the perpetuation of the poverty cycle. 6.32 Given the proliferation of NGOs and the doubtful nature of some of them, the need for coordinating and monitoring their operations can hardly be overemphasized. The establishmnent in 1988 of the Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGAB) indicates that the need for coordination '5Such ambivalence has not gone unnoticed, as illustrated by the following comment which appeared in La Nation (the main newspaper): "The importance of Development Associations in promoting the socio-economic development of the areas they represent is no longer to be demonstrated. In the political sphere as well, they play a very active role at the grassroots level, thus showing their presence in almost all domains." (Quenum. M., 'Seminaire national sur le r6le des associations de d6veloppement., La Nanton, August 5 1992). 97 is felt by the NGOs themselves, but CONGAB has never been able to function because of lack of funds, and its role is not yet fully accepted by all NGOs. In any case, such an umbrella organization cannot substitute for the Government in setting norms and standards for social services provided in the country (whether by the Government itself or by NGOs), and in providing and enforcing legal sanctions for unethical behavior. In addition, it is the Government's responsibility to coordinate the interventions of different actors so as to ensure that the efforts of donors and NGOs produce the best possible results given the available means. Even if the Government does not have the resources necessary to offer effective safety nets to its citizens, it should at least make sure that the safety nets offered by others are as good as they can be. Dealing with Transitory Shocks 6.33 Food Insecurity. There is general agreement that Benin can potentially satisfy its food requirements, but that there are pockets of food insecurity. According to FAO, 20 percent of households suffer from food insecurity, with urban households more likely to be chronically at risk and rural households (which make up the bulk of the food-insecure) more likely to be temporarily at risk"'. Although food insecurity in Benin is far from being as serious a problem as it is in neighboring Sahelian countries, relatively high malnutrition rates justify focusing attention on this problem, however transitory and localized it might be. 6.34 Responsibility for food security and nutrition is divided essentially among two government agencies. ONASA deals primarily with the supply side, by monitoring food availability and forecasting shortages on the basis of agricultural, climatic and market factors; to this end it publishes a monthly bulletin. DANA concentrates on nutritional issues, surveillance and food quality control; it further operates a flour enrichment factory in Ouando (see below). These two institutions have, to some extent, overlapping mandates and a restructuring of their tasks is underway'". As ONASA and DANA are basically monitoring programs, their operation would greatly benefit from cooperation with the University of Benin, which has a well-established Department of Human Nutrition and Food Sciences in the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences. This Department could play an important role as a supplier of much needed analytical capacity. 6.35 Institutions dealing with food security are assisted by a number of donors which provide both technical assistance and funding for projects. In addition to the Cathwell project mentioned earlier, on- going interventions related to food security include: (a) an Early Warning Project with ONASA which started in 1988 with FAO support; (b) a GTZ-financed Food Security Project which has assisted ONASA in its restructuring process and has undertaken a thorough review and diagnosis of the food security situation; (c) pilot field operations financed by IDA and implemented by NGOs, which have led to the preparation of IDA's Community-Based Food Security Project; (d) a UNICEF/DANA pilot project to improve children's nutrition; (e) a program for the institutional strengthening of DANA including a baby food production unit implemented with Italian assistance; and (f) WFP (World Food Program) distribution '4FAO/ONASA, Projects GCPS/BEN/049/NOR-GCPS/BEN/051/NOR, "Programme national complet de securite alimentaire." Cotonou: May 1993. '7ibid. 98 of 5-6,000 tons of food yearly since 1990, mainly through cereal banks established by NGOs in food-insecure areas'41. 6.36 It is difficult to say how effective food security interventions have been. Continued high malnutrition rates would suggest a negative answer, but given the pressing population problem faced by Benin and the growing natural resources degradation, it may well be that the situation would have been much worse in their absence. Some aspects of the current approach could be improved. For example, the fact that WFP provides food through existing projects means that assistance will not necessarily go to those who most need it but to those who are lucky enough to live in a village which has been selected for the implementation of a project. In addition, the wisdom of obtaining needed food aid from abroad, rather than buying it from surplus areas in Benin, appears questionable to say the least. 6.37 In the last few years, much effort seems to have gone into studying and organizing the sector, which may be interpreted as needed lead time for preparing an effective national food security policy. Such a policy was recently elaborated in the framework of a National Complete Program for Food Security financed by FAO"9. The government envisions a three-pronged strategy. One, ensure sustainability of domestic food supply by increasing productivity and intensifying agriculture in the South, and stopping natural resource degradation in the North; two, reduce seasonal instability of supply by developing local markets, improving the information flow on prices and markets to limit speculation, and reducing the isolation of enclaved zones to permit better integration in the marketing network; and three, improve access to food supply and better diets by developing new income-earning opportunities, diversifying agricultural production, and introducing nutritional programs. 6.38 Unemployment. When structural adjustment came, the restructuring of the public sector (either through liquidation, privatization or rehabilitation of state enterprises) meant an inevitable reduction in the work force. This took place either through a program of voluntary retirement (PDV, Programmes de departs volontaires) or by forced dismissal. The PDV has more or less achieved its goal in numbers (4,200 from 1989 to 1992, with a further 2,000 scheduled for 1993), but the increase in state revenues from the reduction in salaries has turned out to be less than expected"5t. This group has been more quickly re-absorbed into the work force, and shows greater optimism than those who were made redundant involuntarily, some of whom have not yet received their redundancy payments, either because of a problem in disbursement or because the state has not yet fully released them from their duties"'. Those who have been made redundant tend to see themselves as victims of the system, which indeed they are. Although unemployed graduates, university and other, make up only 2 percent of the population, they, along with other civil servants now redundant, are recognized as a possible threat to the stability of the country, and are considered a priority target group by the government. '4For a more detailed description see: World Bank, 'Community-Based Food Security Project", Staff Appraisal Report, October 1993. '49FAO/ONASA, op.cit. '50This is a consequence of several factors. First, the number of departees in both 1991 and 1992, though significant, fell short of the original targets. In addition, in both 1991 and 1992, the Government incurred additional wage bill expenditures as a result of an effort to compensate employees at their indice rael, which had not been done since 1987. '5'The main source of information on the conditions of retrenched civil servants are the three "light" surveys carried out by INSAE/UNDP (op.cit.). 99 6.39 The state is no longer providing new jobs, and to date no long-term program of employment generation exists in Benin. Measures have been taken to assist the educated unemployed, however, and two programs have been established to provide short-terrn employment to the uneducated poor. None of these has been entirely successful. The CePEPE (an NGO) was created in 1990 as part of an UNDP- financed project to provide training for redundant civil servants and unemployed graduates (for example through an internship program for young graduates, which has placed 1,315 of them) as well as to facilitate the creation of small and medium enterprises. So far it has had limited impact. Figures vary, but it appears that financial constraints have limited training activities, and of 45 proposals submitted for the creation of small enterprises, only 16 were found viable and financed. In addition, it is not surprising that after seventeen years of a paternalistic state, the majority of those seeking assistance tend to be people in search of employment rather than aspiring entrepreneurs, so that CePEPE is working more as an employment agency despite its efforts to focus its activity on enterprise. 6.40 AGETUR (Agence d'ex&cution des travaux urbains) is an autonomous, non-profit agency set up in October 1990 on the initiative of the Benin government with World Bank financing, to provide an alternative source of income for those affected by structural adjustment with labor-intensive programs to rebuild the infrastructure in Cotonou and Porto-Novo. The agency is responsible for carrying out government or community-requested programs, almost entirely road-building and accompanying sewage works, by hiring small local enterprises selected by competitive bidding and unskilled labor to carry out the work. Between January 1991 and June 1992, AGETUR had provided 130,756 days of employment and used the services of a dozen local enterprises. By May 1993, these figures had risen to between 250,000 and 300,000 work days through 25 local enterprises'52. It is calculated that 90% of the project funds have found their way into the national economy. AGETUR is responsible for the management, supervision and evaluation of the projects, as well as for the disbursements of all payments connected with a project. In this way, cumbersome government procedures are avoided. Although the future and the overall effectiveness of this agency have been questioned, projected work has been carried out faster than expected and expanding AGETUR's activities is considered as one of the most promising ways to alleviate the urban unemployment problem resulting from the CFAF devaluation. 6.41 Whereas AGETUR's activities are restricted to urban areas, an equivalent agency, AGDSD (Agence de gestion des dimensions sociales du developpement), which became effective in October 1992, handles rural projects including road construction, school renovation, and construction of health centers. This is also an autonomous agency, with the same management responsibilities as AGETUR, and is financed by the European Development Fund, DANIDA, the United Nations Equipment Fund and GTZ. To date, the agency has implemented relatively few activities and it is too early to make any assessment. It appears, however, that it has already encountered some obstacles in carrying out its mandate. Although in theory it encourages local enterprises to bid for projects, capacity is limited and urban enterprises are more often used. Projects are selected by the sectoral ministry, which decides where the project should be, hence rural communities have little decisional power. If the budget is insufficient, AGDSD negotiates a contribution with the local Development Association in terms of workers, supplies or financing. Local community participation in project implementation is strongly and actively encouraged, but, given the limited decisional power accorded to rural communities, one has to wonder whether this is done to empower people or to keep costs down by ensuring their contributions. In the renovation of a school, for example, the Parents' Association has a contract with AGDSD and agrees to set aside a sum from the '5-Personal coninunication with AGETUR Director, May 1993. 100 school budget (CFAF 25,000-100,000) for maintenance; a representative of the agency visits the project every three months. 6.42 Given the rate of population growth and the limited natural and economnic resources of the country, it is clear that unemployment (and underemployment) will remain a daunting problem for the foreseeable future. Efforts to address this issue have followed approaches adopted in other African countries, with more or less similar results. Programs to assist retrenched civil servants in setting up small-scale enterprises have generally been rather unsuccessful, so CePEPE's disappointing performance should not be surprising. On the contrary, examples of successful urban infrastructure programs such as AGETUR abound (e.g., AGETIP in Senegal, AGETIPE in Mali, NIGETIPE in Niger, AMEXTIPE in Mauritania, etc.), indicating that this is a good formula for providing short-term employment to urban dwellers. However, its effectiveness depends on (and is limited by) the capacity of local enterprises. In addition, the majority of people are looking for a permanent job. Finding temporary work with AGETUR is better than nothing, but AGETUR is not in a position to provide a definitive solution to their problem. 101 -II. Elements of a Poverty Alleviation Strategy 7 A Framework for Poverty Alleviation 7.1 The final goal of a Poverty Assessment is to formulate a strategy for poverty alleviation. Before providing specific recommendations for intervention, however, it is useful to define the context in which such interventions should take place. This is important for two reasons. One is that the recommendations should be shown to be a logical outcome of the analysis presented. The other is that, should part of the recommendations turn out to be difficult to implement because of political or practical obstacles, the existence of a framework would allow decision-makers to devise alternative interventions which are still consistent with the overall analysis. This chapter is divided into three parts: the first focuses on the general framework considered necessary for a sustainable development project which encompasses poverty reduction; the second concentrates on the institutional framework needed to optimize the impact of poverty alleviation measures; and the third considers two aspects of the legal framework which are crucial to any effort to reduce vulnerability- gender inequality and land tenure. The Wider Context 7.2 Interventions for poverty alleviation are generally conceived and evaluated in terms of an intended output. Whether it is macro-policies or narrowly targeted projects, objectives tend to be expressed in terms of measurable outcomes, such as faster GDP growth or reduced infant mortality rates. Focusing on the final outcomes, however, carries the risk of not giving adequate attention to the processes of change needed to achieve and sustain them. The argument at the basis of this chapter is that the process is part of the output. If we accept that a fundamental requirement of a poverty alleviation strategy is to be sustainable, it is obvious that the country itself will have to develop the capacity to identify the causes of poverty and vulnerability, plan interventions to address them, and put plans into practice. The fact that 15 percent of the Beninese population is absolutely poor, and another 15 percent can be considered relatively poor, suggests that the country does not yet have such capacity. Of course, limited financial resources are a key constraint to poverty alleviation, but a number of successful low-investment NGO projects have shown that money is, at best, only part of the answer (see Box 7.1). The answer lies largely in less tangible factors which belong to the social and political sphere. Empowerment, participation and a bottom-up approach are examples of such factors. They represent the process through which an enabling environment for long-term poverty alleviation is created. 7.3 A typical pitfall of interventions to reduce poverty is concentrating on the economic and technical aspects with little or no consideration for the socio-political context with which economic and technical factors interact, and in particular for the way in which the socio-political context will have to evolve to allow for the planned economic and technical improvements. Agricultural projects provide some of the most compelling evidence of the difference it can make to give attention to social and political processes. A review of twenty-five World Bank projects, for example, found that the main reason for failed long- term sustainability was lack of farmer organization and participation'53. More generally, there seems to be widespread agreement among students of development that effective popular participation in the '53Cernea, M., "Farmer Organizations and Institution Building for Sustainable Agricultural Development" in Regional Development Dialogue, no.2, 1988. Box 7.1: PADES-Cobly (Atacora) PADES-Cobly (Programme d'appui au diveloppement de la sous-prifecrure de Cobly) was launched in 1991 by SNV (Dutch volunteers) to assist one of the poorest and most isolated sub-districts in Benin. The goal is to promote structural changes that will improve the socio-economic position of the underprivileged, especially women. The philosophy guiding project implementation is that the role of the NGO should be limited to stimulating the local population to take into their own hand their development. Hence, the assistance provided by SNV concentrates on capacity building: villagers are helped to analyze their situation, identify solutions for their main problems, organize themselves in (functional) groups to take action, and obtain the services open (in principle) to them. Fimaning for specific projects is not provided, but limited technical assistance is available, e.g., literacy classes or advice on the type of mill that should be purchased. The role of the NGO, therefore, is that of catalyzer and of intermediary between the local population and public or private services. For example,i eight groups were helped obtain credit from the local bank (CLCAM), a service which was hitherto considered out of reach by villagers. Sou=re: SNV- B6nin, Plan amel 1993, Rapport anuct 1992. Cotonou, 1993. formulation and implementation of public policies, and of beneficiaries in the design and delivery of public services, is essential for successful development. In this sense, Benin's recent history augurs well. It is true that the link between democratic forms of government and good economic performance has not been found to be consistently strong'54, but it is difficult to see how under the Kerkou regimne it would have been possible to nurture civil society and encourage empowerment at the grassroots. 7.4 The following sections will focus on four aspects of the change process which is necessary for poverty alleviation- a bottom-up approach, participation, governance and attitudes. To be sure, a bottom-up approach, greater participation, better governance and constructive attitudes are pre-requisites not just of an effective poverty alleviation strategy, but of sustainable development in general. This is no coincidence, for sustainable development implies poverty alleviation. The Design of Poverty Interventions: Bottom-Up vs Top-Down 7.5 Although the poor are often thought of as a more or less homogeneous group within a country, efforts to help them have made it clear that poverty is primarily a micro-level phenomenon. It is possible to say that a country or a region is poorer than another, but in the end poverty is experienced by each household and person in a unique way. Poverty (and vulnerability) have as many faces as the poor, because, as explained in Chapter 3, in each case they are the outcome of the interaction between different sets of factors operating at four different levels: the national level (e.g., macro-policies, political regime), the community level (e.g., social infrastructure, physical environment), the household level (household structure, access to land, wealth) and the individual level (e.g., health, education, gender, personality). '1See for example: Healy, J. and M. Robinson. 'Democracy. Political Change and Economic Policy' (mimeograph). London: Overseas Development Instiitute, 1991. 103 7.6 Economic analysis starts from the macro-level and, in a deductive process, infers the impact of various factors on lower-level factors, thus arriving at an explanation of poverty at the micro level. Poverty alleviation interventions deriving from this type of analysis, therefore, tend to focus on macro- policy changes, whose benefits are assumed to either accrue directly to the poor or to trickle down to them. The approach advocated here does the opposite. The point of departure is the poor themselves and, with an inductive process, the analysis climbs from the micro to the macro level. The reasons for this choice are both theoretical and practical. Putting individuals or households at the center, and trying to see poverty through their eyes, makes it easier to appreciate the multi-dimensionality of poverty, thus making it easier to understand how different factors (and sectors) interact with each other. This understanding becomes crucial when designing interventions. 7.7 There are also practical reasons for an inductive approach. Unless poverty alleviation interventions address the causes of poverty as they are perceived by the target population, there will be little community participation, making interventions more costly and sustainability doubtful. This is not to say that macro-level interventions are not needed or not useful. A recent review of the impact of structural adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan Africa on the poor shows that in a number of cases they have proven beneficial in improving the welfare of the lowest income groups'53. But macro-level policy measures, by their very nature, cannot take into consideration specific cause-effect linkages which manifest themselves only at the micro level, nor can they deal with "outlying cases". Thus, they run the risk of not benefiting (or even hurting) certain groups, particularly if such groups are marginalized, as the poor tend to be. 7.8 Macro-level interventions which ostensibly benefit the poor more than the non-poor may end up benefiting the richer (or the average) poor, while the core poor fall further and further behind. For example, improving the quality of primary education will result in gains for those who manage to send their children to school, but the really destitute cannot afford schooling for their children and therefore gain nothing. Similarly, agricultural extension services tend to benefit richer farmers, while the smallest smallholders are seldom assisted (see Box 7.2)- and the landless, of course, receive nothing. This type of risk is made all the more real by the fact that the impact of macro-level policies is difficult to monitor and may take a long time to be felt. Paricipation 7.9 Repeated failures of top-down projects have resulted in the emergence of a consensus in the development community on the need to involve intended beneficiaries. The reasons for doing so have been as varied as the ways to do it. With the overarching aim of increasing sustainability, "participation' has been used as a cost-sharing device, to increase effectiveness, to build beneficiary capacity, and to empower beneficiaries'56. Similarly, the methods actually employed to make interventions "participatory" have ranged from mere information (beneficiaries are told in advance about the intervention), to consultation (beneficiaries are asked for their opinions and suggestions), joint planning '5Husain, I., 'Poverty and Structural Adjustment: The African Case," HRO Working Paper no. 9. Washington DC. World Bank. September 1993. '3This classification is found in: Samuel. P., "Community Participation in Development Projects'. World Bank Discussion Paper no. 6, Washington DC, 1987. 104 Box 7.2: Rural Extension Services in the Atlantique Province 'Interaction between extension staff and peasants is characterized by a bargain for mutual benefits. Extension workers' clients are chosen according to their willingness or ability to pay in cash or kind for CARDER service, that should actually be free of charge. What is the outcome that can be expected from such processes? As the 'market' prices of both the personal services of the extension workers as skilled labor force and various CARDER services delivered through the sub-districts are too high or of no interest for other reasons for small peasants (for example: preparing of orchards by extension staff), the majority of CARDER exchanges are done with better off farmers. The services become more expensive, the higher the position of the CARDER member who renders the service. This is because he can deliver services of higher quantity and quality (transport of inputs to the farm by pick-up etc.) due to his position within the CARDER hierarchy. The only chance for small peasants to benefit to some extent from CARDER is by trying to help the extension workers in the sub-districts fulfil some of their formal obligations in cultivating a demonstration field and getting some reward in return. Generally speaking, however, CARDER activities under the guise of T&V organizational principles favor rich farmers. Although there is a trickle down effect to be assumed where CARDER activities automatically serve a greater community (concerning well or rural road construction, for instance), CARDER activities most probably increase socio-economic disparities between peasants, which is contradictory to the objectives of CARDER and the intervening donor agencies." Souce: von der Lube, N., Transfer of Tecbnology or Baur Trade? Tbe Rural Extension Service in the Adantique Province of Benin as a Market for Negotating Resources, aareriy Jownal of IhtemaonaJ Agniczduart 30248-63, July-September 1991, 259. (beneficiaries are given some control over the shape and timing of the intervention) and decision-making (beneficiaries control, in part or in total, planning and implementation). 7.10 The choice of a particular method for involving beneficiaries should depend on the main goal to be achieved through "participation". Unfortunately, donors and government alike tend to develop unrealistic expectations as to the effect of their methods. Consultation methods are often used because they are easy, but it should be understood that consultation alone is unlikely to generate a sense of ownership among beneficiaries, and therefore to produce heightened sustainability"'. This is not to say that nothing short of beneficiary control over interventions would do. Consultation, for instance, plays a key role in targeting and evaluating poverty alleviation programs. 7.11 Building on existing participatory mechanisms is generally a way of facilitating the process. In Benin, traditional authority tends to be organized along hierarchical lines (patriarchal and patrilinear) that preclude universal participation. Women enjoy a lower status than men in the community, and ;For further discussion on the relationship between participatory strategies and project sustainability see: Donnelly-Roark, P., Future Directions for Poverty Alleviation Strategies in Africa" (draft), discussion paper for Workshop on Poverty Alleviation, Ghana, July 1993. 105 consequently tend to be excluded from much decision-making. Many local NGOs, although genuinely interested in fighting poverty, tend to operate in a hierarchical manner, whereby the beneficiaries' role is to "obey" the NGOs' leaders, and even field workers have no say in decisions concerning projects. Nevertheless, the widespread presence of various types of associations, especially in the form of tontines, suggests that the socio-cultural context is conducive to community organization, a fundamental pre- requisite for effective participation. In this sense, more needs to be known about the existence and functioning of traditional networks, which are likely to be strongly influenced by the characteristics of the different ethnic groups. Training and support to local NGOs can help them learn participatory approaches to run their projects, thus improving their effectiveness and long-term sustainability. 7.12 Unfortunately, the cooperative movement aggressively imposed by the previous regime has made many rural people suspicious of efforts to organize them. The most eloquent example of failed forced participation are the CAETS (Cooperatives agricoles experimentales de type socialiste), which promoted the collectivization of means of production and were totally rejected by farmers. Only in the cotton- producing zone did the cooperative movement take hold, probably because farmers already used to working together were offered by the Government a guaranteed market, technical and financial support, and the opportunity for significant revenues. With the advent of democracy, the various types of grassroots organizations imposed under Marxist-Leninist ideology were quickly dismembered. At the same time, development associations proliferated. As mentioned in Chapter 6, it is not clear whether these associations are a true expression of community empowerment or whether they are the result of the political ambition of the civil servants who founded them- in all likelihood, they are distributed along a spectrum going from genuine empowerment to manipulation. One way or another, their potential to organize people and promote self-determination should be recognized. Governance 7.13 The form, the extent and the sustainability of participatory approaches tend to be closely linked to governance issues. Repressive and autocratic regimes generally feel threatened by true popular participation, regardless of their official rhetoric, and the very nature of their apparatus acts as a powerful deterrent against grassroots initiatives. The well-known human rights violations of the K6rekou regime'58 certainly represented a major impediment to the development of civil society, although even during that time professional associations and savings clubs prospered. In this sense, the main damage done by the past government through its human rights violations or its heavy-handedness in promoting cooperatives is relatively minor. As recent history shows, newfound democracy is rapidly healing those wounds. Free press, the constitution of opposition parties, the flourishing of development associations and the enthusiasm with which many NGOs are now adopting empowering strategies are all very encouraging signs that civil society is deepening and broadening. 7.14 The real damage comes from the impact of ideology, and the resulting policies, on bureaucracy and on people's mentality. With civil service employment guaranteed for life and political patronage determining careers, the public sector of the past government became dominated by corruption and nepotism, with services being rendered to the public not as a duty but as a special favor (see Box '5T'hroughout the 1970s and 1980s political opponents were detained without trial, outside the jurisdiction of the courts, and torture was commonplace. For more details see: Arnnesty International Report 1991. London: Amnesty International Publications, 1991. 106 7.2)'"9. However, attitudes are generally slow to change, and an analysis attributing the present state of affairs exclusively to the communist doctrine of the Kerekou regime would be indefensibly simplistic. At the very least, it should be kept in mind that the roots of this phenomenon can be found in the colonial legacy of the French, who deliberately created an elite of "collaborating indigenous intermediaries" for whom the state came to symbolize both a source of wealth and prestige as well as an oppressor to outsmart. 7.15 Although the structural adjustment process has made it clear that not all public employment is guaranteed for life and considerable "sanitization" has taken place in a number of agencies, by and large the public sector remains hampered by the corruption, bureaucratic mentality and lack of professional integrity which had characterized the Marxist-Leninist period. Needless to say, the main victims are the uneducated, the powerless and the poor, who are not sure about their rights, cannot invoke the protection of well-placed contacts and do not have the money needed to bribe civil servants. The Importance of Norms and Values 7.16 Establishing individual accountability, trimming down bureaucratic procedures, decentralizing decision-making and providing civic education to the masses are all measures that would strengthen civil society and improve governance. The average citizen would benefit, and the underprivileged would benefit even more. The biggest challenge, however, is to change the social norms and values which have generated decisions and behaviors harmful to equitable development and allow them to continue. Three inter-related cultural characteristics have been identified as making this task particularly difficult. First, low academic standards and secure employment upon graduation have generated a lazy attitude among the educated population, thus creating what has been called "a minimal effort society" (une societe du moindre effort). Second, two decades of autocratic rule, combined with the effects of the colonial legacy, have produced "the Santa Claus government syndrome" (I'Etat P&re Noel, in the words of a politician) whereby the private citizen expects an all-powerful government to provide an answer to every problem"6. Third, widespread belief in traditional cosmologies, such as vodoun in southern Benin, may have a dampening effect on individual initiative and create a mindset which is incompatible with traditional (Western-style) approaches to poverty alleviation. 7.17 Much has been written about traditional cosmologies, and much remains to be understood about their relationship with social, political and economic behavior. What follows does not have the pretence of doing justice to current knowledge, let alone of shedding new light on the subject. It simply represents an effort to draw attention to a fundamental aspect of poverty alleviation (and development in general) which is generally overlooked'61. 1''Young, C., 'Africa's Colonial Legacy", in Berg and Whitaker, eds., StrategiesforAfrican Development. Berkeley: University of Califomia Press. W50Magnusson defines this characteristic as 'the umbilically related perception of access to the state as the wellspring of personal and communal financial well-being.' (Magnusson, B., "Antecedents to Political and Economic Reform in Benin", in Deng, Kostner and Young (eds.). Democratization and Structural Adjustmnent in Africa in the 1990s, Madison: University of Wisconsin. 1991.) '6'A stimulating discussion and at least partial review of the literature can be found in: Denis Hynes. "'Voodoo Economics'": The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Legba' (mimeograph). Washington DC: Center for Development and Population Activities (undated). 107 7.18 Inasmuch as cosmologies are a set of assumptions about how the world actually works, they influence all aspects of life. What is of particular interest here, however, is that traditional cosmologies in Benin provide an explanation for human suffering- and for success. Disease, death, bad harvests and poverty itself can all be explained by the intervention of superior forces. The difference between success and failure is not one of worth or indeed of effort, but rather one of relationship with cosmological powers. The implications of such beliefs are very significant, as they allow individuals to avoid taking responsibility for their situation. Hence the inertia recorded by a number of development workers, and the sometimes stubborn resistance to innovations. Also, since unusual success is seen as undeserved, those who enjoy it must have acquired it by evil means, and therefore recourse to less than honest means to "redress the balance" is entirely acceptable. This tends to result in what has been defined as a society run by fear, where important amounts of resources are spent on "protection" and every effort is made to keep a low profile, even at the cost of foregoing much-needed improvements in household welfare. 7.19 There is, however, a more positive side to the relationship between traditional cosmologies and poverty. While it is true that expenditures for "protection" may be high, it is also true that, once protection is ensured, individuals are left free to pursue their economic goals in the most determined manner. The traditional dynamism of the informal sector certainly shows that not all Beninese are shy in taking advantage of economic opportunities. It would be wrong to conclude, therefore, that traditional cosmologies are necessarily an obstacle to the change process necessary for a successful and sustainable strategy to reduce poverty. The only conclusion which can be legitimately drawn is that they play an important role in shaping people's behavior and failure to take them into consideration could have considerable costs in terms of effectiveness. The Institutional Framework'62 7.20 The advent of democracy in 1989 set in motion a restructuring process in the public sector which has already produced considerable results. Day-to-day operation of the state bureaucracy has improved, responsibilities among ministries have been re-allocated (e.g., through the creation of a Ministry of Environment), specialized agencies have been created to bypass some of the administrative red-tape (e.g., AGETUR, AGDSD, FAIB, CePEPE), and a reform of CARDER is underway'". Efforts to empower the urban population are evident in the context of an urban rehabilitation project, whereby mayors bave been elected and activities to encourage commnunity participation have been carried out in some neighborhoods. In addition, the reform of the local tax system (recently presented to the Parliament) should facilitate the establishment of municipal councils, which would be democratically elected and therefore responsible to their electorate. Nevertheless, there are still many aspects of the institutional framework which would prevent the implementation of an effective poverty alleviation strategy. 7.21 Keeping in mind that poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, lack of coordination and collaboration among government institutions is a major obstacle not only for the implementation of a poverty alleviation strategy, but also for the overall economic development of the country. Indeed, the low rate of execution of the PIP has been attributed in part to the insufficient collaboration between 162 This section was largely inspired by the debates which took place during the "Toward a Strategy for Poverty Alleviation" seminar, held in Bohicon in April 1994. 63 See: World Bank, Agricultural Services Restructuring Project, Staff Appraisal Report no. 9442-BEN, June 3 1991. 108 technical ministries and other ministries, as well as between ministries and extension services (see Chapter 4). Similarly, the relationship between the public and private sectors remains problematic. To make things worse, public services tend to engage in practices that severely limnit their effectiveness. On the one hand, the present promotion system for civil servants, particularly with regard to the nominations for positions of responsibility, does not ensure an optimal fit between the skills needed for a position and the qualifications of the person occupying it. On the other hand, field staff receive neither the motivation nor the supervision necessary to encourage them to take effective steps to assist vulnerable groups. It is therefore not just a question of less government, but of better government too- a government open to new ways of operating, to create an environment that promotes innovative institutional arrangements for a successful fight against poverty. 7.22 Innovative institutional arrangements should be explored to increase the level of self-determination of local communities. Experience shows that democratic structures with appropriate financial resources foster self-reliance and encourage private initiative at the community level. Presently, mayors have been elected, but they do not dispose of financial or technical resources, so that power is in practice still in the hands of civil servants nominated by central authorities. The decentralization process already planned by the government should address the problem of lack of resources for locally-elected authorities and define the relationship between local and central authorities. At the same time, neighborhood associations and NGOs active in urban areas should be promoted. What is needed in the end is the creation of rural and urban districts with clearly defined powers and resources which guarantee them a modicum of autonomy. The premises are: (a) a simplified and more efficient system of collecting local taxes; and (b) a capacity-building effort including training for elected representatives, the creation of district-level technical services (perhaps through the secondment of civil servants), the elaboration of guidelines for district-level targeted projects and a redefinition of the practices of civil servants from central services. In addition, each district should be able to create its own consultative bodies to ensure the effective participation of traditional authorities, associations, NGOs and local administrative authorities (prefets and sous-prtfets). 7.23 The role played by traditional authorities should not be forgotten, especially concerning their relationship with "modern" authorities and their capacity to initiate interventions. Often influencial in rural areas and acting as moral authority, how can they become partners in the fight against poverty? Should they be given consultative powers? Should they be integrated in district-level institutional structures? Should they be given administrative responsibilities? A review of the solutions adopted in other African countries would represent a useful contribution to the debate. 7.24 Within the civil society, the recent proliferation of various groups, associations and NGOs has given life to a movement whose potential should be better exploited. This could be done through a combination of capacity building and support, building on the initiatives already carried out, such as the training program on strategic planning and management offered by the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, the training needs assessment conducted by the Institute for International Environment and Development (a London-based NGO), and the seminars on micro-project planning held by FENONG. It could also be helpful to define a specific legal status for NGOs, different from other types of associations'", as well as measures to promote a better collaboration between government and NGOs, and among NGOs. The importance of exploiting the potential of associations (including NGOs) is well MAlI associations are presently regulated by the 1901 law on the freedom of association. 109 understood by government authorities, as demonstrated by their request for support in this sense during a recent round table on the social dimensions of development (June 1994). 7.25 The transition period after the end of the Kerekou regime witnessed intense political competition for the conquest of democratic power. This competition has left little room for poverty alleviation preoccupations. Because no poverty alleviation strategy can succeed without strong political support, the attention of opinion leaders and political figures should be increasingly focused on these issues"6. An information and sensitization effort through modern and traditional media should therefore be undertaken, targeting not only the intellectual and political elite but also the general public, so as to create demand for concrete and effective government action, while at the same time stimulating grassroots initiatives. 7.26 The preceding analysis points to the need to reorient the practices and procedures of public services to make them more effective in general and more useful to the poor in particular. This reorientation must be reflected at the macro level by a national development plan which makes poverty reduction one its primary objectives. In this vein, public expenditures should be determined while keeping in mind their impact on vulnerable groups. For example, expenditures for poverty alleviation should be considered equal to expenditures in the social sectors, as some education and health expenditures are clearly not benefiting the poor (e.g., university scholarships and sophisticated medical treatment), while other non-social expenditures do help them (e.g., water and sanitation in poor communities, informal education, rural feeder roads). Grouping public expenditures cross-sectorally according to their potential to improve the living conditions of vulnerable groups would help measure government commitment to poverty alleviation. With regard to planning, the following steps should be taken by ministries and government agencies without delay: * assess the impact of their present policies and activities on poverty; * draft their own poverty reduction strategy (compatible with their mandate, of course) and start implementing it; * intensify relationships with each other with the aim of implementing integrated poverty reduction interventions. 7.27 The process described above presupposes the use of monitoring techniques and indicators which are the object of the following chapter. This need for analysis, monitoring, collaboration and coordination, and more in general the need for a new institutional framework, is also discussed in the "Background Document for the Consultation on the Social Dimension of Development" produced by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Restructuring with GTZ and UNDP support". '65The importance of political leadership for poverty reduction has been demonstrated before. Suffice it to remember President Roosvelt's War on Poverty' of the 1930's in the United States, or the key role played by Gandhi in India. '66Minist6re du plan et de la restructuration 6conomique, 'Projet de document de base...', op. cit. 110 The Legal Framework 7.28 Law is the expression of the norms and values of a society (or at least of the ruling groups in a society) and plays a crucial role in promoting good governance and participation. The proper functioning of legal institutions is a requirement for sustainable economic development in that they ensure "predictability, calculability and security of property rights and transactions", and protect against the arbitrary and discretionary power of the state and its agents'6". In addition, law can be one of the most powerful safeguards of the interests of vulnerable groups. Conversely, the legal system can also be a barrier to development and an instrument in the perpetuation of vulnerability. While an overall assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the Beninese legal system is clearly beyond ihe scope of this report, two issues which appear to be particularly important in ensuring the success of poverty alleviation interventions are discussed below. Gender Inequality 7.29 According to the constitution promulgated in December 1990, all citizens have equal rights, including access to health, education, culture, information, professional training and employment. However, it is evident from gender-disaggregated statistics as well as from field studies that women and men do not enjoy equal status, and therefore equal opportunities within the Beninese society. For example, girls' enrollment rates are half those of boys, and female-headed households have been identified as the main vulnerable group. The explanation for women's disadvantaged position lies for the most part in cultural norms and values, which are sanctioned in traditional laws. 7.30 In theory, traditional law has been superseded by modem law, but in reality this is not always the case, especially where family law is concemed. One reason is that modem law is generally not familiar to the average citizen, let alone by poor (and therefore uneducated) people. Even if it were, it would still be largely unaccessible because of its high costs (travel, waiting time, court proceedings, etc.) and because of the hopelessly overburdened legal system. Should access to the modern legal system be gained, the attitude of many lawyers and judges is still strongly influenced by traditions which discriminate against women, so that a female plaintiff would be unlikely to receive a fair treatment. 7.31 To make things worse (for women), modem family law has retained some of the discriminatory aspects of traditional law. First of all, the traditional polygamous marriage is the norm, unless the couple specifically renounces it, generally by celebrating a marriage according to the French Civil Code (and therefore monogamous). Entering a traditional polygamous marriage implies accepting traditional laws regulating marital unions, hence modem laws in such cases do not apply. On the other hand, modem family law does not offer much more protection to women than traditional law. For example, men can request a divorce on grounds of adultery, but women do not have such an option unless their husband's extramarital relation is within the household'". Should the head of the household die, his eldest brother inherits the function, and with it the control over the household possessions (including children). This means that, in the absence of a written will to the contrary, a widow cannot inherit and will depend on her brother-in-law even for access to goods that she herself brought into the marriage. "'Ghai, Y., "The Rule of Law, Legitimacy and Governance", Internatonal Journal of Sociology of Law. 14:179-183. 1986. "6Association des femmes juristes du B6nin, Guide jurzdique de la fem,ie bininoise. USAID/UNICEF, Cotonou, 1991. 111 7.32 The unfairness of family law has long been recognized, along with its potential role as an instrument of women's and children's oppression, and therefore as a cause of vulnerability. Yet, in spite of many speeches and good intentions, a new family code is not yet in effect. In its commitment to true democracy, as well as to improving the welfare of its citizens, the Beninese Government should see to it that at least modern law gives adequate protection and equal opportunities to all. Providing a code that could guarantee women equal rights to men would be an important step toward enabling women to contribute more effectively to the country's progress. Changing the law on the books, however, would not be enough. Its application should be facilitated through a widespread information and education campaign meant to reach all social strata, in rural as well as urban areas. At the same time, access to the legal system should be made easier. A possible measure in this sense could be the institution of legal aides at the sub-district level with responsibility to assist women and children in having their rights respected'69. Consideration should also be given to investing some of the responsibility (and authority) for promoting women and children's rights to the Centers for Social Promotion, magistrates, and the Ministry of Justice. Land Tenure"° 7.33 Benin's land tenure legislation dates essentially from the colonial period, with the exception of Law no. 65-25 (August 1965) which institutes a modern procedure to express an irrevocable right of ownership. In practice, however, the application to agricultural lands of the land registration system prescribed in Law no. 65-25 is unfeasible, because it involves expenses out of proportion to the value of land and it assumes the existence of an administration able to handle demand, which is not presently the case. Thus, land tenure practices tend to be regulated by custom, especially at the village level. 7.34 According to customary law, land belongs to the community and its heritage is managed by village authorities (elders, village chiefs or family heads). Lacking secure land rights, farmers have little incentive for medium and long-term measures to preserve land quality- with disastrous environmental and economic consequences (see Chapters 2 and 4). The inexorable pattern of land degradation, spurred by short-sighted agricultural practices and population pressure, is resulting in increased competition for land, as well as increased poverty among the losers in this competition. In the overpopulated South, where the competition is fierce, contiguity disputes are common and individualistic behavior forms are becoming the norm rather than the exception. Land scarcity appears to be inevitably leading to a steady process of appropriation of rights. Conversely, in the sparsely populated North little appropriation has taken place and migrants are often given land without reluctance. 7.35 The present confusion with regard to land tenure is certain to have a negative impact on economic development, natural resource management and social stability. While in the long run all Beninese are likely to be affected, it is the vulnerable groups who are likely to suffer the most, by being conned or pushed out of "their" land, and by being unable to use land (often their only asset) as a collateral to obtain credit. Fortunately, there is evidence that both the Government and donors are aware of the urgent need to resolve land tenure problems, and committed to finding a solution. In 1990 an interministerial '6This possibility has already been seriously considered by the Association des femmes juristes du Binin (the Beninese women lawyers' association). '8The following discussion is based on: World Bank, Benin Agricultural Sector Review, Report No. 10709-BEN, 1992. For more details on land tenure issues see also: Janz, K.. "Politique fonciere - Rapport de mission," (mimeograph). Hamburg, April 1990. 112 commission was set up to prepare the basis for modern land tenure legislation containing an urban and rural land tenure code, which should include transitory provisions to take account of situations created by custom (and therefore of regional differences). In addition, the World Bank Natural Resources Management Project contains a component on land tenure issues aiming at clarifying the land tenure situation and producing a land tenure plan in four pilot sites"'. 7.36 In light of these very encouraging developments, it is important that the Government seize the momentum and intensify its efforts to find a prompt and durable solution to land tenure problems. To begin with, field experiments as the basis for identifying land tenure situations, making the necessary arbitration decisions and drawing up "rural land tenure plans" should be intensified, so as to cover a variety of sites representative of different land tenure situations. Such experiments should be monitored by an ad hoc interministerial commission, which would be in charge of evaluating findings and drafting a land tenure code. Assistance from outside experts would most likely be needed in drafting the land tenure code, so as to make it possible to build on experience in dealing with these issues from elsewhere. While land tenure rights should be established following customary practices to the greatest possible extent, respect for tradition should be tempered by the preoccupation of protecting vulnerable groups. In this sense, it is essential that provisions be made to give women land tenure rights. Clearly, the new family code advocated above would have to complement such provisions. "'World Bank, Benin Natural Resources Managefent Project, Staff Appraisal Report no. 9982-BEN, February 18, 1992. 113 8 Monitoring Poverty 8.1 Policies and programs designed to reduce poverty require a clear understanding of the nature and extent of the problem. Once policies have been adopted and interventions are ongoing, information is critical to evaluate their effectiveness and fine-tune their design. An accurate measurement of poverty, therefore, is an investment. It is not costless, but it can save considerable money and suffering if it helps to focus limited resources where they will be most effective. Reliable and detailed information on the magnitude and characteristics of the phenomenon will facilitate accurate targeting of poverty-oriented interventions. Monitoring the actual impact of policies on the poor may help reduce wasteful subsidies or review well-intentioned but counterproductive decisions. In addition, the measurement of poverty has a governance dimension, in that it encourages accountability'. 8.2 This chapter starts with a review of the quantitative data presently available to improve our understanding of poverty in Benin. The review is not meant to be exhaustive, but it covers the largest and most recent data sets containing information at the household and individual levels. Because some of these larger-scale surveys appear to have been one-shot deals, the second section is devoted to a discussion of the existing data collection systems, not only to follow the evolution of basic poverty indicators but also to monitor the impact of poverty-related initiatives. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the in-country capacity and potential for accurate poverty measurement, offering some suggestions. Eisting Data 8.3 Household Data. There are several sources of nationwide household economic and nutritional statistics. Unfortunately, nearly all data were collected in the period 1986-1987, that is, under very different macro-economic and political conditions, and before the 1989 crisis year. The most important data set available at the household level is the Enqu&te budget-consommation (EBC) by the National Statistical and Economic Analysis Institute (INSAE). The EBC, a national household budget survey, took place over four cycles, covering a period of one year and three months. Approximately 2,700 households were included in the survey; a subset of 900 was visited four times for direct observation, while the remaining households were visited three times and were administered a retrospective questionnaire. The household budget survey consisted of several modules. The modules most relevant for a poverty study concerned revenues and expenditures, food consumption, and nutritional status. Unfortnately, this data set has significant shortcomings as a basis for calculating a poverty line and estimating the distribution of poverty. 8.4 The module on revenues and expenditures covered only monetary incomes, which led to a gross underestimate of the true level of income, particularly in the rural areas. Incomes in the urban 172ee: World Bank, 'Managing Development: The Governance D4nension- A Discusion Papere, SEC M91-820, June 1991. environment may represent the situation of 1986/87 better, but the changes in the structure of employment since that time may invalidate part of the data1". The food consumption module measured all food intake during food preparation in the household and at mealtimes, but food consumed in between meals or away from home (e.g., snacks and purchased meals) was not measured in terms of its nutritional value. This is likely to have resulted in an underestimation of the level of food consumption, especially in urban areas where large quantities of food are consumed away from home. In addition, questions have been raised on the sarnpling procedures employed as well as on data processing (see Annex 1). 8.5 Besides the household budget survey, a number of other food consumption surveys have been conducted in the past fifteen years. The largest was a survey covering 896 households in a national sample drawn from the 11 districts (sous-prqfectures) that appeared to be the most disadvantaged after a study of the available data on precipitation, population density, agricultural production, and health. This survey, the Surveillance alimentaire et nutritionnelle (SAN) took place in 1987/88, only three months after the EBC was completed; its results appear to confirm the general level of food consumption found by the EBC. More recent data on a national level do not exist, but since then several smaller studies have been conducted in different parts of the country. 8.6 Estimates of national and regional food production can also be obtained through the statistical data on crop production and animal husbandry. In particular, ONASA and DANA have attempted to use agricultural statistics on food crop production collected by CARDER to monitor food security by evaluating production figures at the district level against the background of population data and food requirements. This procedure depends on a number of assumptions that may have little validity in some Districts while being fully applicable in others. On a national level, it is a well-established method to estimate food security as the energy balance between food production and food requirements. At the local level, this approach is less suitable and even potentially dangerous because the cash needs of the rural population may push them to sell these crops even when local requirements are not satisfied. Nevertheless, if handled with proper care, the staple food production data are important indicators of potential food security problems at the district level. 8.7 Nutritional Data. Both EBC and SAN had anthropometric modules to collect basic information on heights, weights and ages of the population. The EBC collected this data during all four rounds, but only the results of the first two rounds of measurement have been analyzed, limiting the usefulness of the findings. In northern Benin, the periods covered coincide with episodes of food scarcity and the first period after the harvest, when recovery from the earlier hardship is not yet complete"74; in southern Benin, these first two rounds of the EBC took place during the long rains and the short rains, respectively. As a consequence the anthropometric data are seriously biased, and the nutritional indicators do not represent the yearly averages well. The SAN data cover two seasons, as well. While in this case the quality of the data does appear good, its limited geographic coverage (only 11 districts) and the purposive sampling approach adopted reduce its suitability as a national indicator of nutritional status. '731t should be mentioned, though, that salaries, even in the urban areas, only represented a minor part of household budgets in 1986/87. Proportions range from 0.3% (Center Rural) to 10.3% (Cotonou) of the total monetary income. '74Ategbo, E., Food and nutrition insecuriy in nonthern Benin..., op. cit. 115 8.8 Virtually all efforts to assess regional food security in Benin have used the data collected (since 1982) by the Catholic Relief Services (Cathwell) through their nutrition program for mothers and children (see previous chapter). Cathwell collects monthly information on the weight-for-age'75 of the child population receiving food supplements. Experience in a number of countries with similar data, however, has shown that the limitations of data from intervention programs should not be taken lightly'76. Although in principle the food distributed by Cathwell through the Centers for Social Promotion is not limited and participation is open to everybody, attendance is strongly biased towards the immediate population surrounding the centers- a factor that operates even more strongly in the isolated areas that provide the typical environment of many vulnerable populations. Further, participation requires monthly attendance and long waiting times at the distribution centers and is conditional on full vaccination of the child; in some centers, only children born in maternity wards are accepted. All of these factors combine to make the attending population primarily a cross-section of the poorest households with a semi-urban (district headquarters towns) background, rather than a representative sample of the national population. 8.9 As with food consumption, this large data set on nutritional status is supplemented by a number of studies on a smaller scale. These studies are useful for evaluating the quality of the national data, because they are usually obtained with more reliable techniques and with greater supervision of collection procedures. In addition, they provide detailed information on some of the aspects of nutritional problems in Benin that have not been covered in the larger surveys. There has been little work as regards evaluation of the nutritional effects of food-related policy measures or of other specific intervention efforts. '7 8.10 Health Data. All health centers within each district forward their records of hospital admissions and outpatients to the district health administration. This administration compiles a district summary report, which is forwarded to the Regional health administration. Regional compilations of all data are forwarded to the National level. The computerization of this system has resulted in high quality and timely statistical information published by the Ministry of Health. Besides the routinely collected data on patients and outpatients, the Ministry has been experimenting with a community health survey technique whereby the regular district health personnel conduct the survey. In 1988 and 1990, a modest start was made by carrying out small surveys in six villages (selected from different districts, one in each Region of the country). In 1992 a third survey was conducted, this time aiming at representative samples of six districts; 200 households were surveyed in each district. Although an exercise of this size is not suitable for monitoring community health issues at the national level, this approach is an important step toward a regular health monitoring system. '7"The Cathwell program still uses the traditional Harvard Weight-for-Age tables, and calculates percentage data on that basis. While this may have advantages by reducing the training requirements of the CRS prograrn staff, it should be seriously considered whether the more modem WHO References, which by now are an internationally recognized standard, would not be more suitable. '6See for instance Hoorweg, J. and R. Niemeijer. Intervention in Child Nutrition. London. New York: Kegan Paul Intemational, 1989. '"A recent example of this approach is: Fakambi, L., 'Factors Affecting the Nutritional Status of Mothers: the Food and Nutrition Program of the Ouando Horticulture and Nutrition Center in the People's Republic of Benin," Intemational Center for Research on Women Report no. 11, Washington DC, June 1990. 116 Monitoring Systems 8.11 Serious efforts to monitor poverty cannot depend on occasional large surveys, such as the EBC. The fact that it took six years to produce results is a clear indication of the inappropriateness of such an approach in light of the institutional capacity presently available in the country. It is true that it was the first such survey to be carried out in Benin and was therefore marred by many unexpected administrative and technical problems, but the fact remains that a large amount of money and time went to obtain results which, in the form and at the time they were published, were largely unusable for poverty analysis. For example, the lowest income bracket distinguished in presenting results is for monetary incomes below CFAF 105,000 per year. Seventy percent of households fall in this category, meaning that the poor, not- so-poor and core poor are all lumped together. Clearly no targeting of any sort is possible on the basis of such an analysis. If survey findings had been published in a timely manner and with the appropriate corrections and detail, the EBC would have been a precious tool to gain an understanding of many aspects of poverty in that particular year. But its value to decision-makers today is limited, because poverty has a dynamic dimension that cannot be captured by sporadic data collection. 8.12 Regular monitoring, which is essential for effective poverty alleviation interventions, demands the establishment of data collection systems, that is, established ways to obtain information and feed it to users at periodic intervals. An example of a data collection system is CARDER's regular gathering of agricultural production data, which is used by ONASA and DANA to monitor food security on an ongoing basis. While the shortcomings of using district-level data to estimate a highly localized phenomenon such as food insecurity have been pointed out in the previous section, it is clear that updated information on agricultural production plays a vital role in planning well-targeted interventions for poverty alleviation. The system used by CARDER to collect production data is presently under review'78. At the time of writing, the report on the first phase of a UNDP-assisted effort by DAPS (Direction analyse, prevision et synth&se) to improve collection of agricultural statistics in the field was about to be finalized. 8.13 The importance of a continuous and reliable flow of information is most apparent in the food security and nutrition sectors. It is easy to see that if information about food shortages is late in coming, the consequences may be disastrous. Hence the willingness of donors to contribute to the establishment of data collection systems in this area. But regular data-gathering should not be considered a luxury to be afforded only for the most extreme risks. And it does not have to be cumbersome. The Light Household Survey (Enquete legere aupres des menages - ELAM) conducted by INSAE under the auspices of the Technical Unit on the Social Dimensions of Development (DSD) is a good example. ELAM is a yearly survey (now in its third year) to monitor the impact of adjustment on urban households. It contains two small samples: one of randomly selected households, the other of self-declared unemployed individuals (including retrenched civil servants and unemployed graduates). While its scope is quite limited, it contains valuable information on labor market movements, incomes and safety nets (in the form of gifts received and given). Better still, findings are available within a few months. '781The data collected by CARDER in the past are generally considered relatively weak. Some of the older data especially may have considerable bias, and, as confirmed by a few field tests during the Rapid Poverty Appraisal, the error in the data is not always in the same direction. Remote areas sometimes are not well covered, resulting in a 'road-side' bias of CARDER statistics. Further, in some cases, production and extension effort targets may have resulted in over-estimates of the true production levels in the past. (See Box 4.1). 117 Capacity-Building for Monitoring Poverty 8.14 Compared to most Sub-Saharan African countries, the amount of poverty-related information available in Benin from official sources appears superior. A closer look, however, reveals two alarming trends. One is that the majority of the quantitative studies are based on a very small number of data sets, with the same data being recycled with small variations and little chance for correcting eventual mistakes in the initial data processing. The other is that many of the more policy-oriented studies rely on unrealistically small samples and less than rigorous analytical methods. It is also disturbing that once the statistical analysis is done, the Government does not always have the capacity to elaborate on its irnplications. A case in point is the EBC module on anthropometric measurements: after presenting a table with distressingly high malnutrition rates, especially for young men (over 30 percent in the 18-19 age cohort), the commnentary focused on the comforting finding that very few people were overweight even after 45 years of age. 8.15 Given the lack of recent household budget data and their importance for monitoring poverty, a new household budget survey would be extremely useful. The interest expressed by some donors in assisting in this sense, therefore, is most welcome, and the resulting information could represent a solid baseline which could be periodically updated at limited cost. It is essential, however, that the assistance provided aim at building local capacity not only to organize and carry out data collection, but to analyze, present, and discuss the data. The creation of multidisciplinary teams would probably prove to be a useful tool in ensuring that all implications of the findings are considered. More work is also needed to obtain malnutrition data, and this is for two reasons. One is that considerable investments are being made to improve food security, and their effectiveness is threatened by the lack of reliable estimates of malnutrition levels"7. The other is that anthropometric measurements are good (and relatively cheap) indicators of poverty, in that they reflect not only access to food but also a number of other poverty- related conditions such as environmental health, mother's education and access to health care. The availability of local professionals highly competent in this field (the Universite nationale du Benin is a regional center of excellence for human nutrition) and the existing twinning arrangement with the Department of Human Nutrition of the University of Wageningen (The Netherlands) would facilitate acting on this recommendation. 8.16 Another area for which additional information is needed is access to land. Little is known about the distribution of land resources within communities, yet land often represents the main asset of the poor, and the difference between the poor and the extremely poor. Lack of knowledge is partly due to the complexity of the land tenure system, which is subject to continuous change due to increasing land pressure and a tendency to monetize access to land. In many areas, land use has evolved into a defacto stable system, with a clear demarcation of usufructuary rights. With increasing pressure on land, this has reportedly resulted in large disparities of control over land. Such disparities should be estimated on an individual, rather than household, basis because of the differential land rights of men and women, and also of young men and old men". '7"nadequate malnutrition data could threaten the effectiveness of food security interventions in two ways: by leading to inappropriate targeting and by making impact evaluation unreliable. "MThe FAO/ONASA report for the Programme national comnplet de securitc alimentaire (op.cit.) reports the number of households with access to less than I or 1.5 ha. (in the South and North, respectively), but does not mention the source of this information. 118 8.17 Light and focused surveys such as ELAM appear to be a viable way to assess changes in the characteristics of poverty as well as the impact of specific policies or projects. Therefore their wider use should be encouraged, expanding to rural areas. The problem is that findings from small-scale rural surveys are more difficult to extrapolate to the regional or national level. One solution would be to rotate the districts sampled, so as to obtain a reasonably good national coverage every two or three years; to facilitate representativeness, sampling could be based on agro-ecological zoning. As noted earlier, a sirnilar approach is being pioneered by the Ministry of Health. Another solution would be to adopt a sentinel-site approach, whereby a limited number of villages throughout the country are targeted for regular monitoring, possibly with the involvement of local people in data gathering. The longitudinal character of such an approach would justify training selected local people in simple data collection techniques. Rapid rural appraisal techniques could also provide a creative answer to the need to obtain periodic updates on the evolving living conditions in both rural and urban areas. 8.18 For cost-effective poverty monitoring the Government should not only gather its own data, but also take advantage of infornation available from other sources. NGOs often have information which is under-utilized because administrators (and donors) may not recognize that they could use it, and that the NGOs have it. Secondary level training institutes and university departments may also have useful information which goes untapped. Establishing a computerized database on Master's theses and other academic research would help make this information more available. The Government should strive to develop channels to share information with donors and NGOs, focusing especially on information gained from implementing (as opposed to planning) poverty alleviation projects. All partners in Benin's development would benefit from sharing experience about what works and what doesn't. The ongoing effort to coordinate interventions in the social sectors through the Technical Unit of the Social Dimensions of Developments is a step in the right direction, but the repeated postponements of the roundtables organized for this purpose raise some doubts as to the practicality of the approach adopted thus far. More informal occasions in which different parties will feel free to openly discuss their failures and successes are likely to result in greater cumulative learning and more effective interventions. 8.19 The development of a learning culture would mean that Government, donors, NGOs and communities would have to build a sense of shared purpose. None of these actors can control the others; they would have to work from mutual appreciation and influence. This means that the learning, and the listening, has to be top-down and bottom-up. Decision-makers need to know how innumerable small farmers make decisions about what to grow and how to use their resources; communities need information about prices, markets, improved health and nutrition practices, etc. Decision-makers must find out how interventions intended to help poor communities have affected people's lives; poor communities have a right to participate in the identification and design of interventions intended for their benefit. There are two implications for action. The first is that the approach used to obtain information must be as participatory as possible; this point will be elaborated upon in the next chapter. The second is that qualitative information must complement quantitative data. Cultural factors may explain why the poor choose one coping mechanism over another, or what the reasons are behind choices that appear counter- productive from a narrowly economic point of view. Anthropological and sociological research, therefore, should not be seen as an optional "soft" touch to be added to the more rigorous "hard" data. It is a much needed ingredient for the design of an effective poverty monitoring system. Summary of Recommendations for Poverty Monitoring 8.20 A review of existing data and ongoing information-gathering systems has revealed three main gaps: (a) lack of reliable malnutrition data at the national level, (b) lack of information on household 119 consumption levels and intra-household allocations, and (c) lack of information on the coping mechanisms of the poor. These gaps represent a serious impediment to monitoring poverty and the success of efforts to alleviate it, as well as to designing effective interventions. Especially in light of the recent devaluation of the CFAF, it is essential that Benin and its partners in the development process are able to keep a close watch on the evolving situation, so as to detect the first signs of any negative impact on the welfare of the most vulnerable- and also to record improvements, of course. 8.21 Because knowledge is a pre-requisite for effective action, the recommendations offered below should be carried out in the short term, that is, within a year or so. The estimates included should be considered just as benchmarks. (a) A new household budget survey should be carried out as soon as possible, provided substantial technical and financial assistance are made available. An interdisciplinary approach would facilitate a comprehensive treatment in data gathering and analysis, and, especially, in interpreting findings. While the main unit of analysis should be the household, the survey should be designed in such a way as to allow for the measurement of intra-household allocations, since this would permit an analysis of intra-household inequality. Ideally, this type of survey should be repeated every five years. (Estimated cost: US$600,000) (b) National-level nutritional indicators should be collected regularly, possibly through a collaboration between the Department of Human Nutrition at the university (twinned with a Dutch university) and the Ministry of Health'81. (Estimated cost: US$600,000) (c) Light and focused surveys combining quantitative and qualitative analysis should be carried out at least once a year to monitor household-level consumption and other poverty-related indicators both in rural and urban areas. Particular attention should go to sampling, especially in the rural areas, to optimize representativeness within the limits of relatively small samples (sampling based on agro-ecological zoning and periodic rotation could help in this sense). Execution could be the joint responsibility of the Technical Unit on the Social Dimensions of Development and INSAE, possibly with the collaboration of field personnel from other ministries for data gathering (e.g., from Social Affairs), and of university-based researchers. (Estimated cost: US$70,000) (d) Socio-economic analysis should be complemented by the analysis of cultural variables which are likely to play a major role in shaping vulnerability as well as in determining the appropriateness and effectiveness of poverty alleviation interventions. For example, the important role played by traditional medicine, food taboos and traditional ceremonies in people's lives suggests that systematic analysis of the relationship between these variables and vulnerability could significantly increase our understanding of poverty and stimulate innovative approaches to its reduction. The '"'As explained earlier in this chapter. the data collected by Cathwell are not considered adequate because they are seriously biased. 120 social sciences departments of the university could play an important role, but capacity building may be needed. (Estimated cost: US$70,000) (e) Given the limited resources and capacity for data gathering and analysis, twinning arrangements with academic or research institutions with greater capacity should be explored, similarly to what is already being done with regard to nutrition. (f) The Technical Unit on the Social Dimensions of Development should produce a yearly poverty monitoring report summarizing information available from all sources- NGO reports, ad-hoc surveys, academic papers, ministerial documents, etc. To this end, regular informal meetings should be organized by the Technical Unit for Government, donor and NGO representatives to exchange information on poverty related-issues and, especially, to openly discuss failures and successes of interventions to alleviate poverty. The Technical Unit may also want to consider publishing a brief newsletter to disseminate information on what appears to be working or not working, and on new studies available. Of course, for this communication technique to be effective, all actors on the poverty scene should be encouraged to contribute information and ideas. (Estimated cost: US$10,000). 121 9 Elements of a Poverty Alleviation Strategy 9.1 The first large-scale poverty alleviation programs in Sub-Saharan Africa tended to concentrate on short-term welfare assistance to vulnerable groups, to be provided until the positive growth effects of macro-policies-which might cause some short-term harm to these groups-kicked in and provided needed growth. Experience has shown, however, that poverty alleviation objectives are best achieved through long-term measures which are interactive with growth policies, rather than mere addenda. Moreover, economic growth is not enough, even when the growth policies pursued are meant to benefit the lowest socio-economic strata directly. Worldwide comparisons indicate that the countries which have been most successful in reducing poverty have both implemented efficient growth policies and provided basic social services to the poor. Hence the popularity of a two-pronged approach to poverty alleviation combining interventions in the productive and social sectors. 9.2 The effectiveness of this well-tested strategy should not lead to the conclusion that short-term targeted programs are not needed. The poorest of the poor need them. Short-term interventions are necessary because extreme poverty is so physically and mentally debilitating, if not actually life- threatening, that any delay in alleviating it can have disastrous consequences for the people concerned, and make prevention for the next generation almost impossible. Targeting is necessary because the extreme poor may be unable to take advantage of general measures, because general measures may not be enough, and because the non-poor may have to be excluded to contain costs or to ensure that the poor are not crowded out. The success of short-term targeted interventions for certain groups depends partly on the existence of structures capable of reaching these groups (NGOs, CPSs). The problem of poverty monitoring seems closely related to capacity to carry out targeted interventions. 9.3 This chapter does not pretend to present a comprehensive and detailed poverty alleviation strategy for Benin. That can only be obtained through pervasive and repeated consultations with the poor themselves and the intermediary institutions who work with them (e.g., NGOs, churches, local government services). What follows, therefore, is only a selection of key interventions, which will certainly have to be complemented by others. For exarnple, no measure to target retrenched civil servants and unemployed graduates specifically is suggested because they are not considered to be among the poorest or the most vulnerable. Nevertheless, it is clear that their needs cannot be ignored by a comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy due to their political weight (they are often referred to as "time bombs") and to the fact that their continuing difficulties have had a negative influence on attitudes toward schooling. Policies for the Productive Sectors Sustainable Agricultural Growth 9.4 Because the majority of the poor are farmers, interventions that accelerate the growth of the agricultural sector are likely to be particularly beneficial to the poor. In light of the analysis presented in the previous chapters, these interventions should have three characteristics. First, they should be mindful of the environmental degradation already underway in many parts of the country and aim at reversing this process, or at least at slowing it down. Second, they should strive to increase returns to labor for the most vulnerable farmers, so as to raise their income. Third, they should increase employment opportunities in rural areas to diminish the need for migration and to make fuller use of the main asset of the poor- their labor. 9.5 Agricultural growth in past years has depended primarily on the expansion of cotton production. However, keeping in mind that world cotton prices have steadily declined in the past few years, and that cotton production already suffers from structural excess (e.g., increasing Central Asian capacity), the cotton sector cannot be expected to be the engine of post-devaluation growth. The Government's decision to increase cotton prices paid to growers only by about 40 percent should ensure that ginning capacity is not exceeded; it can thus be expected that, at least for the next year, agricultural growth from cotton production will be limited'". 9.6 While the recent devaluation is unlikely to increase the productivity of the cotton sector, it should provide a stimulus to food crop production by encouraging the substitution of imported food with domestic food and by making Beninese crops more competitive on the international market, particularly in neighboring Nigeria. It may take some time, however, before devaluation produces the intended supply response among subsistence farmers. Besides the inevitable time-lag due to the pace of agricultural cycles, three other factors will influence the timing and extent of farmers' response: (a) lack of information about new opportunities and about the prices they could reasonably demand; (b) limited marketing opportunities due, at least in part, to inappropriate transport facilities (roads and means of transport); and (c) little access to the inputs needed to increase productivity, including fertilizers, seeds, farm equipment and technical knowledge. 9.7 The measures recommended below address these three constraints to increased productivity and greater returns to labor. Some of them can and should be implemented in the short-term, that is, within six months or a year; their cost tends to be limited and they are often pre-conditions for further action. Other measures will require a more substantive effort- more planning, greater managerial and organizational skills, more money, more time, more political support. They are therefore recommended for the medium to long term, that is, for implementation within the next three to five years. Considering that women and men have different duties and responsibilities, all recommended actions should be carried out keeping in mind the need to address the specific needs and constraints experienced by farmers because of their gender. As women appear to face greater constraints to increased productivity than men (primarily because of their heavy domestic workload), some recommendations aim specifically at increasing women's opportunities to contribute to agricultural growth- as well as to the welfare of their families. 9.8 A concerted effort should go into identifying export possibilities for food crops (fruits and legumes appear to hold the greatest promise). Import substitution is likely to take place because of price differentials, but farmers may not be able to envisage opportunities for import substitution of processed food. For example, concentrated tomato paste and bouillon cubes are two imported products which were widely consumed before the devaluation and which could conceivably be replaced by local products. Import substitution should be actively supported by carefully evaluating different opportunities. At the 'MThere are plans to expand ginning capacity, but this will certainly not be achieved in one year. 123 very minimum, the Government should ensure that food aid distributed in the country (e.g., to refugees from Togo) be purchased domestically as long as surplus exists. Farmers should be kept informed of marketing opportunities for different crops and processed food through the mass media (especially the radio) and extension services'". 9.9 Information about new prices and opportunities should be coupled with the provision of appropriate technical assistance, so as to enable farmers to increase productivity and meet quality standards. Extension farmers should be trained, and motivated, toward greater client orientation, including participatory approaches and attention to women's special needs and constraints. Motivating tools could include minimum quotas for contacts with female farmers, mechanisms to allow communities some control over extension agents, and prizes for best results in assisting poor farmers. Technical on- the-job training for extension agents should be provided to enable them to be helpful to farmers who wish to take advantage of new opportunities. In this sense, a special effort should go into demonstrating and making available time-saving devices for women (de-hullers, small mills, improved stoves, etc.). 9.10 Existing marketing systems for crops other than cotton should be studied with a view to identifying ways of protecting farmers in isolated areas from the effective monopoly of a few well- organized traders who maintain artificially low producers' prices. Action to address this constraint is all the more urgent as one of the expected benefits of the devaluation is increased production stimulated by increased producer prices, yet preliminary evidence"8 indicates that some five months after the announced change in parity there has been little change in this respect. While the proposal to create marketing boards is still to be debated, there is little doubt as to the potential benefit of improved rural road infrastructure through proper maintenance and the construction of new feeder roads. It would facilitate market integration, hence benefiting producers, who would be able to sell their surplus andlor receive better prices for it, and consumers, who would not have to face shortage periods and the accompanying price hikes. Rural feeder roads would also improve access to agricultural inputs and manufactured goods (including agricultural equipment), facilitate the work of agricultural extension officers and make it easier to reach health and education facilities. 9.11 Credit should be made more accessible to subsistence farmers. This would enable them to obtain agricultural inputs and implements, and result in increased yields. In addition, it would provide them with an alternative to the loans obtained from middlemen, who often leave farmers no choice but to sell their crops while they are still in the field for ridiculously low prices. At present, cotton producers have easy access to in-kind credit through SONAPRA, and wealthier farmers can obtain credit through local mutual agricultural credit associations (CLCAM), but subsistence farmers can not save enough money to access CLCAMs and the existing land tenure system does not allow the use of land as collateral. The existence of tontines, and their traditional discipline, could represent a point of departure for the provision of financial intermediation to smallholders, and the use of group guarantees to replace individual securities would facilitate access to the poor. CLCAMs should be encouraged to make a concerted effort "3A GTZ/ONASA project presently being implemented aims at disseminating price information, in part through the radio. "Igue. J.. 'L'impact de la devaluarion du franc CFA sur les couches demunies de la population b6ninoise," (mimeograph). Cotonou, May 1994. 124 to reach smallholders, especially women, as experience shows that this is possible without endangering financial solvency (see Chapter 4). In addition, savings and credit schemes operated by NGOs should be studied with a view to replicating successful formulas. Since experience shows that these systems work best when run by private entities, the Government and the donor community should consider providing seed money for their expansion. Summary of main agriculture policy recommendations Short Run Medium and Long Run Conduct studies to identify export Teach client orientation to extension agents possibilities, and advertise results (radio, (participation, gender sensitivity), set targets extension). (female farmers quota) to evaluate it, and provide motivation for change. Conduct studies to identify opportunities for Increase community (men and women) control import substitution of processed food, and over extension services. advertise results (radio, extension). Require that food aid distributed be purchased Provide technical on-the-job training to from domestic surplus, when available. extension agents in response to farmers' needs (time-saving devices for women). Improve rural feeder road maintenance. Build rural feeder roads. Study food marketing systems in view of Reduce marketing margins and the role of reducing marketing margins. intermediaries. Evaluate NGO savings & loan systems in view of replicating successful formulas. Provide assistance to promising savings & loan systems, and seed money for replication. Encourage CLCAM to reach smallholders. Which Role in the Tertiary Sector? 9.12 As the fastest-growing sector of the economy, the tertiary sector (and especially commerce) appears most promising for securing jobs and income-earning opportunities for the poor. However, its perfornance rests on a fragile basis because it is largely beyond government control. The main reason for this fragility is that it depends on the regional context, in particular on the monetary and commercial policies of Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, Niger, Burkina and Togo. Should Nigeria successfully address distortions in its economy, Benin's tertiary sector would suffer. Political conditions also play a significant role, as demonstrated by recent developments in Togo and the resulting increase of traffic in the port of 125 Cotonou. In addition, the bulk of the tertiary sector is informal and therefore outside direct government influence. 9.13 Excessive penalties, heavy taxation and a high level of protection are among the most important determinants of the expansion of the informal sector. Insofar as it is considered desirable to encourage informal enterprises to enter the formal sector, a number of measures should be taken to address the situation. Among the most important are a revision of the tariff system and a simplification of the regulations governing formal businesses. These two measures could offer informal operators an attractive alternative to the bribes paid to evade the powerful Beninese administration, and encourage the expansion of the private sector. 9.14 While fiscal and legal incentives are needed to bring informal operators into the formal sector, they will have little effect without a dramatic change in the complicity of regulation enforcement personnel. But too stringent an enforcement of regulations or incentives could have the undesired effect of pushing the formal sector towards more informal activity. In addition, because of the pervasiveness and popularity of informal operations, any forceful attempt to curtail them would most likely result in social unrest'". It would also place a de facto monopoly on informal activities in the hands of a few civil servants with power to shut down non-compliant formal operators. 9.15 Especially in urban areas, informal entrepreneurs are quick to shift from one activity to another to take advantage of new opportunities. This constitutes a safety net for low-level civil servants and greatly reduces the vulnerability of operators during a period of depressed formal sector employment. A "formalization" of the informal sector is bound to reduce such flexibility, so that any potential economic benefit would have to be considered in light of the cost of higher urban unemployment. Also, prices in the informal sector tend to be considerably lower than in the formal sector. Should informal enterprises be formalized, their prices would rise and the poor would see their purchasing power eroded. In the end, it is not clear whether the poor would gain from a greater formalization of the economy, and therefore no recommendation is given toward this objective. Employment Creation 9.16 Employment creation appears to be unanimously perceived by Government, donors and NGOs as the most urgent measure needed to contain the social costs of adjustment, which are predominantly borne by the urban poor. Two alternatives are examined: employment creation through public works (a quick fix for unemployment problems) and self-employment (a slower, but more sustainable option). 9.17 Employment through Labor-Intensive Public Works. While large-scale employment creation through public works holds much promise in terms of quick relief to the urban poor, it does not represent a long-term solution. However, it may be a necessary and useful interim measure to bridge low-income families over the devaluation shock before the expected economic growth offers more sustainable opportunities to earn a living. For these reasons, possibilities in this sector have been considered with particular attention, both within and outside the Government. At the moment, one of the most promising options for quick action in urban areas seems to be AGETUR (see Chapter 6). As the implementing agency for labor-based infrastructure rehabilitation in Cotonou and Porto Novo, AGETUR has gained a solid reputation. Its small and competent staff makes it possible to create employment relatively quickly 85The customs agents' crackdown on fraudulent oil imports in 1992 provoked riots at the Nigerian border. 126 (e.g., within five to seven months of the invitation to bid, faster for maintenance work), and all work is very labor-intensive. 9.18 Unfortunately, there are severe limitations to the amount of employment that can be generated through AGETUR. Within its present structure, AGETUR has the capacity to manage about CFAF 6 billion per year; the director estimates that they could double that figure if they could add one or two staff, but their absorptive capacity could not go much beyond that. Considering that even with the labor-intensive methods used in AGETUR works, only 25 percent of funding goes to salaries, it would be possible to create only some 500 jobs per year- while in Cotonou alone there were already over 20,000 unemployed individuals before the devaluation. An alternative is represented by low-skill maintenance work, which makes it possible to spend 80 percent of the budget on salariesd'. It is recommended that immediate steps be taken to allow AGETUR to work to capacity by providing supplemental funding within the framework of the World Bank's Urban Rehabilitation and Management Project. 9.19 Even if almost all AGETUR work could focus on low-skill maintenance (i.e., the fastest and most labor-intensive intervention), its management would not want to expand operations beyond Cotonou and Porto Novo for fear of being weighed down by administrative procedures. Hence, serious consideration should be given to the creation of "satellite" AGETURs in all major urban centers. These new agencies (AGETUR2, AGETUR3, etc.) would operate on the same principles as the present agency, but be independent of it, so as to keep a light and flexible structure for quick action. A first step in this direction is represented by the ongoing efforts at passing legislation to make it legal for AGETUR-type agencies to be project managers (maftres d'ouvrage diliguis)'". 9.20 AGDSD, the agency established in 1992 under SAL II to carry out emergency rehabilitation of social infrastructure (schools, health centers and rural feeder roads), has characteristics similar to AGETUR, but is connected to the Ministry of Planning and does not appear to be as efficient- in part because of the wide scope of its mandate and in part because the bulk of its work is in rural areas, while some 80 percent of contractors are based in Cotonou and Porto Novo. The director estimates that, under present conditions, the agency could manage a budget of CFAF 2.7 billion CFAF, and that it would take about 10 months from invitation to bid to hiring of labor (less time for rural feeder roads, longer for building rehabilitation). In total, AGDSD could create some 250-300 jobs a year. 9.21 Creating employment through the Ministry of Public Works and Transport is another possibility, although there is reason to believe that it would not be easy in the short term. The Ministry has thus far shown little interest in labor-intensive methods (as of now, at the most only 10 percent of total funding goes to salaries) and public works are almost exclusively financed by donors, whose conditions may preclude labor-intensive methods. An intensification of routine road maintenance has been recommended in the World Bank's Transport Sector Strategy Note as a priority policy measure to ensure that road infrastructure is maintained and road investments produce the expected economic benefits. In addition, '36The French social fund established as an accompanying measure (mesure d'accompagnentnt) to the devaluation has provided CFAF 190 million for low-skill maintenance work through AGETUR. which will make it possible to create 90 jobs for a whole year and 1,000 daily jobs for two months. ''7Such legislation has already been drafted. 127 each major construction project could include a support-to-small-and-medium-entreprises component which would strengthen these enterprises by providing credit as well as technical assistance. 9.22 Preventive road maintenance, rather than periodic rehabilitation, would result in a five-fold increase in routine maintenance in both urban and rural areas, and would allow for the use of labor-based methods which create jobs accessible to unskilled labor". To meet road maintenance needs, it has been estimated that road maintenance expenditures should increase by around CFAF 2 billion per year (before devaluation)"S. This could be financed partly through the restructuring of the Road Fund, but transitional arrangements for external financing would be required until permanent mechanisms for additional financing are established. In addition, the management capacity of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport should be increased by providing it with outside specialized assistance as needed. 9.23 Self-Employment. Assistance to microenterprises should be seen both as a measure to create employment and as a measure to prevent unemployment. The latter goal is probably the most urgent to pursue. It is urgent because the devaluation appears to pose serious operating problems to many microenterprises (see Chapter 4) and to have caused a disruption in the tontine system on which many of the urban poor depend for working capital and for renewing their capital stock. At the same time, there is evidence that NGO projects providing access to capital to low-income groups (including those too poor to be able to join a tontine) are running into trouble, and therefore it would not be reasonable to expect such interventions to be able to fill the gap left by the collapse of traditional systems. 9.24 At present, too little is known about the extent of disruption in systems of financial intermediation available to low-income groups and the coping strategies that might have emerged. In some cases, it may be advisable to move quickly to bail out worthy projects to enable them to continue operating- perhaps with a more prudent policy. It is difficult to say, however, whether an all-out effort to provide emergency assistance to ongoing financial intermediation mechanisms is warranted. Hopefully, the proposed monitoring activities (see Chapter 8) will help in assessing the situation and provide guidance for action. In the meantime, it would be helpful to provide basic information on the meaning and implications of the devaluation to micro-entrepreneurs'9. This could help to reorient activities toward promising sub-sectors and could possibly prevent unscrupulous behavior on the part of middlemen. 9.25 Creating (rather than retaining) employment through self-employment is a goal that may be difficult to achieve in the short term. Efforts to provide training, technical assistance and even funding to encourage retrenched civil servants and unemployed graduates to set up their own enterprises have thus far produced limited results (e.g., in over two years CePEPE has contributed to the creation of only 16 enterprises), and there is no reason to believe that devaluation will drastically improve their effectiveness. In any case, the focus of these efforts is not the real poor. The UNDP/GTZ-funded assistance fund for community initiatives (Fonds d'appui aux initiatives de base- FAIB) in the Ministry of Planning is meant to support conimunity-initiated productive projects in rural areas. There are plans to restructure '"A prime candidate for the implementation of such a program should be the Cotonou-Porto Novo road, given its essential role in Benin's economic life and its proximity to the two urban areas most affected by devaluation. "9World Bank, Benin Transport Sector Strategy Note (draft), December 1993. "WAn example are the informal workshops organized by the diocese of Cotonou at the markets to discuss with women ways to cope with the devaluation. 128 it and broaden its scope, but it is difficult to see how it could provide assistance on a significant scale in the near future, especially to the urban poor. 9.26 Medium- and long-term policies to create self-employment should aim at addressing the two main constraints faced by microenterprises: lack of business and marketing skills and insufficient access to capital. Basic training in business and marketing skills should be made available at little or no cost. It should be designed keeping in mind that the majority of informal operators are illiterate, and that women may face particular obstacles because of legal discrimnination, their subordinate condition in society and the demands on their time. While responsibility should in principle rest with the Ministry of Industry and Small and Medium Enterprises, it would be unrealistic to expect it to carry out such a mnandate without outside assistance. NGOs, especially those already working with micro-entrepreneurs, would be better placed to reach the target group. Similarly, expanded credit opportunities should be offered to microentrepreneurs by channeling assistance (technical and financial) through NGOs with a proven record of effectiveness in this area. Needless to say, credit should be available on terms accessible to the poor (e.g., group guarantees rather than collateral, short-term, small amounts). Summary of main policy recommendations for employment creation Short run Medium and long run Provide supplemental funding to AGETUR and Create satellite AGETURs in all major urban AGDSD. centers. Pass legislation to allow NGOs to be maftres Build capacity of Ministry of Public Works and d'ouvrage delegues. Transport to handle labor-intensive works and l ____________________________________ expand maintenance