Report No. 16777 Tunisia Impact Evaluation Report Reducing Flood Hazards and Traffic Congestion Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan 2289 -TU) June 20, 1997 Operations Evaluation Department U0'O Abbreviations and Acronyms BIRH Bureau of Hydraulic Inventory and Research DAT Directorate of National Land Planning DHU Direction de l'Hydraulique Urbaine ERR Economic Rate of Return GNP Gross National Product IER Impact Evaluation Report NGO Non-Govermmental Organization OED Operations Evaluation Department ONAS Office National de l'Assainissement SFPP Sfax Flood Protection Project Director-General, Operations Evaluation D Robert Picciotto Director, Operations Evaluation Department :Roger Slade for ]Elizabeth McAllister Division Chief :Yves Albouy Task Manager :Ronald Parker The World Bank Washington, D.C. 20433 U.SA. June 23, 1997 OfRice of the Director-General Operations Evaluation MEMORANDUrM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Impact Evalluation Report on Tunisia Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan 2289-TUN) Attached is the Impact Evaluation Report (IER) on the subject project prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). The Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan 2289-TUN approved in 1983) was the first free-standing flood protection project in Tunisia in which the Bank was involved. The main objective of the project was to minimize the damage potential of future flooding in Sfax. Flood protection infrastructure constructed under the loan included protective embankments, a 13-km long drainage canal from the flood zone to the sea, and the realignment of dry riverbeds. A bypass road was constructed on both banks of the canal. T'he focus of the inpact evaluation was to assess the effectiveness of the canal and bypass road. A key impact of the project is that flood control infrastructure continues to channel flood waters into a carefully designed drainage system which does reduce uncontrolled water flows and damage to urban infrastructure and protects households and commercial businesses. The bypass road dramatically improved access into already urbanizing agricultural areas. This created new commercial and real estate investment opportunities, and an attendant increase in land prices around the belt road. New construction in the areas of project influence attests to the increased confidence of developers, both public and private: in 1988- 1994, the number of houses located near the canal increased 56 percent, and the number of occupants more than doubled, reaching about 12,000. About 400 new business establishments can be found along the bypass. In spite of a dramratic increase in the number of vehicles, passing through the city still takes about 10 minutes less when using the bypass than going through downtown. Annual traffic increases on the bypass continue to surpass: growth at other important routes, indicating that the road is still fulfilling a well-identified need. The canal has improved environmental sanitation by preventing flood-caused contamination on both sides of the canal, and helped to drain stagnant bodies of water, thereby reducing related health hazards. Between of 82 and 90 percent of respondents surveyed said that the project had had a positive impact. Benefits could have been greater however had the policy framework in which the infrastructure operates more fully suppoited project objectives. For example, the presence of certain pollutants in the canal occurs because 70 percent of homes in zones adjacent to the canal have not been connected to the sewer network. Also, the tnunicipality has not yet managed to construct sufficient storn sewers to fully drain important streets. Similarly, urban policy pernitted sparse settlement in expensively protected areas, and urban sprawl into unprotected areas, to the extent that a second, longer and more expensive flood protection/drainage canal is beginning to be discussed. Attachment Contents PREFACE .......................................................... 3 EVALUATION SUMMARY .......................................................... 5 1. STUDY OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY ............................................... 11 Background ........ 11 Focus of the Inpact Evaluation .................................................... 12 Methodology .................................................... 12 Structure of this volume .................................................... 13 2. THE PROJECT ALND ITS SETTING .......................................................... 15 Sfax .................................................... 15 Early Attempts to Reduce Sfax's Vulnerability to Frequent Flooding ................. 15 Disaster Vulnerability: Torrential Rains, Overgrazed Slopes and H-igh Water Tables .................................................... 16 Traffic Patterns and Flood Control Before the Project ......................... .............. 17 Project Objectiives and Design .................................................... 18 Project Preparation and Implementation .................................................... 19 Infrastructure Details .................................................... 19 3. IMPACT ON FLOOD CONTROL AND THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT ....... 23 Discussion of lLrban Impacts .................................................... 23 Reduced Potential Flood Damage .................................................... 24 Impact on Economic Activities ........... ......................................... 26 What if the Canal had not been built? .................................... ................ 26 Attitudes and Perceptions of the People Living in the Study Area ........... ........... 28 Analysis of Negative Impacts Cited ........................... ......................... 30 Unforeseen Environmental Impact ........................ ............................ 30 Opinion of Public Officials .................................................... 32 Factors of Perl'ormance .................................................... 35 The Key Lesson .................................................... 34 4. IMPACTS ON URBAN LAND VALUES, HOUSING AND RELATED IMPROVEMENTS .......................................................... 35 Household Characteristics .................................................... 35 Land Prices .................................................... 37 This report was prepared by Mr. Ronald Parker (Task Manager) and Ms. Reno Dewina (Research Assistant). The field survey and local data collection was carried out under the direction of Mr. Jean Francois Landeau, the former Task Manager. Mr. Arthur Anger and Ms. Armele Vilc6us provided administrative support. 2 Changes on the Neighborhood Level ........................................... 38 Urban Amenities ........................................... 39 Housing Renovation/Upgrading .40 Number of Building Permits Issued .41 Other Impacts .41 5. IMPACT ON TRAFFIC AND URBAN ACTIVITIES .43 Increase in the Number of Vehicles on the Road .44 Traffic on the Bypass .44 Driving Time .44 Has Traffic in the Urban Center been Ameliorated? .45 Road Safety .46 Accidents .46 Commercial Opportunities Created by the Bypass Road .47 Job Creation .50 6. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .. 51 ANNEXES 1. Building Permits Issued in the Study Area .................................. 53 2. Methodology .55 3. Most Dangerous Intersections in Sfax .................................. 57 4. Comments from the Borrower ..................... 59 3 Preface The Sfax Flood Protection Project was the first free-standing flood protection project in Tunisia in which the Bank was involved. This Impact Evaluation Report (IER) assesses the medium and long-term impacts of the flood protection infrastructure constructed with the proceeds of the loan. The IER was prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank. The study was launched during the study team's first mission to Sfax in June 1995. Research in the field was conducted over a period of about four months between January and May of 1996. On-site iinspection by a multi-disciplinary core team composed of a housing economist, a financial/iinstitutional specialist, a social scientist, and a field survey team was used to evaluate the impacts of the projects on the beneficiaries and stakeholders. A building census covered about 500 comimercial buildings, and a detailed questionnaire was administered in 120 households. Survey results were supplemented by data provided by the Municipality of Sfax, and central government agencies. Official material reviewed included traffic accident reports and building permit applications. On September 10, 1996 OED organized a workshop for key individuals who had participated in the implementation of the project. Many of the attendees (Tunisian officials from different ministries and government agencies as well as selected local consultants) completed a questionnaire, and their opinions and evaluative conclusions are cited within this volume. The study teamn particularly wishes to acknowledge the participation of officials from the Tunis District, the Sfax District, the Municipality of Sfax, the communes involved, the Ministry of Equipment, and the public agencies Societe Nationale Immobiliere de Tunisie and the Office National d'Assainissement. The assistance of the relevant faculties of Sfax University during the evaluation planning and execution phases is gratefully acknowledged. Basic Loan/Credit Data (actual) US$ Board Ln/Cr Number Project Name Million Approval Completion Ln. 2289 Sfax Flood Protection 22.3 06/16/83 01/17/90 I 5 Executive Summary The Project 1. Severe flooding in 1982 caused considerable damage to Sfax, a major Tunisian city, and its suburbs. Experts estimated the probability of re-occurrence of a similar flood at 0.66 percent-in layman's terms the disaster was a 130 year event. A survey assessed economic losses at about US$80 mnillion. Seventy lives were lost, more than 700 houses were destroyed and 8,000 damaged; along with streets, roads, bridges, railways, power supply lines, and telecommunication equipment. 2. The Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan 2289-TUN approved in 1983) was the first free-standing flood protection project in Tunisia in which the Bank was involved. The main objective of the project was to minimize the damage potential of future flooding in Sfax. Secondary objectives were: reducing the risk of life losses; providing the population with a greater sense of security; reducing economic losses to production and assets (mainly real estate); and ensuring permanent and efficient maintenance of the flood protection infrastructure. The flood protection works, which cost US$40 million, had 4 components: * to recalibrate 9 km of a dry watercourse to handle flood waters; * to construcl: a protecting embankment on the left bank of another dry riverbed; * to construct a dike 10 km north of Sfax; * to construct a 13-km long canal about four kilometers away from the city center. A bypass road was a by-product of the canal although it had been planned since 1961. 3. The Project Completion Report and Audit of the project concluded that the project infrastructure had reduced the risk of flood, although both documents noted that the system had yet to be fully tested. The Operations and OED evaluations concurred that, overall, the project contributed significantly to the urban development of Sfax. The Audit noted that the need for a quick response had foreclosed the opportunity for meaningful beneficiary participation in project planning. The Impact Evaluation of the Sfax Flood Protection Project concentrates primarily on those impacts related to the flood protection canal and the associated bypass highway, and it also assesses medium- and long-term impacts on stakeholders, as well as the medium and long-term impacts on the urban development of the city itself. Impact on Flood Control 4. The project economic rate of return (ERR) was recalculated at project completion at 23 percent. The cost stream includes the investment, operating and maintenance costs (free of taxes and duties) over a 40 year period for the facilities included in the project augmented by the investment, operating and maintenance costs related to three stormwater collectors which were included in the Second Urban Sewerage Project,' but which form an integral part of the flood protection works. The benefit stream consists of the estimated damage cost which has been avoided by the project. To calculate this figure, the 1982 and several previous floods were analyzed and a relationship established between the flood frequency and the estimated damage values (in 1983 prices) caused by these floods. The same computation was repeated with the project in place in order to obtain the curve representing the residual damage values. The area 'Loan 1675-TUN. 6 between the two curves represents the probable annual averted damages and amnounts to TD 4.02 million in 1983 prices (US$6.4 million). 5. Significant benefits have already been realized. Recent heavy rainfalls, though not of catastrophic flood proportions, have been evacuated by the flood protection system with greater ease than in the past. The two years with the highest total rainfall and most instances of torrential rains since project completion were 1990 and 1995. Municipal sources estimated averted damage at TD 2.4 million annually for those years without taking into account the considerable economic losses avoided in terms of property, personal belongings and foregone production. People who live near the canal are highly appreciative of the flood protection offered, although lower income families were slightly more positive. In the study survey, the canal's contribution to public safety was the most frequently cited project benefit. This aspect tended to be recognized more frequently in the lower income (81 percent) than in the middle class areas (73 percent) because the forrner suffered more from flooding in the past than the latter. Impacts on Urban Development Patterns 6. The substantial amount of new construction in damaged areas attests to the increased confidence of developers, both public and private. The number of people living in the immediate vicinity of the project infrastructure has been steadily growing. In the period between 1988- 1994 the study found that the number of houses located near the canal increased 56 percent, and the number of occupants more than doubled, reaching about 12,000. 7. The canal and (above all) the bypass were important catalysts on urban development because they provided better entry into already urbanizing agricultural areas which had poor or no vehicle access. This made them more desirable neighborhoods to live in, and created new commercial and real estate investment opportunities. Depending upon the neighborhood, between of 82 and 90 percent of respondents surveyed said that, in their opinion, the project had had a positive impact. The increase in land prices was expected to be one of the most significant indicators of the impact of the belt road-canal. This happened, although not in the manner anticipated. The project infrastructure-while it disrupted neighborhood social interaction patterns, and changed land boundaries-greatly encouraged the demand for buildable lots, mostly by middle-income households. This evolution of land use, largely explains subsequent price rises. 8. Dike protection permitted agricultural land to be re-zoned for urban development, increasing the value of the land by up to 400 percent, but land prices inside the canal's protective barrier are not markedly higher than those outside: land prices near the bypass, and unprotected by the canal, rose considerably. There are several explanations for the fact that land prices inside the canal did not rise as anticipated: 1) vast tracts of land outside the canal-protected area were better protected because of dikes, storm sewers and other drainage infrastructure; 2) throughout the neighborhoods both inside and outside the canal, the risks of high levels of water are reduced by the existence of an unimpeded channel to the sea; 3) the land inside the canal was less adequately served with storm drains; 4) land prices reflect travel times, and demrand for land centered on those areas that were high status neighborhoods but still under-valued in terms of travel time to the city center; and 5) the population is aware that a 130 year flood is an unusual event, and discount the value of protection because they do not expect to see another in their or their children's lifetimes. 7 Impacts on Traffic and Other Activities 9. The belt road, originally designed to be an urban road, carries heavy traffic moving at limited speed, which is controlled by three-color traffic lights at each major intersection. The measurement of project impacts on traffic reduction is complicated by the growth in the total number of vehicles in circulation within Sfax. The number of cars used primarily for circulating within Sfax increased from 7,000 vehicles in 1971, to 13,000 in 1980, and to 36,000 in 1996. Since 1990 the belt road has helped to absorb a share of the penetrating traffic which would formerly have had to pass through the downtown area. Prior to the project, traffic at the entrances to the downtown area of Sfax had increased at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent. After the bypass was opened to traffic in 1990, the rate of traffic increase downtown slowed to 3.8 percent annual rate which, if not an outright reduction, suggests that part of the increase in traffic was rerouted onto the bypass. Three principal downtown streets registered an absolute decrease in traffic volurne, including one which showed a dramatic 60 percent decrease at times of peak use. 10. The overall travel time passing through the city is about 10 minutes shorter using the bypass than by going through downtown. The annual traffic increase (16 percent) on the bypass surpasses growth at other important routes. This increase, which shows the extent to which traffic is being diverted from other major routes, is one of the most important indicators of project impact. A secondary benefit occurs when flammable cargo or other hazardous materials are carried by trucks that now take the bypass: pedestrian exposure to chemical vapors from dangerous materials has been shifted away from the most populous area to less dense areas with greater natural airflow. 11. While the bypass allows vehicle traffic to avoid the downtown commercial district, it now runs through a zone bustling with new commerce. Before the project, there were very few businesses in these areas. Now that some time has passed after project completion, about 400 new business establishrnents can be found there. This is something of an unintended consequence. Since it was not the intent to attract commercial development to the area, the bypass road was designed without service lanes. Factors limiting further economic development of zone are the lack of adequate parking, traffic-related nuisances, as well as the absence of lanes in which merging traffic can pick up speed. 12. Both urban growth and commercial development account for the heavy traffic on the belt road, and partly explain the steady increase in the accident rate despite the traffic lights and speed limit signs (50 krn/h). The number of accidents on the bypass increased between 1991 and 1995 at an average rate of 28 percent a year. With its present level of road signing, traffic control, lighting and enforcement, the bypass is steadily becoming more dangerous for local users. The accident rate is high: 11 dead, 43 wounded in 35 accidents in 1995-grim statistics for an urban road. The consulting engineers who conducted the traffic study attribute the current (which they class as excessively high) accident rate to technical weaknesses in the Sfax bypass design (most notably: narrow lanes, narrow bridges, difficult crossroads, insufficient signaling, and no street lighting). Street lighting has been prioritized by the Government, and is scheduled to be introduced.2 2 Under the Ninth Development Plan. 8 Environmental Impact 13. Positive environmental impacts. The environmental impact of the project was expected to be positive because it channeled flood waters into a carefully designed drainage system, which would reduce damage to urban infrastructure, protect private and commercial dwellings and reduce erosion in the project area. Secondarily, the project was designed to improve environmental sanitation by preventing flood-caused contamination (due to sewage overflows and water-borne garbage) in the study area, and by draining stagnant bodies of water thereby reducing related health hazards. These were achieved largely as planned in many, but not in all, neighborhoods. 14. Negative environmental impacts. In the event, however, the project did have some negative environmental impacts, some of which should improve with time as more residential plots connect to the sanitary network. These included accumulation of contaminated groundwater at the northern outlet of the belt canal, which results in unpleasant odors and creates an environment that facilitates mosquito breeding. Institutional Development 15. The institutional development which took place as a result of Government participation in the project was modest. The most noteworthy institutional achievement was the creation of a maintenance unit for flood protection works, a first in the Ministry of Equipment. Three similar units have been established in other parts of the country, modeled on the Sfax maintenance unit. Factors of Performance 16. Size and execution optimized in project. Both the canal and highway larlgely achieved their objectives. The project had the right size and configuration to be implemented without time and cost overruns. The study found that the major contributing factors to successful implementation were: (i) the local capacity to plan and supervise the various works, (ii) timely disaster mitigation planning,3 and (iii) earlier Bank work with sector staff in stormwater drainage. Still the study finds that impacts were sub-optimal, and suggests two reasons for it: inadequacy of supporting infrastructure and shortcomings in urban policies. 17. Inadequacy of supporting infrastructure. The canal has not fully solved the problems posed by torrential rains because there are insufficient roadside drains/storm sewers in the city.4 Project design focused on evacuating flood waters approaching the city from the hinterland, but paid little or no attention to the disposal of storm water falling on the city itself. Roadside drains and storm sewers constructed under the urban project have helped, but they are not sufficient to handle the water flowing in the streets at peak periods. Thus, heavy rainfalls are not being fully channeled into the canal and standing water remains on the roads and in residential areas, caus- ing health/pest hazards among other problems.5 3 A flood damage reduction master plan had been prepared before the disaster. 4The Borrower's view is that, "While the project is regarded as having fully solved the problem of tlooding from wadis close to the city, it does need to be supplemented by a stormwater drainage system within the city that either connects to the flood protection canal or empties into the sea. Creation of such a system, which is the responsibility of the municipalities affected, will be programmed in accordance with the resources they have at their disposal." 5 The Borrower asserts that there are no health or pest hazards associated with the water stagnating in low-lying areas at this time. 9 18. Shortcomings in urban policy. The policy framework in which the project operates did not fully support project objectives. For example, transport policy favored the development of private transport over public, with the almost inevitable result that traffic concentration improvements and travel-time reductions from the use of the bypass gradually diminished as the number of vehicles circulating within the city multiplied. In a similar fashion, urban policy permitted sparse settlement in expensively protected areas, and allowed vast tracts of urban land to be kept off the market for speculative purposes. As a result, Sfax's urban sprawl has covered a far larger area than would otherwise be necessary, and has (probably) created the need for a second, longer and more expensive flood protection/drainage canal in the near future.6 19. The presence of pollutants in the canal is also the result of inadequate urban policies generally. In Sfax about 60 percent of houses are not connected to the sanitation network. The study found that inside an area 70 meter-wide on each side of the beltroad, only 29 percent of the housing is connected to the ONAS sewer network.7 20. On September 10, 1996 OED organized a workshop for key individuals who had participated in the implementation of the project. Many of the attendees (Tunisian officials from different ministries and government agencies) completed a questionnaire which inter alia identified the lessons learned by Government through participation in project activities. They suggested that Government needs to do something about the low costs associated with holding vacant or under-utilized urban land, and the absence of incentives that motivate the general public to maximize on public investment. Other measures proposed by the workshop included urgent measures to overcome project deficiencies. They recommended additional investments inter alia in the following: * lighting for walkways and streets along the bypass; * improving roadside drainage; * improving the functioning of the canal; e increasing the number and quality of pedestrians facilities; * improving the functioning of traffic lights; * making mlaintenance works on the canal more frequent; * widening the bridges in order to reduce accident risks in the crossroads. 21. Overcoming infrastructure bottlenecks is a long-term process, which requires a supportive legal framework, and which usually has institutional development components that need to be functioning in place before the concrete is poured. The Impact Study concludes that it is difficult in the extreme to solve flood and traffic problems with physical infrastructure only, and that similar projects should in future also address those policy improvements which can enhance the flood protection and traffic benefits. 6 The Borrower sees the current urban development pattern as follows: "Expansion of the city past the existing flood protection canal is taking place in accordance with approved development plans. Flood protection for these new areas can be provided by a second canal located beyond the expansion area or by other means recommended as a result of the study that has just been initiated." Connections to the sewer network in the zones adjacent to the project area will increase significantly over the next few years as a result of the laying of approximately 200 km of pipes by ONAS under the Fourth Urban Project. 11 1. Study Objectives and Methodology The Impact Evaluation of the Sfax Flood Protection Project in Tunisia concentrates principally on the project's impacts in the urban area, andfocuses primarily on those impacts related to the floodprotection canal amd the associated bypass highway. The key project-related issues addressed include: did the canal and bypass increase the protection of the city; alleviate poverty, improve living standards, or make local goods and services more accessible; what have been their impacts on urban land values and housing markets; what have been the impacts of the road on the neighborhoods through which it passes, have travel times been reduced, or has traffic in the urban center been ameliorated? Research and on-site inspection was conducted by a multi-disciplinary core team, and a localfield survey team was used to evaluate the impacts of the projects on the benificiaries and stakeholders. The two teams investigated the physical results as well as changes in service levels, policy improvements, reform in the land tenure and ownership system, and improvement in housing quality. The main study area was defined as a band 100 meters wide on both sides of the canal. 1.1 The Impact Evaluation of the Sfax Flood Protection Project in Tunisia concentrates principally on the project's impacts in the urban area, and focuses primarily on those impacts related to the flood protection canal and the associated bypass highway. The purpose of this study is to assess medium- and long-term impacts on the targeted beneficiaries and other stakeholders, as well as the medium and long-term impacts on the urban development of the city itself. Background 1.2 Severe flooding in 1982 caused considerable damage to Sfax, a major Tunisian city and its suburbs. On October 30 and 31, 1982 rains of unusual intensity fell over the areas north and west of town. A total of 177.3 mm of rain was registered in 13 hours, with a peak hourly rate of 45.2 mm. The flood started a few hours after the onset of the rain and peaked during the night of the 30th, with peak levels continuing through the 31st of October. The enormity of floods is expressed by their return period (i.e. how many years until another flood of equal magnitude is likely to come again)--and experts classed the disaster as a 130 year event i.e., it had a probability of re-occurrence of 0.66 percent. A survey carried out after the flood assessed economic losses at about TD5O million (US$80 million). Seventy lives were lost, more than 700 houses were destroyed and 8,000 damaged; along with streets, roads, bridges, railways, power supply lines, and telecommunication equipment. 1.3 The Sfax Floocd Protection Project (Loan 2289-TUN approved in 1983) was the first free-standing flood protection project in Tunisia in which the Bank was involved. Sfax is spread out along a set of "wheel-spoke" thoroughfares converging to the city center. The project undertook two principaLl activities: the building of a semicircular canal to catch and divert the flood waters that periodically plague the city and the building of a road on both banks of the canal which enabled through-traffic to bypass the city center (relieving traffic jams in the downtown area and, in general, contributing to the improvement of traffic flow in all parts of the city). The technical, financial and economical approach taken by this loan was elaborated in close cooperation with the Government through the Directorate of Urban Hydraulics. 12 1.4 The World Bank's involvement in urban development in Tunisia dates back to 1973 when the First Urban Development project (Loan 937/Credit 432-TUN) was apiproved. It was related to urban transport in Tunis and focused on the institutional strengthening of the Tunis District. The Second Urban Development project (Loan 1705-TUN) approved iin 1979 concentrated on providing better shelter and improved urban services for low-income populations, and aimed at the establishment of a viable institutional framework to implement new urban development and housing policies. The objectives of the Third Urban Development project (Loan 2223-TUN) approved in 1982 were similar in terms of reducing inequities in housing policy, and strengthening the institutional framework of the involved agencies. Focus of the Impact Evaluation 1.5 The study focuses on key canal-related issues such as: * did the intervention reduce the risk of loss of life from floods? * did it increase the protection of the city? * did it alleviate poverty, improve living standards, or make local goods and services more accessible? * did it have impacts on urban land values and housing markets? * did it ensure the permanent and efficient maintenance of flood protection infrastructure? The assessment of the bypass road constructed explores questions such as: * what have been the impacts of the road on the neighborhoods through which it passes? * have travel times been reduced? * has traffic in the urban center been ameliorated? * have real estate prices changed because of improved road access? * has there been a change in the accident rate? 1.6 The evaluation makes a distinction between impacts at the levels of households, neighborhoods and urban development/institutions in its analysis of the various effects of this project. An analysis of how the sector and country context influenced the project's achievements was also undertaken. Methodology 1.7 Research and on-site inspection by a multi-disciplinary core team composed of a housing economist, a financial/institutional specialist, a social scientist, and a field survey team were used to evaluate the impacts of the projects on the beneficiaries and stakeholders. As part of the in-depth assessment of project impacts in Sfax, studies and commissioned papers; were also conducted under the supervision of consultants. Impact evaluation at neighborhood and the institutional levels 1.8 To evaluate the technical, institutional, financial and environmental impacts of the projects, the core team investigated the physical results as well as changes in service levels, policy improvements, reform in the land tenure and ownership system, and imprcvement in 13 housing quality. The rnain study area was defined as a band 100 meters wide on both sides of the canal. On May 16, 1996 the study team conducted a commercial building census. Team members visited 394 stores and premises not used for housing and completed written check sheets. In addition to the household survey discussed below, the study team also surveyed 96 business establishmenls (at least one person in each business responded to an open-ended survey instrument). The team also conducted 11 structured interviews with government officials: three interviews were conducted with the president of a district (and two others with vice-presidents of other districts); and 2 small group interviews were conducted with senior staff in two NGOs. In the higher business circles, the team interviewed the director of a Chamber of Commerce and a director of the municipal arts and crafts organization. The team conducted three other elite interviews with technicians/experts: an engineer highly familiar with the city, a director of a local consulting firm, and the regional director of land use planning. Finally a medical doctor was also interviewed to get an independent perspective on project impacts on neighborhood health. Other sources of neighborhood data were: on-site examination of the physical results of the projects, a review of documents (1,113 building permits within the study area were also analyzed) and relevant secondary data, key informant interviews, focus groups and informal community interviews which took place in a random fashion. Further details on study methodology can be found in Annex 2. Participatory Evaluation: contribution of Government officials 1.9 On September 10, 1996 OED organized a workshop for key individuals who had participated in the impilementation of the project. Many of the attendees (Tunisian officials from different ministries and government agencies as well as selected local consultants) completed a questionnaire which reflected their understanding of project impacts, institutional development, and the lessons learned by Government through participation in project activities. Their opinions and evaluative conclusions are broadly reflected within this volume, and specifically cited at several points. Structure of this Volume 1.10 The following chapters in this volume have been grouped around five topics. * The project and its setting; * Impacts on flood control and the urban environment; * Impacts on urban land values, housing, and related improvements; * Impacts on traffic and urban activities; * Findings amd recommendations. 15 2. The Project and its Setting Sfax, a major Tunisian port city, suffers frequent damages from flooding. The downtown area lies at the foot of a gently sloping plain covered with sparse vegetation. When torrential rainstorms occur, the high water table, extensive urbanization, and lack of vegetation contribute to intenseflashfloods and heavy erosion. Plans for more systematic protection had been under consideration since the 1950s, yet only minimal protection measures were in place in 1982 because of a lack offinancing. The main objective of the disaster reliefproject was to minimize theflood damage potential in Sfax. Secondary objectives were to reduce the risk of life losses; provide the population with a greater sense of security, and to reduce economic losses to production and assets. The flood protection canal that was constructed to drain runoff inscribes an arc about four kilometers in distance from the dense urban center of the city. It is crossed by 19 major bridges and 19 pedestrian walkways. Parallel to the canal and on both sides of it is a bypass road eight kilometers long. The canal is about 12.3 kilometers in length. Sfax 2.1 Sfax is Tunisia's major port and second largest city. In the beginning of the 20th century, the population of Sfax was around 50,000. The growth of the city has been rapid,8 it currently has a population of about 400,000.9 Sfax is located on the country's east coast about 267 miles from Tunis, the capital. Greater Sfax consists of the port area, the industrial zones located in the littoral corridor, north and south of the port, the traditional quarter or medina, followed to the west by pockets of densely populated slums, and more recent residential developments. Beyond these lie low-density neighborhoods where there are one-family homes on garden lots of substantial size (thejneins). Sfax has developed at the expense of these lots which are gradually being subdivided, thereby increasing urban density. Clusters of commercial activity (the merkhez), which includle craftsmen's' shops and markets, have appeared where major roads pass through the jneins. Indeed, some of the larger merkhez have eventually become townships in their own right. Greater Sfax includes the surrounding communities of Agareb, El Ain, Sakiet Ezzit and Sakiet Ed Dair, and covers an area of 13,000 hectares, while the Sfax Govemorate covers 708,600 hectares. The majority of usable land in the Govemorate is under cultivation, around half is devoted to the cultivation of olive trees alone. Early Attempts to Reiduce Sfax's Vulnerability to Frequent Flooding 2.2 Sfax lies at the hub of a network of roads that converge to a downtown area. The center is situated at the foot of a gently sloping plain covered with sparse vegetation. Annual rainfall ranges from 37 mm to 650 mm, averaging about 200 mm. The high water table, extensive urbanization, and lack of vegetation contribute to intense flash floods and heavy erosion. 2.3 Sfax suffers frequent damages from flooding and experienced severe floods in 1934, 1942, 1950, 1957, 1969, and 1973. The need for providing adequate flood protection control measures had long been recognized, yet only minimal protection measures were in place. Plans for more systematic protection had been under consideration since the 1950s, but were not acted on for lack of financing. The population growth rate was 2.2 percent/year in the period 1984-1994. In 1982 during project preparation Sfax had a population of 313,000. 16 2A In the 1950s and 1960s, protective measures were studied by various consulting firms and some flood protection was provided through diversion of two dry riverbeds (Oued Khalifa and Oued Maou), and the construction of dikes which could provide drainage following major storms. In 1977 and 1978, a foreign consulting firm prepared a sewerage and slorm water drainage master plan proposing a belt canal around the city's perimeter, with a number of storm drainage collectors placed in a radial pattern outside the canal. The northern section of this canal would drain storm water around the city's perimeter directly into the sea, the southern section would empty into the Oued Maou. As financing was unavailable at that time, the project was not implemented. 2.5 The development of the Sfax Flood Protection project (SFPP) in Tunisia was facilitated by earlier Bank work. Bank financing helped to establish and develop the entities responsible for water supply and sewerage (SONEDE and ONAS) and staff have maintained an ongoing dialogue with the Tunisian Government on sector policies and operating practices. In this manner the Bank was able to build on some indirect experience with flood control (stormwater drainage had been a component of earlier sewerage projects). Disaster Vulnerability: Torrential Rains, Overgrazed Slopes and High Water Tables 2.6 In the semi-arid region surrounding Sfax, there is scant vegetation uphill' from the city. What little there is tends to be either naturally sparse or overgrazed. The city's natural environmental defenses were weak to begin with, and agricultural land use patterns further reduce the moisture absorption capacity of the soil and enhance the violence of flash flooding. 2.7 Most of the rain falls in the months from September to December, and floods usually occur in October, when it rains the hardest. Rainfall data gathered over a 100 year period were analyzed during project preparation, and a depth-duration-frequency correlation was established.10 2.8 The typical flash flood in the Sfax area is caused by torrential rainstorrns concentrated on small areas. Flooding generally starts within hours of the onset of the rain, leaving little or no time to evacuate population or their belongings. Because of the unpredictability of these storrns and the fact that they often occur at night while people are asleep, it was determined during project preparation that an advance warning system would not be feasible. 2.9 The sloping plain above Sfax has permeable soil which easily allows infiltration of surface water. However, the water table is relatively high and thus its ability to absorb rain water is limited. In certain localities (and depending upon weather and season) the water table is sometimes above ground level. Swamps and stagnant pools can be found in most neighborhoods. Project designers considered and rejected the idea of attempting ito increase the potential of Sfax's loose and porous soil to reduce stormn water runoff. The soil's storage capacity for additional water could be temporarily increased by water extraction, but any water extracted would be quickly replaced by salt water infiltrating from the sea, which would jeopardize the aquifer upon which the city depends for its water supply. ' Annex 3 in the Staff Appraisal Report 17 2 2.10 The Sfax plain covers an area of roughly 135 km , and the city lies at the low end. The gradient of the slope fiom the sea to about 15 km from the coast averages about 2 percent to 3 percent. Even beyond this point the gradient is not severe. The slope of the first several kilometers from the coast is less than the average. The most urbanized area generally coincides with the high water table, occupying the zone from where it is most difficult to evacuate stormwater. Traffic Patterns and Flood Control Before the Project 2.11 The original ciity was a medina surrounded by large garden plots (ineins). Fourteen main roads (known locally as radiales), coming from other towns inland converge as they approach the downtown/port area. Before the bypass road, through-traffic had to pass through the center. As cars approached the center, the radiales come together (like spokes into a wheel hub) and incoming traffic is funneled ever more tightly into fewer streets and lanes. Merging traffic delays exacerbated traffic problems and increased transit times (see Figure 2.1). 2.12 Development along the radial roads has led to the progressive densification of the gardens (jneins), which were subdivided, often between family members, and built on without permits and connections to trunk services. Relatively sparse settlement (three dwellings/hectare in a vast 10,000 hectare zone) and lack of drainage infrastructure increased the flooding in the jneins area. Since the downtown was lower than the more inland areas, following heavy rains the radiales provided channels for suburban runoff and compounded flooding in the center. The gardens were originally enclosed by hedgerows of cacti growing over earthen fences (known locally as the tabias system) which helped to hold the soil, reduce runoff and increase absorption of rain water. Over the last several decades, this traditional coping mechanism has been lost. The urbanization of the garden lots led to the gradual destruction of the tabias and concomitant diminished water absorption and increased runoff velocities. 2.13 Much of the runoff finds its way into two main dry watercourses near Sfax: Oued Maou in the south and Oued Ezzit in the north. These oueds and their tributaries are dry for all but a few days of the year, to the point that landowners plant trees and cultivate crops in their dry beds. Indeed, the treatment of the land in and around the oueds was another major contributing factor that increased the effects of flooding. Although the 1975 Law (Code des Eaux) forbids, inter alia, construction in watercourses, which are declared part of the public domain-and this Law has usually been enforced-there have been some squatters and other isolated exceptions, that exacerbate naturally dangerous conditions. Oued Maou has been leveed with earth dikes and its left bank levee contained a "blow-out" section designed to fall under extreme flows in order to maintain the integrity of the rest of the system. The intensity of the 1982 flood was such that the "blow ouit" section failed as planned. Oued Ezzit is not leveed and its channel is cluttered in parts with residential and commercial buildings, trees and debris. Its lower reaches are actually occupied by a shop-lined street. 2.14 The oueds and their tributaries were rarely lined, and structural protection measures such as bridge abutments, ripwrap or gabions are seldom used. Prior to the project there were no adequately sized retention basins and accompanying structures to reduce the velocity of rushing waters and capture some of the sediment and debris they carry. There has been little attempt to maintain the size of the channels and sediment deposited has only been removed where deposits have created immediate problems, such as on roads or within small storm drainage structures. The result has been a reduction of the carrying capacity of existing channels. 18 Project Objectives and Design 2.15 The main objective of the disaster relief project was to minimize the flood damage potential in Sfax. Secondary objectives were: reducing the risk of life losses; providing the population with a greater sense of security; reducing economic losses to production and assets (mainly real estate); and ensuring permanent and efficient maintenance of the flood protection infrastructure. The flood protection works, which cost US$40 million, had 4 components: * to recalibrate 9 km of a oued (Oued Ezzit) north of Sfax; * to construct a protecting embankment on the left bank of another oued (Oued Maou) south of Sfax (2); * to construct another dike 10 km north of Sfax (3); and * to construct a 13-km long canal about four kilometers away from the city center (4), (The bypass road was a by-product of the canal although it had been planned since 1961). 2.16 Least cost solution. The level of protection" l was determined in such a rnanner that the marginal cost of providing the protection equals the marginal benefits. Canal design took into consideration several alternatives of construction costs, types of lining, and ongoing maintenance costs. The location of the belt canal was particularly appropriate since it was constructed parallel to a belt road that was already under construction, which provided accessibility for heavy equipment during construction, and subsequently facilitated maintenance of the canal. 2.17 The project supported the following physical components: * rehabilitation of the water course of Oued Ezzit on the northern side of Sfax; * rehabilitation and extension of the existing dikes along Oued Maou and Oued Khalifa on the southern side of Sfax; D construction of an eight-km long belt canal at about four km from the city center; 3 minor flood protection works in neighboring villages; * provision of equipment to maintain the flood control facilities; and * staffing, equipping, and operation of a special Flood Protection Section within the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Equipment in Sfax to be responsible for maintenance and repairs of flood protection works. l i.e. size and capacity of the canal, which is a function of the decision to design the facilities for a 100 year recurrence flood. 19 Project Preparation and Implementation 2.19 The project concept-digging a belt canal as a barrier against flooding together with the construction of storm water drainage systems- was innovative for Tunisia. The Government had engaged a consortium of consulting firms to prepare a feasibility study. Using a 1 00-year series of hydrological data, the specialists updated the 1978 master plan, which provided a basis for detailed design and., subsequently, for project appraisal. The study was finished by January of 1983, before the rains started to fall, and detailed designs were available at loan effectiveness. 2.20 The SFPP was designed to protect Sfax and neighboring communities at an economically acceptable cost, and low operating costs contributed to benefit sustainability. While not providing blanket protection against worst-case scenarios that might never arrive (which would have been prohibitively costly), the facilities were designed to protect against those events that were statistically likely to occur. However, protection facilities can withstand a flood of catastrophic proportions (a 100-year event). A related Bank-financed project, the Second Urban Sewerage Project, constructed three storm water collectors to evacuate flood waters from the city center. 2.21 Institutionalframework. Since February 1983, the Sfax Regional Director (Ministry of Equipment) has been responsible for the maintenance and repair of flood protection works in the Govemorate. A new section, the Direction de l'Hydraulique Urbaine (DHU), was created and staffed for that purpose. The Bank loan also financed the purchase of equipment for DHU to ensure the proper maintenance of the canal. Simultaneously with project preparation, Bank staff involved in the project also collaborated in a study carried out by the Directorate of National Land Planning, assisted by Stockholm University, evaluating Tunisia's flood-sensitive areas. This study lead to the establishment of a national flood hazard map and also predicted which zones would experience increases in land values as a result of flood protection projects. The Office National de I'Assainissement (ONAS) was responsible for the combined urban stormwater and sewerage systems. The Directorate of National Land Planning (DAT) of the Ministry of Equipment coordinatecl the preparation of the countrywide flood hazard map. The Bureau of Hydraulic Inventory and Research (BIRH), a public enterprise which operates under the Ministry of Agriculture, was responsible inter alia for studies and research related to rainfall and river flow. Finally, rainfall data was collected by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Meteorological Service of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Infrastructure Details 2.22 The flood protection canal inscribes an arc around the dense urban center of the city (see Figure 2.1). It is crossed by 19 major bridges (16 road bridges and 3 railroad bridges) and 19 pedestrian walkways (small bridges for people that will not accommodate vehicles). 20 Figure 2.1 Location of the canal and bypass road '~~~~~- 1 '- - 1 5~~~~~~~~~~~~0 11---10 2.23 Parallel to the canal and on both sides of it, are the one-way lanes of the bypass road (see Figure 2.2). This road is known locally as the "rocade at kilometer four" because it is found at approximately that distance from the medina on the various radiales that lead out of the city center. 21 lane lane 10.0 m 10.0 m _ C A N AWML_~rCANAL Figure 2.2 Cross-section of Canal and Bypass Road 2.24 The bypass road is twenty meters wide, (there are two lanes for travel in each direction, around nine meters wide on each bank, and narrow shoulders too narrow for parking). The bypass road is 8.0 kilometers long, it was built between 1987 and 1990. The canal about 12.3 kilometers in length. 23 3. Impact on Flood Control and the Urban Environment This chapter describes the medium- and long-term impacts of the flood protection canal and the bypass road on the city's inhabitants, and its urban development pattern. It also traces their effects on traffic and the environment. Recent heavy rainfalls, though not of catastrophicflood proportions, have been evacuated by thefloodprotection system with greater ease than in the past. People who live near the canal are highly appreciative of the floodprotection. In the study survey, the canal's contribution to public safety was the mostfrequently citedproject benefit, although this aspect tenaded to be recognized more frequently in the lower-income (81 percent) than in the middle class areas (73 percent) because the former suffered more fromflooding in the past. The substantial amount of new construction in damaged areas attests to the increased confidence of developers, both public andprivate. The canal and the bypass provided better access to already urbanizing agricultural areas which had poor vehicle access. This created new commercial and real estate investment opportunities including an increase in landprices. Reduced Potential Flood Damage 3.1 The main positive impacts of the canal on the rapidly growing neighborhoods within the study area has been to minimize the flood damage potential by: * reducing disaster risks; * ensuring permanent and efficient maintenance of the flood protection infrastructure; and * reducing economic losses to production and assets (mainly real estate). 3.2 Since the project was built there have been no more floods. How much of this alleviation can be attributed to the flood control infrastructure, and how much to a decrease in torrential rains? Additiionally, what is the positive impact under average and extreme rainfall conditions? 3.3 According to the National Meteorological institute, over the last ten years rainfalls over 10 mm have continued to occur on average six times a year. And when it rains heavily it pours: average precipitation during these events has actually been 22 mm. The following Figures (3.2 and 3.3) give rainfall data over the last decade in Sfax. 24 Figure 3.2 Total Annual Precipitation in Sfax 250 200 150 1 E Total PrFcipitation (j 100 irknm)m 50 0 n ID r- 00 a, 0 - et 00 00 00 00 00 ON 0% a 0% Figure 3.3. Instances of Rainfall > 10 mm in Sfax 10- 6 - Fjurb.rofraus l 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 3.4 The magnitude of the losses averted can be estimated: the floods of 1969, 1973 and 1982 have been evaluated at 25.5, 11.7 and 47 million Tunisian Dinar (in 1982 prices) respectively. At current prices, any disaster subsequent to those listed would have cost a multiple of these figures, without taking into account lives lost. Moreover, between 1969 and 1982 there was no ten-year period without a major flood event. It is now some fifteen years that flooding has been averted. 3.5 Under normal conditions, there is also a positive impact. Run-off from rains in excess of 20 mm used to leave standing water 20-40 cm in the streets of the downtown area.12 Also severely affected by standing water were nearby towns of El Habib, El Bahri, Bourguiba, El Khalije and Mraia. Standing water used to remain in the streets for several days, causing the following problems: 12 Principally the Avenues des Martyrs, du 5 Aout, de l'Armee, d'Algerie, du Commandant Bjaoui, rue de Tazarka, quartier de Moulin-ville and De Pic-ville. Also previously interrupted by flooding were the principal radiales Gremda, El Ain, Menzel Chaker, Agareb, Soukra, M'harza, Mahdia, Habbana, Saltnia, and Sidi Salem. 25 * Deterioration of lateral service roads. Assuming, based on past experience with run- off, that 10 kilometers (of segments) of these smaller streets would need to be repaired annually: the cost would be 400,000 dinars;13 * Damage to sections of the main roads (radiales): 15 kilometers of roadwork annually estimated at 1,050,000 dinars;14 * Damage to housing (essentially to earthen structures and dwellings in low-income areas), (conservatively) estimated at 100,000 dinars annually; * Interruption of economic activities - commerciial: 120,000 dinars annually - delays, enforced absences, and water-related sickness: 240,000 dinars annually; * Damage to motorized vehicles: 420,000 dinars annually; * Removal of water-borne sand and mud from streets and storm sewers: 75,000 dinars. 3.6 Significant benefits have already been realized. The cost savings because damage from torrential rains of less than catastrophic scale have been avoided comes to 2,405,000 dinars annually, based on the above official estimates without taking into account the considerable economic losses avoided in terms of property, personal belongings and foregone production. 3.7 At project completion the recalculated ERR was 23 percent. The cost stream includes the investment, operating and maintenance costs (free of taxes and duties) over a 40 year period for the facilities included in the project augmented by the investment, operating and maintenance costs related to three stormwater collectors which were included in the Second Urban Sewerage Project,15 but which form an integral part of the flood protection works. The benefit stream consists of the damage cost which has been avoided by the project. To calculate this figure, the 1982 and several previous floods were analyzed and a relationship established between the flood frequency and the estimated damage values (in 1983 prices) caused by these floods. The samne computation was repeated with the project in place in order to obtain the curve representing the residual damage values. The area between the two curves represents the probable annual averted damages and amounts to TD 4:02 million (US$ 6.38 million) in 1983 prices. 16 For years from 1982 forward, benefits were assumed to increase as a result of population and GNP growth in the project area, estimated at about 3 percent and 2 percent per annum respectively. This analysis does not consider unquantifiable benefits (life, health, environment) so that a return of 23 percent is a minimum value. 3.8 An important psychological impact is that flood protection infrastructure17 provides the population with a greater sense of security, particularly among the poor. Figure 3.1. shows the percentage of informants who mentioned "end of flooding" as benefits of the project. 3 Valuation developed with the Municipality's road maintenance staff. 4 Valuation developed with the Municipality's road maintenance staff. 5 Loan 1675-TUN. 16 One of the most important benefits of the project is that it avoids considerable economic losses in terms of property, personal belongings and foregone production. These were not taken into account in the Municipality's figures cited in the previous paragraph. 17 The realigmnent of 9 km of Oued Ezzit north of Sfax; the construction of a protective embankment on Oued Maou; the construction of the dike 10 km north of Sfax; and the construction of the 13-km long canal. 26 Figure 3.1. Percentage of Informants in the Study Area Who Cited "End of Flooding" as a Benefit of the Project 90. 80- 60 _Endofflooding l 40 1 - . 020 - /l - Low-income Areas Middle-income Areas 3.9 Recent heavy rainfalls, though not of flood proportions, have been evacuated by this system with greater ease than in the past. The substantial amount of new construction in damaged areas attests to the increased confidence of developers, both public and private. Dike protection permitted agricultural land to be re-zoned for urban development, increasing the value of the land by up to 400 percent. There are several explanations for the fact that land prices inside the canal did not rise as anticipated: 1) vast tracts of land outside the canal-protected area were better protected because of dikes, storm sewers and other drainage infrastructure; 2) throughout the neighborhoods both inside and outside the canal, the risks of high levels of water are reduced by the existence of an unimpeded channel to the sea; 3) the land inside the canal was less adequately served with storm drains; 4) land prices reflect travel times, and demand for land centered on those areas that were high status neighborhoods but still under-valued in terms of travel time to the city center; and 5) the population is aware that a 130 year flood is an unusual event, and discount the value of protection because they do not expect to see another in their o! their children's lifetimes. 3.10 Institutional development. The institutional development which took place as a result of Government participation in the project was modest. The most noteworthy institutional achievement was the creation of a maintenance unit for flood protection works, a first in the Ministry of Equipment. Three similar units have been established in other parts of the country, modeled on the Sfax maintenance unit. Government officials have found that these units function efficiently, as has the Bank-financed special equipment that helps to ensure the proper maintenance of the canal. 3.11 Roads near the canal. The bypass road was a by-product of the canal although it had been planned since 1961. New roads constructed off (perpendicular to) the rocadle along the belt canal are another visible benefit of the project. The bypass road provides for better traffic circulation in the canal zone (all other main roads in the area are radiales) and acts as a downtown bypass. The smaller roads enable goods and people to reach most neiighborhood buildings by vehicle. The bypass has alleviated downtown traffic as well (details in Chapter 4), the same impact which similar measures have obtained in Tunis, Sousse, and BEeja. Additionally it incorporated an isolated zone into the mainstream of city life. 27 Discussion of Urban Impacts 3.12 In terms of its impact on urban development, the canal and (especially) the bypass were important catalysts because they provided better access to already urbanizing agricultural areas which had poor or no vehicle access. This made them more desirable neighborhoods to live in, and created new commercial and real estate investment opportunities. Small businesses flocked to the zone because rents started out low, and commercial buildings there offered access to the large numbers customers who use the new bypass. Particularly noteworthy is the development of factories and warehouses in the new industrial zone, Poudriere II, on one side of the bypass. The increase in land prices was expected to be one of the most significant indicators of the impact of the belt road-canal. This happened, although not in the manner anticipated. While land prices inside the canal's protective barrier did not go up substantially, that of land nearby but outside the canal rose considerably (impacts on land prices are discussed more in detail in Chapter 4). The project infrastructure-while it disrupted neighborhood social interaction patterns, and changed land boundaries-greatly encouraged the demand for buildable lots, mostly by middle incorne households. This evolution of land use, largely explains subsequent price rises. In this context, the project helped create an outlet for a long pent-up demand for additional urban housing and land. However, much of the land which was developed stayed within the family. Since many property owners' children were married adults, once the area became suitable for commuters to live in, their parents gave them a piece of land to build their homes on-a common practice in Tunisia. 3.13 As new people settled in the area, they changed its physical appearance and demographic composition: over time a larger percentage of area occupants have become homeowners. Before settling in the canal area, only 32 percent of the heads of households said that they were homeowners: now 93 percent of those interviewed own the homes they live in. The newly arrived people tend to be younger and more educated than those who lived there before, and to come from higher professional categories than the ones who were already settled. Homeowners have tended to make gradual improvements to the physical structure of their homes, and to improve the living conditions on the inside. 3.14 With the construction of hundreds of new buildings, population density has greatly increased both inside and outside the protected area. However, household size has decreased,18 and it is probable (because of the lower age of the head of household and the decrease in household size) that there has been a decrease in the density of occupancy per room. 3.15 The rate of connection to the sanitation network in the study area remains inferior to the average rate for the city of Sfax (which is 40 percent, see discussion in para. 4.12) but this represents a small improvement for the zone when compared to pre-project figures. There has been a marked decrease in squatting (from 31.1 percent to 0.8 percent)-probably not caused by anything to do with the project but due rather to legal and social changes occurring in the whole country. 3.16 There was also a change in the type of housing which prevailed. Before the project, there were mainly single-family homes; after the project, there was an increase of urban-style multiple occupant buildings (often for different generations of the same family, or some form of shared ownership), and more two-story homes. At the street level, it is increasingly common to Is From 5.7 people in 1975 to 5 people in 1994. 28 build a commercial unit (either for family use or to rent out), usually a worksholp, office or storefront; with housing on the floor above. Before 1985, only 25 percent of the building inventory was two- (or more) story buildings; after 1985 this number increased to 51 percent. This change in housing type is additional confirmation of rising land prices (see Chapter 4): high land costs made it too expensive to build villas. Impact on Economic Activities 3.17 Development of commercial activities. One example of the impact of the project on the economy is the development of commercial activities along the canal, and where the bypass road crosses the radiales. Before the project there were very few businesses in these areas. Now that some time has passed after project completion, about 400 new business establishments can be found there. This illustrates, on one hand, an important project impact on Sfax's urban development, and on the other, its impact on the local economy. 3.18 To some degree, the impact is sub-optimal, and the number of new establishments overstates the benefit. The local economy has been slow, and many of the new businesses have closed. Property owners say that they cannot find new tenants easily (see para 5.17). Some observers attribute this problem to the regional character of the bypass and the local character of the economic activities that have been established there to date. Factors limiting further economic development of zone are the lack of adequate parking, traffic-related nuisances, as well as the absence of on-ramps and lanes in which merging traffic can pick up speed. Attitudes and Perceptions of the People Living in the Study Area 3.19 In order to ascertain how aware people in the study area were of the project, the study team asked the families interviewed to give the date construction began on the canal and bypass road. An impressive two-thirds in the middle class areas were able to identify the exact year.'9 In the lower-income neighborhoods, less than half of the respondents knew the year. Interestingly, a large group of those who had lived there before the project (51.4 percent) placed the date between the floods and actual start-up (1982-84). The canal may have been tied to the flood in their minds, and they recollected (incorrectly) that the project had begun very soon after the 1982 iTagedy. Thus taking the percentage of residents who know the acti;al construction date was a good proxy, but it may underestimate the actual level of awareness. 3.20 Within the study area, residents were asked whether they thought the SFPP had a positive impact. An overwhelming majority believed that it had (see Figure 3.4). 19 61.3 percent of families who had lived there before the project, and 65.9 percent of those who moved there after it was completed. 29 Figure 3.4. Percentage of Residents in the Study Area Who Thought the Project Had a PFositive Impact 100- 90- 70- 50- 40- 30* t0 V. Yes %No In the aggregate, within the study area by the canal, 86.7 percent of respondents were able to identify one or more positive impacts on their lives which had been a direct result of the canal. Figure 3.5 lists the most frequently cited advantages. Figure 3.5. Peircentage of Informants in the Study Area that Cite Different Benefits 90- 30- 70- 60- 40I oLowincome Areas 30 1,Middle.-inorneAreasl 20. 0 End of Taffic Easier Closer to Other flooding more fluid access to work or home shopping I~_ i 3.21 To some degree what the people saw is a function of where and how they live; to a lesser degree how long they have lived in the study area also influenced their attitudes. The canal tended to be cited more frequently in the lower income (82 percent) than in the middle income areas (73 percent) for removing the threat of flood because the former suffered more from the floods than the latter. On the other hand, those people who stated that the access to homes is easier and businesses are closer were found more in middle-income areas than in the working class areas because they either drive themselves or can more easily afford to take public transportation. Additionally, the bypass road surface is better in the middle class areas. Moreover, the Northern part of the canal-bypass project, which goes through working class areas, is served less by public transport, in part because it ends at the edge of the urban area. In the middle class areas, thie bypass is used by the buses which provide transit between Tunis and Gabes, so urban service is supplemented by inter-urban, and bus quality is better and buses pass 30 more frequently. Again, those who cited increased fluidity of traffic flow towaLrd downtown and between the different parts of the city provided by the bypass were more likely to come from the middle class areas than from the working class areas because the former use more private cars, and probably go downtown more often than the latter. The above figures indicate that the contributions of the canal-bypass to neighborhood quality of life are known and appreciated by stakeholders in the city of Sfax. Analysis of Negative Impacts Cited 3.22 The widespread acknowledgment of project benefits did not prevent the stakeholders from attributing negative impacts to the project. It will be recalled that one in eight (13.3 percent) people living in the study area could not identify a single positive prqject impact and/or failed to see how the canal/bypass improved their life. In addition, almost unanimously people living in the study area identified some negative project impacts that affected their lives. Figure 3.6 Public Opinion: Did the Project Have Negative Impacts? 100.0- 90.0 80.0 70.0- 60.0 - 50.0 income Areas 40.0 -EMiddle- income 30.0 -Areas 20.0 10.0 % Yes % No Unforeseen Environmental Impact 3.23 The environmental impact of the project was expected to be positive because it channeled flood waters into a carefully designed drainage system, which would reduce damage to urban infrastructure, protect private and commercial dwellings and reduce erosion in the project area. Secondarily, the project was designed to improve environmental sanitation by 31 Fhpr 3.7 9t0bder-ld 41e Drnboktiw ae b of the Projed ,M O . . . . . ..... ... . . ... . . .... ...... . . . . . . .. . . . .... . . . .. ... ........ . . . . ............ no- lwbd a U* N*% Nwm awe Dhtki Iadepmc LUs1b.dW, o preventing flood-caused contamination (due to sewage overflows and water-borne garbage) in the study area, and draining stagnant bodies of water thereby reducing related health hazards. These were achieved largely as planned in many, but not all neighborhoods. 3.24 In the event, however, the project did have some negative environmental impacts, some of which should improve with time. These included accumulation of contaminated groundwater at the northern outlet of the belt canal, which results in unpleasant odors and creates an environment that facililtates mosquito breeding. This contamination is the legacy of an olive oil factory that once operated in an oued, where waste products were allowed to saturate the ground. Although maintenance crews remove rubbish from the canal on a regular basis, they cannot cope with the odor problem, though eventually the olive wastes are expected to decompose to a point where they cause no further problem. 3.25 There are other sources of the polluted water that sits in the canal during periods of low rainfall. The overflows from nearby drywells has led the infiltration of household wastewater into some parts of the canal. This contamination is supplemented by untreated industrial run-off. 3.26 The presence of pollutants in the canal cannot really be classed as an impact of project infrastructure but rather the result of urban policies in general. In Sfax about 60 percent of houses are not connected to the sanitation network. The study found that inside an area 70 meter-wide on each side of the beltroad, only 29 percent of the housing is connected to the ONAS sewer network. This implies that more than 70 percent of households use a septic system that-because the water table is so high-pollutes ground water. Drywells actually raise the level of the water table, and the water table is currently going up by an astounding 10-15 centimeters every year. This has the added effect of increasing the likelihood of overflow, making drywells increatsingly less practical. The rising water table reaches above the bottom of the canal in some (limiited) areas and this leads to infiltration into the canal contributing to the odor problem the residents complain about, as well as providing additional sources of water for 32 incubation ponds where mosquitoes breed.20 The water seeping from the aquifer required treatmnent with insecticide to reduce mosquito infestations, but it was not possible to determine what chemicals were used, or whether these pose a risk to the marine life of the coastal zone. The Office National de l'Assainissement (O.N.A.S.) has been working on ways to overcome these problems, and it shared its plans for additional sanitation networks (that will be installed in the area bordering the canal in order to alleviate this problem) with the study team. 3.27 The Sakiet Ezzit canal (North of Sfax) was built so that water could flow out even during low tide levels, with the result that it gets the high tide flowback inland for about 700 meters- another source of the smelly stagnating water which the residents of the study area complained about in the household surveys. Complaints associated with stagnant water were very common: either algae, bad odors, mosquitoes, or dead animals thrown in the canal were cited as negative impacts for 75 percent of the inhabitants in low income areas, and by 54.2 percent of the people of the middle-class areas. Far too many residents throw garbage into the canal (200 m3 are collected each month). These problems are much less severe where the canal d;rains at the high tide level. Field observations revealed that the most affected by these problems are (naturally) the people living closer to the sea and those living in the area known as Sidi Mansour Haffara. 3.28 The rocade is a source of noise pollution for the inhabitants, especially disturbing to long-time residents in the areas that were not much built up before the project. The traffic noise (especially from poorly muffled trucks) disturbs the sleep of (bypass) road-side dwellers. The canal and bypass bifurcate many neighborhoods, and cut the city in two. The difficulties of crossing from one side of the canal to another-because overpasses are too far apart for pedestrians-rends the social fabric in may places (see para 3.30). Opinion of Public Officials 3.29 At the end of the OED sponsored workshop for government officials who had participated in the implementation of the project, about half the participants turned in the questionnaire they had been given: 15 out of 17 respondents felt that the overall impact of the project on the development of Sfax had been positive. They suggested that in the future, similar infrastructure projects should undertake better baseline studies and conduct an ernvironmental impact assessment so that retrospective evaluation can be more easily conducted.21 3.30 Among the constraints the project had to deal with, they highlighted an urban policy that permits sparse settlement in expensively protected areas. As a result, Sfax's urban sprawl has covered a far larger area than would otherwise be necessary. Vast tracts of urban land have been kept off the market for speculative purposes. Government officials believe that the low costs associated with holding vacant or under-utilized urban land, and the absence of incentives that motivate the general public to maximize on public investment in protection and drainage infrastructure has (probably) created the need for a second, longer and more expensive flood protection/drainage canal in the near future. 3.31 Participants at the workshop proposed urgent measures to overcome what they saw as project deficiencies. Their proposals included: 20 The NGO A.P.N.E.S. (Association de Protection de la Nature et de I'Environnement de Sfax) highlighted this problem in its meetings with the study team. IPrior to 1989 Environmental Assessments were not required for Bank-financed projects. 33 * lighting for walkways and streets along the bypass; * improving roadside drainage; * improving the functioning of the canal/finishing the mouth of the canal through harnessing works; * increase the number of bridges, pathways and walkways for pedestrians; * improve the management and functioning of traffic lights, especially in the major crossroads; * find other mreans to reduce the impact of neighborhood separation created by the building of lhe canal; * minimize negative environmental impacts by strengthening oversight, and making maintenance works on the canal more frequent; * undertake a campaign of community awareness to reduce the dumping of refuse in the canal; and * widen the bridges in order to reduce accident risks in the crossroads. Factors of Performance 3.32 The study finds that both the canal and highway largely achieved their objectives. In those areas where impacts were sub-optimal, the study found that the policy framework in which the infrastructure operates did not fully support project objectives. For example, transport policy favored the development of private transport over public, with the almost inevitable result that traffic concentration improvements and travel-time reductions from the use of the bypass gradually diminished as the number of vehicles circulating within the city multiplied. In a similar fashion, urban policy permitted sparse settlement in expensively protected areas, and allowed vast tracts of urban land to be kept off the market for speculative purposes. As a result, Sfax's urban sprawl has covered a far larger area than would otherwise be necessary, and has (probably) created the need for a second, longer and more expensive flood protection/drainage canal in the near future. 3.33 The canal has not fully solved the problems posed by torrential rains because there are insufficient roadside drains/storm sewers in the city. Project design focused on evacuating flood waters approaching the city from the hinterland, but paid little or no attention to the disposal of storm water falling on the city itself. Storm drains constructed under the urban project have helped, but they are not sufficient to handle the water flowing in the streets at peak periods. Heavy rainfalls are not being fully channeled into the canal and standing water remains on the roads and in residential areas, causing health/pest hazards among other problems. 3.34 However, these should be transitory as their resolution is a matter of remedial action. The real problem arises when it comes to taking the action, because there is confusion over who is responsible. The city authorities regard the canals, protective works, their maintenance, and any resulting problems, as the central government's responsibility. The project did in fact entrust the Ministry of Equipment with the job of maintaining the flood protection works (see para 2.21), but it is hard to see how the Ministry can take responsibility for the city's overall drainage system. 3.35 The project's sustainability is assured by the force account funding for operation and maintenance. This approach to cost recovery was chosen because, while the benefits of the project would be widespread, the beneficiaries could not be easily identified. The Tunisian Government decided that its policy is that the state should pay for the cost of flood prevention 34 infrastructure out of general revenues. First, different floods affect different parts of the city and it is impossible to predict which residents will be affected and the extent to which their property and possession may suffer from future floods. Second, the public infrastructure of the entire Sfax Governorate is at risk from floods. Third, the whole Tunisian economy is affected because of the essential rail, highway, port and telecommunication, facilities pass through Sfax. 3.36 To a large degree, the project was able to reduce the destructive impact of torrential rains because the best approach to the flooding problem was chosen. Staff involved in project preparation said that they did not accept the Flood Master Plan designs uncritically. In fact, they analyzed several alternatives before deciding on the course of action. The three basic possibilities that were examined are: * A legislative solution that relies exclusively on legislative measures to prevent the population from living in high-risk areas; * A no-action solution: a do-nothing approach could be chosen, and the individuals affected by the disaster, or the Government, assume the cost of the damages when floods occur; * Structural solution: The construction of flood protection works to protect the endangered areas. 3.37 The legislative solution was rejected because it would have depended on a strict zoning policy and the relocation of tens of thousands of people-economically prohibitive and politically unacceptable. Zoning alone would not solve the problem as all existing structures in the high risk areas would remain exposed. A comparative cost/benefit analysis of the "no action" and the proposed "structural" solutions demonstrated that the latter was the best solution.22 The Key Lesson 3.38 The Impact Study concludes that it is difficult in the extreme to solve complex urban flood and traffic problems only by constructing infrastructure. Recent OED evaluations have noted that overcoming infrastructure bottlenecks is a long-term process, which requires a supportive legal framework, and which usually has institutional development components that need to be functioning in place before the concrete is poured. Bank support for similar projects should be contingent on the requisite software accompanying the flood protection and traffic infrastructure. 22 The selected flood protection system was the least cost solution at a discount rate of 10 percent. Considering the topographic and demographic characteristics of Greater Sfax, an intercepting canal between the outside impluvium and the agglomeration to be protected was determined to be the most logical solution. 35 4. Impacts on Urban Land Values, Housing and Related Improvements The urban areas made mnore accessible by the bypass road have broughtfew new citizens to Sfax. Generally, subdividedplots have been purchased or otherwise obtained by locals, who have benefitedfrom substantial appreciation. Of the people currently living on the banks of the canal, (98 percent) are long-ti,me residents of Sfax. In the 15 year period since construction began, the number of houses located along the bypass road near the canal increased, and the number of occupants rosefrom 2,000 to about 12,000. The bypass and the canal divided the city in two, the infrastructure having an important obstacle effect in that it divides the city into "inside " and "outside" the bypass road zones. Within the study area, residents were asked to identify changes to their neighborhood which have occurred since the project. Respondents identfied new streets, businesses and buildings as the most noteworthy post-project changes near their homes. An average of about 62 percent of allfamilies surveyed had made a signi ficant improvement to their homes at some point in time. The studyfound that home improvements are more frequent in the lower-income neighborhoods (66.7 percent) than in the areas of middle class (58.3 percent). Household Characteristics 4.1 The number of people living in the immediate vicinity of the project infrastructure has been steadily growing. In the period between 1978-1994 it is known that the number of houses located along the bypass road near the canal increased, and the number of occupants rose from 2,000 to about 12,000. Most people living in the study area were either born near where they live' now or are rural immigrants who settled in the neighborhoods before the project. Only 14.6 percent of the heads of households surveyed in lower-income neighborhoods came to live in the area after the project. Most better-off inhabitants are new-comers, many came from more central neighborhoods in Sfax. They came looking for a single house (villa) which was close enough for an easy commute to work downtown, but far enough away from the downtown area to provide a more suburban life style for their families. The study found that 38.9 percent of the better-off heads of households carne to the canal area after the completion of the project and the migration of better-off families to the zone largely explains the impact of the project on these areas. 4.2 The building census conducted by the study compared the age of buildings on the bypass with those on the radiales within the study area. Figure 4.1 below shows the percentage of buildings in the study area which were built before and after the project was completed. The study found that becoming a homeowner is highly correlated with making ongoing improvements to the housing conditions. This commitment to pleasing visual and living conditions is a result of the cultural attitude toward (investments in) housing and its relationship to status. However, the ongoing building upgrading everywhere observable around the canal, should be credited as much to the pattern of urbanization typical of Tunisia as to the impact of the project. 4.3 Arrival date. The urban areas made more accessible by the bypass road have brought few new citizens to Sfax. Generally subdivided plots have been purchased or otherwise obtained by locals. Of the people currently living on the banks of the canal, (97.5 percent) are long-time residents of Sfax: either they were born in Sfax (82.5 percent), or they have been settled in the 36 canal area since before the project (15 percent). Those who were not born in Sfax and/or who settled in the area after the project infrastructure was completed represent just 2.5 percent of all the heads of households. As for the relationship between longevity in the neighborhood and socio-economic status, 38.9 percent of the households in the middle class areas moved to their current location after the beginning of the project, versus only 14.6 percent for those of the working class areas. About 18 percent of the households in the middle class areas and 8.3 percent of those of the working class areas changed homes after the project; 39.6 percent of the heads of the households in the working class areas were born in the area where the canal was built. Flgure 4.1. Buildings Built Before and After the Project 7000 10.0 40.0 g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ OnBln 3o __Radials Before 1988 Aft 1988 Furthermore, 64.6percent changed homes but moved from another homes that was already located within the same area where they now reside, Of the heads of the households, 22.9 percent were not born in Sfax. In contrast to the working class areas, the survey showed in the middle class areas only 13.9 percent of the heads of the households were born in the area where the canal was built, and none was born in the building in which they now reside. 4.4 Age. The heads of the households in the middle class areas are younger (73.2 percent are less than 50 years old) than those of the working class areas (40.5 percent of the heads of the households in this area are over 60 years old). 4.5 Professional status. In the of middle class areas 22.2 percent of respondlents class themselves as "bosses" and 47.2 percent as middle level professionals. But in the working class areas, informants classed themselves as workers or employees (27. 1 percent), and retired or inactive (20.8 percent). There were very few respondents who classed themselves as unemployed or inactive who were less than 60 years old (6.3 percent) in the working class areas. This shows that the population of the study area is well integrated in the Sfaxian economy. However, in what the city considers to be low-income neighborhoods, 4.2 percent of respondents class themselves as bosses and/or high level professionals and 22.9 percent as middle-level professionals. Hence the neighborhoods are somewhat heterogeneous-a fact that can be explained by the lower cost of real estate in lower income areas (land costs are low enough that the better-off families can afford to build villas where land is still relatively cheap). While land in Sfax often changes hands without the fact that it is for sale becoming public knowledge, the increase of land prices caused by the building of the canal, especially in the middlle class areas, led some poor people who inherited land to sell it on the open market. 37 Land Prices 4.6 In Sfax, as in any city, the construction of a divided highway through an urban area has both positive and negati ve impacts. As far as many local property owners are concerned, the increase in the value of property within the area bordering the canal is the most important of the project's positive impacts. By opening up a very large urban area in the outskirts of Sfax to motorized transport and a newly important transport corridor, the bypass added value to the land, causing an important increase in land prices. The increase in value of the land near the canal lead to subdivision (splitting up of the larger land holdings) so that families could capitalize on the sale of some land while retaining some for their own use. On the other hand, study surveys also reveal that an important number of large plots of less-than-fully utilized land are being held off the market for speculative purposes. Additionally, desirable areas with high land prices inevitably exclude certain segments of the population who can not afford to live there. 4.7 Prices of plots next to the expropriated area varied between TD1O and TD25/meter2 in 1980 reaching a maximum of TD60 along the radial roads. When asked to recall land prices in the study area before the canal was built, 83 percent of households living in the area estimated that prices were below TD30 per square meter. Now that the canal has been completed, when asked to estimate the current value of land in the neighborhood only 26 percent of respondents in the study area mentioned this price; but 38 percent put the price per square meter in a range from TD5O to more than TD80-this can be compared to the recollected price, 8 percent said that land was worth that much before the canal. These prices can be compared to land cost in other neighborhoods. Sf3 4.8 The prices of plots suitable for building in Greater Sfax2 range from DT 10 to 250 per square meter. The higher the price, the closer to downtown. Prices also change according to proximity to the radiales or other major roads and they increase according to the land's nearness of these roads. In an informal survey made with four (real estate) brokers of Sfax on May 1996 these experts estimated that plots located in the study area along the bypass would range from TD10-80 per square meter. However, they noted that between 1994 and 1996, the real estate market was slow, buyers were scarce, real estate supply low, and sellers were generally limited only to people in dire need of money (to pay off a debt or to pay for urgent medical care). The market is expected to pick up in the near future. 4.9 Land prices are high on both sides of the central part of the canal. Reaching a high of DT 70 per square meter in the central part, land prices go down to DT 20-30 per square meter in the North and South wings of the canal, the lower figure in those areas where the bypass is a dirt road. There is no significant price differential between property inside and outside the protective canal, which presumabl,y reflects the fact that flooding danger and rain-related nuisances have also been reduced in the area outside canal but within reach of related drainage infrastructure like storm sewers. The fact that prices are about the same inside and outside the protective barrier also indicates that because of improved storm water evacuation to the sea there is a limit to the potential height of floodL waters. It is also true, however, that higher land prices reflect the value added by the bypass, which improves access to the rest of the city. Finally, speculation and scarcity also play a role in land appreciation: many informants and the consulting engineers cited the domination of the land market by a few individuals within Sfax as an important 23 1994 estimates. 38 contributing factor to higher prices. Indeed, there are large plots which rarely change hands outside a group of Sfax families. On the other hand, the North and South ends of the canal are low-lying areas, still subject to standing water, that are less desirable historically and on amenity grounds because they contain no orchards. These are the areas which have been attracting immigrant groups from elsewhere in Tunisia and low-income families because land is cheapest there. 4.10 Obstacle effect. Not all landowners benefited from the project. The bypass and the canal divided the city in two, the infrastructure having an important obstacle effect in that it divides the city into "inside" and "outside" the bypass road zones. Although :38 bridges (16 road bridges, 3 railroad bridges and 19 pedestrian bridges) were built, not all areas are served equally well. The more densely populated areas and heavily traveled routes are relatively well served. However, areas which can still be classed as urban are rather poorly served, with the result that pedestrians may need to walk a kilometer or more to get to a point directly across the canal, less than 30 meters from their point of origin. About 3 8 percent of the households in the working class areas and 49 percent of those of the middle class areas complained about the way the project infrastructure created a separation between their homes and those of neighbors which they frequently visited. When asked to suggest improvements in bypass infrastructure, about 40 percent of all respondents suggested that the number of pedestrian bridges be doubled. Additionally, the road and canal left many owners with unusable fractions of their original plots. Some buildings were totally or partially destroyed to establish the right of way or, later on, during the construction process. This fragmentation of real estate and structures in the area led to the creation of a "checkerboard of triangles:" leftover plots and plots which cannot be built for other reasons are interspersed with usable land and buildings for the entire trajectory. Changes on the Neighborhood Level 4.11 Within the study area, residents were asked to identify changes to their neighborhood which have occurred since the project. Disaggregated by longevity and neighborhood (that is, distinguishing between families that have lived in the middle class and low-income areas since before and after the project) respondents identified new streets, businesses and buildings as the most noteworthy post-project changes near their homes (see Figure 4.2). Figure 4.2. Types of Changes Introduced in the Neighborhood 70 50- 40- 30 .MddIl4COMICAMR Nesw New New Other i Iut S Busians Buddigss 39 Urban Amenities 4.12 In urban Sfax, over 80 percent of homes connected to the sanitary sewers, but in the canal area (Onein) connection rates are still well under the city average. In terms of connection to the sanitation (sewer) system, only 40 percent of the population (and a smaller percentage of homes) in the study area are connected. In the working class neighborhoods of the study area more homes have connections to the sewer system (31.3 percent) than in the middle class areas, where are only 12.5 percent of the homes connected. More than 50 percent of the households evacuate wastewater through drywells (puits perdus), the rest use latrines or public facilities. 4.13 Although it is unlikely that the project had any impact on the level of amenities and sanitary equipment within the study area houses, the study team asked about these aspects in order to have a better grasp on living conditions within the neighborhoods studied. Results in Figure 4.3 below have been disaggregated by longevity and neighborhood. Figure 43. Amenity Level of Houses in the Study Area 100.0 70.0 6000v 40.01 20.0 sl__ 300 * * i * i ,i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~MiddIo-mcoonAre.l ng S- tthtb. T_ITphro.K Water (Ye.) (Wa) (Y-) (Ye.) (Ye-) Project activities did not lead to the introduction of sanitation infrastructure in the areas which needed sanitation nor did it stop the practice of parcellization (excessive subdivision) common in Sfax, which actually increases the number of plots without access to sanitation and running water. The level of certain amenities and the presence of modem household facilities (telephone and the bathtubs) depends on the buying power of the households and the level of urban services provided to the area by the city. 4.14 The fact that the connection point to the main lines of the sewer system (collectors and interceptors) is closer to the lower-income neighborhoods explains why a higher percentage of homes (31.3 percent) are connected there than in the middle class neighborhoods (12.5 percent). There are two other explanations for the higher service levels in lower-income neighborhoods: 1) there have been targeted sanitation programs for Sfax's poorer neighborhoods; and 2) the middle class neighborhoods have a population density low enough to make the use of dry wells 40 almost practicable. A similar situation prevails with the poor neighborhoods in terms of running water, service levels are higher because the middle class can afford other acceptable alternatives. This pattern is repeated in other aspects of daily life and is related to the model of growth in the city of Sfax. Housing Renovation/Upgrading 4.15 An average of about 62 percent of all families surveyed had made a significant improvement to their homes at some point in time. The study found that home improvements are more frequent in the lower-income neighborhoods (66.7 percent) than in the areas of middle class (58.3 percent). This is due to the still-changing character of the homes located in the lower-income neighborhoods and, in general, to the more functional (better) state of those located in the middle class area. Figure 4.4 shows home improvement rates in both income neighborhoods since project completion. Figure 4.4 Infornants Who Significantly Inmproved Their Homne Since the Project go.0. 50.0 - 40.0- 30.0 20.0. 10.0 i LowerinOrnme Aea Middl4nCrme Area 4.16 It is logical that the changes in the homes are more important in the lower-income neighborhoods than in the middle class neighborhoods. Moreover, the changes in the middle class areas are often made by lower-income households which settled there and which inherited land and a structure/s that they gradually improved as they could afford. F Figure 4.5. Types ofimprovements Made to Homes in the Study Area j ...........~~~........... ................. ............ ........ ... ... ... ..... ...... ............. .................... ................ ............................................. .................... 300 X 25.0- 20.0 15.0. MSattem P sM= B Irbmom YK&cn PRebuldlng MuI APnkl Added FaCdC _OIge 41 Number of Building Permits Issued 4.17 Building permits granted after 1985 represent 63.3 percent of all the permits granted for the area under study in the last 15 years. The numbers for building permits show that the project accelerated the building in the area and the increase for the demand of building permits (see Annex 1). Other Impacts 4.18 The reduction in the size of the households which is taking place in the project area is reflected, to varying degrees, throughout the entire country. Smaller family size is a result of several factors, but household composition has been heavily influenced by the birth control policy followed by the national government since 1966. In the thirty years this policy has been implemented it has significantly reduced fertility and launched Tunisia into a demographic transition. Thus, in the canal area, the reduction in the size of the households is not an impact of the project, but is related to the system of social changes noticed in urban areas in Tunisia for the last thirty years. 4.19 An interesting change in residential architecture was mentioned by some of the informants surveyed. Traditionally the entry way into the house has been on the street side. This has been both for convenience and, to a certain degree, for status reasons. Older homes along the bypass follow this design practice. However, having a door on the bypass facilitates the entry of dust into living quarters, and it does not help to cloak traffic noise. To overcome these inconveniences, many families that have built more recently leave a passage into the back of the house, and the main door no longer opens off the main road. Other informants lamented the development of urban buildings in areas once reserved for agricultural activities and rural type homes. A few others commented on the reduction in the amount of space available for children to play and other outside activities. I 43 5. Impact on Traffic and Urban Activities The overall travel time passing through the city is about 10 minutes shorter using the bypass than by going through downtown. The annual traffic increase (16 percent) on the bypass surpasses growth at other important routes. This increase, which shows the extent to which traffic is being diverted' into from other major routes, is one of the most important indicators of project impact. In Sfax the transport policy environment did not support project traffic reduction objectives because itfavored the development ofprivate transport over public. The number of cars usedprimarilyfor circulating within Sfax increasedfrom 7,000 vehicles in 1971, to 13,000 in 1980, and to 36,000 in 1996. The belt road, originally designed as an urban street, carries heavy traffic moving at limited speed, which is controlled by traffic lights at major intersections. On the most heavily traveled segment, it is near saturation. Since 1990 the belt road has helped to absorb a share of the penetrating traffic which wouldformerly have had to pass through the downtown area Prior to the project, traffic at the entrances to the downtown area of Sfax had increased at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent. After the bypass was opened to traffic in 1990, the rate of traffic increase downtown slowed to 3.8 percent annual rate which, if not an outright reduction, suggests that part of the increase in traffic was rerouted onto the bypass. Three principal downtown streets registered an absolute decrease in traffic volume, including one which showed a dramatic 60 percent decrease at times ofpeak use. 5.1 The belt road was originally designed as an urban street, although it is now used almost as a freeway (in the sense that cars travel at speeds considerably above the posted speed limit when traffic permits). ][t was opened as an unpaved road in 1988, then upgraded to a paved road on most of its length by 1990-which can be considered as the year it was opened to traffic (since a few less-used section are still unpaved). Since it was ultimately only possible to acquire a band 32 meters wide for the entire project (see cross-section in Figure 2.2), the road was limited to 20 meters including shoulders, that is, 10 meters for each side). It was foreseen that this excessive narrowness was going to be a significant constraint on the flow of traffic, and the study found that this is indeed the case. 5.2 The study team asked a Tunisian firm of consulting engineers to analyze traffic patterns and road safety to find out to what extent one of the key objectives of the bypass had been attained, i.e. to shift traffic away from over-congested urban radiales. Since it was not possible to compare before and after project conditions (it being impossible to have figures on traffic levels on a road not built) the consultants used some traffic modeling data generated by an earlier traffic study.24 This data, which used 1976 conditions to estimate what the use of a bypass would have been at that time, was compared to the current statistics dealing with traffic. This chapter also reviews certain aspects of road safety including the number and frequency of accidents on the bypass: and the types of places they happen. Locations of accidents from police accident reports were plotted on a map to identify the most dangerous intersections, and an analysis of the causes of accidents has been done. Annex 3 illustrates the intersections where loss and damage were highest. Data for the period after the bypass began functioning has also been compared to the total data for accidents in the city of Sfax before the project. 24Comparator study was made by the D.A.T/Groupe 8 (1976). 44 Increase in the Number of Vehicles on the Road 5.3 In Sfax the transport policy environment did not support project objectives. Incentives to reduce the use of private vehicles and/or to promote the use of public transport would have advanced the objectives of the project and enhanced the utility of the transport infrastructure. In greater Sfax, transport policy favored the development of private transport over public. Large urban areas beyond the end of the bypass were only sporadically served by buses. The almost inevitable result was that traffic concentration improvements and travel-time reductions from the use of the bypass gradually diminished as the number of vehicles circulating within the city multiplied. The measurement of project impacts on traffic reduction is complicated by the growth in the total number of vehicles in circulation within Sfax. The number of cars used primarily for circulating within Sfax increased from 7,000 vehicles in 1971, to 1J3,000 in 1980, and to 36,000 in 1996. The large increase in the number of cars in circulation-which is paralleled by the increase in two-wheel vehicles-is a reflection of an increase in disposable income and concomitant improvement in the standard of living of many households. But it cannot be denied that another factor which has contributed to the rapid growth of private motorized transport has been the poor service provided by the public transportation system. Traffic on the Bypass 5.4 Given the speed limit (50 kilometers per hour) and the relative narrowness of the bridges (8 to 11 Im), larger vehicles traveling on the two lanes (going in each direction) have to stagger their bridge crossing. Because this impedes flow, the study's traffic engineers estimate that the bypass will not allow more than 1,200 cars per hour. On the most heavily traveled segment, the bypass road is near saturation, however: measurements showed a peak-use average of 1,059 cars per hour. While traffic on the bypass only reaches this rate (on the part that is miost traveled, Gremda-Menzel Chaker) at high-traffic periods, it has increased at a rate of 16 percent a year on average since it opened. If past trends continue, saturation at peak hours could be reached in a year's time. 5.5 The increase of vehicular traffic on the bypass surpasses growth at other important routes. For example, at the level of the bypass, on the radiales of Gremda, Tunis, and Mehdia, the traffic at the morning rush hour increased at a rate of 3.8 percent a year between 1976 and 1990 and at a rate of 10.2 percent between 1990 and 1995. This latter increase is reflected on all the Sfax radials which, in addition to the factors mentioned above, is explained bty the much higher population density in areas which were recently planted in crops or used for orchards, but which have been rapidly urbanized, particularly in the period 1990-1995. Thus the 16 percent traffic increase along the bypass, revealing, as it does, the extent to which traffic is being diverted into its lanes, is one of the most important indicators of project impact. Driving Time 5.6 The disproportionate increase in traffic on the bypass is strong evidence that individual users find that for their purposes there are still time and distance economies to be made through its use. However, because of infrastructure deficiencies, notably the lack of shoulder width and the narrowness of bridges, travel time is increasing rapidly at high traffic periods. The average 25 including two-wheeled vehicles it would be about 40,000. Number of vehicles (estimated by) using national rate of 7 percent vehicle growth annually since 1980. 45 speed at the morning rush hour is currently at 12 km/hour whereas it was 16 km/hour in 1990. When it was opened to the public in 1990, the most traveled eight kilometers took 10 minutes driving time plus an estimated 5-10 minutes waiting at traffic lights over the 10 main intersections. Now the driving time (while vehicle is in motion) during the morning rush hour has increased 25 to 30 minutes; and the waiting time has increased marginally as well, because the bridges are saturated during rush hours. Despite this, the overall travel time passing through the city is still about 10D minutes shorter using the bypass than by going through downtown. Observations revealed that the bypass is popular with taxi drivers. Interviews with taxi drivers showed that they believe that the bypass has helped to relieve the traffic pressure in the downtown area, and they appreciate the fact that they can now move from one radial to the other in a manner that would have been very difficult and/or impossible without the bypass. The time gain is greater on average (24-27 minutes, compared with 10 minutes traversing the entire city) for drivers just switchiing radial roads. Has Traffic in the Urban Center been Ameliorated? 5.7 Sfax is characterized by a massive vehicular migration from the outskirts to the center at the start of the work day and an equally large return vehicle flow at the end of the day. Downtown Sfax has more than 90 percent of all jobs but only 10-20 percent of residences (housing) according to local officials. Almost 94 percent of trips in private vehicles within Sfax have home as the point of origin or destination. About 34 percent of these trips are between home and the work place. 5.8 The number of cars in traffic in 1976 just on the radiales of Greater Sfax (moving in or out of the downtown aerea) was 7,294 vehicles daily, which represented a traffic inflow at the morning rush hour of.just 1,312 private cars. By 1990, official estimates put the flow into the central city at 10,000 a day, not counting public vehicles. Since 1990 the belt road has helped to absorb a share of the penetrating traffic which would formerly have to pass through the downtown area. Prior to the project, traffic at the entrances to the downtown area of Sfax had 26 increased at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent. After the bypass was opened to traffic in 1990, the rate of traffic increase downtown slowed to 3.8 percent annual rate which, if not an outright reduction, suggests that part of the increase in traffic was rerouted onto (one of several new) transverse routes or bypasses including the one at kilometer four, which was the longest and most important to open around that time. While several other principal streets saw large increases between 1990-1995, three did register an absolute decrease, including Menzel Chaker which showed a dramatic 60 percent decrease at times of peak use. 5.9 The consulting engineers note that even where average traffic volumes are rising, the bypass improved greatly theflow of the traffic through a decrease of traffic jams (in the downtown area). In summary, the distance of travel between home, work and shopping has been shortened for many families, not to mention the resultant decrease in travel time and use of fossil fuels. Moreover, the increase in traffic on the bypass and improvement of connections between the urban highway (radiales) are direct results of the project. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the bypass allowed heavy trucks (estimated at 150 per day) to avoid the downtown crossing. 26 5.5 percent between 1976 and 1990 and 5.7 percent between 1990 and 1995 (as measured along the eight main radiales which run into the center). 46 5.10 A secondary benefit occurs when flammable cargo or other hazardous materials are carried by trucks that now take the bypass: pedestrian exposure to chemical vapors from dangerous materials has been shifted away from the most populous area to less dlense areas with greater natural airflow. Road Safety 5.11 Along the bypass there has been a steady increase in serious and fatal accidents. The engineers on the study team attribute this to: * lack of public/street lighting. The sides of the road are very dark, which hides pedestrians, children and people alighting from parked cars from the eyes of drivers; * narrow crossroads lead to tight turns and remove a necessary margin for error; * traffic lights are not adequately maintained, with the result that some accidents are the result of non-functioning or malfunctioning equipment; * the lack of parking coupled with excessively narrow shoulders have the unintended effect of (parked/stopped cars) blocking travel lanes which leads to emergency merges, avoidance maneuvers and accidents; and - there are no exit/entrance ramps or slow lanes for merging traffic. Accidents 5.12 Unfortunately, the number of accidents on the bypass has been increasing, as fast as the traffic. Since the asphalting of the bypass in 1990, the following pattern of traffic; accident- related injury and damage has unfolded (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Figure 5.1 Number of Accidents on the Bypass ,30 l1 f Numberofaccidents 10 X.I. .. . . .. . . .... .... ..... ..... .. .. .. ; < ~~~~ ~ ~~~~ ~~1991 1992 1993 1994 995s 47 Figure 5.2 Mortality and Morbidity on the Bypass 60 / 40 \ I *Number of wounded i 30 I | Number of dead I 1 0 ...... ......... 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Both urban growth and commercial development account for the heavy traffic on the belt road, and partly explain the increase in the accident rate despite traffic lights at every intersection and speed limit signs.27 The above table shows that the number of accidents on the bypass increased between 1991 and 1995 at an average rate of 28 percent a year. With its present level of road signing, traffic control, lighting and enforcement, the bypass is becoming steadily more dangerous for local users. The accident rate is high: 11 dead, 43 wounded in 35 accidents in 1995-grim statistics for an urban road. The consultants attribute the current (which they class as excessively high) accident rate to technical weaknesses in the Sfax bypass design (most notably: narrow lanes, narrow bridges, difficult crossroads, insufficient traffic signs/signaling, no street lighting). The 7 meter-wide lanes which are found in some areas are too narrow for heavy trucks, and makes passing a dangerous operation. The bridges, which are of a standard more appropriate to country roads than urban ones (8 meter-wide instead of 15) are bottlenecks. The absence of public lighting is a source of accidents in part because many bicycles do not have lights. The map in Annex 3 illustrates the most dangerous intersections on the bypass, based on official accident data. Commercial Opportunities Created by the Bypass Road 5.13 When land was expropriated for the project, the indemnities paid to land owners were modest. To provide additional compensation, the land which they retained was granted exemptions from certain building and zoning restrictions, which increased its commercial value.28 27 The Borrower commented that, "With the rapid increase in traffic volume, it has become clear that the width of the belt road (two lanes in each direction) has rapidly become inadequate. It may be noted that the absence of street lighting along the belt road, which is a contributing factor to the traffic accident rate, will be rectified under the Ninth Development Plan. 2s Exceptions to the Urban P'lan were granted in 1986-87 in response to numerous complaints from former owners. These exemptions complemented the low indemnities on the expropriated land, but they also changed the urban profile 48 5.14 On May 16, 1996, a team commissioned by the study to survey the study area counted 394 business-suitable/commercial premises as well as 12 factories. The surveyors only counted the premises located on the bypass or installed on a road which reached the bypass, taking into account only those which were located within 100 meters of the bypass road, oni each side of the canal. The activities which were found at that time to be ongoing have been classified into four categories: Groce Stor Services -Groceries -Barber Shop -Groceries & gas -Mechanics -Groceries & tobacco -Auto body work -Groceries & fruit and vegetables -Party Items -Other foodstuff -Other Services Non-grocery Stores Small Workshops -Furniture -Small iron works -Building materials -Carpenter -Iron works -Other workshops -Spare parts -Coal and gas -Other materials 5.15 Although there were a number of artisan workshops before 1988, they tended to be inside earthen homes, or in temporary structures: stores and steel-reinforced concrete commercial buildings of the type now prevalent were the exceptions in the zone before 1988. About 70 percent of the stores and workshops in the area have been constructed since 1988 when the beltroad was opened with a dirt surface (not yet paved). The monthly rent for a commercial unit in the study area ranges between TD40-100. The average rent for premises bordering or visible from the bypass is around TD80. 5.16 The types of activities and the intensity of use currently found along the beltroad are different than those in the bustling downtown and along the radiales (where a broader range of products and services can still be found). An analysis of the establishments open for business (see Figure 5.3) showed that services were most common (40 percent), followed by small repair shops (27 percent), non-grocery businesses (hardware, spare parts, agricultural clhemical, etc., 23 percent), and food shops (10 percent). of the area. A negative urban impact, unaesthetic constructions and poor use of urban space, is not a negative impact of the project, but rather of the decision to grant exemptions. 49 Figure 5.3 Types of Commercial Enterprises Found Along the Bypass 140 ' 120 .||' gTotalNo. (Irey N6n Services Smal Closed Stocrs y Nony WoSishops Stoeds Stores Among the things that the building census discovered include: o the small shops for repairing cars and bicycles are concentrated on the beltroad, very few were on the radiales; D 51 percent of the shops have been constructed since 1990, that is, since the beltroad was paved; * 77 percent of the shops are self-contained constructions while the rest are extensions to dwellings; * 56 percent of the shop owners are working alone (no employees); * About 28 percent of occupants own the premises were their business is located; * 71 percent are tenants; and * one percent occupy premises which they do not own but for which they pay no rent. 5.17 The high proportion of new services and repair shops is a desirable state of affairs: these operations create more jobs. Even more employment could be created if deficiencies were overcome. The absence of parking in some areas coupled with the difficulties finding a place to park in others, the delay before telephone connections are granted/installed, the absence of public lighting, and traffic-related nuisances have led numerous shops to close. The field survey building census showed that 32 percent of the shop premises were closed or not functioning as active businesses on a daily basis (3 times the frequency observed on the radial roads). However, many storefronts were built on speculation (with the owners living on the floor/s above). In the early years of the bypass, the extent and nature of the commercial opportunity which it offered was not well understood. Some of the stores that closed overestimated the potential clientele. Others were never occupied. There is therefore something of a glut of commercial space on tihe canal-area market, which will likely disappear as the local economy improves and as businesses better suited to actual market conditions are installed. 50 Job Creation 5.18 The commercial activities on the bypass generate more jobs than the ones on the radiales, both because of the nature of the enterprises, and the fact that each estaLblishment is a bit more spacious. The jobs created by businesses along the bypass and the ra,diales are as follows: * on the bypass there were 163 paid jobs for each 100 establishments dedicated to commercial activities; * on the radiales there were 134 jobs for each 100 establishments; * the average for all businesses visited by the study team was 151 jobs for each 100 activities. 5.19 Most of the entrepreneurs who run establishments in the study area are men (94 percent). They range in age between 20 and 77 years old. The women who manage activities tended to be in service businesses, most often they were hairdressers, seamstresses or tailors. Almost 90 percent of the shopkeepers who are on the bypass, settled in their current premises after the project was completed. Low rent and excellent access to downtown Sfax were the main motivations cited by entrepreneurs who did not own their own premises for their location decision. Entrepreneurs complained most about the lack of parking, noise caused by cars and heavy trucks, air-borne dust, and poor security. They observed that the lack of public lighting makes it easier for thieves (who work at night) to break in and rob them. Many of those interviewed worried that if business does not pick up that they will be forced to close and/or move elsewhere. 5.20 Even limiting the area studied to 100 meters on both sides of the canal (and there were numerous establishments just outside the area counted, it remains nonetheless incontrovertible that the canal and the bypass have exerted a positive economic impact on Sfax, and contributed to the growth of small enterprise and family incomes. 2the average floorspace in the units surveyed was 48.4 square meters. 51 6. Findings anid Recommendations 6.1 The Impact Evaluation confirms earlier evaluation findings that-although there were small glitches in design-both the canal and highway largely achieved their objectives. The most fundamental impact of the project is that flood control infrastructure continues to channel flood waters into a carefully designed drainage system which, every rainy season, reduces damage to urban infrastructure, protects private and commercial dwellings and significantly reduces uncontrolled water flows in the project area. Secondly, the canal has improved environmental sanitation by preventing flood-caused contamination on both sides of the canal, and helped to drain stagnant bodies of water, thereby reducing related health hazards. In termns of the bypass road's impacts, it is impressive that even after the number of cars in Sfax increased more than three-fold since the project was built, the overall travel time passing through the city is still about 10 minutes shorter using the bypass than by going through downtown. The fact that annual traffic increases on the bypass continue to surpass growth at other important routes is also an indicator that the roads component is still fulfilling a well-identified need. 6.2 In light of the achievements noted above, it is still important to reflect about ways that potential benefits couldl have been further maximized. The policy framework in which the infrastructure operates did not fully support project objectives. Transport policy favored the development of private transport over public, with the result that traffic concentration improvements and travel-time reductions from the use of the bypass has gradually diminished as the number of vehicles circulating within the city multiplied. Similarly, urban policy permitted sparse settlement in expensively protected areas, with the result that Sfax's urban sprawl has covered a far larger area than would otherwise be necessary, to the extent that a second, longer and more expensive flood protection/drainage canal is beginning to be discussed. It is difficult in the extreme to arrive at lasting solutions for flood and traffic problems with physical infrastructure only. OED suggests that similar projects should in future also address those policy improvements which can enhance the flood protection and traffic benefits. Another tool which may have been under-utilized was public awareness/education. For example, communicating the dangers of hazardous materials to the broader population would have created pressure on polluters, who are obviously known to their neighbors. 6.3 Another study finding is that the lack of supporting infrastructure can significantly constrain project benefits. The canal has not fully solved the problems posed by torrential rains because there are insufFicient roadside drains/storm sewers in the city. 6.4 In spite of the numerous positive outcomes described in this volume, benefits were also constrained because of design shortcomings. Specifically, the evacuation of flood waters approaching the city from the hinterland was dealt with properly, but insufficient attention was given to the disposal of storn water falling on the city itself; heavy rainfalls are not being fully channeled into the canal, and standing water remains a problem in some neighborhoods. Better baseline studies and an environmental impact assessment (which, under current guidelines, would now be required of a Bank-sponsored project) so that retrospective evaluation can be more easily conducted. 6.5 Again it must be recognized that many of the important findings contained in this volume come from the Government officials and other involved and informed staff who 52 participated in the OED sponsored workshop. They were the ones who suggested that Government needs to do something about the low costs associated with holding vacant or under- utilized urban land, and the absence of incentives that motivate the general public to maximize on public investment. Other measures proposed by the workshop included urgent measures to overcome project deficiencies. It will be recalled that they recommended additional investments inter alia in the following: * lighting for walkways and streets along the bypass; * improving roadside drainage; * improving the functioning of the canal; * increasing the number and quality of pedestrians facilities; * improving the functioning of traffic lights; * making maintenance works on the canal more frequent; * widening the bridges in order to reduce accident risks in the crossroads. 6.6 Another issue noted in this study is that when urgent action is required, there is sometimes confusion over who is responsible, the city or the central govemment. The city authorities regard the canals and their maintenance as the central government's responsibility, but the flood protection infrastructure is a system that goes beyond the project-built infrastructure, and it is hard to see how the Ministry can take responsibility for the city's overall drainage system. Certainly many other cities in the world deal effectively on their own with such systems. 6.7 In conclusion, the project was able to reduce the destructive impact of torrential rains and construct an effective traffic congestion reducing bypass because, after analyzing many alternatives, very good approaches to the problems was chosen. Nevertheless, overcoming infrastructure bottlenecks is a long-tern process, which requires a supportive legal framework, and which usually has institutional development components that need to be functioning in place before the concrete is poured. Bank support for similar projects should be contingent on having the requisite software accompanying the flood protection and traffic infrastructure. Where it is not already in place, a parallel effort is needed. 53 Annex 1 Building Permits Issued In the Study Area On or Before 1985 After 1985 Total Number % Number % Number % La mer (Nord) - Sidi Mansour 4 0.8 8 1.3 12 1.1 Sidi Mansour - Saitnia 57 11.5 67 10.9 124 11.1 Saltnia - Route de Mahdia 86 17.3 98 15.9 184 16.5 Route de Mahdia - Route de Tunis 46 9.3 69 11.2 115 10.3 Route de Tunis - Teniour 19 3.8 15 2.4 34 3.1 Teniour - Gremda 38 7.6 76 12.3 114 10.2 Gremda - L' Afrane 29 5.8 34 5.5 63 5.7 L'Afrane - El Ain 35 7.0 34 5.5 69 6.2 El Ain - Route de Menzel Chaker 43 8.7 41 6.7 84 7.5 Route de Menzel Chaker - Rtoute d'Agareb 63 12.7 60 9.7 123 11.1 Route d'Agareb - Soukra 38 7.6 35 5.7 73 6.6 Soukra - M'harza 3 0.6 12 1.9 15 1.3 M'harza - Route de Gabes 29 5.8 54 8.8 83 7.5 Route de Gabes - La Mer (Sud) 7 1.4 13 2.1 20 1.8 Total 497 100.0 616 100.0 1,113 100.0 Source: Municipalite de Sfax 55 Annex 2 Methodology 1. Research and on-site inspection by a multi-disciplinary core team composed of a housing economist, a financial/institutional specialist, a social scientist, and a field survey team were used to evaluate the im[pacts of the projects on the beneficiaries and stakeholders. As part of the in-depth assessment of project impacts in Sfax, studies and commissioned papers were also conducted under the supervision of consultants. Impact evaluation at the household level 2. To assess direct impacts of the projects on beneficiaries, a field survey was undertaken by a local research team specialized in survey techniques. The team surveyed 120 households and asked 49 questions in each household. The sample was stratified two ways: (i) households living in their homes before 1985 were compared with the households which were established later; and (ii) two kind[s of neighborhoods were represented-low-income and middle class. Nature of the instrument 3. Before the questionnaire was used, early versions of the instrument were pilot tested in about 20 households to ensure that respondents understood the questions. The survey instrument investigated the extent to which the project affected informants in terms of: (i) their income, assets, expenditures, and consumption; (ii) their access to social services; and (iii) their health. Households' perceptions with regard to the project 's achievements and deficiencies were also explored. Background data on the respondents' age, profession, family composition, housing previous address, etc., were also gathered. 4. Taken together the neighborhood and family data focused both on current and retrospective conditions, and covered the following issues (a) improvement in standards of living such as health conditions, water and sanitation (including the impact of insect pests as a result of new infrastructure use), and access to social services (schools, health centers, community centers, markets); (b) housing conditions such as plot allocation, land values, building permits, property titles and taxes, mortgages, rentals and building material loans; and (c) income/expenditures and assets. Conditions before and after-project were investigated. 57 Annex 3 Mt,stD.igcw Iitazimto, in Sfa b44h isi., / I.. 4. T1eBIa* Poubnwk htmscMu a mm.a 59 Annex 4 Comments from the Borrower (Translation of French Original) REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA MIIiVISTR Y OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOUSING Urban WVater Department Tunis June 7, 1997 No. 9801D9 Mr. Yves Albouy Chief, Infrastructure and Energy Division Operations Evaluation Department The World Bank Washington, D.C. Dear Sir: _SMbjet: Impact Assessment of Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan 2789-TUN) Rlef Your communication of May 12, 1997 'In response to the copy of the impact assessment statement on the abovementioned project, which you forvarded to us on Mav 12, 1997, we would like to make the following comrnments: Page1para. 2 The second of the four flood protection works components listed should read: ' .., to construct a protecting embankment on the left bank of another dry riverbed.". Page 3. para, 9 The belt road, designed to be an urban road, carries heavy traffic moving at limited speed, which is controlled by three-color traffic lights at each intersection. This belt road does not serve as a freeway. Page 4. para, 11 The belt road allows vehicle traffic to bypass the downtown area. As a bypass road, it was designed without side service lanes [?? voies d'evitement] or parking areas; it was not intended to attract commercial development. 60 Annex 4 Page 4. para. 12 Both urban growth and commercial development account for the heavy traffic on the belt road. and partly explain the increase in the accident rate despite traffic lights at every intersection and speed limit signs (50 kn/'h). With the rapid increase in traffic volume. it has become clear that the width of the belt road (two lanes in each direction) has rapidly become inadequate. It may be noted that the absence of street lighting along the belt road, which is a contributing factor to the traffic accident rate, will be rectified under the Ninth Development Plan. Page 5. para. 14 The accumulation of groundwater at the northern outlet of the canal twill also lessen with time as more and more residential plots bordering the canal are connected to the sanitation network. Page 5. para. 17 While the project is regarded as having fully solved the problem of flooding from the wadis close to the city, it does need to be supplemented by a stormwater drainage system within the citv that either connects to the flood protection canal or empties into the sea. Creation of such a system, which is the responsibility of the municipalities affected, will be programmed in accordance with the resources they have at their disposal. It should be noted that no health or pest-related hazards are caused by water stagnating in low-lying areas. Page 6. para. 18 Expansion of the city past the existing flood protection canal is taking place in accordance with approved development plans. Flood protection for these new areas can be provided by a second canal located beyond the expansion area or by other means recommended as a result of the study that has just been initiated. Page 6. para, 19 Connections to the sewer network in the zones adjacent to the project area will increase significantly over the next few years as a result of the laying of approximately 200 km of pipes by ONAS under the Fourth Urban Project. /s/ M. Kharrat Director, Urban Water Department 61 Annex 4 REPUBLIQU'E TUNISI'EYNE i,' j 3tl j J Mrnis8re de ('Equipement ; m j9 Direcnion ne l'Hy(draulique Lrbe,ine 1i 1 , ! Tunis, le: 7/06/1997 NO 980/D9 Monsieur YVES ALBOUY, Chef de Division Infrastructure et Energie Departement de I'Evaluation Retrospective des Op6rations A Ia Banque Mondiale V B ,J E T Emde dirmnacadu -roi-t pcur ila protection contre les inondations de Sfax (?rtZ S9-TLU. RERNCE : Vorre envoi du 1Z Mai 1997. Faisant suite a vorre envci du 1: Mvai 1997 d'une copie du resume de l'e6ude d'impact relatif au projet cite en objet, j'ai l'honneur de vous taire part des commentaires suivants: - Page I S 2 11 convient de rectifier le deuxieme type d'intervention cornme suit: "construire une levee sur la rive cauche d'un autre lit assiche." - gage 3 § 9 : La rocade qui est conque comrne une route urbaine, draine ur. srafic intense i vitesse limitee. La circulation sur la rocade est r6gle par des feux tricolores au niveau de chaque carrefour cette rocade ne fait pas fonciion d'autoroutc. - PRQe 4 _ : La rocade perrnet de devier le trafic routier par rapport au centre ville, cette route de deviation qui a ete conque sans voies d'evitement et sans parkings le long des voies n'avait pas pour objectif le deveioppernent des activites commerciales. - Pge 4 12: ILa croissance urbaine ainsi que le developpement des activites comrnerciales ont engendre un trafic intense 'e long de la rocade, cc qui explique en partie l'accroissemenT du taux des accidents de circulation malgre une signalisation lumineuse au niveau de tous les carrefours et des pannaux de limitation de vitesse (50 Km/h). La conrsequence de P'6volution rapide du ;rafic permet de constater que la largeur de la rocade (2 x 2 voics) est devenue rapiderent insuff ante. Il ccr.vier.: de signaler que I'absence d'6clairage de la rocade qui est l'une des raisons qui favorise les accidents de circulation sera satisfaite au cours du 96me plan de ddveloppement. 62 Annex 4 - Pae 4-g 14 Laccumulation d'eau Souterraine au debcuche Bord du canal scra egalement attenu6e avec .e temps par sui.e de 'arnelioration des taux de raccordement des rnverains 1u reseau d'assainisserrent des eaux usees. - P!ge ; j I, On considere que ie prcjet a bien resolu le prcbleme des c,res des Oueds qui se trouvent a proximite de la ville, toutefois ce projet devrait itre complir6 par un drainage des eaux pluviales des zones urbaines qui sera raccorde au canal de protection de Laville ou A la mer selon le cas. L'ex6cution de ce reseau qui est du ressort des collec:ivit6s locales sema programrme en foncvion des moyens de ces collectivites. Il est a signaier qu'il n'y a pas eu de problmes sanitaire5 et de presence d'animaux nuisible5 causcs par la stagnation d'eau dar.s certains endroits bas. *Page 6 § 1S: L'Lextension de la ville au deli du canal de protection seo air selon les plans d'amenagemnent approuves , la protection contre les inondations de catte extension pourra etre faite par un deuxierne canal qui sera irnplante au dela de l'extension de la viile ou par tout autre moyen que i'6tude qui vient d'tre lancee aura a. definir. - 'Page 6 § 19 . Le maccordernernt au r-seau d'eaux usees des zones environrnan:es au projet va s'ameliorer sensibiernent au cours des prochaines annees par la r6aiisation d'ernviron 200 Km de conduites par TL9ONNAS dans le cadre du quatrissme projet urbain. LE DIRECTEVR DE L'HYDRAtLLIQ1E U\A rbaine/g *~ / IMAGING Report No.: 16777 Type: IER