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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
(SCL-43660)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$284 MILLION EQUIVALENT

TO THE

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

FOR A

THIRD SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT

June 30, 2003

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 13, 2003)

Currency Unit = Argentine Peso
 1 peso = US\$ 1 (1998-2001)
 .35 (2003)
 US\$ 1 = 1 peso (1998-2001)
 2.80 pesos (2003)

FISCAL YEAR

January 1- December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGN	<i>Auditoría General de la Nación</i> (National Audit Agency)	NBI	<i>Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas</i> (Unsatisfied Basic Needs)
ANSES	<i>Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social</i> (National Social Security Administration)	NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy	PASS	Workfare program of the Province of Santa Fe
DECRG	Development Research Group (World Bank)	PEL	<i>Programa de Emergencia Laboral</i> (Emergency Work Program)
GOA	Government of Argentina	PIU	Project Implementation Unit
FONAVI	<i>Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda</i> (National Housing Fund)	QAG	Quality Assurance Group (World Bank)
MTSS	<i>Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social</i> (Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security)	PRWP	Policy Research Working Paper
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)	UNEC	Unidad Ejecutora Central (Central Implementation Unit)
ICR	Implementation Completion Report	URAT	<i>Unidad Regional de Aprobación Técnica</i> (Regional Technical Approval Unit)

Vice President:	David de Ferranti
Country Manager/Director:	Axel van Trotsenburg
Sector Manager/Director:	Christopher Chamberlin
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ARGENTINA
AR-Social Protec.3

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<i>Project ID:</i> P049269	<i>Project Name:</i> AR-Social Protec.3
<i>Team Leader:</i> Theresa Jones	<i>TL Unit:</i> LCSHS
<i>ICR Type:</i> Core ICR	<i>Report Date:</i> June 25, 2003

1. Project Data

Name: AR-Social Protec.3 *L/C/TF Number:* SCL-43660
Country/Department: ARGENTINA *Region:* Latin America and Caribbean Region

Sector/subsector: Other social services (96%); Central government administration (4%)
Theme: Social risk coping (P)

KEY DATES

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Revised/Actual</i>
<i>PCD:</i> 02/02/1998	<i>Effective:</i> 11/03/1998	11/03/1998
<i>Appraisal:</i> 04/21/1998	<i>MTR:</i> 12/01/1999	12/15/1999
<i>Approval:</i> 06/30/1998	<i>Closing:</i> 06/30/2000	12/30/2002

Borrower/Implementing Agency: ARGENTINE REPUBLIC/MIN. OF LABOR & SOCIAL SECURITY
Other Partners:

STAFF	Current	At Appraisal
<i>Vice President:</i>	David de Ferranti	S.Javed Burki
<i>Country Director:</i>	Axel van Trotsenburg	Myrna Alexander
<i>Sector Manager:</i>	Christopher Chamberlin	Xavier E. Coll
<i>Team Leader at ICR:</i>	Theresa Jones	Theresa Jones
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2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S
Sustainability: L
Institutional Development Impact: M
Bank Performance: S
Borrower Performance: S

Quality at Entry: QAG (if available) ICR
Project at Risk at Any Time: No

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

The development objective of the Argentina Third Social Protection project was to support the third phase of TRABAJAR, a social safety net program of workfare. Through the execution of small infrastructure facilities, it was expected that TRABAJAR would contribute to improvements in the living standards of the communities where the subprojects were located and would create opportunities for temporary employment for poor workers.

The project built on the experience of the first and second Social Protection Projects. The first Social Protection project safeguarded critical social programs, including the first phase of TRABAJAR during the 1995-96 Tequila crisis, while the second Social Protection project financed the continuation of the TRABAJAR program during 1997-98. These projects shared the objective of supporting improvements to the TRABAJAR program, particularly in the areas of targeting, the quality of subprojects, and evaluation -- aspects that have had wide applicability to other social programs in Argentina.

The development objectives were realistic and consistent with the priority needs for social protection, as well as the Government of Argentina's strategy. The project supported the CAS objective of enhancing social development, including poverty alleviation and strengthening the social safety net. The CAS explicitly included a program of public works assistance in order to temper the effects of the economic recession that had continued in 1997-98, after a short-lived recovery. Although the unemployment rate declined slightly from its peak of almost 19 percent in 1996, it was still high at the end of project execution, standing at 17.8 percent in October, 2002.

The development objectives were based on the Government of Argentina's interest in reducing poverty, strengthening the social safety net and improving the efficiency of social expenditures. The Government's strategy to reduce poverty was based on the strong link between unemployment and poverty, thus attention has been focused on actions to promote more job creation. At the same time, the Government endeavored to design effective social safety net programs to address the needs of the poor, and in particular to confront the immediate problem of high unemployment. Unemployment was above average levels among the poor, who did not have access to other safety nets, such as unemployment insurance or severance payments. In reference to improving the efficiency of social expenditures, this project supported several improvements in the procedures of TRABAJAR in order to address some of the weaknesses identified in an ex-post evaluation of the TRABAJAR program. These included: (i) ensuring that more projects were visited during the evaluation process; (ii) providing more assistance to executing agencies during project implementation; (iii) following more closely the results of project supervision; and (iv) organizing better the subproject cycle.

3.2 Revised Objective:

The development objective was not revised during project implementation.

3.3 Original Components:

The Third Social Protection project, financed with a US\$284 million loan and with US\$733 in counterpart funds, consisted of the following three components:

Component 1: TRABAJAR Subprojects (US\$ 1.05 billion; 97.5% of total project costs). This component was designed to maximize the benefits for poor workers in the country as well as for poor communities, by providing temporary financial assistance to poor workers through the execution of small infrastructure projects. In addition to helping poor, unemployed workers, the activities under this component would

improve social and economic infrastructure in poor communities, thereby raising living standards. It was expected that under this component about 300,000 workers would participate in the TRABAJAR program and 15,000 projects would be financed. In response to the Bank's request and their own concerns, the Ministry of Labor took several steps to improve the transparency and social control of the program during implementation, particularly regarding beneficiary selection. Lists of the beneficiaries working on individual projects were made available on the internet. Also, rules were made that stipulated that beneficiaries would have to be selected from lists provided by the Offices of Employment Services, if they existed in the area. Initial experience showed that these steps were perceived favorably, and there was some evidence that it facilitated greater opportunity for participation by more vulnerable households.

Subprojects would be proposed by municipalities, provinces, national agencies or organizations of civil society. The main source of subproject requests was expected to be municipalities, given the types of projects eligible for financing. All subprojects were to be evaluated by professionals (mainly architects and engineers) contracted by the provincial offices of the MTSS, according to a methodology outlined in the operational manual, which included economic, technical, financial, institutional, environmental, and social aspects. A database on prices of materials as well as unit costs was developed from previously approved projects and was designed to be used to compare the budgets presented in the project proposals.

Subprojects were supposed to be labor-intensive and relatively small, with an average project size of less than \$100,000, employing an average of 20 workers. To be considered for financing subprojects had to: (i) fall within the accepted menu of subprojects; (ii) be technically sound; (iii) be implemented in a short period of time (3 to 6 months); (iv) employ no more than 100 people; and (v) offer a monthly wage of \$200 or less to participating workers. In order to maximize the number of beneficiaries that could be covered in the context of increasing fiscal constraints, in 2000, the Ministry of Labor lowered the maximum value of transfers to beneficiaries from \$200 Arg. pesos/mo. to \$160 Arg. pesos/ mo. The types of subprojects eligible for financing included rehabilitation, expansion, and new construction covering: potable water, sewerage, latrines, housing, roads, urban works, irrigation, schools, health centers and other community social infrastructure. Subprojects would be supervised at least two times during implementation, and for 30 percent of subprojects, a site visit would accompany evaluation.

Subprojects that received a positive evaluation would be considered at monthly meetings by committees constituted at the regional level, which included members of civil society as observers. Subprojects were then to be ranked by a point system according to several criteria, the most important of which was the poverty level of the area in which the subproject was located. If the subprojects were approved, payments to workers would be made through checks processed by the National Social Security Agency (ANSES) and paid directly to the workers in different payment locations (banks or post offices). Before payment was made, cross checks were carried out to ensure that the beneficiary was not receiving unemployment compensation nor was employed in the formal sector. The payment system was modified slightly during implementation to depend almost exclusively on banks and to lower the processing fees. This was an improvement since it reduced administrative costs and improved controls. There had been problems because the post office did not return money unclaimed from beneficiaries to the Ministry of Labor in a timely manner.

Under the previous Social Protection projects, TRABAJAR had only financed the costs of unskilled labor. Under the Third Social Protection Project, provision was made for TRABAJAR to finance the costs of materials for selected projects in poor areas in order to improve geographical targeting. These projects would have to satisfy several criteria including: (i) be located in one of 300 municipalities in which the share of the population with unsatisfied basic needs (NBI) is over 40 percent; (ii) fall into the category of either potable water or social infrastructure (including education, health, and sanitary facilities for those

and other community infrastructure); and (iii) cost no more than \$35,000. Given the US\$30 million that had been allocated for this category, it was estimated that materials could be covered for up to 1,500 projects, about 10 percent of the total number of projects expected to be financed under the loan. Although the initial experience with financing subproject materials during 1999 was successful, it was discontinued at the beginning of 2000 because of a drop in the budget and the ensuing uncertainty over future budget allocations. Financing of materials was re-launched at the end of 2000 when the Ministry of Labor received a budget allocation for this category of expenditure from the Ministry of Economy. However, subsequently the Government decided to request a re-allocation of \$26.5 million from this component of the loan to cover payments to beneficiaries.

Component 2: Project Administration (US\$ 25 million, 2.3 % of total project costs). This component was designed to cover the administrative costs associated with the management and supervision of project implementation. TRABAJAR was directed by a small team within the Directorate of Employment and Training Policies in the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Day-to-day management was handled by the provincial Offices of Employment and Training. The management team provided the subproject menu, criteria and other instructions for subproject preparation, evaluation, approval and supervision. It was also responsible for assigning the resources for each province according to the distribution of the poor unemployed.

Additionally, an ex-post evaluation of a sample of TRABAJAR subprojects financed in 1997 indicated the existence of some weaknesses in the evaluation and supervision procedures used by the Ministry. As a result, in the design of the third TRABAJAR project, the Ministry gained additional responsibilities to ensure that more projects were visited during the evaluation process, provide more assistance to executing agencies during project implementation, follow more closely the results of the project supervision, and better organize the subproject cycle.

Component 3: Monitoring and Evaluation of Employment Program (US\$2 million, .2 % of total project costs). This component was designed to finance the evaluation and monitoring of the TRABAJAR program, as well as for other employment programs operated by the MTSS. Evaluation of the TRABAJAR program was intended to include ex-post evaluations of subproject quality. Some of these evaluations were to focus on special topics, such as the experience with subproject operations and maintenance, specific project categories and problems with executing agencies. The evaluations carried out under the project jointly by the DECRG of the Bank and staff of the Ministry of Labor included: "Do Workfare Participants Recover Quickly from Retrenchment?", Policy Research Working Paper (PRWP), no. 2672 by Martin Ravallion, Emanuela Galasso, Teodoro Lazo, and Ernesto Philipp, September 2001, and "Assisting the Transition from Workfare to Work: A Randomized Experiment" by Emanuela Galasso, Martin Ravallion and Agustin Salvia, PRWP no. 2738 (December 2001). In addition, a joint evaluation was carried out to try to identify the impact of the projects financed under the Program in the communities where they were located.

3.4 Revised Components:

The project components were not revised during project implementation.

Component 3: Monitoring and Evaluation of Employment Program.

3.5 Quality at Entry:

This project was designed before routine quality assessments were initiated, thus there is no QAG rating. However, for the purposes of this report, the project's quality at entry is rated as **satisfactory**. The program fit well with both the Bank's and the Borrower's strategies, and was an appropriate fit with the institutional

capacities in Argentina at the time.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

Satisfactory. The Third Social Protection Project was successful in achieving its objectives by meeting or surpassing the original goals in most areas, albeit with significant delays. Contextual factors that had an impact on implementation included budget cuts and a change in political administration in late 1999. In addition, the decline in unemployment rates in 1997-98, was reversed beginning in 1999 and the Argentine economy stayed in recession, leading to an increase in poverty in the country.

Temporary financial assistance to unemployed poor. Social Protection III achieved its primary objective, to reduce poverty by providing temporary income support to poor, unemployed workers. The project generated 464,102 temporary jobs for which about US\$362 million in payments to workers were made. The initial goal established for the Program was 300,000 temporary jobs. The initial monthly wage paid to workers was 200 Arg. pesos, later reduced to 160 Arg. pesos.

Evidence on the extent to which TRABAJAR was successful in reaching the poor and the amount of the income gain to participating households is available from an evaluation carried out between 1999-2000 (for more details see "Do Workfare Participants Recover Quickly from Retrenchment?", Policy Research Working Paper No. 2672 by Ravallion, Galasso, Lazo, and Philipp). The aim of the evaluation was to answer two main questions: Is the program reaching poor families through the direct incomes gains from TRABAJAR jobs? What happens when their participation in the program has finished? To address these questions, a special-purpose survey of random samples of TRABAJAR participants was done in May/June 1999 in 3 provinces, and repeated in 3 subsequent rounds of the survey done at six month intervals. The timing of the survey of TRABAJAR participants was chosen to coincide with the twice-yearly household survey carried out by the National Statistical Institute in Argentina. The larger household survey was the source of the control group. The Bank worked closely with staff in the project unit to construct matched control groups from the household survey. Propensity score matching methods were used, following Jalan and Ravallion (Income Gains to the Poor from Workfare: Estimates for Argentina's Trabajar Program, Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2149), in their previous evaluation of TRABAJAR, using a different survey carried out in 1997. By matching the program participants with nonparticipants in the larger survey based on their characteristics, it was possible to create a counterfactual group and estimate what program participants' incomes would have been if they had not participated in the TRABAJAR program.

The evaluation found that over half of participant households had incomes that placed them in the poorest 10 percent of the population. Nearly 80 percent were in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution. Given a headcount poverty rate of 29 percent at project inception in Argentina (it has since risen to more than 50 percent), it is reasonable to conclude that the vast majority of participating households were poor. These results were very similar to the results of the previous evaluation, suggesting that the finding that the program was very good at providing income support through work to poor families was robust. The evaluation also followed up with workers for a year after they left the program and compared them with the control group of those who stayed in the Program. The results showed that the initial income loss after leaving TRABAJAR was sizeable, representing about three-quarters of the gross wage within the first six months, although falling to less than half over 12 months. The conclusion is that the program generated sizeable net income gains to participants, again similar in magnitude to the results of the previous evaluation of TRABAJAR.

TRABAJAR tried to target both poor workers and poor communities by offering a relatively low wage rate

and by ensuring that the work was carried out in poor areas, thereby benefiting the poor as workers and also as residents. In the paper "Performance in Reaching Argentina's Poor as Workers" (October 2000), Martin Ravallion measured TRABAJAR's performance in reaching poor areas using the poor-area targeting differential. This measure is the regression coefficient of TRABAJAR spending per capita on the per capita poverty rate, estimated across all departments in each province. (For more detail on the methodology, see "Monitoring Targeting Performance When Decentralized Allocations to the Poor are Unobserved." by Martin Ravallion, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2080). This figure can be interpreted as the difference between per capita spending on the poor and that on the non-poor. Poverty is measured by the proportion of the population with unmet basic needs. This measure is not ideal (given that it is dated, and the composition and weighting of the indicators used can be questioned) but it was the best option available. Under the second phase of TRABAJAR (1997-1998), financed by the previous Social Protection II Project, the poorest department received on average almost \$37 more per person than the least poor department. However, under the third phase, the poorest department received on average only \$17 more per person than the least poor department. A large part of this deterioration was due to the lower rate of expenditures. In fact, controlling for the lower rate of spending, targeting performance did not deteriorate up to the end of 1999. The experience with the program has been that the gains to the poor relative to the non-poor varied with total spending. The political economy of the program's operation in most provinces entailed that budget cuts were borne mainly by poor areas. This partly reflects the fact that the program was already favoring poor areas, and there was thus little slack for cutting heavily in less poor departments while still allowing for sufficiently broad participation. The decision to reallocate the resources initially set aside in the loan to co-finance materials costs for projects in poor municipalities also negatively affected targeting performance. Thus, although the Program was targeted to poor areas (as shown by the positive sign of the targeting differential), the differential between spending in poor and non-poor areas was not as great under the third phase of TRABAJAR as it was under the previous phase. (For more detail, see Annex Tables 10-12).

The participation of women increased to 20 percent in the third phase of TRABAJAR, compared to 17 percent in the second phase. Women's participation varied greatly across provinces, with some having relatively high participation (30-40%, in line with female participation in the labor market) and others very low (10%). The 2001 impact evaluation study (Jalan and Ravallion) found no evidence of gender bias in the Program. If there were discrimination against women in allocating TRABAJAR jobs, one would expect to see unexploited welfare gains from higher female participation. If the net income gain is higher for women than men, it would imply that there is an income loss from lower female participation. However, the net wage gains from the program accruing to female participants were virtually identical to the gains for male participants. The distribution of female participation was less pro-poor; while over half of the members of participating families were in the poorest decile nationally, this was true of less than 40 percent of the members of female participants' families. This probably reflects lower wages for women in other work, making the TRABAJAR wage more attractive to the non-poor.

Asset creation in poor communities. Judging the performance of TRABAJAR in the area of asset creation is difficult because of the mix of development objectives and because the program worked in several sectors. It would not be fair to compare it with infrastructure projects that have no labor intensity or poverty/targeting objectives. Nor is it completely fair to compare it to other programs that guarantee employment, but subordinate the infrastructure creation goals. Despite these difficulties, evidence from subproject supervision and an ex-post subproject evaluation indicated that the majority of subprojects financed by TRABAJAR were of good quality and generated positive benefits in the communities in which they were executed. Subproject design had a great deal to do with this positive impact: subprojects had to be delivered in a short time period, usually less than 6 months, so benefits were attained relatively quickly. Activities that would only generate temporary benefits, such as cleaning drains, general maintenance, and

the like were not eligible. Instead the subproject menu emphasized projects that would generate benefits beyond temporary employment that would also not be wasteful to the community. Examples of these types of activities include water supply and social infrastructure.

Annex 8 presents information on the number of projects completed in each of the major categories. The most common subprojects were undertaken to improve urban roads, sewerage and drainage systems, housing, as well as schools and secondary roads. Additionally, about 1,660 subprojects were financed in educational infrastructure, which includes school and classroom construction and/or rehabilitation. A large number (1,471) of community infrastructure projects were also carried out, including day care, community and sports centers. Almost 3000 subprojects were undertaken to construct low-cost housing, which were typically done at a lower cost than those built under the Government's traditional public housing program, FONAVI.

One of the challenges faced by the TRABAJAR program was increasing subproject quality and ensuring timely completion. The project's goal was to complete 75 percent of projects on time and in a satisfactory manner. Despite adverse conditions, the project managed to complete 72 percent of subprojects on time and in a satisfactory way. Although the project did not quite meet its goal in this respect, considering that it was operating in a climate of economic and social crisis, this can be considered a reasonable outcome. Additionally, an analysis of performance among provinces shows that 42 percent of the provinces either met or exceeded the target of 75 percent, and very poor performance was concentrated in only a few areas, namely Santa Cruz (56% completion rate), Tierra del Fuego (42.6%) and Neuquén (58.4%), for example. Annex 9 includes a table that shows the differences in subproject type and corresponding completion rates among the provinces.

In late 2001 a sample of 110 subprojects financed under the Social Protection III Project were reviewed. The study focused on the value of the subproject, its quality and cost, environmental aspects, and operations and maintenance. In 70 percent of the cases the facility was in full operation, for about 10 percent of the cases, operation was partial, and in 16 percent of the cases the facility was not yet functioning. The evaluation of the quality of the works and their current status was high for 70 percent of the subprojects, 14 percent were classified as medium, 5 percent were judged deficient and for 10 percent there was not sufficient information to make a judgement. These results demonstrate a substantial improvement over the results of a similar review carried out of a sample of subprojects financed under the Social Protection II project (the previous phase of TRABAJAR). In the earlier report, the conclusion was that only about a third of the localities visited had optimized the use of resources for the subprojects; the share for the recent review is 80 percent. Most of the problems identified in the earlier review - especially in reference to the costing and dimensioning of subprojects - had been resolved using the technical parameters established by the project implementation unit and used during the evaluation process for subprojects. Evaluations show that the TRABAJAR program frequently had a high impact on local development, especially for small municipalities, where a large proportion of public investment was made by the project. Equally important, it is significant that it was widely perceived not only as a workfare program, but also as a public investment program that generates benefits for communities.

4.2 Outputs by components:

Component 1: Subprojects

Satisfactory. By the closing date, the project had generated 464,102 temporary jobs (with an average duration of close to 5 months) and financed about 26,500 subprojects. Payments to beneficiaries amounted to US\$362 million (Annex Table 1). The most common types of subprojects included: urban roads (23%), sewerage and drainage (15%), housing and social assistance infrastructure (each accounting for about

10%), schools and secondary roads (each for about 8%), and community gardens and potable water (each accounting for about 5%)(See Annex Table 8). About 72 percent of the subprojects were completed satisfactorily, which is only slightly short of the 75 percent target (Annex Table 9).

The financing of materials under the TRABAJAR program had good results. Through this activity, TRABAJAR financed 230 projects amounting to a total of \$2.6 million in workfare expenses and \$3.3 million in materials. The design of the component and the process of execution were exemplary and thus complied with criteria for optimal public investment, thereby leading to good outcomes. Unfortunately, the Government in 2000 decided to reallocate most of the resources assigned initially for this category of spending (US\$30 million) to payments to workers, given the tight fiscal constraints and the rising levels of unemployment.

Component 2: Project Administration

Satisfactory. Program implementation and administration was satisfactory throughout the process, despite adverse conditions and situations including budget cuts, the increased importance of other programs in the Ministry of Labor's portfolio under the new administration beginning in 2000, as well as the political and economic crisis in 2001-2. In addition, the Ministry was successful in working with the Ministry of Education to mount a coordinated effort to undertake projects to rehabilitate school infrastructure. The slower than expected disbursements reflected decisions by the central Government to reduce the budget allocation for the Program, and the decision by the Ministry of Labor to begin other programs. The exception to this generally good performance were chronic delays in submitting the required annual audit reports.

Component 3: Monitoring and Evaluation of Employment Program

Satisfactory. The monitoring system established under the previous Social Protection II Project continued to operate well and during implementation the agreed upon indicators were tracked continuously and served as an important input for project management and Bank supervision missions. Several evaluations were carried out and several resulted in publications authored jointly by Bank and Ministry staff. The most important of these were the study of what happened to workers once they left the TRABAJAR Program, mentioned earlier, an evaluation of a wage subsidy for private employment provided by the Ministry during this time, and an evaluation of the impact of a sample of TRABAJAR projects in the communities where they were carried out.

The above mentioned evaluation of the private wage subsidy provided by the Ministry was carried out between December 1998 and the end of 2000. The purpose was to study the transition from welfare to work and whether wage subsidies and/or training programs could be effective to ease this transition and at what cost ("Assisting the Transition from Workfare to Work: A Randomized Experiment", by Emanuela Galasso, Martin Ravallion and Agustin Salvia, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2738). The study carried out an experiment in a welfare dependent region by giving randomly sampled participants engaged in the TRABAJAR program a voucher that entitled an employer to a sizable wage subsidy. A second sample also received the option of skills training and a third sample formed the control group. The study analyzed the effects of this subsidy/training scheme on participants' employment and income and found that compared to the control group, voucher recipients had a significantly higher probability of employment, though their incomes were not higher. Gains were confined to the young (under 30) and women. It appears that voucher recipients took up private sector jobs in the expectation of a higher and/or more stable stream of future income. There was no significant extra impact from the training.

The study concentrated in the welfare dependent department of Confluencia, located in the province of Neuquén. The TRABAJAR participation rate in this department was unusually high relative to the expected demand for the program. In 1998, the average number of TRABAJAR participants per month represented 28 percent of the estimated number of people living in poor households that included an unemployed worker; the corresponding national figure was only 5 percent. Additionally, the proportion of the population living in households who had a total income per person below the poverty line and at least one unemployed person was 3.5 percent in Confluencia and 4.2 percent nationally. Thus, the Ministry contracted this study in order to explore the policy options for assisting workfare participants dependent on the program and improve overall program targeting.

In the study of the impact of the projects in communities a sample of projects was selected and a sample of both users and non-users of the facilities were interviewed in the communities.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

A workfare program, such as TRABAJAR, generates two types of benefits: *direct benefits*, which are the net income gain to poor workers, and *indirect benefits*, which are mainly the value of assets to communities. The cost-effectiveness of workfare, in other words, the proportion of total expenditure that is accountable to the net income gain to poor workers can be decomposed into the following four variables: (i) the budget leverage, or the amount of private financing mobilized by the project; (ii) the labor intensity, or the share of the cost of unskilled labor in the total project cost; (iii) the targeting performance; and (iv) the proportionate net wage gain to poor participants. From the information available, it is estimated that the cost of transferring \$1 to poor workers through the TRABAJAR program is about \$4-5, which is about the same as it was in the second phase of the program since the basic parameters did not change. These calculations suggest that the case for TRABAJAR as an anti-poverty scheme rests heavily on establishing that the indirect benefits are of sufficient value to poor people to outweigh the extra costs that are incurred by providing the direct benefits through this type of program. (For more detail on the analysis, see "Appraising Workfare", World Bank Research Observer 15:31-48, 1999).

Several features of TRABAJAR suggest that the indirect benefits, particularly through the assets created in the communities, help tilt the balance in favor of TRABAJAR over alternative transfer-based programs. These features include: well-defined project selection criteria and approval procedures; co-financing of non-labor project costs by local governments; and the existence of considerable administrative and monitoring controls.

4.4 Financial rate of return:

N/A

4.5 Institutional development impact:

Modest. The project contributed to improved capacity to manage large social programs, especially in the areas of strong technical management, increased use of objective criteria to guide implementation, establishment and use of monitoring indicators, and undertaking high-quality, practical, and timely impact evaluations. However, this improved capacity was not always exploited fully, for example, during 2000-2002. Even with the significant capacity improvements (assisted in some measure by the Third Social Protection Project), the sustainability of the impact turned out to be influenced significantly by the presence or lack of political support.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

Serious floods affected several Argentine provinces and disrupted implementation. The floods made it difficult to implement new subprojects and delayed the completion of some subprojects already in progress. Funds from TRABAJAR were used to support reconstruction subprojects in the wake of these floods.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

The economic and social crisis that began to be felt in Argentina in 2000 had a negative effect on the project. Budget allocations, both for the Government contribution as well as for loan funds, were tightly constrained. To make matters worse, budget allocations during the year were not predictable, making it difficult to implement the program and maintain standards, particularly in the area of supervision of subprojects. This also led to slower than usual implementation and disbursement, although the demand for subproject financing continued to be higher than could be supplied. As a result, the Government requested several extensions of the project's closing date to allow the project to disburse the total amount.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

Continuing high levels of competence and commitment within the PIU were main factors behind the successful implementation record of the TRABAJAR program. Staff continuity also contributed to good results, although staff turnover in the provinces did cause minor disruptions. Supervision reports indicate that the project performed satisfactorily throughout the implementation phase.

5.4 Costs and financing:

Cost changes in the project were not significant. Disbursements were slower than anticipated and spread over 4 years instead of the 2 envisioned during project planning. The Government reallocated funds several times away from materials financing to payments to beneficiaries, to be able to meet demand and increase coverage, especially during the crisis. At closing the project had disbursed 100 percent of the proceeds of the \$284 million loan.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

Likely. The funding for the TRABAJAR program by the World Bank represented a decision to finance a temporary program that would be phased out gradually as the increased flexibility of the labor market, together with economic growth raised the rate of job creation in the Argentine economy and unemployment decreased. At the time the project was approved it was recognized that the future scale and operation of the TRABAJAR program would depend on the level of unemployment and other economic conditions in Argentina. Given its demonstrated success in targeting poor workers and in financing small infrastructure projects, TRABAJAR (or similar programs) could reasonably be expected to remain a part of the social safety net in Argentina, to be used flexibly for some population groups depending on economic and social conditions. In late 2001 and early 2002, social and economic conditions deteriorated sharply in Argentina. The Government quickly put into place a large-scale workfare program known as Heads of Household, which is similar in some respects to the TRABAJAR Program (see below).

The sustainability of the sub-projects financed under TRABAJAR was expected to be high given the high share of financing by local governments and the fact that many sub-projects involved remodeling, refurbishment, or expansion of existing facilities. The results of the ex-post evaluation of a sample of projects demonstrated that these expectations were in most cases born out in practice.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

Although TRABAJAR will not continue in its original form, the Government of Argentina has designed a similar project based on the experience of the TRABAJAR program. In response to the social and

economic emergency, the Government's strategy was to expand financial support to families in danger of economic deprivation, through the newly created and financed Heads of Household Program. This program has as its base the previous TRABAJAR program, although it has been modified, largely to respond better to the deepening crisis. The similarities include: (1) requirement to work at a wage rate expected to be self-targeted to the poor; and (2) impact evaluation using household surveys to test for performance in targeting and other areas. The differences include: (1) guaranteed access to all eligible heads of household willing to fulfill the work requirement; (2) an expanded menu of eligible activities that includes services and other typologies with high labor intensity; (3) supervision at the local level on a sample, not the totality, of projects, and (4) more local involvement in selection of activities and registration of beneficiaries. The program expanded quickly, in part due to the previous experience with TRABAJAR. Since its announcement in April 2002, the program has expanded to cover about 2 million beneficiaries in April 2003.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank

7.1 Lending:

Satisfactory. In the opinion of the Borrower, the Bank team's assistance during preparation and appraisal was very helpful. In interviews, the Borrower expressed appreciation for the expertise and technical assistance given by the Bank. They stated that they felt part of a team, which was crucial for the preparation of the project. Social Protection III was prepared, approved and became effective within a short time. Project design started in November 1997 (identification), appraisal took place in April and negotiations in May 1998. The Board approved the project on June 30, 1998. The Government signed the Loan Agreement on October 20 and it became effective November 3, 1998 (about 4 months after Board approval). There were no significant lags up to effectiveness, relative to the schedule set out in the Project Appraisal Document.

The main priorities during the design of TRABAJAR III were to ensure good targeting to poor workers, the allocation of resources within provinces to favor poor areas, and to increase the benefits of the works in the community, all relative to TRABAJAR II. The most important input for project preparation was the impact evaluation of Social Protection II (TRABAJAR II), recommended and financed by the previous loan. In addition, a review of a sample of projects financed under TRABAJAR II was carried out and its conclusions and recommendations were an important input into the design of the project. A joint Bank-Ministry of Labor team analyzed the results of both evaluations. The Borrower indicated that the participation of the Bank's team was very important and its technical assistance crucial to the evaluations. The main design changes that were implemented in the project, drawing on these studies, consisted of: (i) the introduction of procedures aimed at improving the impact of community works, including changes in evaluation criteria, ranking of projects, consideration of prior performance of implementing agency; (ii) increased support (technical assistance) to municipalities in preparing projects; (iii) improved evaluation and supervision instruments; and (iv) strengthening the capacity of the PIU (UNEC). The Borrower also found useful the social evaluation carried out during project preparation, which included consultations with key stakeholders, particularly municipal officials and NGO's.

It is important to mention that as result of the floods in the northeast region, which occurred shortly before negotiations, at the Borrower's request, the Bank increased the loan amount by \$42 million, from \$242 million to \$284 million, and the amount of financing available for materials from \$9 to \$30 million.

7.2 Supervision:

Satisfactory. Supervision missions were scheduled every four to six months to ensure that the program was on track and that targeting performance and the quality of the projects financed was adequate. The

Borrower mentioned that the close monitoring of the program by the Bank was very useful, and mentioned specifically activities such as participation in the meetings of the URAT (*Unidad Regional de Aprobación Técnica*) and field visits to projects and Regional Units (*Gerencias*). In addition, the Borrower emphasized the Bank's rapid and adequate responsiveness during the emergency period, beginning at the end of 2001 and first semester of 2002, when the project experienced implementation difficulties as a consequence of the financial system constraints and the fiscal and debt crisis.

Aside from the generally excellent opinion about the Bank's technical and managerial performance, the Borrower pointed out two specific cases in which they were unsatisfied with the Bank's response. The first related to a requested audit of the payments system after a new payment system was implemented which made more use of the banking system instead of the post office. An audit of the new system was required by the Bank's Financial Management Specialist. However, the Bank's response to the Terms of Reference presented by the Ministry for the bidding process to contract a private firm competitively took six months to process. When the Bank finally answered, it added the requirement of a private audit for the entire project, expanding the scope beyond what had been originally agreed. Finally, it was agreed to do the payment systems audit in the framework of the normal audit of financial statements by AGN, after nine months of delay. The Borrower indicated that the responsiveness of the Bank in areas related to financial management improved significantly in the last year of the project. The second case concerned the Bank's positive evaluation of the workfare program of the Province of Santa Fe (PASS) carried out in the context of another Bank loan (Santa Fe Provincial Reform, Ln-4634) and the subsequent pressure by the Bank for the Ministry of Labor to allow more flexibility for Santa Fe within the context of the TRABAJAR Program. The Borrower argued that they thought that the PASS was not consistent with the objectives of TRABAJAR III, because of its less strict work requirement, lower quality of projects and lower benefit (\$100 Arg. pesos monthly). In their opinion, all these aspects contributed to a deterioration in the quality and implementation of TRABAJAR III in this province.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:

Satisfactory. Bank performance is rated as satisfactory. The preparation process was efficient and, according to the Borrower, added value in important areas to the re-design of the TRABAJAR Program. The inputs needed were either done as a part of the previous project or were arranged to be carried out in a timely fashion so that their results were available early enough to be considered in the process. The Bank team incorporated the needed technical skills. Just before negotiations took place, the Bank denied the Government's request for the loan to include financing for a pilot phase of a subsidy for private employment. The Ministry of Labor was successful in convincing the Bank to permit loan funds be allocated to undertake an evaluation of the scheme, and to provide technical assistance.

Borrower

7.4 Preparation:

Highly Satisfactory. The Borrower's performance can be rated as highly satisfactory during preparation. Changes were made in the operational manual and other instruments needed for the project in an efficient and timely fashion. The Borrower was able to identify the weaknesses in the previous project and focused on changes aimed at improving the performance of the Project. Substantial work was required to develop the component of the project which provided co-financing for the materials cost of projects in poor areas. The team was high quality and worked effectively.

7.5 Government implementation performance:

Satisfactory. Government implementation of the project was highly satisfactory up to 2000 when there was a change in government and a decline in the Borrower's political support for the Program. The outgoing administration did not include financing for the Program in their proposed budget for 2000,

although they had authorized commitments that generated spending obligations in that year. Although funding was restored by the new government, implementation - both the pace of disbursements and quality - started to deteriorate, due to the fiscal crisis and the lack of a clear employment strategy. The new administration saw TRABAJAR as a trademark of the former government. Progressively a smaller share of projects were able to be financed even though they had received a positive technical evaluation. Uncertainty and declining resources made it difficult to plan technical assistance, maintain the capacity and quality of the PIU and the Ministry of Labor provincial offices, or to maintain supervision standards. The Ministry of Labor started new employment programs, reducing the role of TRABAJAR within the Ministry. Coordination with other workfare programs financed and run by provinces or municipalities also became more of a problem.

During 1999, \$116 million, 40 percent of the Bank loan, was disbursed. In 2000, only \$90 million was drawn from the Bank loan, due to a reduction in the budget for the Program, and the amount of disbursements declined by about half in 2001. This implied a lower level of approvals (a monthly average of 9,000 workfare participants in 2000 and 7,500 in 2001, compared to 14,000 in 1999). The coverage of its target population reached an average of only 6% in 1999 and fell to 3% in 2000, compared to a level of nearly 10% under the previous project. In addition to difficulties caused by the budgetary constraint, the Ministry of Labor had to negotiate each quarter with the Ministry of Economy to maintain the budget "quota". This implied a lot of effort and continued uncertainty about resource availability. Demand for the Program continued to be high. The share of viable projects (those which had received a positive technical evaluation) financed declined from 70 percent in 1999 to 50 percent in 2000.

Even though the new administration did not eliminate the program, it responded to the worsening social situation with other programs, crowding out TRABAJAR and reducing its quality. Nevertheless, throughout project execution, guidelines in the operational manual were generally respected. For example, there were only a few substantial deviations from the agreed formula to allocate resources from the Project to provinces according to the distribution of poor, unemployed, and these did not represent a significant share of resources. Only 3 provinces (Jujuy, La Pampa and Neuquen) received a significantly higher share of project resources than their formula would have given. On the other hand, the province of Buenos Aires (including the urban areas surrounding the capital), received slightly less than the formula dictated.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

Satisfactory. The PIU in the Ministry of Labor was dedicated, experienced and capable. They provided technical assistance to executing organizations (provinces, municipalities, NGOs); updated operational manuals; communicated well with provincial officials; and monitored the project carefully. It was also quick to take adaptive actions, to follow up closely the Bank's recommendations made in supervision missions and to take the initiative to make needed changes during implementation. Compliance with the Operational Manual was in general carefully monitored. The diffusion of various materials, such as forms, guidelines, etc was done transparently. At the beginning of the project, the PIU was scaled up particularly on evaluation and monitoring capacity (for example, to support the materials component and regional technical assistance). In 1999, the process of project evaluation and selection worked well, improving compared with TRABAJAR II. The PIU technical evaluation was based on clear criteria, the process was coordinated with regional units and provincial directors and the six regional project approval groups functioned properly. In 2000, an important decision was taken by the Ministry of Labor to base the allocation of funds among provinces on spending in all national workfare programs, which included PEL (*Plan de Emergencia Laboral*) and "*Crear Trabajo*" (productive projects) . This probably accounted in some part for the deviations mentioned above in the use of the allocation criteria for some provinces. Funds were increasingly allocated to respond to specific local situations or based on political negotiations with "piqueteros" groups, particularly in the second semester of 2001. In addition, the Ministry of Labor

began to give the highest priority to ensuring that beneficiaries received payments, regardless of the quality of the work activities, and weakened the Program's supervision and monitoring activities.

Beginning in 2000, human resource capacity in some key areas started to deteriorate. In May 2000, the PIU had to cut salaries and lay off staff, in the context of general cuts within the public sector. This measure fundamentally affected the area of evaluation, which disappeared, and the regional units. Moreover, the effect was even worse since the PIU was in charge of the financial administration and the monitoring of all programs at Ministry of Labor. The area of monitoring was finally closed in mid 2002.

The Borrower's inter-agency relationships were satisfactory, particularly with the Chief of Cabinet's office. This office proposed to do an "external" evaluation of the program, with the objective to improve the next stage in the program, but was not able to follow up on the idea.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

Overall, Borrower performance is rated as satisfactory. This included a period at the beginning of the project of highly satisfactory performance. Beginning in 2000, the interest and financing of the Program began to decline, although local demand remained high. In fact, in view of the worsening economic and financial crisis, TRABAJAR III should have been increasing, not decreasing its role, were it to carry out its intended counter-cyclical role as a safety net. The Government that took office in late 1999 did not fully embrace the TRABAJAR Program. Neither did they develop an alternate design or strategy.

8. Lessons Learned

The key lessons learned and recommendations are as follows:

- Self-targeted public works programs can effectively direct the majority of cash transfers to the poor, provided the wage rate is set no higher than the ruling market wage for unskilled labor. Setting the wage rate at this level also minimizes perverse incentives by ensuring that the program does not attract employed individuals.
- Close monitoring is necessary during project execution to ensure that the targeting is working effectively and to be able to identify problems in the project cycle or poor performance in some localities.
- The cost effectiveness of workfare programs like TRABAJAR depends in large part on the value of the assets created through the subprojects. Effective subproject evaluation, monitoring and supervision are critical to ensuring that the subprojects produce benefits for poor communities that go beyond temporary income transfers to unemployed members. With respect to evaluation, visiting the site of the proposed subproject prior to the approval decision is an important instrument to ensure that subprojects are appropriate and of high quality. After project approval, effective supervision monitoring--including appropriate on-site visits--is essential to ensure the high quality of works and their timely completion
- Rigorous, high-quality evaluations can be successfully carried out with government counterparts at a reasonable cost, if use can be made of existing survey instruments, and can be effective in building capacity.
- Governments may not make use of effective counter-cyclical instruments because of a preference for financing other programs or because of extremely tight fiscal constraints. It is recommended to raise

this issue at higher levels, for example the Ministry of Economy and Production, to ensure consideration of this issue at the highest levels. The issue should also be raised as part of the overall country dialogue.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:
See Annex 13.

(b) Cofinanciers:

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

10. Additional Information

Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix	Projected in last PSR ¹	Actual/Latest Estimate
Number of workers hired Payments made to beneficiaries Share of projects which have been completed satisfactorily.	464,102 workers hired \$400 billion Arg. pesos 26,000 subprojects financed: 72% completed satisfactorily	464,102 workers hired \$400,808,280 Arg. pesos 26,453 subprojects financed: 72% completed satisfactorily

Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US\$ million equivalent)

Component	Appraisal Estimate US\$ million	Actual/Latest Estimate US\$ million	Percentage of Appraisal
TRABAJAR Sub Projects	1050.00	1265.00	120
Project Administration	25.00	25.00	100
Project Monitoring and Evaluation	2.00	2.00	100
Total Baseline Cost	1077.00	1292.00	
Total Project Costs	1077.00	1292.00	
Total Financing Required	1077.00	1292.00	

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US\$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category	Procurement Method ¹			N.B.F.	Total Cost
	ICB	NCB	Other ²		
1. Works	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	720.00 (0.00)	720.00 (0.00)
2. Goods	0.00 (0.00)	0.50 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (1.00)
3. Services (Consultancy Services- 11 and Financial Services- 10)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	11.00 (11.00)	10.00 (0.00)	21.00 (11.00)
4. Remuneration for Temporary/Fixed Term Staff (TRABAJAR Program)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	300.00 (242.00)	0.00 (0.00)	300.00 (242.00)
5. Materials for Selected TRABAJAR Sub projects- Goods	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	30.00 (30.00)	0.00 (0.00)	30.00 (30.00)
6. Project Administration	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	5.00 (0.00)	5.00 (0.00)
Total	0.00 (0.00)	0.50 (0.50)	341.50 (283.50)	735.00 (0.00)	1077.00 (284.00)

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US\$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category	Procurement Method ¹			N.B.F.	Total Cost
	ICB	NCB	Other ²		
1. Works	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	900.00 (0.00)	900.00 (0.00)
2. Goods	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
3. Services (Consultancy Services- 11	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	11.80 (11.80)	10.00 (0.00)	21.80 (11.80)

and Financial Services- 10)					
4. Remuneration for Temporary/Fixed Term Staff (TRABAJAR Program)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	362.00 (269.10)	0.00 (0.00)	362.00 (269.10)
5. Materials for Selected TRABAJAR Sub projects-Goods	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	3.10 (3.10)	0.00 (0.00)	3.10 (3.10)
6. Project Administration	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	5.00 (0.00)	5.00 (0.00)
Total	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	376.90 (284.00)	915.00 (0.00)	1291.90 (284.00)

^{1/} Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.

^{2/} Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by Component (in US\$ million equivalent)

Component	Appraisal Estimate			Actual/Latest Estimate			Percentage of Appraisal		
	Bank	Govt.	CoF.	Bank	Govt.	CoF.	Bank	Govt.	CoF.
TRABAJAR Sub projects	272.00	778.00		272.00	993.00		100.0	127.6	
Project Administration	10.00	15.00		10.00	15.00		100.0	100.0	
Project Monitoring and Evaluation	2.00			2.00			100.0		

Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

Not Applicable

Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:

Stage of Project Cycle	No. of Persons and Specialty (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)		Performance Rating		
	Month/Year	Count	Specialty	Implementation Progress	Development Objective
Identification/Preparation					
	11/24/1996	3	TASK MANAGER (1); ECONOMIST (1); EVALUATION SPECIALIST (1);		
Appraisal/Negotiation					
	04/27/1998	6	TASK MANAGER (1); ECONOMIST/TARGETING (1); ENVIRON.EVAL/COSTING (1); ENGINEER (2); EVALUATION SPECIALIST (1)		
	05/08/1998	6	TASK MANAGER (1); ECONOMIST/TARGETING (1); ENVIRON.EVAL/COSTING (1); ENGINEER (2); EVALUATION SPECIALIST (1)		
Supervision					
	11/20/1998	5	TASK MANAGER (1); ECONOMIST/TARGETING (1); ENVIRON.EVAL/COSTING (1); ENGINEER (2)	S	S
	06/03/1999	5	TASK MANAGER (1); ENVIRON.EVAL/COSTING (1); ECONOMIST/TARGETING (1); ENGINEER (2)	S	S
	12/17/1999	4	ECONOMIST (1); ECONOMIST, EVALUATION (2); ENGINEER (1)	S	S
	06/09/2000	3	TASK MANAGER (1); CIVIL ENGINEER (2)	S	S
	10/13/2000	2	SOCIAL PROTECTION (1); EVALUATION (1)	S	S
	06/01/2001			S	S
	12/19/2001	2	TASK MANAGER (1); ENGINEER (1)	S	S
ICR					
	11/01/2002	3	TASK MANAGER (1); ENGINEER (1); SOCIAL SCIENTIST (1)	S	S

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle	Actual/Latest Estimate	
	No. Staff weeks	US\$ ('000)
Identification/Preparation	18	67,758
Appraisal/Negotiation	12	33,373
Supervision	34	144,477
ICR	7	29,343
Total	71	274,951

Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

	<i>Rating</i>				
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Macro policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Sector Policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input checked="" type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Physical</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input checked="" type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Financial</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Institutional Development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Environmental</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<i>Social</i>					
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Poverty Reduction</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input checked="" type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Gender</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Private sector development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Public sector management</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA

Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance

- Lending
- Supervision
- Overall

Rating

- HS S U HU
- HS S U HU
- HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance

- Preparation
- Government implementation performance
- Implementation agency performance
- Overall

Rating

- HS S U HU
- HS S U HU
- HS S U HU
- HS S U HU

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. Social Assessment by Maria Elina Estébanez and Patricia Feliu. May 1998.
2. Institutional Financial Management Assessment by Jose Maria Giordano. May 1998.
3. Ex-post evaluation of projects financed by TRABAJAR II. April 1998.
4. Income Gains to the Poor from Workfare: Estimates for Argentina's Trabajar Program by Jyotsna Jalan and Martin Ravallion, 1999, Policy Research Working Paper #2149.
5. Do Workfare Participants Recover Quickly from Retrenchment? By Martin Ravallion, Emanuela Galasso, Teodoro Lazo, and Ernesto Philipp. September 2001, Policy Research Working Paper #2672.
6. Ex-post evaluation of subprojects financed by TRABAJAR III by Maria Claudia Vasquez. February 2002.
7. Assisting the Transition from Workfare to Work: A Randomized Experiment by Emanuela Galasso, Martin Ravallion and Agustin Salvia. December 2001, Policy Research Working Paper #2738.
8. Estimating the Benefit Incidence of an Antipoverty Program by Propensity Score Matching by Jyotsna Jalan and Martin Ravallion. 2001.
9. Performance in Reaching Argentina's Poor as Workers by Martin Ravallion. Input to the supervision mission, October 2000.

Additional Annex 8. Type of Subprojects Approved

Type of Subproject	Total Number	Percentage
Drainage & Sewerage	6,739	25.4%
Urban roads	6,144	23.2%
Housing	2,809	11%
Secondary Roads	1,779	7%
Educational infrastructure	1,659	6.2%
Cultural/community infrastructure	1,471	5.5%
Community gardens	1,368	5%
Potable Water	1,257	4.7%
Other types	3,227	12%
TOTAL	26,453	100%

Source: Table 6.1 from the Monitoring Indicators produced by UNEC for the Third TRABJAR program.

Additional Annex 9. Subproject Completion Rates by Province and Type

SUBPROJECT COMPLETION RATES BY PROVINCE AND SUBPROJECT TYPE As of September 2001

Province	Health Infra.	Social Infra.	Housing/ gas/elect.	Development Infra.	Envir.	Others	Community development	W/out Info	Total
Capital Federal	77.8	79.3	50	75	-	-	75	-	74.6
Partidos del Conurbano	75.2	68	73.1	64.1	66.7	89.1	98.8	100	70.9
Buenos Aires	76.3	63.5	52.7	63.8	78.2	90.4	100	80	67.4
Catamarca	92.6	70.5	92.2	90.8	-	100	-	-	86.6
Chaco	56.6	56.7	71.2	64.1	66.7	88.7	100	-	64.6
Chubut	91.2	73.1	75	77.1	93.8	96.9	100	100	82.4
Cordoba	66	62.9	67.5	70.5	100	87.1	100	50	69.7
Corrientes	74.5	65.8	58.2	70.6	50	96.6	-	100	69.1
Entre Rios	85.4	87.8	79.5	76.7	100	88.9	100	100	83.1
Formosa	60	70.1	65.4	63.7	100	97.1	100	100	68.6
Jujuy	72.7	65	50	72	92.9	79.2	100	75	70.9
La Pampa	91	79.3	80.4	86.5	100	95.1	-	-	86.6
La Rioja	80	67.4	69.7	66.7	100	100	100	-	74.6
Mendoza	91.4	78.9	81.1	89.9	91.7	100	100	-	88.3
Misiones	59.6	62	80.2	50.8	66.7	100	-	75	61.6
Neuquén	75	62.2	52.2	53.4	90	69.8	-	50	58.4
Rio Negro	70.7	59.4	70.4	67.8	84.2	87.5	100	-	68.9
Rosario	79.3	54	64.7	63.5	80	93.5	100	50	63.4
Salta	85.7	74.1	78.3	88.9	100	100	91.7	-	86.5
San Juan	75.3	42	30.2	71.4	100	92.3	100	-	62.7
San Luis	86.9	72.5	66.7	85.1	100	100	100	-	84.2
Santa Cruz	-	47.8	50	61.9	100	100	-	-	56.1
Santa Fe	80.3	73.7	76.8	82.5	100	91.7	-	85.7	80
Santiago del Estero	91.6	95.7	74.3	93.9	100	100	100	100	91.5
Tierra del Fuego	-	41.9	66.7	35.7	100	30	100	-	42.6
Tucuman	56.3	55.3	87	65.7	57.1	96.3	100	-	65
TOTAL/ AVERAGE	75.4	66.5	68.3	69.3	84.5	91.6	98.8	78.7	72.1

Source: Monitoring Indicators produced by UNEC for the Third TRABJAR program.

Additional Annex 10. Poor Area Targeting Performance

		Targeting Differential across 510 departments (\$ per person per 5 months)	Budget-neutral targeting differential (\$ per person per 5 months)
TRABAJAR II	5/1997-9/1997	71.6	27.4
	10/1997-2/1998	15.3	14.5
	3/1998-7/1998	22.9	18.3
TRABAJAR III	8/1998-12/1998	24.3	22.6
	1/1999-6/1999*	23.4	24.9
	7/1999-11/1999	23.9	23.9
	12/1999-4/2000	5.0	17.1
	5/2000-9/2000	7.6	20.6

Note: Budget-neutral targeting differential is calculated by fixing the rate of spending at the level in 7/1999-11/1999 but using the actual spending shares across departments. * is the 5 month equivalent.

Source: Performance in Reaching Argentina's Poor as Workers by Martin Ravallion. Input to the supervision mission, October 2000.

Additional Annex 11. Targeting Performance by Five Month Intervals, TRABAJAR II and III

Province	Targeting Differential (\$ per person per 5 months)							
	Trabajar II			Trabajar III				
	II.1 5/1997- 9/1997	II.2 10/1997- 2/1998	II.3 3/1998- 7/1998	III.1 8/1998- 12/1998	III.2 1/1999- 6/1999 (5 mth equiv.)	III.3 7/1999- 11/1999	III.4 12/1999- 4/2000	III.5 5/2000- 9/2000
Buenos Aires	-2.8	-15.4*	-7.8	1.6	-3.8	-5.5	0.0	-3.1
Catamarca	33.9	11.6	30.7	51.4*	85.1*	84.2*	27.1*	24.1*
Chaco	19.3	2.7	18.2	11.3	0.3	8.6	1.0	-2.0
Chubut	33.1	45.4	18.2	55.8*	34.2*	2.5	0.7	10.3
Cordoba	143.5*	96.9*	159.3*	187.2*	113.3*	167.4*	14.1*	19.6*
Corrientes	67.6*	-0.3	4.8	20.4*	21.2*	34.4*	6.2*	3.7
Entre Rios	31.2	-0.6	26.0	22.8	-4.3	16.5	7.2*	-3.7
Formosa	7.9	18.5*	6.7	6.1	9.4	13.7	12.0	5.0
Jujuy	93.2*	27.1	34.2	128.6*	46.9*	37.4	2.0	15.7
La Pampa	27.8*	17.5*	-6.0	3.3	-4.5	0.1	-0.8	4.2
La Rioja	-7.5	-1.3	22.4	-1.1	11.2	0.1	0.0	2.1
Mendoza	64.0*	4.4	43.5*	35.3*	13.5	19.2*	3.7	3.2
Misiones	-14.2	-8.8	-8.5	0.6	8.8	9.5	4.7	-1.2
Neuquén	-4.3	-11.4	12.6	-23.8	-13.6	-7.9	-5.6	2.2
Rio Negro	60.1*	25.1	103.2*	28.1*	69.9*	27.6*	0.4	5.5
Salta	94.4*	39.5*	76.6*	49.6*	81.4*	62.3*	16.0	23.7*
San Juan	92.0*	63.1*	45.7*	35.5*	49.7*	17.0	17.0*	-1.5
San Luis	78.5	3.1	31.2*	29.6*	29.3*	50.8*	15.0*	10.8
Santa Cruz	39.3	-23.3	8.3	3.6	24.0	4.1	11.0	23.5*
Santa Fe	56.7*	25.7*	19.9	8.1	-3.1	3.8	-0.6	0.8
Santiago del Estero	88.3*	-6.6	3.8	9.2	18.4*	22.1	-2.0	0.5
Tucuman	112.2*	38.6*	47.1*	27.8*	26.3*	25.3	15.5*	14.7*
All Departments	71.6*	15.3*	22.9*	24.3*	23.4*	23.9*	5.0*	7.6*

Source: Performance in Reaching Argentina's Poor as Workers by Martin Ravallion. Input to the supervision mission, October 2000.

Additional Annex 12. Program Spending by Five Month Intervals, TRABAJAR II and III

Province	Program Disbursements (\$ per person per 5 months)							
	Trabajar II			Trabajar III				
	II.1 5/1997- 9/1997	II.2 10/1997- 2/1998	II.3 3/1998- 7/1998	III.1 8/1998- 12/1998	III.2 1/1999- 6/1999 (5 mth equiv.)	III.3 7/1999- 11/1999	III.4 12/1999- 4/2000	III.5 5/2000- 9/2000
Buenos Aires	1.09	0.92	1.51	1.23	1.57	1.42	0.44	0.59
Catamarca	14.24	3.76	4.06	3.42	3.96	3.28	0.94	1.70
Chaco	17.79	5.16	7.09	6.88	4.02	5.06	1.75	1.57
Chubut	5.67	2.69	4.83	3.32	2.18	2.40	0.48	0.96
Cordoba	4.44	2.82	2.38	2.12	1.77	2.55	0.66	0.78
Corrientes	14.81	2.30	3.38	4.74	2.73	3.83	0.80	0.96
Entre Rios	7.43	4.13	3.92	4.38	2.46	2.28	0.82	0.88
Formosa	13.36	4.19	5.22	4.86	4.23	3.86	1.44	1.30
Jujuy	18.96	5.20	6.58	9.41	4.46	4.46	2.10	1.63
La Pampa	8.54	4.20	6.20	5.60	4.30	4.20	0.59	0.82
La Rioja	15.13	2.55	4.00	3.06	2.61	2.59	0.76	0.86
Mendoza	5.89	1.56	2.23	1.72	1.10	1.68	0.42	0.46
Misiones	12.05	6.07	5.56	4.93	3.83	4.92	1.05	1.58
Neuquén	12.11	5.83	7.68	6.07	3.54	3.37	1.30	1.16
Rio Negro	8.90	4.58	5.51	4.13	3.85	3.53	0.93	1.23
Salta	13.07	3.78	4.55	2.52	3.51	2.51	1.18	1.98
San Juan	8.92	3.35	2.79	1.86	2.91	1.83	0.55	0.81
San Luis	16.66	2.47	3.53	2.78	2.30	3.08	0.83	1.14
Santa Cruz	5.69	2.87	4.05	0.42	2.62	0.37	0.78	0.72
Santa Fe	7.95	4.46	4.01	3.06	2.36	3.14	0.76	1.06
Santiago del Estero	21.38	4.07	3.96	3.87	4.18	5.71	1.10	1.90
Tucuman	13.65	4.58	5.46	4.12	4.00	3.77	0.99	1.35
All Departments	6.37	2.58	3.05	2.62	2.29	2.44	0.71	0.90

Source: Performance in Reaching Argentina's Poor as Workers by Martin Ravallion. Input to the supervision mission, October 2000.

Additional Annex 13. Borrower's Contribution to the ICR

INFORME DE CIERRE

CONVENIO DE PRESTAMO BIRF 4366-AR Tercer Proyecto de Protección Social - TRABAJAR III

1. Marco General de acción de la Secretaría de Empleo y Capacitación Laboral del MTEyFRH

Durante los últimos años de la década del 90, se profundizó en Argentina el proceso de ajuste estructural, observándose un escenario altamente recesivo en la economía nacional. Esta situación se reflejó en el mercado de trabajo, marcando una tendencia creciente de la exclusión y precarización. A partir del aumento de los niveles de desempleo, subempleo y precarización laboral. Una de las consecuencias de esta situación fue el proceso de empobrecimiento de un número importante de hogares, que se vieron afectados en forma paulatina y creciente por la caída o pérdida de los ingresos.

Numerosos estudios muestran que el incremento de la desocupación y el subempleo, así como las situaciones de precariedad laboral han incidido fuertemente en la situación de los hogares, incrementando los niveles de pobreza e indigencia. La escasa cobertura de las políticas de protección social, en particular aquellas vinculadas al seguro por desempleo, motivaron la necesidad de definir políticas emergentes, así como profundizar la cobertura y mejorar la focalización de aquellas existentes para atender esta coyuntura.

Algunos indicadores de la situación social grafican las tendencias de los últimos años, registrando el crecimiento de las tasas de desempleo, subempleo, pobreza e indigencia en personas y hogares. (cuadro 1 y 2)

Indicadores de Situación social

**Cuadro 1: Evolución tasa de actividad, empleo desocupación y subocupación
Total de Aglomerados urbanos - Período 1997 - 2001**

Año	Actividad	Empleo	Desocupación	Subocupación
Oct.97	42.3	35.3	13.7	13.1
Oct.98	42.1	36.9	12.4	13.6
Oct.99	42.7	36.8	13.8	14.3
Oct.00	42.7	36.5	14.7	14.6
Oct.01	42.2	34.5	18.3	16.3

Cuadro 2:**Evolución de la Indigencia, la pobreza y la desocupación en GBA. Período 1997 a 2001**

Período	Hogares		Personas		Tasa de desocupación
	Bajo línea de Indigencia	Bajo línea de pobreza	Bajo línea de Indigencia	Bajo línea de pobreza	
Oct.97	5	19	6.4	26	14.3
Oct-98	4.5	18.2	6.9	25.9	13.3
Oct-99	4.8	18.9	6.7	26.7	14.4
Oct-00	5.6	20.8	7.7	28.9	14.7
Oct-01	8.3	25.5	12.2	35.4	19.0

El Gobierno Nacional profundizó las modalidades de intervención a través de los programas sociales focalizados para atender a los sectores más vulnerables, afectados tanto por su situación de pobreza como por sus posibilidades de acceso al mercado laboral.

En tal sentido, las políticas socio-laborales se incorporan a las políticas sociales nacionales como parte de los programas focalizados que atienden, a través de acciones de capacitación y fomento del empleo, a los trabajadores desocupados en situación de pobreza.

1.1 Políticas de Empleo y Capacitación Laboral del MTSS

A partir de los años 80 a nivel mundial, y en la Argentina en fecha mucho más reciente, empezó a hacerse evidente que dos elementos que parecían indisolublemente vinculados - el empleo y el crecimiento económico - comenzaban a tomar distancia. Es posible comprobar que en los países más desarrollados, la recuperación y el crecimiento de la economía no redundó en la misma proporción en la creación de puestos de trabajo, constituyendo el desempleo una preocupación importante de los gobiernos.

Para tratar de contrarrestar estos efectos, en muchos países se inició el desarrollo de políticas de empleo, un conjunto de acciones destinadas, en algunos casos, a potenciar o atenuar los impactos de las políticas de crecimiento económico sobre el empleo: promoviendo la creación de empleo, favoreciendo las políticas de reconversión y recalificación de la fuerza de trabajo o atenuando los procesos de reestructuración que impactaban sobre la reorganización del trabajo y la destrucción de empleos.

A partir de los años 90, la República Argentina, afectada por procesos similares, atacó la respuesta a los cambios en el mercado de trabajo definiendo un nuevo marco regulatorio para las relaciones laborales. La primera expresión de esta definición política fue la Ley Nacional de Empleo (N° 24.013). Esta incluye un conjunto de acciones, medidas e incentivos que favorecen bajo distintas formas la promoción y mantenimiento del empleo, al mismo tiempo que prevé mecanismos de financiamiento para impulsar políticas activas y pasivas de empleo (Fondo Nacional de Empleo).

El Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social comienza a desarrollar programas de empleo orientados a fomentar oportunidades para los grupos con mayores dificultades en el ingreso y permanencia en el mercado de trabajo y reducir el impacto de la caída del nivel de ingresos por pérdida del empleo.

Desde el año 1993 se llevan a cabo programas de empleo directo, que operan a través del financiamiento de mano de obra para el desarrollo de actividades de interés comunitario. Están destinados a aquellos trabajadores con mayores dificultades laborales y sociales y su objetivo es brindar ocupación transitoria a trabajadores desocupados. El primer antecedente de estos programas fue el Programa Intensivo de Trabajo (PIT), con una cobertura de casi 70.000 beneficiarios/as anuales.

Los programas de empleo directo han evolucionado como resultado de las sucesivas evaluaciones y mediciones; mejorando sus criterios de focalización y cobertura. En este sentido, con la colaboración financiera y técnica de los organismos de crédito externo se ha logrado mejorar su cobertura y alcance. El Programa TRABAJAR II constituyó una primera etapa en este sentido. Con el apoyo del Banco Mundial – Préstamo BIRF N° 4195 -AR alcanzó mejores niveles de focalización y cobertura territorial. Durante el desarrollo del Programa, entre los años 1997/1998 se incorporaron 400.189 beneficiarios que se desempeñaron en algo más de 16.000 proyectos de construcción, ampliación y rehabilitación de infraestructura social comunitaria, destinada a poblaciones de bajos recursos. Para la ejecución de estos proyectos se comprometieron aproximadamente 383 millones de pesos destinados al pago de las ayudas económicas no remunerativas mensuales a los beneficiarios del Programa.

Para superar la transitoriedad del impacto se dio prioridad a la realización de proyectos de obras y servicios. Estas acciones contribuyeron a atenuar el impacto de la pobreza, en particular en las áreas urbanas abordando su atención desde una doble dimensión: a través de la transferencia de ingresos a los hogares más pobres y generando infraestructura social, comunitario y de desarrollo con alto impacto en las condiciones de vida de los grupo de población en situación de mayor vulnerabilidad.

En síntesis, el desarrollo de estos programas permitió al Ministerio de Trabajo acumular experiencia, diseñar e implementar instrumentos metodológicos para el monitoreo y la gestión que aseguran que los beneficios alcancen a los trabajadores desocupados en situación mas vulnerable tanto por el nivel de sus calificaciones, así como por las condiciones de pobreza de los hogares a los cuales pertenecen.

2. Convenio de Préstamo N° 4366/ARG

2.1 El Programa TRABAJAR III

El Programa TRABAJAR III, forma parte de las políticas de empleo, en particular los programas de empleo directo. Se instala como una segunda etapa del Programa TRABAJAR, ejecutado durante 1997/98 financiado por el Banco Mundial en el marco del Segundo Proyecto de Protección Social. TRABAJAR III fue creado por la Resolución M.T. y S.S. N° 327/98 y reglamentado por la Resolución S.E.C.L.N°397/98, ejecutado bajo la responsabilidad institucional del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social.

El Programa TRABAJAR III se orientó a atender las situaciones de emergencia ocupacional, contribuyendo a disminuir el impacto provocado por la pérdida de ingresos como consecuencia del desempleo abierto. El Programa brindaba ocupación transitoria a trabajadores/as desocupados/as que no percibían prestaciones por desempleo ni participaban en otros programas de empleo o capacitación laboral.

Como resultado de las evaluaciones del Programa TRABAJAR II se realizaron ajustes de diseño y procedimientos con la finalidad de asegurar el cumplimiento de los objetivos del Programa. El ajuste del diseño se orientó en dos perspectivas: por una parte, asegurar la focalización hacia los hogares más

pobres y por otra fortalecer la pertinencia y calidad de los proyectos financiados, garantizando el impacto sobre la población más vulnerable.

2.2. Objetivos del Programa

El Programa constituyó un instrumento de financiamiento de mano de obra para la realización de proyectos comunitarios destinados a la realización de obras de infraestructura social y económica. Los mismos se orientaron a satisfacer necesidades socialmente relevantes de la población con menores recursos. Constituyeron una respuesta comunitaria a las necesidades locales, vinculando las demandas de la población con los recursos disponibles tanto a nivel territorial como los provenientes de otros programas. Al mismo tiempo, se promovió la articulación y complementación de las políticas de emergencia de empleo - financiadoras de mano de obra - con otras líneas o programas sociales que proveen recursos para asistencia técnica y/o insumos para realizar obras de infraestructura.

Los proyectos aprobados en el marco de TRABAJAR III se proponían:

- 1.- Constituir un mecanismo ágil y flexible de financiamiento de mano de obra en proyectos que surjan de demandas prioritarias de la población, en localidades y barrios en situación de pobreza y para grupos vulnerables, con el objeto de mejorar las condiciones de vida.
- 2.- Incorporar trabajadores/as desocupados/as con baja calificación que residan en la localidad de ejecución de la obra, promoviendo la realización de actividades mano de obra intensivas.
- 3.- Dar respuesta a demandas y necesidades prioritarias en materia de infraestructura social y comunitaria.
- 4.- Facilitar el acceso a otros Programas Sociales (Nacionales y/o Provinciales) destinados a la superación de la pobreza que aseguren el cofinanciamiento de los proyectos previstos en este Programa.

El Programa promovió la participación de instancias organizativas de carácter regional o local (organizaciones de la sociedad civil). La presencia y el compromiso de este tipo organizaciones intermedias con reconocimiento en la localidad aseguraba un importante nivel de control social y, simultáneamente, aportaba competencias para la definición de proyectos emergentes del diagnóstico de las necesidades sociales prioritarias.

A los efectos de realizar proyectos con mayor impacto social, asegurando la focalización en las áreas más pobres, el Programa aportó recursos para financiar los materiales para la ejecución de obras de infraestructura. Dichos proyectos estaban destinados a atender las necesidades prioritarias de las poblaciones de menores recursos en las áreas de salud, educación y provisión de agua.

Para atender el logro de este objetivo se definió, en el TRABAJAR III, un componente específico que apoyó con el financiamiento de los materiales y la mano de obra, a los proyectos realizados en las pequeñas localidades (de 500 a 50.000 habitantes) con altos porcentajes de población en situación de pobreza. Este nuevo componente se denominó “TRABAJAR con Materiales”. (Los instrumentos normativos del Componente Materiales son las Res. MTySS N° 156/99 y Res. SEyCL N° 201/99). En ellos se definen sus características específicas e incluyen el listado de localidades en las cuales pueden llevarse a cabo proyectos con financiamiento de materiales. Estos recursos están destinados a beneficiar

a localidades que cuenten con poblaciones con alto índice de pobreza y que no superen los 50.000 habitantes).

2.3 Focalización

El Programa TRABAJAR III se basó en la transferencia de ingreso a los hogares pobres, afectados por la situación de desempleo. En tal sentido se aplicaron criterios genéricos de focalización que permitían identificar a los/as trabajadores/as desocupados/as pertenecientes a hogares en situación de pobreza. Sobre la base del monto de la ayuda económica transferida se autofocalizaba sobre los hogares pobres, organizando la distribución de los subsidios en función de la realización de tareas en proyectos.

Por otra parte, a los efectos de establecer un criterio equitativo y transparente de asignación de recursos por provincia, se definió una distribución porcentual teniendo en cuenta la participación de la población beneficiaria - trabajadores desocupados en situación de pobreza – por jurisdicción:

Gerencia de empleo	Población Objetivo	
	v.a.	%
Buenos Aires(a)	160,734	11.84
Conurbano	254,566	18.75
Capital Federal	19,729	1.45
Catamarca	17,452	1.29
Chaco	68,977	5.08
Chubut	13,269	0.98
Córdoba	99,331	7.31
Corrientes	52,746	3.88
Entre Ríos	45,961	3.38
Formosa	35,404	2.61
Jujuy	39,742	2.93
La Pampa	9,464	0.70
La Rioja	12,316	0.91
Mendoza	47,561	3.50
Misiones	58,568	4.31
Neuquén	22,632	1.67
Río Negro (b)	28,026	2.06
Salta	63,285	4.66
San Juan	21,139	1.56
San Luis	14,361	1.06
Santa Cruz	2,297	0.17
Santa Fe (a)	61,402	4.52
Rosario	73,610	5.42
Sgo. del Estero	55,884	4.12
Tierra del Fuego	1,921	

	0.14	
Tucumán	77,618	5.72
TOTAL	1,357,995	100.0

3. Resultados del Programa

En cumplimiento de sus objetivos, el Trabajar III inició su ejecución en agosto de 1998, hasta junio de 2002 ha financiado cerca de 26,500 proyectos por un monto a cargo del Programa de US\$383 millones de dólares. La asignación de los recursos para las diferentes provincias y localidades ha cumplido con los criterios establecidos en el Manual Operativo, en relación con el porcentaje correspondiente a la población objetivo por jurisdicción.

Durante el desarrollo del Programa se incorporaron 464.102 beneficiarios que se desempeñaron proyectos de construcción, ampliación y rehabilitación de infraestructura social comunitaria, destinada a poblaciones de bajos recursos. Para la ejecución de estos proyectos se comprometieron \$ 400.808.280 destinados al pago de las ayudas económicas no remunerativas mensuales a los beneficiarios del Programa.

Cuadro 1 - Programa TRABAJAR III: Total de proyectos, beneficiarios y monto a cargo del programa, por gerencia.

GERENCIA	Total					
	Proyectos aprobados		Cantidad de Beneficiarios		Monto Total a Cargo del Programa	
	Absoluto	% Col	Absolutos	Porcentaje	Absolutos	Porcentaje
CAPITAL FEDERAL	365	1.4%	4,961	1.1%	4,484,440	1.1%
PARTIDOS DEL CONURBANO	3,127	11.8%	71,254	15.4%	65,870,120	16.4%
BUENOS AIRES	2,828	10.7%	49,262	10.6%	44,668,840	11.1%
CATAMARCA	527	2.0%	7,213	1.6%	6,025,680	1.5%
CHACO	1,239	4.7%	28,517	6.1%	23,507,700	5.9%
CHUBUT	464	1.8%	5,348	1.2%	4,875,400	1.2%
CORDOBA	2,152	8.1%	31,602	6.8%	29,447,960	7.3%
CORRIENTES	833	3.1%	14,701	3.2%	12,025,180	3.0%
ENTRE RIOS	1,239	4.7%	19,209	4.1%	16,139,840	4.0%
FORMOSA	582	2.2%	10,425	2.2%	9,098,640	2.3%
JUJUY	1,340	5.1%	24,540	5.3%	18,377,280	4.6%
LA PAMPA	368	1.4%	5,784	1.2%	5,494,880	1.4%
LA RIOJA	244	0.9%	3,364	0.7%	3,178,720	0.8%
MENDOZA	782	3.0%	12,418	2.7%	10,679,400	2.7%
MISIONES	1,185	4.5%	18,287	3.9%	16,370,040	4.1%
NEUQUEN	707	2.7%	14,698	3.2%	9,994,720	2.5%
RIO NEGRO	907	3.4%	12,011	2.6%	10,075,920	2.5%
SALTA	1,283	4.9%	23,953	5.2%	19,365,720	4.8%
SAN JUAN	423	1.6%	6,863	1.5%	6,068,040	1.5%
SAN LUIS	357	1.3%	3,759	0.8%	3,787,880	0.9%
SANTA CRUZ	110	0.4%	1,498	0.3%	1,260,960	0.3%
SANTA FE	1,545	5.8%	23,751	5.1%	20,657,520	5.2%
ROSARIO	1,824	6.9%	26,618	5.7%	19,979,100	5.0%
SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO	894	3.4%	19,095	4.1%	15,789,420	3.9%
TIERRA DEL FUEGO	87	0.3%	990	0.2%	752,240	0.2%
TUCUMAN	1,041	3.9%	23,981	5.2%	22,832,640	5.7%
Total	26,453	100.0%	464,102	100.0%	400,808,280	100.0%

La asignación mensual en cada año de ejecución se presenta en el siguiente gráfico. Durante el año 1999

se presentó la mayor asignación de recursos. De acuerdo con la disponibilidad restante, se distribuyeron los recursos para los años 2000 y 2001, con el fin de dar continuidad al Programa. Los totales asignados para cada año fueron: \$83.9, \$169.3, \$82.6 y \$47.5 millones, respectivamente. El gráfico que se incluye a continuación muestra la evolución mensual de asignación de fondos por año durante el período 1998/2002.

La distribución porcentual del número de proyectos y los recursos del Programa según las tipologías de proyectos de mayor utilización se resumen en el siguiente cuadro:

Si se realiza un análisis de la totalidad de los proyectos realizados por TRABAJAR III según tipología, se observa que: se ejecutó la mayor cantidad de proyectos en el tipo infraestructura de desarrollo - que comprende proyectos de vialidad urbana, caminos secundarios, mejoramiento de pequeños proyectos de riego en áreas pobres y defensas hidráulicas- representando casi el 34% del total. Estos proyectos son más intensivos en mano de obra y en consecuencia requieren un menor nivel de inversión por parte de los organismos responsables.

Al mismo tiempo, el Programa participó de manera significativa en las áreas pobres desarrollando infraestructura sanitaria, aportando agua potable, desagües cloacales, núcleos húmedos, entre otros. Estos proyectos representaron casi el 23% del total, destacando que tienen un alto impacto en el mejoramiento de la calidad de vida de la población en situación de pobreza.

Otros proyectos que tuvieron importante impacto fueron los de infraestructura social. Se incluyen en esta tipología la refacción, construcción y mejoramiento de áreas destinadas a la atención de la salud, la educación, asistencial y comunitaria. Este tipo de obras ha permitido fortalecer o crear estructura en un importante número de localidades. La participación en el programa resultó con el 22%. (ver gráfico 1)

También es importante mencionar los 2719 proyectos de vivienda que se realizaron con el Programa, representando el 11% de la totalidad de los mismos.


Los proyectos del Programa TRABAJAR III tuvieron un costo promedio aproximado \$15.000. La cantidad de beneficiarios promedio por proyecto fue de 17. La duración promedio fue de 4.5 meses. Los proyectos más intensivos en mano de obra resultaron los de la tipología vivienda social con un promedio de 22 beneficiarios. El monto promedio de la ayuda económica fue de \$178. Cabe señalar que desde 1998 hasta 2000 la ayuda fue de \$200, habiéndose producido una baja a \$160 hasta el cierre del Programa.

Los proyectos de TRABAJAR podían ser presentados en carácter de ejecutores por: organismos públicos, nacionales, provinciales o municipales y organizaciones de la sociedad civil sin fines de lucro con personería jurídica debidamente acreditada. Algo más del 60 % de los proyectos estuvo a cargo de las municipalidades, y el 22 % fueron realizados por organizaciones de la sociedad civil. Los organismos provincias también participaron en el cofinanciamiento de los proyectos, ejecutando un 10% de los mismos. (ver gráfico 2).

La participación de los Programas Sociales focalizados impulsados tanto por la Nación como por las provincias, no aparece registrada como ejecutores directos, ya que los recursos son transferidos a los Municipio u ONG. No obstante, de la información disponible se observa que sólo para algunas tipologías se logró una eficiente articulación con otros Programas Sociales Nacionales y Provinciales destinados a población vulnerable o en situación de pobreza. Además de la articulación con el Ministerio de Educación (Manos a la Escuela); otras experiencias exitosas en este sentido, fueron las desarrolladas

con los programas de vivienda social (Emergencia Hídrica – BID y Programa 17 de MDS), que en algunos casos han contado con financiamiento internacional. También tuvo un impacto positivo la vinculación con el Programa de Seguridad alimentaria – PROHUERTA - que promueve huertas comunitarias.

**Cantidad de proyectos aprobados según tipo de organismo responsable.
Total País. Agosto de 1998 - Enero de 2002.**



El logro más importante del Programa TRABAJAR III fue llegar a los hogares más pobres, impactando positivamente sobre sus niveles de ingreso, así como realizar pequeñas obras de infraestructura social y comunitaria en, todas las provincias y en casi la totalidad de departamentos del país

El Programa TRABAJAR III con el auspicio del Banco Mundial realizó un estudio para medir el impacto del Programa, la transferencia de ingresos en los hogares Ravallion, M, Emanuela Galasso, Teodoro Lazo y Ernesto Philipp. 2001 "Do Workfare participants recover quickly from retrenchment?". Policy Research Working Paper 2672, World Bank., así como profundizar en el conocimiento de las características de los beneficiarios y sus hogares.

El estudio también se enfocó a analizar la situación de los trabajadores del Programa una vez que salen del mismo, es decir cuando dejan de ser beneficiarios. Se realizó un relevamiento a beneficiarios en tres aglomerados urbanos (Chaco, Mendoza y Tucumán), sobre el mismo marco muestral de la EPH y en forma simultanea con dicha encuesta. Durante 18 meses se realizó un seguimiento de los beneficiarios, esto permitió aplicar la metodología de "matching" construyendo un grupo testigo con la información de la Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, es decir con personas que reunían características similares a los beneficiarios pero que no participaron en el Programa TRABAJAR.

Los principales resultados de esta investigación son:

Respecto de la focalización hacia los hogares pobres: en tanto que en la evaluación de TRABAJAR II se encontró que el 76% de los beneficiarios del Programa pertenecían al quintil más bajo de ingresos (medido per capita en el hogar); en el TRABAJAR III se encontró que un 78% de los beneficiarios se encontraban también en el quintil más bajo de ingresos.

Por otra parte según los resultados de la evaluación es posible afirmar que los hogares eran beneficiados con la transferencia de ingresos que realizaba el Programa y que no resultaba inmediato el proceso de sustitución de ingresos una vez que dejaban el Programa. Esto dependía de las condiciones del mercado de trabajo. El estudio informa que los beneficiarios logran un reemplazo parcial de los ingresos durante los primeros seis meses, aproximadamente un cuarto de la ayuda económica transferido por el Programa. Alcanzando un reemplazo del 50% de los ingresos transferidos al cabo de un año.

El Banco Mundial también realizó una evaluación ex –post de la muestra de proyectos del Trabajar III, cuyo objetivo principal fue la identificación de los impactos directos o indirectos que generaron los proyectos sobre la población usuaria. En este sentido, la evaluación determinó el grado de cumplimiento de los objetivos del Programa, relacionados con la contribución al mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida de la población afectada, así como el énfasis en los proyectos de orientación social. Esta identificación y análisis de los impactos de los proyectos permitió estimar el aporte adicional del Programa relacionado con el producto (proyecto), como un valor agregado al proceso de transferir recursos para pago de mano de obra.

En tal sentido la evaluación confirmó que otro de los logros del TRABAJAR III fue afianzar la tarea iniciada por TRABAJAR II, basada en la introducción de una cultura de proyectos de inversión. De este modo se canalizaron los recursos a obras de utilidad pública. Los proyectos se orientaron a atender las necesidades locales. La UNEC trabajó profundizando los logros en referencia con la calidad de los proyectos. Se puede observar que hubo un avance importante en el financiamiento de proyectos más pertinentes en términos de utilidad social y que el Componente MATERIALES constituyó un importante mecanismo para fortalecer el impacto de los proyectos en las localidades más pobres. Es posible afirmar que TRABAJAR se constituyó, con alta visibilidad, a nivel nacional en una herramienta eficiente para la realización de pequeñas obras de interés comunitario, impactando en los diferentes sectores públicos locales y regionales.

Estas son algunas de las conclusiones de la evaluación ex post de proyectos: *“El Programa tiene un alto impacto en el desarrollo local de los municipios pequeños, en donde un importante porcentaje de la inversión pública es aportado por el Programa. En dichas localidades es evidente el valor agregado que se ha dado a la financiación de la mano de obra, objeto del Programa. Es así como en estos municipios pequeños el Trabajar III ha sido percibido, no solamente como un programa de empleo sino como un programa de inversión pública que genera beneficios públicos”* (Vázquez, María Claudia. Evaluación ex –post de una muestra de proyectos del Programa Trabajar Banco Mundial - febrero de 2002).

Por otra parte, una de las metas pactadas con el BIRF se relaciona con la finalización de proyectos, los indicadores de monitoreo presentan un cumplimiento de obras finalizadas es algo más del 72%, y las provincias que tienen mayor cumplimiento en la ejecución son Santiago del Estero, Santa Fe, Entre Ríos, Chubut, Catamarca, Mendoza y Salta, todas con más del 80% de obras finalizadas. En tanto que las provincias de Santa Cruz, Neuquén Tierra del Fuego y Misiones son las que han tenido peor desempeño, presentando menores niveles de cumplimiento, en algunos casos inferiores al 50%. Resulta

significativo el número de proyectos que no alcanzó metas en la provincia de Buenos Aires, pero cabe señalar que se debe en buena medida a la incidencia de las inundaciones que ha mantenido anegada amplias zonas del centro y norte de la misma durante un largo período de tiempo impidiendo a los municipios derivar recursos para estas obras, dejándola paralizadas. (Cuadro 2)

Para este tipo de situaciones el Ministerio lanzó el Plan Extraordinario de Regularización, que permitió acordar con los Municipios y organismos ejecutores un esquema de compromisos para finalizar las obras, evitando sanciones y mejorando el desempeño general del programa.

Cuadro 2 - Cumplimiento de metas. Total país. Proyectos aprobados desde Agosto de 1998 a Enero de 2002. Proyectos finalizados al 30 de Junio de 2002.

Gerencia	Cumplimiento de Metas	
	Alcanzó metas % fila	No alcanzó metas % fila
CAPITAL FEDERAL	74.6	25.4
PARTIDOS DEL CONURBANO	70.9	29.1
BUENOS AIRES	67.4	32.6
CATAMARCA	86.6	13.4
CHACO	64.6	35.4
CHUBUT	82.4	17.6
CORDOBA	69.7	30.3
CORRIENTES	69.1	30.9
ENTRE RIOS	83.1	16.9
FORMOSA	68.6	31.4
JUJUY	70.9	29.1
LA PAMPA	86.6	13.4
LA RIOJA	74.6	25.4
MENDOZA	88.3	11.7
MISIONES	61.6	38.4
NEUQUEN	58.4	41.6
RIO NEGRO	68.9	31.1
SALTA	86.5	13.5
SAN JUAN	62.7	37.3
SAN LUIS	84.2	15.8
SANTA CRUZ	56.1	43.9
SANTA FE	80.0	20.0
ROSARIO	63.4	36.6
SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO	91.5	8.5
TIERRA DEL FUEGO	42.6	57.4
TUCUMAN	65.0	35.0
Total	72.1	27.9

NOTA: Excluye proyectos dados de baja y sin información.

La totalidad de los proyectos contó con al menos dos vistas de supervisión durante su ejecución. Cabe señalar que la duración de los proyectos variaba de tres a seis meses. Para los proyectos de mayor

duración en la mayoría de los casos tuvieron tres visitas. Para todo el Programa, el promedio de vistas por proyecto 2,3.

3.1 Componente MATERIALES

El componente de materiales, “Trabajar Materiales”, inició su ejecución en julio de 1999. Este componente financiaba la mano de obra no calificada y hasta el 80% del costo de los materiales para proyectos orientados a satisfacer necesidades básicas, como infraestructura de educación, salud, asistencial, etc., los cuales han sido considerados como de mayor impacto social dentro del Programa Trabajar. A través de este componente se han financiado proyectos de origen municipal en aquellas poblaciones con un NBI mayor de 30% que no cuentan con recursos para aportar los materiales de los proyectos.

El “Trabajar Materiales” ha financiado 230 proyectos por un monto de \$2.6 millones en mano de obra y \$3.3 millones en materiales, para un total de \$5.9 millones. En general, este componente presenta altos índices de cumplimiento en la ejecución de los proyectos y buenos resultados en lo que se refiere a su pertinencia y al cumplimiento de los objetivos. Estos logros se deben principalmente al diseño del componente y al proceso de ejecución, los cuales cumple con criterios de optimización de la inversión pública. Otro de los factores que ha influido en el éxito de estos proyectos es la intervención directa que ha tenido la UNEC en todo el proceso de evaluación y supervisión (En las misiones de supervisión del Programa, se analizaron y visitaron proyectos del Trabajar Materiales, lo que ha permitido verificar su buen desempeño y su importancia en términos de impacto. Estos análisis han sido base para la decisión de hacer énfasis en la evaluación de proyectos correspondientes a las tipologías más relacionadas con las necesidades básicas de la población). La mayoría de los proyectos de componente MATERIALES correspondieron a la tipología Infraestructura asistencial (40,7%) y las provincias que presentaron mayor cantidad de proyectos ejecutados fueron Santa Fe, Santiago del Estero, Salta y Misiones.

Una de los objetivos de gestión que se planteó en TRABAJAR III fue mejorar la calidad de los proyectos así como su impacto social, en tal sentido, no sólo, se incorporó el componente materiales, para apoyar a los municipios y localidades más pobres. Se establecieron convenios y acuerdos con otros programas sociales focalizados y con otras áreas del Gobierno Nacional.

En esta dirección de desarrolló el Subprograma “Manos a la Escuela”, destinado al mejoramiento de la infraestructura escolar. En coordinación con Ministerio de Educación de la Nación se desarrollaron pequeños proyectos de refacción, ampliación y mejoramiento de los establecimientos educativos. A la mano de obra financiada por TRABAJAR se sumaron los aportes, del Ministerio de Educación, para los materiales. Los equipos técnicos de Arquitectura Escolar de las distintas jurisdicciones se responsabilizaron del proceso de evaluación de los proyectos bajo los criterios, parámetros y metodología del Trabajar III. Este componente contribuyó al cumplimiento de los objetivos del Programa y, en general los proyectos presentaron un buen impacto en el mejoramiento de las condiciones edilicias de las escuelas, en distintos municipios y localidades del país. El componente inició en noviembre de 2000 y a financiado cerca de 350 proyectos.

4. Resultados Planificados Y Resultados Obtenidos

En términos generales la gestión del Programa TRABAJAR III ha dado cumplimiento a lo previsto en su planificación inicial.

En lo que respecta a la gestión:

El Programa TRABAJAR III pudo capitalizar la experiencia de gestión que se instaló a nivel territorial durante el Segundo Proyecto de Protección Social -TRABAJAR II. Así se desarrollaron y fortalecieron los distintos procesos del Programa. Se consolidaron algunos aspectos aun débiles durante el primer tramo de Programa TRABAJAR, en particular los procesos de evaluación técnica y seguimiento. Cabe señalar que estos se habían incorporado en los programas de empleo del Ministerio de Trabajo a partir de TRABAJAR II.

Se fortaleció la estructura de gerenciamiento del Programa, tanto nivel central como territorial. Este fortalecimiento permitió contar con información confiable de manera sistemática, organizando un sistema de indicadores de monitoreo actualizado que orientaba los distintos procesos de gestión, el rediseño y ajuste del Programa así como la toma de decisiones.

Al mismo tiempo, la asistencia técnica a los organismos ejecutores permitió conformar un capital social en el territorio en materia de ejecución de proyectos. Se desarrollaron saberes y competencias en el nivel local en los procesos de identificación y formulación de proyectos, se lograron articulaciones entre distintas organizaciones, programas sociales y agentes públicos aportando a la definición de propuestas más pertinentes y de mejor calidad.

Cabe señalar que a lo largo de su ejecución, la situación social en Argentina ha registrado una gran complejidad, incrementándose los niveles de conflictividad. El período 98 -2002 resultó crecientemente recesivo. Se vio afectado seriamente el mercado de trabajo, siendo su efecto más notable el aumento de la pobreza y el desempleo abierto.

Como lo muestran los indicadores de monitoreo, no existen distorsiones en la mayoría de las provincias respecto los criterios utilizados por el Programa para la asignación de los recursos. Es importante mencionar que se definió la participación de cada provincia teniendo en cuenta la distribución porcentual de la población beneficiaria - trabajadores desocupados en situación de pobreza - por jurisdicción.

Se observa que hay provincias que han incrementado su presupuesto y otras que han ejecutado proyectos por menor cantidad de recursos que los que les correspondía. Excepto para los casos de Buenos Aires y de Jujuy, la totalidad de las provincias, presenta una ejecución muy similar a la planificada. Si bien la Provincia de Buenos Aires, que participó en el Programa con menos cantidad de recursos que los previstos, mejoró su desempeño respecto de TRABAJAR II, y al igual que en período anterior contó con un programa provincial, que registró una gran cobertura en particular en el Conurbano bonaerense, donde se concentra la mayor parte de población desocupada en situación de pobreza.

El caso inverso se presenta en la Provincia de Jujuy, es una jurisdicción que presenta una ejecución que supera lo planificado. Esta provincia registró un importante nivel de conflictividad, fuertemente afectada

por la pobreza y el desempleo, pero al mismo tiempo con altos niveles de participación de los grupos de desocupados, los que generaron una fuerte demanda de protección social. Pero a diferencia de Buenos Aires, la Provincia de Jujuy no contaba con presupuesto adicional para asegurar una cobertura mayor para los desocupados.

La cobertura promedio agregada de población objetivo durante todo Programa equivale a algo más del 30% para el total país, registrándose una oferta heterogénea a lo largo de su ejecución. La Provincia de Jujuy presentó una cobertura mayor que el promedio, acercándose casi al 50% de la población objetivo, con alto impacto en algunos departamentos próximos a la capital provincial. Buenos Aires sin embargo se mantuvo cercana al promedio nacional con el 28% de cobertura.

La crítica situación social, así como coyuntura socio laboral exigió una rápida y sistemática respuesta del Programa. El impacto se registró fundamentalmente en algunas localidades afectadas por el desempleo y las falta de perspectivas en los mercados de trabajos locales. Se mantuvo la conflictividad en lugares (Cutral-Co, Zapala y Plaza Huinul en la Pcia. de Neuquén; Tartagal, San Pedro y Ledesma en la Pcia. de Jujuy,) y creció notablemente en los aglomerados urbanos, que habían tenido un perfil industrial en décadas pasadas, como Rosario, y algunos distritos del Conurbano.

Por otra parte, surgieron numerosas organizaciones de la sociedad civil que agruparon a los trabajadores desocupados y se constituyeron en un polo de la demanda social y laboral. Estas organizaciones presionaron por una respuesta estatal en materia de política social que atendiera el desempleo.

Esta situación ubicó al Programa TRABAJAR en ciertos niveles de tensión en especial durante la última etapa de su ejecución. En los centros urbanos con mayor concentración de población creció la pobreza y el desempleo. Como resultado de esta situación se aprobaron una importante cantidad de proyectos que tuvieron como objetivo atender a la coyuntura emergente. Durante el período 2002/2001, la consecuencia de esta situación impactó en dos niveles: por una parte, en la calidad de los proyectos, y por otra, se vio afectada la distribución de los recursos intra e interprovinciales (menor cobertura de las áreas más alejadas y en algunos casos más pobres).

Al mismo tiempo, se observó, en los distritos mencionados, que los organismos responsables presentaron dificultades en el cumplimiento de los compromisos asumidos, viendo restringidos los recursos de contraparte necesarios para la ejecución de las obras.

No obstante y teniendo en cuenta la meta acordada con el Banco Mundial sobre el cumplimiento físico de los proyectos: que al menos el 75% de los proyectos debían estar finalizados y poder ser utilizables, esta meta fue prácticamente alcanzada y está siendo mejorada a través del Plan regularización que permitió acordar con los Municipios y ONG que habían tenido dificultados de financiamiento durante la realización de las obras.

De las conclusiones de las visitas de supervisión y de la evaluación ex post de proyectos del Programa TRABAJAR III, se observa un impacto altamente positivo de los proyectos, en particular los orientados a cubrir necesidades sociales básicas (agua potable, educación, salud e infraestructura asistencial.). También, cabe señalar que, en algunos casos los presupuestos de los gobiernos municipales y provinciales debieron ajustarse en un contexto recesivo, afectando en algunos casos la operación y puesta en marcha de los servicios y prestaciones que se preveía desarrollar en los proyectos finalizados. En síntesis, se observó que esta fue la principal causa por la que algunas obras no pudieron ser plenamente utilizadas, por falta de recursos para la prestación del servicio.

5. Lecciones aprendidas del Programa

1.- De acuerdo a lo analizado, el impacto alcanzado por el Programa cumplió con los objetivos trazados en el diseño del mismo. El TRABAJAR III ocupó a más de 400.000 beneficiarios y contribuyó a mejorar el ingreso de los sectores más pobres de la población. A través de la ejecución de proyectos se construyó y mejoró infraestructura para los sectores con mayores carencias económicas.

2.- El monitoreo sistemático de la ejecución así como las evaluaciones realizadas periódicamente respecto del monto de la ayuda económica permitió asegurar la focalización adecuada del Programa. La evaluación de Programa demostró que se atendieron a los hogares más pobres afectados por el desempleo, el mecanismo de autofocalización prepuesto permitió eficientemente incorporar, en proyectos, a los trabajadores desocupados más pobres.

3.- Además de focalizar el beneficios en los hogares pobres el programa trató de promover la localización de proyectos en las áreas más pobres. Para ello, se aplicaron criterios de priorización que permitieron favorecer la aprobación de los proyectos desarrollados en las localidades con mayores índices de pobreza (medido según NBI de población) y privilegiar el desarrollo de infraestructura social básica. Estos criterios se relacionan: i) con la localización del proyecto según nivel de pobreza, ii) la priorización de tipologías según su impacto en las condiciones de vida de los hogares pobres; iii) la intensidad en el uso de mano de obra; y iv) articulación con otros Programas Sociales. Asimismo, se incluyó por primera vez en un programa de empleo la ponderación de criterios en función de prioridades sociales y de emergencia ocupacional a cargo de los actores locales.

Una de las conclusiones que surgieron de los análisis realizados sobre el desempeño del Programa se observa que hay una relación importante entre el nivel de gastos (ayudas económicas pagadas) y la focalización. A mayor nivel de gasto mejor focalización, es decir que mayor nivel de recursos invertidos es posible llegar a mejor a las áreas más pobres y en general más alejadas. Cabe señalar que El Programa TRABAJAR ha focalizado mejor en las áreas pobres que otros programas de empleo Directo del Ministerio de Trabajo.

4.- Las lecciones aprendidas en TRABAJAR II y la experiencia recogida durante la gestión de TRABAJAR III aseguró el funcionamiento de equipos técnicos en el nivel central y territorial, fortalecimiento la asistencia técnica a organismos ejecutores así como la evaluación técnica, monitoreo y seguimiento de proyectos. Esto dio como resultado no sólo una mejora en la cantidad y calidad de información sobre el Programa, sino que también mostraron evidentes cambios positivos en favor de la pertinencia y calidad de proyectos ejecutados.

5.- Si bien no era un objetivo del programa fortalecer el capital social, una de las lecciones aprendidas nos indican que la conformación de redes sociales, la participación de organizaciones de la sociedad civil en acuerdo con los gobiernos locales, potencia no sólo la ejecución de las obras sino también su operación y mantenimiento. La capacidad local de poner en juego competencias personales e institucionales incrementaba notablemente los recursos invertidos en términos de impacto social. No obstante, se ha observado que, en algunos casos la capacidad institucional de los organismos ejecutores de proyectos no resultó adecuada para la gestión de las propuestas aprobadas,

fundamentalmente por la inadecuación de los recursos humanos capacitados para llevar a cabo la coordinación técnica de las obras, así como para la operación y mantenimiento.

6.- Desde lo operativo el Programa TRABAJAR logró consolidar los procesos de incorporación, validación y control de los beneficiarios así como alcanzar altos niveles de transparencia en los procesos de pago directo del beneficio a través de la red de bancos asociada a ANSES.

6. Misiones de Supervisión y Evaluación del Banco Mundial al Programa TRABAJAR III

El Banco Mundial ha desarrollado visitas de supervisión y seguimiento del Convenio de Préstamo N° 4366-AR, que se ejecutó en el período 1998-2002. Las principales preocupaciones del Banco Mundial se centraron en asegurar la focalización, en la calidad de los proyectos y a la gestión del Programa a nivel regional, en particular los aspectos referidos a la supervisión y seguimiento.

El desempeño del Banco Mundial en sus misiones de evaluación fue altamente satisfactorio en todos los niveles del ciclo operativo del Programa: evaluación, supervisión, seguimiento y monitoreo, y sus recomendaciones han contribuido a mejorar el alcance de los objetivos. Cabe señalar que la continuidad de los equipos técnicos que conformaban las misiones del Banco permitió alcanzar amplios niveles de conocimiento del Programa así como de las particulares territoriales de la gestión. Esto favoreció al mismo tiempo un fluido intercambio con los equipos técnicos de la UNEC.

7. Conclusiones

El Programa TRABAJAR III, durante el período de ejecución 1998 a 2002 ha logrado:

- Contribuir al alivio de la pobreza dando apoyo a proyectos de construcción, ampliación y refacción de infraestructura social, brindando empleo transitorio a más de 400.000 personas.
- Desarrollar un sistema de gestión y financiamiento de proyectos que permitió brindar una respuesta dinámica a la demanda de proyectos que satisfacen necesidades de poblaciones con alto porcentaje de NBI.
- Beneficiar no sólo con una ayuda económica mensual a personas desocupadas sino brindar la posibilidad de participar en obras que contribuyen a mejorar las condiciones de vida del lugar que habitan.

A los efectos de profundizar el desarrollo de la política social en Argentina es importante rescatar las lecciones aprendidas por el Programa.

No obstante, el agravamiento de la crisis social durante el año 2001, la persistencia del proceso de empobrecimiento, el fuerte aumento del desempleo, de la precarización y la exclusión social, instaló en la sociedad argentina una fuerte demanda sobre los programas de inclusión monetaria, en particular por parte de los hogares más pobres sin ingresos o con ingresos que no les permitía superar la línea de indigencia. Esta situación provocó una importante presión sobre los programas de empleo directo en general y sobre TRABAJAR en particular.

