Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 28057-CM IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-28690) ON A LOAN/CREDIT/GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 41.7 MILLION (EQUIVALENT US$ 60.7 MILLION) TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT June 24, 2004 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective September 1, 2002) Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFA) CFA 1 million = US$ 1538.46 US$ 1 = CFA 650 AT APPRAISAL Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFA) CFA 1 million = US$ 1,980 US$1 = CFAF 505 FISCAL YEAR July 01 June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDB African Development Bank AFD Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency) APN Autorité Portuaire Nationale (National Ports Authority) EIB European Investment Bank BDR Base de Données Routières (Roads Database) BGFT Bureau de Gestion du Fret Terrestre (Roads Freight Bureau) CAMAIR Cameroon Airlines CAMSHIP Cameroon Shipping Lines CAMTAINER Société Nationale de Transport et de Transit du Cameroun (Cameroon Container Transport and Freight Forwarder Company) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CCO Comité Consultatif d'Orientation (advisory committee, part of the reforms process) CEMAC Communauté Economique et Monetaire de l' Afrique Centrale CFA Cameroon currency (Franc CFA) CNCC Conseil National des Chargeurs du Cameroun (Shippers' Council) COFACE French Import Export (insurance credit company) CPE Cellule de Protection de l'Environnement (Environmental Protection Unit) CTS Comité Technique de Suivi (technical body for privatization oversight) DCA Development Credit Agreement DR Direction des Routes EDF European Development Fund IMF International Monetary Fund FSD Fonds Social de Développement (social development fund) GUCE Guichet Unique du Commerce Extérieur (one-stop shop) HIPC Highly Indebted Poorest Countries IDA International Development Association IMF International Monetary Fund LABOGENIE Laboratoire National de Génie Civil (National Road Laboratory) MATGENIE Parc National de Matériel de Génie Civil (Public Works equipment leasing co., state owned) MINEFI Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (Ministry of Economy and Finance) MINT Ministère des Transports (Ministry of Transport) MINTP Ministère des Travaux Publics (Ministry of Public Works) ONPC Office National des Ports du Cameroun (Former Cameroon National Port Authority) OPA Organisme Portuaire Autonome (Autonomous Port) PAD Port Autonome de Douala PPRCP Private Sector Support Project PUER Programme d'Urgence d'Entretien Routier QAG Quality Assurance Group REGIFERCAM Former state-owned railway company (liquidated) RNCC REGIFERCAM RUR Redevance d'Usage de la Route (Road User charge) SAC III Third Structural Adjustment Credit SAR Staff Appraisal Report SDR Standard Drawing Rights SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises SOTUC Société de Transport Urbain du Cameroun (Urban Public Transport Company Liquidated) TAC Terminal à conteneur (Container Terminal of the Douala Port) TIR Transit International Routier (International Road Transit) TSTAP Transport Sector Technical Assistance Project TSP Transport Sector Project VAT Value Added Tax Vice President: Callisto Madavo Country Director: Ali M. Khadr Sector Manager: Sanjivi Rajasingham Task Team Leader: Jean-Francois Marteau CAMEROON TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 7 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 15 6. Sustainability 16 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 17 8. Lessons Learned 19 9. Partner Comments 20 10. Additional Information 20 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 21 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 23 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 26 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 28 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 31 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 32 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 33 Annex 8 Borrower's contribution 34 Project ID: P000393 Project Name: CM TRANSPORT SECTOR Team Leader: Jean-Francois Marteau TL Unit: AFTTR ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 23, 2004 1. Project Data Name: CM TRANSPORT SECTOR L/C/TF Number: IDA-28690 Country/Department: CAMEROON Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: Roads and highways (86%); Central government administration (14%) Theme: State enterprise/bank restructuring and privatization (P); Export development and competitiveness (P); Pollution management and environmental health (P); Rural services and infrastructure (P) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 04/13/1987 Effective: 04/24/1997 04/24/1997 Appraisal: 05/14/1995 MTR: 12/31/1998 02/20/1999 Approval: 05/30/1996 Closing: 12/31/2002 12/31/2003 Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT/MIN. OF PUBLIC WORKS & TRANSPORT Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo Jean-Louis Sarbib Country Director: Ali Khadr Andrew Rogerson Sector Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard Team Leader at ICR: Jean-Francois Marteau Jean-Noel Guillossou ICR Primary Author: Jean-Francois Marteau; Abdelghani Inal 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: 3.1.1 Preamble: Since 1990, the Government of Cameroon has embarked in the design and implementation of a Transport Sector Program. The Transport Sector Project (TSP), whose preparation and implementation spanned more than thirteen years, was one of the various instruments used by the World Bank to support the implementation of this program. In order to have a broader understanding of the Project's specific impact, this preamble will provide an overview of the context in which the Program was prepared, as well as its history and its main features. The preparation of a Transport Sector Program was initiated in 1990 as Cameroon was going through a very severe economic crisis that had left the sector in disarray. From 1986 to 1993, Cameroon experienced serious economic difficulties, with per capita income falling by 50 percent. The contraction was also reflected in a severe fiscal crisis, leading to drastic cuts in infrastructure spending. As a result, the transport sector, like many other sectors, experienced very dire financial difficulties. Moreover, it was suffering from an ill-adapted regulatory and institutional framework, and an inefficient management system. It could no longer play its role to fuel the economic growth of the country. Mindful of the need to reform the sector, the World Bank initiated a long-term dialogue process with the Government as soon as 1990 to prepare a Transport Sector Program, to which the Bank would contribute provided that initial reform steps be implemented. While donor coordination was initially lacking in the sector, this process progressively assembled the whole donor community. As an initial step of this process, a sector study (Report No. 11430-CM, dated June 30, 1993) provided a core diagnosis of the sector together with recommendations for actions and reforms. However, the government capacity to sustain dialogue and undertake reforms at that time was extremely low, and its financial capacity almost non existent. The devaluation of the CFA Franc in January 1994, after striking a shock, changed the context and helped build ownership for the reforms. The Sector Program, as described in the June 1996 Transport Sector Policy Letter, became and remains the reference for all donor interventions in the sector. In mid-1995, after nearly five years of dialogue, the Government officially adopted a program of reforms, later outlined in its June 1996 Transport Sector Policy Letter. As a result, an overall framework for the Transport Sector Program was agreed upon between the Government and the entire donor community, which aimed to "improve efficiency and sustainable and coherent development in the transport sector to enable it to resume its contribution to development, poverty alleviation, and protection of the environment." The reforms envisaged were to be supported by a tentative five-year US$ 722 million investment program over the period 1995-2000. After the adoption of the sector policy, several donors, notably the European Union and the French Aid, endorsed the Program reform strategy as the basis for their interventions, and the African Development Bank modified its support to take into account reforms in the road sector. The World Bank Group used several tools to support the Program (see below), with a combination of technical assistance, adjustment support and investment lending. This Sector Policy remains the reference underlying the current Government strategy. The Transport Sector policy is comprehensive and based on four main pillars. The outcomes of this policy since its inception are briefly described below: - 2 - l State divestiture from transport operations in favor of private operators, and institutions more focused on planning, regulation, and sector policies. The State has withdrawn from all transport operations, inter alia urban transport, railways and road maintenance. As an exception, CAMAIR, the State-owned airline, has not been privatized, nor were some port services which (in agreement with the Bank) were deemed too sensitive on security grounds to be privatized; the ministries of Public Works (MINTP) and Transport (MINT) were restructured along the lines defined in the Policy; l Better balance between investment and maintenance expenditures, and sustainable resource allocation. Resource allocation between road investment and maintenance is better balanced and reforms were achieved in dialogue with the Bank, the IMF, and other development partners of Cameroon. Additionally, funding for road maintenance has been secured on a sustainable basis through the allocation of a portion of the tax on transport fuel to a Road Fund; l Improved regulatory framework resulting in more liberalization, and increased competitiveness. The regulatory framework was improved, transport activities were liberalized at that time, which generated greater competition, especially between rail and road transport; besides, technical laws and regulations in air, maritime and land transport were updated; and l Protection of the environment. The environmental protection legal framework was adopted for the entire transport sector and an environmental protection unit was set up in the Ministry of Public Works, which now serves the entire sector without donor funding. Bank support to the Program progressively evolved from a comprehensive sector-wide hybrid operation to a series of smaller more focused mutually reinforcing operations. As no lending could be approved in the absence of sufficient track record in policy reform, Bank support in the early 1990s was limited to dialogue and economic sector work. The TSP then under preparation was supposed to carry the lending instrument. Designed as a combined project (adjustment and investment credit), the TSP would contribute to support all sector reforms, while providing needed investment to the road and rail sub-sectors. However, after appraisal in 1993, the team concluded that the Government's financial capacity and commitment to reforms could not provide the basis to launch successfully an operation of that scale, and that a more gradual approach using tailor-made support was preferable. Hence, the following operations were deployed. l A Transport Sector Technical Assistance Project (TSTAP, Cr. 2703-CM, approved on April 11, 1995 and ended in 1999) contributed to fine tune the reforms and prepare the associated implementation plans together with a sector-wide investment program for the period 1995-2000. l The scope of the TSP--whose preparation resumed (re-appraisal mission in May-June 1995, and board approval in May 1996) after the Government began to take steps towards implementing the Sector Policy--was eventually limited to a contribution to the road component of the overall Sector Program, and selective support to institutional sector reforms. The decision to delink the adjustment and investment components of the original TSP was taken in early 1996, based on the following three reasons. First, the government capacity to handle a complex adjustment lending was not there in 1996. Second, a comprehensive Structural Adjustment Credit was under preparation, which became the Third Structural Adjustment Credit or SAC III, and provided the required global macroeconomic framework. Last, allowing more time for the preparation of the adjustment component by integrating it in SAC III allowed to set more ambitious targets for some major reforms in the Port and Road sub-sectors. l The Third Structural Adjustment Credit or SAC III, Cr. 3102-CM, approved on February 8, 1998, became the preferred instrument to carry out the overall transport sector reform agenda. l Bank support was subsequently complemented by two other projects. The Private Sector Support Project (PPRCP, Cr. 3359-CM, approved in May, 2000) provided technical assistance to support privatization of some transport activities. The railway concession project, approved in July 2002 (Cr. 3695-CM, initially negotiated in 1999) provided the necessary funding for track renewal and - 3 - implementation of a model environmental mitigation plan. The right sequencing of these operations developed synergies and produced outstanding results. Because the objective of this report is to strictly evaluate the TSP, areas unrelated to the Project's components will not be covered in the following pages. However, the Government contribution, provided in Annex 8, includes a matrix that summarizes the outcomes of all sector reforms originally forecast in the Program. Contributions of other projects or donor interventions to achieve some project objectives are detailed in Annex 1.2 and discussed where relevant in this report. The ICR of the TSTAP (report 20044 dated Feb 14, 2000) provided details on the initial implementation of the Policy whereas the upcoming ICR of the SAC III , which contained two transport sector adjustment tranches, will discuss in detail the outcomes of the main sector reforms. 3.1.2 Original Objectives Project objectives are: (a) to support : (i) road maintenance; (ii) the preservation of the national road network; and (iii) road safety; (b) to support the Borrower's gradual retrenchment from the execution of road maintenance by: (i) promoting the participation of small and medium enterprises; (ii) transferring public equipment leasing activities; and (iii) developing the use of labor-intensive methods; (c) to revise the transport sector institutional framework by: (i) restructuring the Ministry of Public Works (MINTP) and shifting its role in road maintenance from the execution by force accounts into subcontracting of works, planning, and supervision; (ii) restructuring the Ministry of Transport (MINT) and focusing its role on planning, policy development and regulation; and (iii) increasing private sector and beneficiary participation in transport management; and (d) to protect the environment. 3.2 Revised Objective: Not applicable 3.3 Original Components: The TSP targeted the road sub-sector with two main components, presented below as described in the Development Credit Agreement. Component A: Road Maintenance and Road Safety A.1 Execution of sections of the three-year maintenance program for the primary roads in the priority network. During the first year, this included rehabilitation or periodic maintenance of 915 km of roads (300 km paved, 615 km unpaved); during the two following years, the sections were to be determined as part of the overall road maintenance and rehabilitation program prepared by the programming system set up by the TSTAP (70.7 percent of the credit amount). A.2 Execution of a rural infrastructure maintenance program, including rehabilitating a 1,500 km section of the 10,952 km priority rural roads, and involving the beneficiaries in managing rural transport infrastructure, and A.3 Construction of two weighing stations, the first on the national highway RN3 at the exit of Douala, and the second on the national highway RN1 between Maltam and Kousseri (13.8 percent of the total for A2 and A3). Component B: Technical Assistance and Training - 4 - B.1 Technical Assistance and Training to support restructuring the MINTP and MINT, and to acquire computers and office equipment (4.4 percent of the total). B.2 The study and implementation of programs aimed at: l improving road safety l enhancing client capacity to supervise the execution of civil works in the transport sector l involving beneficiaries in rural road management l promoting participation of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in road maintenance l strengthening the capacity of the Directorate responsible for merchant shipping to deal with environmental issues l preparing the subsequent phases of the program (6.0 percent of the total). B.3 Surveys and seminars, particularly annual consultations between sector stakeholders, the Government, and donors (5.1 percent of the total). 3.4 Revised Components: Two amendments appended the Development Credit Agreement: First amendment (December 15, 1999) A third component was introduced, to cover the operating costs of the Transport Sector Program coordination unit. These costs were borne by the TSTAP until it closed in 1999, but it was agreed that the coordination unit was still needed for program monitoring and Project implementation, including support to Project activities in other units of the administration, such as the environmental and rural roads units. It is worth noting, however, that the cost of the civil service staff assigned to the coordination unit, including the coordinator, was always funded by the Government. A works subcomponent under component A was also added in this amendment to cover the cost of building offices. Second Amendment (2002) This work subcomponent for office building was never implemented and was finally withdrawn in this amendment, which also slightly modified categories allocation. The following table provides a synopsis of the reallocation of credit amounts in SDR between components and subcomponent in the initial DCA, following the second amendment and as spent at the closing date. - 5 - Components Original After 2nd Latest amendment Amount % km Amount % Amount % Km A Road maintenance and safety A 1 Paved and earth roads 29,530 70.7 915 31,500 75.5 31,601 75.8 1049 A 2 Rural roads and 5,740 13.8 1500 3,100 7.4 3,171 7.6 258 A 3 Weighing Stations B Technical Assistance and Training B 1 Restructuring of MINTP and 1,830 4.4 600 1.4 436 1.0 MINT B2 Studies, supervision, 2,490 6.0 5,500 13.2 5,392 12.9 sensitization, training, etc. B 3 Seminars and surveys 2,140 5.1 650 1.6 683 1.6 C PIU implementing costs 0 0 400 0.9 415 1.0 TOTAL 41,700 100 41,700 100 41,699 100 Fluctuation of the SDR/Euro exchange rate affected the two last road contracts, executed in 2002-2003 and expressed in Euros, which amounted to 15 percent of the TSP costs. As a result, the share of the Project that was supposed to be financed by IDA finally exceeded the allocated SDR amount. The balance, which was not foreseeable at the time of contract signing, was to be covered by the Government budget. 3.5 Quality at Entry: The quality at entry is rated satisfactory, but marginally so, for the following reasons: The Project objectives and the Program objectives more broadly, were in line with the Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, discussed by the Board in February 1996), which essentially aimed at improving the efficiency of the public sector, streamlining its finances, fostering an environment conducive to private sector development and poverty alleviation. The overall design of the project evolved adequately throughout project preparation so as to adjust to the country's readiness and ownership. At inception, the project covered the entire sector, was elaborate and complex, attempting to address the main issues of the whole transport sector and related activities, including road (trunk network, urban and rural), railway, maritime, and air transport, ports, State-owned enterprises, administrations, etc. At the time, its objectives dovetailed those of the Program. Broad institutional reforms were addressed, in addition to physical infrastructure, and road maintenance funding and execution. After the decision to separate adjustment and investment lending at the end of 1995, the final Project design was simplified to support administration reform and the various road sector components (paved roads, gravel roads, and rural roads). The design provided an adequate basis for achieving and monitoring project-related reforms, while benefiting from the earlier sector-wide project concept in terms of policy analysis. Three critical and courageous decisions were taken during the project preparation to adjust to evolving country context. First, the decision to discontinue the Project processing after the 1993 appraisal was courageous in acknowledging that conditions at the time would not permit realization of reforms objectives and that implementing the investment part of the project would run the risk of lack of counterpart funding. Second, the decision to resume project preparation in June, 1994, was justified by the concrete signs of Government's renewed commitment to sector reforms. Third, the decision to remove the adjustment part and limit the project scope to roads after the re-appraisal of 1995 was also appropriate: public finance in Cameroon were not ready for an adjustment lending, and the pace of reforms - 6 - was not fast enough to envisage easily reachable targets for tranche release. On the other hand, the approval of an investment project provided, within the long-term process of sector dialogue, a strong indication of the Bank support to the Government efforts to implement the reforms, especially in the road maintenance area. Narrowing the scope to the road sector, also took into account progress already achieved, which was not yet the case in other sub-sectors. The railway concession, for example, was not completed at the time of project appraisal, and include a railway component requiring a long processing time in the project would have badly affected the disbursement performance. The risks associated with implementing reforms were clearly identified. They were also largely mitigated, with the SAC III providing budget incentives, and other donors complemented IDA investment funding to reforming sub-sectors (EU supported road maintenance and road sector reforms, the TSTAP also supported restructuring of MINTP and MINT, and rural roads benefited from AFD and AfDB funding). Support from other projects and donors coupled with the Bank team's proactive behavior (transport and macro-economic units) made it possible to unleash all the synergy needed to meet the Program and Project objectives. The Bank sought the maximum financing rate to minimize the risk of lack of counterpart funds. Nevertheless, this risk briefly materialized at the inception and during the last two years of the project. The extremely high risk of insufficient allocation of funds for road maintenance was mitigated by the setup of specific deposit procedures, and quickly replaced by the Road Fund, which proved to be a very efficient way of significantly increasing the amounts allocated to road maintenance, which were multiplied by a factor of five in four years. The investment design and preparation relied on (low) Government capacities in a sector-wide context where the Bank and the Government had to focus more on reform implementation, and on gradually establishing the capacities needed by the administration. Project preparation used reputable international consulting firms for project design. In retrospect, the preparation of road subprojects could have been more detailed. The cost of one of the paved roads contract under the first phase was underestimated. The time lap of more than two years between the project appraisal mission and the launch of the bidding process partially explain this, because the roads kept on deteriorating and the volume of works became much larger than anticipated. The lack of specific unit in the government dedicated to rural roads at the time also probably explains the slow preparation of the component dedicated to this sub-sector. Similar shortcomings in technical design have been observed in other sector programs when the Client and the Borrower mostly focus on global institutional reform rather than technical definition of project components. The risk of delays in procurement was not addressed or mitigated, but was later covered in a Bank-supported Government-wide procurement reform. Environmental risks were probably underestimated considering the specifics of the country, but were addressed before credit effectiveness when the Bank required the Government to implement a specific plan, which included enhanced studies, control of environmental aspects of subprojects, and setting up, with technical assistance, of an Environment Protection Unit in the MINTP. The Project preparation probably should have better analyzed the schedule of implementation given the procurement constraints and the administration capacity. This would probably have avoided the need to restructure the project to have the credit fund the operating costs of the Coordination unit. Overall, the few weaknesses of the project detailed design are more than offset by the quality of the policy and reform content crafted during project preparation. The Bank adapted adequately to the country context and effectively designed a series of operations that efficiently supported the Government strategy. - 7 - 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The outcome of the Project is satisfactory, since most of the project objectives have been substantially achieved, as explained below. A summary of the Project objectives achievements and the TSP and other projects contributions to these are shown in Annex 1.2. Ø Objective (a): to support: (i) road maintenance; (ii) the preservation of the national road network; and (iii) road safety With regard to the sustainability and efficiency of road maintenance (objective (a), (i)), the project contributed to the set up of the Road Fund and the divestiture of the Government from road maintenance execution: l The Government progressively understood that efficient road maintenance would rather be done by private contractors than traditional Force Account. The main constraint for implementation was financing, as private companies, and specially SMEs, would not bear the risk of delayed government payment. This was the rationale for setting up a specific funding tool for road maintenance, the Road Fund. l Several years of dialogue were necessary before its setup, as the Bank and the Sector Ministries had to convince the IMF and the Ministry of Finance to derogate from strict budget pooling policy and elaborate specific disbursement procedures for the sector. For example, the Road Fund is not mentioned in the TSP SAR and DCA because no agreement with the Ministry of Finance had been reached at the time, though it was implicitly the only way to achieve the Project's main development objective. l The Road Fund was finally set up in 1998 to channel maintenance funds through the allocation of part of the fuel levy, named the road user charge. The Government has since effectively transferred each year the share of the transport fuel tax initially agreed upon. l The Road Fund was institutionally set up with a board where the private sector holds a majority of seats. It operates like a private entity. The Road Fund is essentially a tool that pays road maintenance contractors upon certification of work by the government agencies that supervise road maintenance. Total process usually takes about two weeks, compared with several months under the normal government budget processing. l Complete withdrawal of the Government from executing road maintenance works had been decided in 1997, and was not effective, contractors being unable to be paid on time, leading to several bankruptcies. The Road Fund setup completely changed the situation, and work programs have run according to plans ever since. The results of the scheme are very impressive, as reflected in the sums mobilized and applied towards road maintenance through the Road Fund, mostly executed by SMEs, and mentioned in the table below. Such totals are by far higher than the amounts provided for in the SAR. It should be noted that road maintenance expenses before the start of the project were between US$ 2 and US$ 7 million per year, compared with more than US$ 30 million annually since 1999-2000. - 8 - Financial year Budgets Income (including RUR) Commitments Payments 1998-1999 15.00 12.00 (12.00) 11.50 4.90 1999-2000 20.00 20.70 (19.90) 25.80 17.51 2000-2001 22.00 20.20 (18.80) 32.40 30.33 2001-2002 26.00 24.30 (21.47) 23.20 26.54 Transitory 2002 (½ year) 13.00 11.32 (9.91) 12.39 8.79 2003 26.00 23.94 (22.55) 20.00 18.57 TOTAL 122.00 112.46 125.29 106.64 (108.87) The current funding now allows for the routine maintenance of 20,000 km of roads, against a SAR target of 10,000. In terms of protecting the road network, project objectives were strengthened by effectively implementing a strategy to control axle load on major roads. The investment carried out for the rehabilitation of the trunk paved and gravel network directly contributed to objective (a) (ii), as it fixed nearly 1,000 km, which represent 5 percent of the priority network. It is a significant contribution to the upgrading of the road network, as it is still considered that more than 60 percent of it is in bad condition. The project also contributed to improved road safety (objective (a) (iii)) through its impact on road condition, and the setup of databases to monitor road condition and accidents. However, no real statistical follow-up supported this contention due to lack of Government resources to cover recurring costs of data collection, which diminished the project impact. Contribution of the project to attain objective (a) was twofold. Directly, the project contributed to training and capacity building both in the ministries and with contractors. Indirectly, it eased acceptability of reforms by providing rehabilitation of 5 percent of the network, so that Government funds could be targeted towards maintenance rather than rehabilitation. Within project supervision, the Road Fund setup and the divestiture from maintenance were the main dialogue subjects between the Government and the Bank, which threatened to suspend the project if the Road Fund was not implemented. The Project DO rating was restored as satisfactory only when the Government finally set it up at the end of 1998. Other donors contributed to this objective, namely the EU with the PERFED I and II programs, which provided assistance to the ministry of works in contract management and direct funding to the Road Fund. The SAC III project also contributed as the Road Fund setup (which had been accepted in principle by the IMF at the time) was one of the conditions of the first transport tranche release. Objective (b): to support the Borrower's gradual retrenchment from the execution of road maintenance by: (i) promoting the participation of small and medium enterprises; (ii) transferring public equipment leasing activities; and (iii) developing the use of labor-intensive methods As mentioned above, this objective was also achieved, since the Government ceased executing road maintenance in 1997. However, the "real start" of effective maintenance under private sector execution started with the Road Fund. Given the average unit amount of maintenance contracts chosen by the Government (US$136,000), the new policy favored SMEs development. More than 200 SMEs currently operate in the sector and absorb most - 9 - of the maintenance funding, compared with less than 50 at the beginning of the project. International firms operate only on some sections of the trunk network that are contracted out under three-year contracts. The number of SMEs using non-mechanized, labor-intensive methods has increased proportionally, although the strategy pursued by the Government and supported by donors has since evolved in favor of techniques optimized for each type of network, taking into account local contexts, and the fact that labor-intensive methods are just one possible means of mixing labor-based and mechanized techniques. The project provided direct contribution to achieving this objective through its restructuring and technical assistance sections. Ø Objective (c): to revise the transport sector institutional framework by: (i) restructuring the Ministry of Public Works (MINTP) and shifting its role in road maintenance from the execution by force accounts into subcontracting of works, planning, and supervision; (ii) restructuring the Ministry of Transport (MINT) and focusing its role on planning, policy development and regulation; and (iii) increasing private sector and beneficiary participation in transport management Restructuring both the MINTP and MINT, and the contracting out of road maintenance works to private companies achieved institutional reform project objectives. i) The MINTP was effectively restructured to include a specific planning unit and a rural roads unit. Divestiture from road maintenance execution was achieved in 1997, and the ministry staff has so far focused on supervision of works. Even if the objective is achieved as compared to the situation at the beginning of the project, strengthening is still needed in terms of planning, programming, and above all monitoring functions, as the latter currently relies largely on EU funded technical assistance, which is due to end in late 2004. However, this remaining agenda is not unusual, and in keeping with road reform patterns observed in other countries. ii) The MINT was restructured and now focuses on planning and policy regulation. All the sub-sector specific laws have been updated, and a directorate for planning created, which supports the Government in policy formulation and implementation. It would still need support to produce sector works comparable with international standards, but already provides a service that did not exist at all before the project. iii) The objective of supporting private sector participation in sector management was achieved, particularly in regard to road maintenance and all transport services. As stated above, the number of Cameroonian SMEs have multiplied fourfold, consultant firms have sprung up, and the annual turnover of private local contractors in the road sector is probably over US$ 50 million, since more than US$ 30 million are consumed by routine maintenance and nearly US$ 20 million by rehabilitation of rural roads through the HIPC funds. This does not take into account the impact of urban road maintenance and other donor-funded projects on SMEs activities. The same turnover in 1996 was probably close to eight times lower (that is, less than US$ 7 million for maintenance, and almost no investment) - 10 - As mentioned earlier, the Project and the Program objective of protecting the environment (objective (d) of the Project) was achieved since Cameroon now has a good legal and regulatory framework for environmental and resettlement impacts of the transport sector, and has established an Environmental Protection Unit (CPE) inside the MINTP that operates efficiently and is adequately funded by the Government. 4.2 Outputs by components: Component A (road maintenance and road safety) Refer to the tables in Annex 2 on costs and detail of road sections included in Component A. Subcomponent A1. Priority network This subcomponent dealt with the rehabilitation or periodic maintenance of a number of roads on the priority network. It was to be executed in two phases: Phase one was supposed to be for the first year of the project and comprised: l The rehabilitation of 615 km of earth roads (estimated to cost CFA 9 billion, including taxes). Its actual execution concerned 663 km for a roughly equivalent final cost. l Periodic maintenance or heavy rehabilitation works on 300 km of paved roads (initially estimated to cost CFA 11.4 billion, including taxes). Actual execution concerned 386 km for a final cost of CFA 16.2 billion (VAT excluded), far higher than the initially envisioned program. The difference is explained by one contract: the heavy rehabilitation of the Kékem-Banjoun mountain road (74 km, traveled by nearly 4,000 vehicles per day) cost CFA 11.2 billion instead of the CFA 4.9 billion initially earmarked. Two years passed between design (appraised in 1995) and tendering, the design included in the tender documents probably not reflecting the road condition. Additionally, some bidders underestimated the cost and the contract had to be re-attributed after the failure of the lowest technically qualified bidder, whose bid was close to the initial estimate, but who finally refused to undertake the job due to fear of heavy losses. This added six more months to the process, and the selected bidder further obtained an increase in the amount of his contract, which was justified by the road technical condition. Phase two dealt with the same type of works for the second and third years of the project, and was supposed to be designed during the first year. An amount of CFA 6.5 billion (including taxes) was initially projected to rehabilitate other unidentified priority gravel roads and CFA 3 billion (including taxes) were earmarked for the rehabilitation of unidentified paved roads. Due to the slippage in costs for the first phase (CFA 5 billion), as well as the time needed to undertake it, the second phase did not get underway until 2000, and dealt with constructing bridges, sanitation and drainage systems, as well as paving the steep slopes of the Bamenda-Wum (25 km) and Nyamboya-Banyo (32 km) roads, for a total cost of CFA 7.7 billion, (VAT exclusive), which was close to CFA 127 million per kilometer (including bridges), normal figures given the area's mountainous conditions. No additional rehabilitation of gravel roads was done due to lack of resources. Subcomponent A2: rural roads (works). The project aimed at rehabilitating 1,500 km of rural roads for CFA 5.5 billion (including taxes) without any prior study. However, given the initially inaccurate estimate and the necessary credit fund reduction for this component due to the above mentioned cost slippage in Subcomponent A1, only 258 km in the Northwest (CFA 3.1 billion VAT exclusive) were financed by the IDA credit in addition to the technical studies and sensitization campaigns for regional programs in the Central and Southern provinces. The rest of the 1,500 km program was finally funded with HIPC resources - 11 - in 2001-2002, while programs funded by other donors covered part of the other regions. The unit cost per kilometer of rehabilitation/construction work in the Northwest averages CFA 11.9 million without VAT. This amount is justified by the fact that the region is mountainous, densely populated, with a heavy rainfall. Subcomponent A3: construction of two weighing stations. Due to lack of resources, the component was ultimately not funded by the Project but by the Government. The axle load policy, including contracting out station management to a private firm, was well implemented and additional stations were either rehabilitated or constructed with the support of the European Union (six are now in operation). The fines for overloading, defined within the CEMAC framework, are partially allocated to the Road Fund. Component B: Technical Assistance and Training Sub-component B1. Support to the restructuring of two ministries, including specialized training of MINT and MINTP staff. MINTP: The project helped set up the planning unit as well as the rural roads unit, through equipment (including traffic survey), technical assistance and capacity building. Both units are now operating without support, and have been able to develop investment plans and a first round of rehabilitation works under the HIPC initiative, which is a significant improvement from the situation before the project where no donor funded implementation was possible without the creation of ad hoc structures. In terms of project inputs, particularly successful was the implementation of an eighteen-month training course on road maintenance management for civil servants, private contractor staff and consultants, by the Yaoundé School of Public Works, in collaboration with the Lyon School of Public Works, to familiarize the entire sector community with road maintenance operations after reforms. This training course is now self-funded by tuition fees and Government support. MINT: The component supported the creation of a directorate for planning and policy design, including the creation of a transport observatory. This is a significant improvement since the Ministry previously had no policy planning tool. The observatory still provides data, though it is no longer funded by the project. The projected activities also included digitizing of transport documents on a pilot basis. Though this operation had encouraging results, it was not extended and its sustainability could not be secured due to lack of funding by the Government, and probably to vested interests. Sub-component B2: studies and supervision. This included design studies on the road investment program and supervision of works (CFA 3.2 billion, VAT exclusive), and a traffic survey (CFA 426 million, VAT exclusive). It also supported the preparation of the rural roads strategy, including a participatory approach to select some 800 km of rural roads for rehabilitation, as well as sensitization and training of the population in road maintenance. The design and implementation of the pilot steps of this new rural roads strategy cost over US$ 1 million (CFA 560 million, VAT exclusive), and its investment part had to be implemented with HIPC resources earmarked for funding rehabilitation of such roads. This implementation has now started and the 800 km identified for rehabilitation have been contracted to bidders. This sub-component also funded part of the Program's environmental strengthening, including formulating environment sector guidelines, and providing training and technical assistance (over US$ 1 million) to CPE staff. The CPE recorded satisfactory results, which explains why other donor-funded projects now turn to it for advice. The costs of the rural road strategy implementation and environmental unit strengthening exceeded preparation estimates, since it was not foreseen at the time that these two processes would require complete project support. - 12 - Sub-component B3. "seminars and surveys" essentially comprised seminars organized along several themes: restructuring the Douala port, public/private sector partnerships, land transport, privatization of the railways, SMEs participation in road maintenance, procurement, road network management, etc. These actions were in line with those initiated within the framework of the TSTAP to enhance ownership of sector reforms. They allowed for secured participation by all stakeholders in the reform process. The third component was added in 1999 to cover recurring TSP coordination unit expenses after the TSTAP closed. It also covered technical assistance costs of the road component executing agency. Total expenses exceeded US$ 1 million over a period of four year and half. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: The detailed economic analysis is provided in Annex 3. Economic rates of return were calculated using the cost-benefit method with a 12 percent discount rate. First component (A1 - A2)/First phase: Rehabilitation of part of the priority network The rate of return of the entire road component fell from 74 percent at appraisal to 58 percent during the mid-term review. This drop was due to a significant increase in program costs (specifically, advanced deterioration of roads due to late work starts) and the relatively low level of traffic. This component remains largely profitable and generates significant non-quantifiable benefits: l Part of the time savings cannot be strictly accounted for, such as the increased availability of roads that used to be totally undriveable during some seasons; l improved land access; l Improvement of safety conditions leading to a decrease in accidents caused by a given road's condition, and; l employment generation through sustained road maintenance. First component(A1-A2) /Second phase: Paving of steep slopes This phase was not identified at appraisal. The final rates of return are relatively low because of the low level of traffic, but are still above 15 percent. Paving steep slopes made it possible to curb road deterioration in this mountainous area. Most of the above mentioned non-quantifiable benefits also apply to these sections. Second component: Rehabilitation of rural roads in the Northwest province Rural roads were not selected at appraisal. According to the SAR, the average rate of return for maintenance works on the entire priority rural network was 36 percent against 52.3 percent for the Northwest. The final rates of return for these roads are in this range, much higher than 12 percent for eight sections out of nine. Traffic on many of the roads was far above forecasts and had a major impact on local development. A sharp drop in vehicle operating costs, travel time, transport fares, and a better access to market for agricultural products have, all combined, enabled users and neighboring population to substantially improve their living conditions. A quantitative assessment of the social impact of the project was not carried out. However, a qualitative evaluation on the basis of data provided by the Program's national coordination unit and the Project - 13 - Mid-Term Review is presented as an attachment to Annex 3 and shows highly significant access impacts for both the rehabilitated rural roads and the priority network. 4.4 Financial rate of return: Not Applicable 4.5 Institutional development impact: The Project's impact on institutional development is substantial. Road maintenance funding and execution. The project helped the adoption of legislative and regulatory instruments related to sector reforms (such as Road Fund law and implementation decrees, and regulations organizing the two ministries). The main project legacy will be the set up of the Road Fund and the withdrawal of Government from road maintenance works, as explained in paragraph 4.1. The Road Fund was established and is now functioning. SMEs have developed; more than 200 are now operating in the sector, compared with fewer than 50 before the beginning of the project. Collection of the road user charge through the fuel levy is effective. A share of the proceeds from road tolls and fines for overloading trucks are allocated to the Road Fund. The MINTP has completely withdrawn from road works, now handled by private contractors selected through competitive bidding. Tender boards were reformed to give authority to decentralized or sector-specific boards, which resulted in improving procurement timing and transparency, though the process duration can still be considerably speeded up. The current system now allows for the maintenance of 80 percent of the priority network, which is comparable to Kenya, but much more efficient than countries like Tanzania (funding covering 40 percent of priority needs in 2002) or most West African countries like Côte d'Ivoire (before the crisis) Mali or Senegal. The payment system is probably one of the most efficient Africa-wide. As indicated in paragraph 4.1, it is not easy to measure the extent of the project contribution to this reform, compared to other projects like TSTAP and SAC III. With both, the project provided a very strong incentive and encouragement to the Government by de facto acknowledging progress already made. The covenants to the mandatory allocation of road maintenance funds in the credit agreement as well as the unsatisfactory rating of the Project DO until the end of 1998 also reinforced the pressure to find a reliable maintenance funding system, which led to the Road Fund. The dilapidated condition of the main network also implied that users would not get to view the results of maintenance reform if part of it was not previously rehabilitated. By rehabilitating 5 percent of the priority network, the project contributed to taxpayer acceptance of the need to maintain road assets. This problem is now surfacing again, since a significant part of the rehabilitation was beyond Government and donor capacities, leading to an increase in the number of roads needing complete reconstruction. Finally, the training and capacity building carried out under the project contributed directly to the reinforcement of the administration and the SMEs. Administrations reform. MINTP and MINT were restructured through the project to include planning or programming departments, which improved their capacity to formulate sector policy. The MINTP is now well equipped to design both investment and maintenance programs. These restructurings still appear fragile, as capacities remain relatively low and, in the case of MINTP, partially dependent on external technical assistance. This is, however, quite comparable to other countries like Kenya or Côte d'Ivoire after their own sector reforms. Countries that have tried to improve their contract management skills often opted for the creation of specific autonomous agencies. Planning functions, that usually remains with the Government administration, show the same weaknesses as observed in Cameroon, their sustainable improvement being usually a challenge. - 14 - Institutional development of rural roads management. A rural road Unit was set up to manage rural road programs, which helped implement the HIPC-funded rural road rehabilitation strategy (little funding was available before the HIPC initiative was launched). The new Ministry organization currently under preparation plans to upgrade it into a Rural Roads Directorate. A rural road maintenance strategy was also designed, based on community participation and labor-intensive methods. This strategy was relying on the communities being empowered to manage their own infrastructure. It is not yet effective as the decentralization laws, which would give adequate responsibilities to local communities, are still pending, but the government has prepared interim measures to continue the strategy implementation. Environmental management. The CPE, established as part of the project, was staffed and provided with the equipment and the necessary training to monitor all transport infrastructure projects. It has kept its efficiency after the project funding ended, and compares with the most efficient of such units in the continent. Adequate supervision of the CPE by the Ministry in charge of Environment will have to be ensured so that it adapts to the evolution of environmental regulations. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: Fluctuations in world oil prices and the price of most of Cameroon export products (coffee, banana, vegetables, timber, rubber, cattle, etc.) as well as fluctuations in the CFA exchange rate have had an impact on the country's revenues and expenditures. This is especially true for transport fuel, which impacts on road traffic, hence, road user fee revenues, and led to the stagnation of Road Fund resources since 2000. With regard to the physical investments in the project, upward fluctuations in the price of bitumen and equipment export insurance cost for foreign contractors (such as the French COFACE, which raised its rates for Central Africa following unrest in other countries), also had an impact on the cost of road works. The exchange rate between the SDR and the CFA went up and down throughout the project's duration, finally resulting in additional requirements for counterpart funding to cover the last road contracts costs. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: Factors affecting the project and under Government control had contrasting effects, including: l Political will to implement reforms. Just after the start of the project, the Government adopted the method of completely contracting out road maintenance and set up the Road Fund, which almost immediately permitted achievement of the project's major objectives, and subsequently helped their consolidation; l Inter-ministerial coordination. Implementation of the rural roads strategy designed under the project was not finalized due to delays in broader decentralization reforms. Nevertheless, good coordination was observed in setting up the Road Funds between Finance and Public Works administrations; l Allocation of counterpart funds: Non-payment of counterpart funds with two years in arrears at the end of the project comes after four consecutive years during which the Government had been able to keep its commitments; l Policy adjustment to the sector situation: The Government did not react to post-2001 stagnating Road Fund resources, while needs were well identified and growing, nor did it modify its financial framework, thereby hampering progress in maintaining the road network as a priority and blocking any expansion of the latter. Instead, it waited until early 2004 to prepare new texts to make the system more sustainable; l Procurement policy. The procurement system was reformed during the project period, leading to improvements but likely with a still significant margin to reduce processing time. - 15 - 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: The implementing agencies include the MINT (Directorate of Land Transport) and MINTP (Direction des Routes, DR). In fact, the TSP Coordination Unit, together with the two Departments, acted as implementing agency for the institutional and monitoring components of the project, the DR being responsible for the road components. Delays by the DR in implementing road components due to inadequate capacity caused the Bank to request, at the mid-term review, that specific units be established to supervise both road investment and rural roads. The measures taken at that time led to efficient implementation of the project during the end of the first and the second phase. 5.4 Costs and financing: The total Program cost was estimated at US$ 722.7 million, including taxes, and was funded by the Government, and some parastatals (port and airport authorities), the European Union, the AfDB, France, Germany, Japan (port), and IDA. The final implementation, and associated costs and results are difficult to assess since some donors, such as the AfDB, granted funds in 1990, whereas other contributions, such as the AFD assistance to the airport sector, which was supposed to back an efficient concessionaire, were ultimately cancelled. Finally, the additional resources generated by the HIPC initiative could not be taken into account at the start of the Program (1990) and the Project (1996). The total Project cost was estimated at US$ 87.6 million, taxes included (CFA 44.2 billion). Of this amount, US$ 60.7 million (SDR 41.7 million or CFA 30.6 billion) was to be provided by IDA, and US$ 26.9 million (CFA 13.6 billion) by the Government. At the end of the project, costs totaled US$ 77.4 million (CFA 50.3 billion), with US$ 56.4 million (CFA 36.3 billion or 41.7 million SDR) coming from IDA credit and US$21 million (CFA 14 billion) from the Government. Fluctuations in the CFA/US$/SDR exchange rates caused the final CFA amount to increase by 14 percent, and in dollars to drop by 13 percent, although, as indicated above, the total SDR amount was disbursed. Government counterpart contribution increased by more than US$ 0.5 million following fluctuations of the SDR-Euro exchange rate mentioned in paragraph 3.4 in the last year of the project, increasing the funding gap experienced by the project at its end. Alterations to the amounts earmarked for different categories resulted from the underestimated 1995 cost of a single paved works contract and of the rural roads component, coupled with delays in the start of some works, leading to the deterioration of the roads slated for rehabilitation. Similarly, the costs (US$ 2 million) of supporting the implementation of the rural roads and environmental protection strategies, which were higher than projected, impacted the consulting services category. Towards the end of the project, the Government failed to allocate the counterpart funds, part of which is explained by the unforeseen drop of the US $/Euro parity. The Government has not yet mobilized enough funds to meet its initial commitments or cover the additional required amounts. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Sustainability of the project's impact is considered likely. It is very likely for most of the reforms linked to the project. The execution of road maintenance works by private contractors is obviously more efficient than the previous system and is not contested. The private sector is now well developed and, given its impact on job creation, constitutes an economic asset for the Government. - 16 - Sustainability of the Ministries reorganization is likely. The Government does not intend to go back to managing transport operations and will probably limit its intervention to regulation and sector policies. However, planning and contract management capacities in MINTP need to be strengthened, as detailed in the following paragraph. Sustainability of the project's achievements in funding road maintenance and managing the road network is likely but needs to be strengthened and developed given the time necessary for the administration to undertake long-term changes, and the adjustments necessary to cope with the evolution of the network. However, sustainability of the rural roads strategy is uncertain because the legal framework for decentralization is not in place, and the current one does not yet allow councils to take over rural roads maintenance. The Community Development Program, to which the Bank contributes through the eponymous project, considers this strategy as the base for rural road maintenance, but does not foresee specific support as it focuses on infrastructure rehabilitation and community institutions. The MINTP is currently proposing an interim strategy to provide adequate support to the rural road maintenance, but it will however depend on questionable budget allocations to the various stakeholders, and the communities' willingness to participate to maintenance in kind or in cash has not been tested on a large scale. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: Even if they are impressive, the project results should now be deepened in three areas. First, the scheme still secures only the maintenance of 80 percent of the whole priority network (20,000 out of 25,000 km) and only part of the main urban roads. To improve this situation would require an increase of the share of the petroleum tax allocated to the Road Fund, and the allocation of other road transport related revenues to the Fund. Second, maintenance and rehabilitation planning, as well as contract management should be improved, as maintenance contracting is now often handled with technical assistance from the EU, expiring late in 2004, and donor funded rehabilitation are usually supervised by ad hoc units. Maintenance contracts, specially for the trunk roads, still offer few quality incentives. The government is contemplating (i) to open a second window for the Road Fund to improve payment process on rehabilitation works, and (ii) to study opportunities for setting up a roads agency, reinforcing planning capacities and new types of long-term performance-based maintenance contracts. However, past history of reform in Cameroon and experience gained in other countries show that donor support is needed to implement these reforms given the vested interests to overcome within the administration. All stakeholders (donors and government) are urging the World Bank to continue leading this dialogue as it did under the Transport Sector Program. Third, funding needs for investment in the priority road network and rural roads will still require donor support, even taking into account additional resources from the HIPC initiative. Studies currently being carried out highlight the need for continued external funding to "save" the priority network: for more than 60 percent of the network, securing current maintenance needs will not be enough to keep roads passable given their already bad condition. The current CAS does not provide for a new project in Transport, though a PRSC in FY06 may be targeting the sector among others. Meanwhile, support for trunk roads may also be partially provided through regional infrastructure projects in the CEMAC zone, but to maintain a form of dialogue and technical assistance will probably be key to secure the outcomes of the project. - 17 - 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: The Bank performance during the project preparation was generally considered satisfactory, but with some shortcomings. Consistency and perseverance existed in pursuit of the approach adopted - sector studies, technical assistance, sector investment program, structural adjustment, and investment projects - coupled with the proactive nature of World Bank teams on the reform agenda, which made it possible to gradually support significant reforms. The Bank also took several difficult and retrospectively accurate decisions, first, to postpone the project in late 1993, and then to split it between adjustment and investment in 1996. Bank staff had good knowledge of the inherent problems and difficulties as well as solutions. Some of the technical aspects of project preparation could have been improved, specifically the scheduling of phases 1 and 2 of the road investment component. It would also have been easier to monitor fewer and clearer project indicators. 7.2 Supervision: The Bank performance with regard to supervision was generally considered satisfactory. Such appreciation is supported by efficient teamwork between the macro-economic group and the transport team, who reviewed the macro-economic and reform aspects for the former, and the technical aspects for the latter. The continuity of the teams, their constitution, proactivity, the Bank support, the extensive and open dialogue as well as the frequency of the various missions all played a major role in implementing the project. Procurement was closely monitored. Periodic meetings and consultations were held with other donors, which ensured coherence of support and actions, and increased collaboration in implementing reforms. The Mid-Term Review took adequate measures to reinforce project management. While focusing on project implementation arrangements, it may have missed an opportunity to revisit the Project objectives and align them more clearly with the components and to review the performance indicators. Project supervision led to two reviews by the QAG in July 1999 and October 2002. The findings of both reviews were satisfactory for the quality of project supervision. The project, handed to five successive project managers during the supervision phase, was not disturbed by this turnover, thanks probably to the stable interface with the resident mission in Yaoundé. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: The overall performance of the Bank is considered satisfactory, based on its preparation and supervision ratings. The Bank played a critical role in helping the Government achieve its ambitious objectives. The Bank's impact on the Program can also be considered as an added positive item in its performance rating, particularly in the privatization of a major part of transport activities, the significant positive changes in the management and maintenance of the road network, and the improvement in transport services and infrastructure. The way the Bank slowly phased its support to the transport sector through several instruments, including this project, is one of the main reasons for its success. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The Borrower preparation performance is rated satisfactory despite long periods of time consumed by studying reforms and formulating the sector policy letter. These delays were partly justified by the very sensitive nature of some reforms. The complexity of the Program and the Project (before limitations to the road sector) have already been noted. Many reforms were formalized during the conclusion of the project preparation. It should be noted that the Government took the responsibility to pay, from its own budget, compensations arising from lay-offs of staff from companies liquidated, privatized or restructured. - 18 - 7.5 Government implementation performance: The report describes Government implementation performance as unsatisfactory, but with several very positive aspects. Reform implementation was highly significant, even if it was sometimes characterized by cumbersome, bureaucratic, and long procedures. The slowness of the Central Tender Board delayed procurement but was subsequently reformed. The main reason for this rating is that Government counterpart funds were not made available during the last two years of the project. At the time this report was drafted, this problem was still unsolved. Most of the other current IDA credits to Cameroon currently face the same situation. 7.6 Implementing Agency: The report describes the Implementation Agency's performance as satisfactory. The Program coordination unit, which had already managed the TSTAP, had the necessary experience to implement the institutional components. With regard to physical components, setting up specialized units inside the Directorate for Roads at the mid-term review made it possible to implement the project within reasonable time limits, in spite of the one-year extension of the credit closure deadline. Quarterly reports, financial statements, audits, and other documents were produced on time. The CPE and the Rural Roads Unit erected within the framework of the Project effectively carried out their functions. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: The Borrower performance is rated generally satisfactory, with a caveat because of the non-compliance with its commitments concerning counterpart funds. The substantial achievements of the project, the efficiency of the implementing agencies, and the linked success of the road sector program more than compensate the counterpart funding difficulties. 8. Lessons Learned The main lessons of the Program and the Project could be the following: l A good combined effort by the IDA macro-economic and transport sector teams and a real dialogue with the Government, leading to firm commitments from the latter, can make possible the undertaking of vast reform programs. The gradual implementation of reforms requires a sustained dialogue with, and support to, the sector and the support of various instruments on the part of IDA. The TSP, Transport Sector Memorandum, TSTAP , SAC III, and, lastly, Railway Concession Project made it possible to have a global and long-term vision of the sector and to ensure continuity of implementation. l More specifically, the complementary relationship between the adjustment and investment lending can ensure the success of sector wide reforms. The investment provides a direct benefit to the sector undertaking the reforms, whereas the adjustment provides incentive to the Government as a whole to carry them on. The port and air transport services reforms, which were not supported by an investment credit, respectively, took long to implement and was not implemented, partially due to lack of incentives that would directly benefit the sector. l The Bank needs to coordinate all its support and insure that the Government will not design conflicting schedules in strategies implementation: the rural roads strategy, for example, has not been rendered sustainable so far because it interfered with much broader decentralization issues that could not be dealt with at a pace compatible with the project. l The organization of road maintenance and the sustainability of its funding requires a gradual approach. - 19 - Though the results achieved are laudable and in accordance with the objectives set during Project appraisal, they need to be enhanced and adapted to the current context with regard to both the method of financing the Road Fund and the organization of public services responsible for road management, which calls for continuous improvement and Bank support. l A solid framework shared with other donors with good coordination, coupled with a large stakeholders involvement, is key to generating positive outcomes for reforms. This strategy was at the basis of the initial discussions with the Government on the formulation of transport sector reforms, and was also fully applied to the road sector covered by the Project. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: (b) Cofinanciers: (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): 10. Additional Information - 20 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 1.1 Output Indicators : Transport Sector Project Indicator/Matrix Projected in SAR Latest Estimate Kms of paved roads rehabilited 300 km of paved roads 386 km of paved roads rehabilitated Kms of earth roads rehabilited 615 km of earth roads 663 of earth roads rehabilitated Kms of high ramps paved Pavement of 30kms out of 65 kms of high ramp roads paved Rural roads: Degree of satisfaction of beneficiaries / a survey was conducted: beneficiaries are pleased with better access to transportation, hospitals, schools and markets, improvement in living conditions, decrease in goods price, increase of small new manufacturers in the villages Rural roads: Level of involvement of beneficiaries in / Strategy under development; NGOs are still working on rural road maintenance sensitization, training on maintenance. The risks of not achieving this objective are high. A Decree is being prepared for local committees to propose workable arrangements Kms of roads maintained about 10,000 kms 21,000 km Average cost of road maintenance by contract US$136,000 by contract Funds allocated to the Road Maintenance Fund, Not agreed at time of negotiation A cumulative total amount of CFAF 76.9 billions deposited on deposited on the SA and disbursed (Road Fund not established) the SA and CFAF 76.2 billions disbursed during the 4 years Road maintenance funding of less 1998-2002, pace sustained afterwards than 4 billion CFA/year before 1996 Traffic on roads maintained or rehabilitated under the Not available Average traffic of 4,000 to 5,000 cars/day project Average number of road maintenance contracts signed not defined 245 contracts/year with local small and medium enteprises/year Number of men/d generated by road maintenance not defined 135,000 men/month contracts Distribution between foreign and local contractors of 60% SME, 17% international and 10% of the resources went to foreign contractors, 90% to local resources allocated to road maintenance 23% force account after four years contractors, force account abandoned since 1997. (cf road maintenance government divestiture strategy, 1996) - 21 - Appendix 1.2 Assessment of project objectives Project objectives Sub-objectives Components of the TSP Other projects that Qualitative assessment of supporting the sub-objective contributed in attaining the outcome (Section 3.1) objective/sub-objective IDA Others a) Support road maintenance A1 and A2 (Rehabilitation TSTAP, AFD, AfDB, Attained. Funding and /maintenance of major roads SAC III EU management to be consolidated and rural infrastructure) preservation of existing A1, A2 AFD, AfDB, Attained. (new rural roads infrastructure (Rehabilitation/maintenance of EU maintenance strategy major roads and rural developed, but awaiting infrastructure), A3 (Setting-up instruments on decentralisation weighing stations) and B2 to go operational) (Rural roads maintenance strategy) road safety B1 (Reorganisation of MINTP, Improved monitoring but MINT ­ setting-up monitoring serious deterioration of results bodies) (2001: 1512 deaths as against 944 in 1996) b) Support gradual encouraging the A1, A2 (Involvement of SMEs TSTAP EU Attained (the majority of Road withdrawal of participation of small-and in maintenance works), B3 maintenance works carried out Borrower from the medium-sized enterprises (Seminars on SME participation by SMEs) execution of in road maintenance) maintenance works by: transferring public Activity not transferred, but equipment leasing activities sector opened to the private sector developing the use of A1, A2 (Use of such techniques EU, GTZ Attained (use of such labour intensive techniques to carry out maintenance works) techniques by SMEs) c) Review the transport reorganising the B1 (Reorganisation of MINTP), TSTAP, FAC Attained (but capacity building sector institutional Ministry of Public Works B3 (Seminars on the SME SAC III in planning, programming and framework by: (MINTP), by withdrawing participation in road monitoring of contracts in the from the execution of road maintenance) sector not yet finalised) maintenance works, and focusing on planning, programming and supervision duties, and contracting maintenance works to enterprises reorganising the B1 (Reorganisation of MINT) TSTAP, FAC Attained (but need for capacity Ministry of Transport (MINT) SAC III building in planning, by refocusing its role on programming as well as planning, policy development monitoring means) and regulation increasing the B2 and B3 (Sensitisation of TSTAP, SAC III Attained participation of the private people on the new rural roads sector and beneficiaries in the maintenance strategy; seminars management of transport on public sector/private sector activities partnership and participation of SMEs in road maintenance) - 22 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Costs by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Project component Appraisal Revised Actual/Latest Percentage of Percentage of revised Estimate Estimate Estimate Appraisal allocation Part A: Road Maintenance and Safety A.1 Rehabilitation and maintenance of 65,91 65,73 59,98 91% 91% Priority Roads Network (paved and earth roads) A.2 Rehabilitation and maintenance of Rural 10,89 5,39 5,62 52% 104% roads and A.3 Construction of 2 weighing stations Part B: Training and Technical Assistance B.1 Training, Technical assistance for the 3,28 1,03 0,79 24% 77% reorganization of MINTP and MINT, acquisition of computers, building of offices B.2 Studies, design and programs' 4,22 8,65 8,86 210% 102% implementation B.3 Surveys and seminars 3,32 0,93 0,98 30% 105% Part C: Project Implementation, 0 0,54 1,14 0 211% Management and Monitoring TOTAL 87,6 82,3 77,4 88% 94% Civil Works Costs (in US$ million equivalent) Civil Works Appraisal estimate Latest Estimate IDA FIRST TRANCHE Paved Roads Kekem-Bandjoun 9.7 20.5 Douala-Edoua-Pouma 4.4 2.8 Garoua-Maroua 8.3 6.3 Additional Rehabilitation 6.0 Total 28.4 29.6 Earth Roads Bamenda-Wum 1.6 2.34 Nanga-Eboko-Mbet-Mbouam 4.2 4.7 Ngaoundere-Meiganga-Garoua-Boulai 7.2 5.5 Kumba-Loum 1.6 1.2 Nyamboya-Banyo 3.0 2.9 Remaining of the priority I roads 12.7 / Total 30.4 16.2 IDA SECOND TRANCHE 7.1 14.1 Undefined at appraisal 7.1 / High ramp section of Nyamboya- Banyo 7.8 road High ramp section of Bamenda-Wum road 6.3 RURAL ROADS IDA program 10.9 5.6 - 23 - Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements: Appraisal Estimate (in US$ million equivalent) Expenditure Category Procurement Method/1 ICB NCB Other NBF/2 Total Cost 1 Civil Works 1a Paved Roads 28.4 / / / 28.4 (17.9) (17.9) 1b Earth Roads 35 2.5 / / 37.5 (23.3) (1.7) (25) 1c Rural Roads / 10.9 / / 10.9 (8.4) (8.4) 2 Goods 0.9 0.2 / / 1.1 (0.8) (0.2) (1.0) 3 Consultant services 3a Training and technical / / 2.2 / 2.2 assistance (1.7) (1.7) 3b Studies, design and / / 4.2 / 4.2 implementation of programs (3.7) (3.7) 4 Surveys and seminars / / 3.3 / 3.3 (3.1) (3.1) TOTAL 64.3 13.6 9.7 0 87.6 (42.0) (10.3) (8.5) (60.7) Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements: Latest Estimate (in US$ million equivalent) Expenditure Category Procurement Method/1 ICB NCB Other NBF/2 Total Cost 1 Civil Works 1a Paved Roads 29.6 / / / 29.6 (20.6) (20.6) 1b Earth Roads 30.6 0.0 / / 30.6 (22.3) (0.0) (22.3) 1c Rural Roads 5.6 0.0 / / 5.6 (4.2) (0.0) (4.2) 2 Goods 0.0 0.2 / / 0.2 (0.0) (0.2) (0.2) 3 Consultant services 3a Training and technical assistance / / 0.4 / 0.4 (0.4) (0.4) 3b Studies, design and / / 8.9 / 8.9 implementation of programs (7.3) (7.3) 4 Surveys and seminars / / 1.0 / 1.0 (0.9) (0.9) 5 Incremental operating cost / / 1.1 / 1.1 (0.5) (0.5) TOTAL 65.8 0.2 11.4 0 77.4 (47.1) (0.2) (9.1) (56.4) 1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies 2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units - 24 - Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Project component Appraisal Estimate Revised Actual/Latest Estimate Estimate IDA Govt CoF IDA Govt CoF IDA Govt CoF Part A: Road Maintenance and Safety A.1 Rehabilitation and maintenance of 42.98 22,94 42,70 23,03 42,77 17,21 Priority Roads Network (paved and earth roads) A.2 Rehabilitation and maintenance of 8.36 2,53 4,12 1,27 4,30 1,32 Rural roads A.3 Construction of 2 weighing stations Part B: Training and Technical Assistance B.1 Training, Technical assistance for the 2.66 0,61 0,84 0,19 0,51 0,28 reorganization of MINTP and MINT, acquisition of computers, building of offices B.2 Studies, design and programs' 3.62 0,60 7,42 1,23 7,54 1,32 implementation B.3 Surveys and seminars 3,12 0,20 0,88 0,05 0,78 0,20 Part C: Project Implementation, 0,00 0,00 0,54 0,00 0,47 0,67 Management and Monitoring TOTAL 60,7 26,9 56,5 25,8 56,4 21,0 - 25 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits summary of findings ERR Civil Works (Roads) Appraisal estimates Latest estimates Paved Roads Garoua-Maroua 22% 36% (1) Kékem-Banjoun 62% 72% (1) Douala-Edéa-Pouma 90% 44% (1) Average for paved roads 52% 55% Earth roads Bamenda-Wum 15% 25% (1) Nanga-Eboko-Mbet-Mbouam 143% 76% (1) Ngaoundéré-Meiganga-Garoua-Boulai 54% Kumba-Loum 23% 14% (1) Nyamboya-Banyo / 55% (1) Average for earth roads 100% 66% High ramp section of Nyamboya-Banyo 18% (2) High ramp section of Bamenda-Wum 16% (2) Rural roads (North West) Lot 1 (3) Nso-Mundum-1 Palace 102% Njenka-Ngwandikang 43% Lot 2 Ntanfoang-Guzang 96% Bawock-Pinyin(Konfin) 200% Bali-Bossa-Bome 42% Lot 3 Santa-Pinyin-Ashong None (very high) Lot 4 Mile 12-Rock Form 47% Baba ll-Ngwandikang 55% Santa-Gahdiwalla-Baligham None (619%) Lot 5 Nkambe-Akweto-Mbande 14% Lot 6 Ndu-Wowo-Ntunbaw 38% Binshua-Bih-Sa'ah 60% Lot 7 Wanagwen-Ngouh(GS) None (very high) Modele-Mbamba-Okoromajang 78% Lot 8 Kumfutu-Aba'ar(Health Center) 54% Lot 9 Misage-Nkanchi-Lassen <0 Average for the overall priority network 36% (1) source: revue à mi parcours du projet (2) source : étude d'impact du PUER2, Juillet 2003 (3) pour l'ensemble des lots : source : étude d'impact du PUER2, Juillet 2003 Appendix 3.B : Social Impacts Social impacts of primary roads rehabilitation The project enabled women, ill and old people to travel throughout the year; facilitated the despatch of perishable products towards consumption centres; improved local SMEs capacities; created jobs and promoted women's participation. - 26 - Social impacts of paving high slopes sections The project promoted job creation (for example 800 local labourers employed in January 2003 for works on Nyamboya-Banyo section) through the development of labour-intensive methods; improved access to social infrastructure, with the building of access ramps and parking areas for the benefit of the populations. The traffic doubled since the end of the project. Social impacts of rural roads rehabilitation The project provided access to remote populations thanks to mobility improvement (increase in traffic from 227 v/d to 649v/d on the rural roads rehabilitated), rise in agricultural productions, job creations, better access to social infrastructure, building of bus stations, reduction of transport costs (from 109 FCFA/km to 46 FCFA/km on average for rual roads) and delays (on some itineraries, travel time has dropped from 1 day to 1 hour- even 15 minutes in some cases) . Development of local capacities The project supported the transfer of knowledge in routine maintenance works implementation, and improved proficiency of firms and control agencies (audit missions, PUER implementation agency). The use of labour-intensive methods was developed. The proportion of contract value going towards unskilled employment increased and stands at: (i) 11% for maintenance; (ii) 23% for rehabilitation; (iii) 11% for reconstruction, including paving (underestimate figures because of the use of non-wage labour for basic road cleaning works). The project promoted development of local maintenance SMEs and research groups as shown in the following table: Years Mechanised SMEs Non-mechanised SMEs Research groups 1996/97 13 24 6 2000/01 100 75 10 - 27 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 03/1992 11/1992 2 TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (2) 11/1993 10 HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1), TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (2), PORT SPECIALIST (1), PSD SPECIALIST (1), CIVIL ENGINEER (1); PSD SPECIALIST (1); HUMAN RESOURCES SPECIALIST (1), TRANSIT & FACILITATION SPEC. (1), OPERATIONS OFFICER (1) 06/1994 Appraisal/Negotiation 10/1994 10 TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1), PRIVATISATION SPECIALIST (2), RAILWAY SPECIALIST (1), ECONOMICS ADVISOR (1), LAYWER (2), PORT SPECIALIST (1), HWY. SPECIALIST (1), OPERATIONS OFFICER (1) 01/1995 2 HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1), OPERATIONS OFFICER (1) Supervision 06/30/1996 3 ECONOMIST (1); PROJECT S HS OFFICER (1); ENVIRONMENT (1) 10/04/1996 2 TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); S S PR. OPERATION OFFICER (1) 04/11/1997 7 ENVIRONMENT (1); U U COORDINATION (1); TASK MANAGER (1); SENIOR ECONOMIST (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); ROAD ENG. (2) 02/03/1998 5 SR. ENV SPECIALIST (1); SR. U U TRANSP ECONOMIST (1); TASK TEAM LEADER (1); CONSULTANT (1); PRINCIPAL ROAD ENGIN (1) 06/23/1998 4 TEAM LEADER (1); U U - 28 - PRINCIPAL RD ENGINEER (1); ENV PROTECTION SPECIAL (1); OPERATIONS ANALYST (1) 11/20/1998 2 CLUSTER LEADER (1); TASK U S TEAM LEADER (1) 02/20/1999 11 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); S S CLUSTER LEADER (1); FINANCIAL MGT SPEC. (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); ECONOMIST (1); ROAD ENG. (1); ENVIRONMENT SPEC. (1); SOCIAL SC. (1); ASSISTANT (1); SECTOR MANAGER (1) 11/13/1999 4 SR. HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); S S PRINCIPLE PORT ENGR. (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); PROGRAM ASSISTANT (1) 11/13/1999 2 TTL S. HIGHWAY ENGINEE S S (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1) 07/13/2000 2 SR. HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); S S SSATP REGIONAL COORD. (1) 04/18/2001 4 TEAM LEADER (1); SR. S S TRANSP. SPECIALIST (1); PROJECT OFFICER (1); LANG. PROGRAM ASSIST. (1) 07/21/2001 4 TTL (1); OPERATIONS S S OFFICER (1); PROGRAM ASSIS (1); INTERN (1) 10/05/2002 3 TTL(1); CONSULTANT (1); S S PROGRAM ASSISTANT (1) ICR 03/08/2003 8 HIGHWAY ENG. TTL (1); S HWY ENG (1); FINANCIAL MANGT. SPECI (1); TEAM ASSISTANT (1); PROGRAM OFFICER (1); LEAD SPECIALIST (1); SR. TRANSPORT SPEC(1); ENGINEER (1) 09/20/2003 3 TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1); MUNICIPAL ENGINEER (1); SR. PROGRAM OFFICER (1) 04/30/2004 3 TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (2); SR. PROGRAM OFFICER (1) NB: Project preparation started in 1987 but data is not available before 1992 - 29 - (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 248.4 655.6 Appraisal/Negotiation 155 134.9 Supervision 458.42 701.87 ICR 35.00 Total 861.82 1527.37 NB: Staff weeks and Budget cost prior to 1992 are not included - 30 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA - 31 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU - 32 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Transport Sector Strategy Note 02/02/1992 Transport Sector Memorandum 06/30/1993 Statement of Appraisal Mission Objectives Back to Office Report of Appraisal Mission 12/30/1993 Minutes of Yellow Cover Review Meeting 02/15/1994 Back to Office Report of second Appraisal Mission Staff Appraisal Report 04/18/1996 Development Credit Agreement 06/10/1996 Notice of Invitation to Negotiation 02/22/1999 Mid-Term Review Aide-mémoire 02/22/1999 Report of the Mid-Term Review (May 1999) Report of last supervision mission (Oct 2003) ICR mission Aide-mémoire 04/16/2004 - 33 - Additional Annex 8. Borrower's contribution RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DU PROGRAMME ET DU PROJET SECTORIEL DES TRANSPORTS CONTRIBUTION DU CAMEROUN INTRODUCTION L'une des exigences de l'accord de crédit 2869-cm est la soumission à l'IDA d'un rapport d'achèvement six (6) mois au plus après la date de clôture du projet. l Le crédit 2869-cm a été signé le 10 Juin 1996. l Mis en vigueur le 24 Avril 1997, il a été amendé trois fois, respectivement en Octobre 1998, Mai et Décembre 1999 et il a fait l'objet d'une prolongation de la période d'exécution de douze (12) mois. l Il a été clôturé le 31 Décembre 2003. l Le présent rapport est la contribution du Cameroun audit rapport d'achèvement. l Sa particularité est qu'il ne se limite pas au projet 2869-cm, mais il se réfère au programme plus ambitieux de la déclaration de stratégie sectorielle des transports insérée dans un processus à long terme de réformes économiques entamées au début des années 1990. l Le rapport évalue rapidement les objectifs de ces réformes dans le secteur des transports avant d'aller dans le détail du projet, objet du crédit 2869-cm. l Il s'agit ainsi, de vérifier si les objectifs institutionnels, physiques, sociaux, économiques, environnementaux et financiers du projet ont été atteints, de même que les impacts du projet au niveau macro-économique et sur la lutte contre la pauvreté. l Le présent rapport est la synthèse du rapport d'achèvement plus exhaustif du Gouvernement du Programme Sectoriel des Transports. PREAMBULE Le Programme Sectoriel des Transports s'inscrit dans le processus à long terme de réformes macro-économiques lancé dès le début des années 90, pour sortir le Cameroun du grand marasme économique, institutionnel et réglementaire dans lequel le pays était plongé. Après près de cinq (5) années de réflexion et de dialogue avec tous les partenaires sociaux du secteur, un programme d'ensemble pour le secteur des transports a été élaboré dans le but de : mener à terme l'ajustement des institutions, faire face aux problèmes financiers du secteur, accroître l'efficacité des opérations et assurer un développement durable et cohérent du secteur des transports pour lui permettre de contribuer à la croissance économique, à la réduction de la pauvreté, à la protection de l'environnement, dans le cadre du Programme Sectoriel des Transports (PST). Il a donné lieu à une lettre de politique sectorielle approuvée en Juin 1995 et comprenant le détail des réformes, et un programme d'investissements. Le Programme Sectoriel des Transports a bénéficié de plusieurs sources de financement : - 34 - A. De la part de l'IDA et du groupe de la Banque Mondiale l Le PPRT crédit 2706-cm approuvé le 14 Avril 1995 et clôturé le 31 Décembre 1999 à près de 20 millions de dollars. l Le PST crédit 2869-cm a financé le Programme d'Urgence d'Entretien Routier (PUER), son rapport d'achèvement est partie intégrante du présent rapport. l Le CAS3, compte tenu de la longue période de préparation du PST, la partie ajustement a finalement été récupérée par le Crédit d'Ajustement Structurel CAS3; ce qui a permis de conclure les réformes importantes du Fonds Routier, du Transport maritime, du Secteur portuaire et de la mise en concession du Transport ferroviaire. Il fait l'objet actuellement d'un rapport d'achèvement en cours de rédaction au niveau du Comité Technique de Suivi (CTS). Nous ne nous y attarderons pas dans le présent rapport. B. De la part de l'Union Européenne à travers ses programmes : Stabex 1992/93, 1993/94, portant sur un programme expérimental d'exécution à l'entreprise des travaux de réhabilitation des routes rurales . C'est de cette opération que sortira le premier tissu de PME d'entretien routier, PIN (Programme Indicatif National) 7e, 8e et 9e, ont financé un programme d'entretien routier pour accompagner la mise en oeuvre du Fonds Routier en favorisant le renforcement des capacités du MINTP dans la maîtrise d'ouvrage, en consolidant le secteur privé (ETP et BET) et appuyant la décentralisation de l'entretien des routes rurales (PAIDER). Perfed N°1 et 2 Les programmes d'Entretien Routier Financés par le FED (PERFED I et II) portant sur un important programme d'exécution à l'entreprise des travaux d'entretien des routes principales du réseau prioritaire, un vaste programme de formation au bénéfice du secteur privé, des entreprises et bureaux d'études, et un appui institutionnel important. des programmes d'allègement des effectifs de la Fonction Publique, du Matgénie et du Labogénie, et d'exécution à l'entreprise des travaux d'entretien financés sur crédit du Programme d'Ajustement Structurel (PASFED). un programme de construction de routes d'intégration régionale (PAS Régional FED). C- De la part de la Banque Africaine de Développement (BAD) portant sur un programme de bitumage des routes, de construction des ponts, de fournitures de matériels de génie civil et de véhicules pour les services du MINTP. D- De la part de l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD) portant sur un programme d'exécution à l'entreprise des travaux d'entretien des routes rurales dans les zones de la Lékié, les ouvrages d'art sur les routes régionales, les ouvrages de franchissement sur les pistes cotonnières, les routes de substitution des gares ferroviaires devant être fermées, la construction des importantes routes régionales Ebolowa-Ambam et Nsimalen-Mblamayo, la réhabilitation des ponts routier et ferroviaire sur la Dibamba, la réhabilitation du pont sur le Wouri, l'informatisation du Guichet Unique et la réhabilitation des ouvrages d'accostage, des quais et terre-pleins du port de Douala, la réhabilitation des locomotives, des wagons ainsi que de la voie du chemin de fer. RAISON D'ETRE DU PROJET Le programme reflète les priorités du secteur tel que le développement institutionnel, le développement - 35 - des capacités d'exécution, la préservation du capital investi, la réhabilitation. Car des infrastructures en bon état sont un facteur critique de réduction de la pauvreté et de développement de l'économie. La promotion des petites et moyennes entreprises et l'utilisation des techniques à haute intensité de main d'oeuvre sont plus aisés à expérimenter. Il en est de même de la mise en oeuvre du désengagement de l'Etat de l'exécution des travaux d'entretien routier et son transfert à l'entreprise. Enfin et non les moindres, la qualité des travaux, l'efficacité et la responsabilisation dans l'utilisation des ressources locales seront améliorés car il y aura séparation des rôles. Le projet était également conforme à la stratégie de l'IDA visant l'amélioration de l'efficacité du secteur public, la création d'un environnement favorable au développement du secteur privé, la stabilisation des finances publiques et la lutte contre la pauvreté. EXECUTION DU PROJET Le suivi et l'évaluation du projet étaient faits par les Ministères de tutelle, la Cellule du PST et les bailleurs de fonds à travers : (i) les rapports périodiques ; (ii) les rapports d'audits ; et (iii) les missions sur le terrain par les bailleurs de fonds et les représentants des Ministères de tutelle. Pour faciliter le suivi, des indicateurs de base sont produits régulièrement. Ces indicateurs ont permis de déterminer l'état d'évolution du Projet et de prendre les décisions nécessaires pour améliorer son exécution. a. Gestion des activités et des composantes La gestion des composantes est revenue aux agences et organes d'exécution qui se trouvent être des directions, des départements ministériels ou des organismes publics ou para-publics sous tutelles. Chaque structure concernée par le Projet était responsable pour établir, en étroite collaboration avec les autres ayant un rôle à jouer dans le même secteur et la Cellule de Coordination du PST, une programmation des activités de son ressort qui se devait d'inclure : (i) la définition des objectifs recherchés ; (ii) la description des activités prévues avec un calendrier de réalisation, et (iii) une estimation des ressources financières nécessaires pour la réalisation des objectifs énoncés. b. Déroulement du projet - Passation des marchés Les fournitures et travaux ont fait l'objet de marchés conclus conformément aux directives pour la passation des marchés financés par les crédits de l'IDA (janvier 1995). Les consultants ont été recrutés conformément aux dispositions des directives sur l'emploi de consultants par les emprunteurs de la Banque Mondiale (Août 1981). - Système financier et comptable du PST Pour la mise en oeuvre du PST, le Gouvernement et l'IDA ont opté pour une comptabilité de type commercial pour le suivi financier et comptable des activités du projet. Cette option nécessitait le recours à une expertise privée qualifiée pour ce type de comptabilité. La comptabilité et les états financiers du projet ont été régulièrement produits : i. les rapports de suivi financier du projet étaient produits suivant le calendrier arrêté dans l'Accord de crédit ; annuellement et à chaque mission de supervision de l'IDA. ii. les états financiers produits à partir du sous-système comptable étaient établis pour être audités tous les six (6) mois la première année d'exécution du projet, et 12 mois à partir de la deuxième année. iii. le suivi des impôts et taxes sur les contrats du projet : la TVA et l'AIR retenus sur les décomptes et enregistrés en comptabilité n'ont pas été apurés régulièrement. - 36 - La Cellule du projet qui devait être informée des opérations de compensation des décomptes de taxes par le MINFIB pour solder les comptes y relatifs dans sa comptabilité, ne l'a pas été et les comptes de TVA et d'AIR n'ont pas été soldés. iv. les pertes de change sur paiements en devises Certains cas de rejet de financement des pertes de change enregistrées lors des paiements en devises à partir du Compte Spécial ont connu quelques difficultés de traitement, en l'absence de directives précises pour le traitement des pertes de change. c. Audit des comptes Les comptes du crédit ont été régulièrement audités et les rapports remis à temps à l'IDA tout au long du projet et du programme. d. Décaissement Le crédit de l'IDA a été décaissé sur la base ci-après représentant la part IDA : 1. Travaux A. Routes bitumées75% puis 85% B. Routes en terre 80% C. Routes rurales 90% 2. Fournitures 100% puis 75% des dépenses en devises et 3. Services de consultants 100% puis 85% Pour tous les marchés, l'Etat a financé les impôts et taxes, y compris la Taxe sur la Valeur Ajoutée (TVA) et les droits d'entrée. Les fonds de contrepartie devaient être déposés sur un compte dans une banque commerciale avant la signature de tout marché de travaux financé par le crédit. Mais ceci n'a pas toujours été le cas, d'où l'important montant des arriérés de paiement dû aux entreprises à la fin du projet ; redevances toutefois prises en compte par les fonds PPTE. Le compte dit des Routes Principales qui avait à recevoir les fonds de contrepartie, a été régulièrement vérifié dans le cadre des activités du projet. Tous les marchés ont été établis `'Toutes taxes comprises'', et les demandes de retrait ont fait état de la TVA. Pour faciliter les décaissements, le Gouvernement a ouvert un compte spécial auprès d'une banque commerciale, à des conditions acceptables par l'IDA. Ce compte était géré par la Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement. Le montant autorisé du compte spécial est de 500.000 dollars. Les demandes de réapprovisionnement du compte soumises à l'IDA à des intervalles réguliers. Ce compte était régulièrement audité. Les décaissements ont été effectués sur présentation des pièces-types justificatives requises par l'IDA, sauf pour les marchés de services de consultants et de fournitures d'un montant inférieur à 50.000 dollars, pour lesquels les relevés des dépenses sont présentés a posteriori. Ces relevés ont été régulièrement examinés par les missions de supervision et à l'occasion d'audits financiers périodiques. Les demandes de paiement direct à partir du compte du crédit ont porté sur des montants d'au moins 50.000 dollars, sauf quand il a fallu résorber certains décomptes en instance. e) Délais de paiement Les délais de paiement sont restés assez longs pour les paiements directs et les réapprovisionnements du compte spécial (45-60 jours). - 37 - Les délais de paiement sur le compte spécial étaient sensiblement réduits lorsque le compte était approvisionné (15-20 jours). EVALUATION DU PST Le PST qui n'a été approuvé qu'en 1996, a conservé un rapport d'évaluation englobant tout le programme de réforme prévu, le programme d'ajustement structurel, d'assistance technique et d'appui à la privatisation et le programme d'investissement. 1. Appréciation générale i) Sur la qualité du projet, la conception du programme était complexe pour faire face aux problèmes importants du secteur tant du point de vue des institutions, de la réglementation, des investissements que des opérations. Il embrassait tous les modes de transport et visait une coordination étroite des bailleurs de fonds et des administrations impliquées. Dans le sous secteur routier, le projet visait l'expérimentation de grandes réformes pour le financement durable des travaux d'entretien et pour l'implication des populations locales dans la planification et la réalisation des travaux. ii) En ce qui concerne les réformes, il est à rappeler que le PST a permis la création d'importantes lois et des codes qui ont : 1) libéralisé le transport maritime, le transport aérien et le transport urbain de personnes par grands bus, 2) mis en place un cadre légal de protection du patrimoine routier, 3) créé un fonds d'entretien routier et, 4) organisé le secteur portuaire dans le cadre d'une loi portuaire, 5) adopté les directives de protection de l'environnement dans les travaux d'entretien routier. iii) Sur le plan opérationnel, le PST a permis la mise en place d'un mécanisme de partenariat public/privé, réservant ainsi au secteur privé, la gestion des activités commerciales et industrielles, et au public le rôle de définir et de déterminer les objectifs, de planifier et de programmer. C'est ainsi que : - la filière maritime (SOCAMAC, CAMSHIP, CAMTAINER) a été privatisée, - la SOTUC, qui assurait le transport urbain a été liquidée et l'activité libéralisée donnant place à une multitude de petits transporteurs (taxis jaune, minibus et motocycle), - une nouvelle organisation de la gestion des aéroports s'est mise en place à travers les Aéroports du Cameroun (ADC), - dans le secteur portuaire, en plus d'une plus grande implication des opérateurs dans la gestion portuaire, il y a eu la mise en place d'un groupement d'intérêt économique des opérateurs portuaires, à travers la mise en place d'un Guichet Unique (GUCE) dans le but de faciliter les procédures, et réduire les délais de passage des marchandises au port de Douala. iv) En ce qui concerne les infrastructures, le PST a mis en oeuvre un important programme d'entretien et de réhabilitation des routes, en utilisant les petites et moyennes entreprises locales à la place de la régie, et le Fonds Routier alimenté par une contribution d'usage de la route à faciliter les paiements des travaux à la place du mécanisme budgétaire de l'Etat. 2. Les résultats Grâce à la synergie entre le programme des réformes, l'assistance technique, le partenariat public/privé et le financement des travaux (investissements), des résultats remarquables ont été atteints. i) Sur le plan global, les objectifs de développement visés par le PST ont été tous atteints. Le secteur des transports est dynamique et efficient, et contribue à la croissance économique du pays et à la lutte - 38 - contre la pauvreté, tout en préservant l'environnement. ii) Sur le plan du partenariat public/privé, l'Etat s'est retiré des opérations de transport, avec un cadre réglementaire opératoire libéralisé donnant lieu à une plus grande compétitivité. Les finances publiques ont été soulagées du poids des entreprises publiques. Des entités nouvelles (Fonds Routier, Guichet Unique, Ports Autonomes) et de nombreuses PME du secteur routier ainsi que des secteurs portuaire et maritime ont vu le jour. La perception de la Redevance d'Usage de la Route, instituée par le PST, se fait normalement, il en est de même du péage et des amendes pour surcharge des camions. La gestion privatisée du chemin de fer a permis à ce mode de se maintenir et de contribuer à l'efficacité de l'économie. iii) dans le domaine routier, un meilleur état du réseau routier, une meilleure gestion du réseau routier, un afflux grandissant des financements provenant des bailleurs de fonds et des usagers des infrastructures, une adhérence à la politique nationale et internationale de réduction de la pauvreté par la création d'emplois à travers la promotion des PME. En tout état de cause, les travaux routiers sont crédités d'un fort taux de rentabilité économique dépassant 150% sur le PUER et atteignant 36% sur les routes rurales. iv) dans le domaine maritime et portuaire, l'accroissement de la fréquentation et du trafic portuaire, l'amélioration des accès maritimes au port (dragage du chenal), la modernisation des équipements portuaires (terminal à conteneurs), l'éclosion d'une multitude de professions portuaire, maritime et para-maritime, la création de quatre (4) ports autonomes et d'une (1) autorité portuaire. v) dans le domaine du transport terrestre, le développement du transport inter-urbain par grands bus, l'amélioration de la desserte des zones rurales, la constitution d'une base de banque de données et le développement d'un programme de sécurité routière ont été les principaux résultats. 3. Indicateurs de performance i) Indicateurs d'activités Les indicateurs d'activités ont permis de suivre l'évolution du Programme en fonction des différentes activités à entreprendre. Les principaux paramètres retenus étant : (i) les travaux réalisés ; (ii) les études réalisées ou à réaliser ; (iii) la formation (le nombre de séminaires et le nombre de participants à ces séminaires) ; (iv) les passations de marchés (les principales variables étant les dates importantes de la procédure : date de non-objection à l'appel d'offres, date de remise des offres, date de non objection à l'attribution du contrat, date de signature du contrat, date de démarrage et de fin du contrat et le coût du contrat) pour les consultants, et pour les fournitures en tenant compte de la nature spécifique de chaque marché. Les travaux ont été réalisés à 100%, bien que les procédures étaient longues et laborieuses pour passer les marchés, pour décaisser et que certains marchés ont débordé les délais de réalisation impartis. ii) Indicateurs financiers Les indicateurs financiers ont comporté les éléments suivants : (i) un rapport financier et comptable ; (ii) une synthèse des dépenses du programme par catégorie ; (iii) décaissements par bailleur de fonds. Le crédit a été consommé à 100%, les différents retards dans le démarrage (12 mois), dans les procédures (11 mois), ont été à l'origine du dépassement de l'enveloppe du crédit obligeant le Gouvernement à un effort supplémentaire en fonds de contrepartie. La comptabilité du projet ainsi que les audits ont été réalisés à temps. Le projet n'a pas connu d'énormes problèmes financiers. iii) Performance de la Banque Le programme et le projet ont bénéficié d'un suivi régulier par la Banque Mondiale, par une équipe sur place qui répondait à toutes les préoccupations immédiates et par une équipe du siège dont les missions rapprochées permettaient de dénouer des problèmes et d'obtenir des avancées. - 39 - La multidisciplinarité des équipes de la Banque constituait un atout essentiel ; le programme et le projet ont bénéficié amplement de la logistique arrière de la banque en documentation et en conseil. Les différents aides-mémoire des missions constituaient ainsi le guide des actions de suivi. La forte rotation des équipes du projet (huit chefs de projet) pouvait être un destabilisateur, mais le professionnalisme des différentes équipes a été plus fort. iv) Performance de l'Administration En dehors des procédures de passation des marchés, l'Administration a été performante sur tous les autres points de vue, pour prendre des décisions importantes quand il le fallait pour reformer le projet, le réorganiser (unité de gestion du PUER), créer les lois et les règlements nécessités, pour accueillir et organiser les missions de revue et de supervision, établir des rapports périodiques et faire les audits nécessaires. Les deux dernières années du projet ont connu des difficultés de fonds de contrepartie. La stabilité de l'équipe du projet a constitué un élément important du succès du PST. De même, l'intégration du personnel issu du secteur privé a constitué un atout certain pour ce succès. 4. Leçons à tirer i) Sur le système de gestion du projet, les performances du système de gestion ont été satisfaisantes en ce qui concerne le sous-système comptable. Le sous-système financier n'a pas donné entière satisfaction au niveau de la génération de certains tableaux ou de la conversion des données en devises. L'interface également n'a pas été exploitée. ii) Sur les procédures de paiement, le projet a connu de nombreux problèmes liés aux procédures. Ces problèmes étaient d'ordre structurel et ponctuel. La rigidité des procédures du côté Banque Mondiale a parfois causé des retards préjudiciables au projet. Une certaine flexibilité tenant compte du niveau d'activité permettrait d'éviter certains problèmes de trésorerie au projet. Du côté du Gouvernement, des procédures de mobilisation des fonds de contrepartie doivent être écrites et communiquées aux projets pour leur application. iii) Sur la gestion fiscale des contrats du projet Une bonne application des dispositions fiscales dans les contrats du projet a manqué. iv) Sur le programme, le programme lui même était ambitieux dans son approche globale. La coordination ne pouvait qu'en être difficile eu égard au nombre et à la qualité des différents intervenants. La définition d'une politique sectorielle des transports a canalisé les interventions des bailleurs de fonds. Cependant, la gestion par chaque bailleur de fonds de son projet n'a pas rendu le suivi coordonné. A cause de l'ampleur des questions à résoudre, il n'a pas été possible, malgré le long délai de préparation, d'avoir des études précises. Aussi, le programme et les projets ont-ils été bâtis sur des données insuffisantes ; ce qui, à l'exécution, a nécessité de nombreuses révisions et adaptations. Grâce à la Cellule de Coordination, le suivi financier, la réalisation des audits, la préparation des rapports périodiques, l'organisation des missions de suivi et de supervision, ont été fait sans difficultés. L'utilisation au sein de la Cellule du personnel recruté du secteur privé a été un atout important. 5. Risques et pérennisation du programme a) Les risques, les risques liés aux réformes ont été bien appréhendés et atténués par la prise en charge des aspects sociaux à travers plusieurs programmes d'ajustement structurels (Union Européenne et IDA). Toutefois, il est à remarquer que les réformes non appuyées par un financement ont connu des lenteurs dans leur exécution. - Sur la libéralisation, celle-ci s'est faite dans la mouvance mondiale, sans évaluer et tenir compte de notre capacité réelle de résistance financière et d'adaptation. - 40 - C'est ainsi que la plupart des privatisations ont échappé aux opérateurs locaux. Elle a ainsi constitué un risque de disparition des entreprises nationales. Et parfois, il a manqué un véritable cadre réglementaire ; ce qui a souvent entraîné l'anarchie (cas du transport urbain). - Sur la privatisation, certains aspects sociaux notamment la reconversion des agents ont été négligés. Toutefois, les effets induits de la privatisation ont permis la création de nombreux emplois ; ce qui a eu pour conséquence d'alléger le risque important des mouvements sociaux qui naissaient. Le désengagement de l'état des travaux a également constitué un risque, les opérateurs nationaux présentant parfois des défaillances. Mais d'une manière générale, les privatisations ont permis une amélioration et une maîtrise des finances publiques dans les secteurs concernés. - le projet comportait un nombre de risques qui pouvaient entraver sa bonne réalisation si des mesures appropriées n'étaient pas prises pour les éliminer ou atténuer leurs effets. Le premier élément de risque portait sur les retards que pourrait accuser l'exécution du programme si la capacité institutionnelle pour le gérer n'était pas à la hauteur de la situation. Ce risque était rendu sérieux par la complexité du programme qui faisait intervenir plusieurs partenaires extérieurs, de nombreuses agences du Gouvernement et/ou entreprises publiques et des communautés et collectivités locales dans la planification, la programmation et l'exécution des travaux routiers. Le délai de passation des marchés a été particulièrement long. Il s'est ainsi écoulé en moyenne 11 mois entre la date de lancement de l'appel d'offres et la date de signature du marché. Le délai moyen de non objection de l'IDA était de 92 jours. Les longs délais de paiement des factures ont été aussi à l'origine de longs délais d'exécution des travaux dans la mesure où ils limitent les moyens d'action des entreprises. Un engagement constant des autorités a été indispensable, et un effort important consenti pour assurer une bonne coordination et des relations de travail harmonieuses entre les différentes agences de l'administration participant au projet. L'exécution du programme était suivi de près. La création des cellules à l'instar de la Cellule du PUER, la Cellule des Routes Rurales et la Cellule de Protection de l'Environnement a été un élément catalyseur pour la bonne exécution du projet. Une réunion mensuelle regroupant les différentes agences du Gouvernement et les bailleurs de fonds a été instituée. Le deuxième risque concernait la volonté politique à soutenir le programme ou les stratégies proposées, plus spécialement en ce qui concerne les routes rurales. Ce risque est d'autant plus réel que le Gouvernement peut être enclin à négliger les routes dans un contexte budgétaire particulièrement difficile. Les dispositions prises ont considérablement atténué ce risque. Cependant, le retard des textes sur la décentralisation ne permet pas l'application intégrale de la nouvelle stratégie des routes rurales. Le troisième risque portait sur l'absence de fonds de contrepartie. Le Gouvernement a dépensé en terme de fonds de contrepartie un montant de plus de 14 milliards, taxes comprises. A la fin du projet, le montant des impayés imputés au fonds de contrepartie est de 1.082.529.096 dont 340.938.161 FCFA initialement imputé au compte du crédit mais non payés en raison de la dépréciation du DTS, une décision récente a autorisé de l'imputation de ce reliquat sur les ressources PPTE. Le quatrième risque sérieux portait sur le manque de transparence qui pouvait se produire dans le processus de privatisation des entreprises publiques. Ce risque n'a pas été expérimenté. Le cinquième risque portait sur la confusion possible des rôles et responsabilités et le manque de collaboration et de coordination efficaces qui pourrait résulter entre les services publics et le secteur privé. La Cellule de Coordination du PST a à cet effet égard évité de s'immixer dans l'exécution directe - 41 - des composantes. Un Comité Interministériel de Suivi des Opérations de Pesage (CISOP) a été créé pour la protection du patrimoine routier. Le sixième et dernier risque concernait le manque de familiarité des structures concernées avec quelques unes des nouvelles mesures. Ce risque s'est vérifié principalement dans l'exécution des travaux d'entretien routier par le secteur privé constitué de Petites et Moyennes Entreprises dans la mesure où les responsables décentralisés du MINTP ont eu tendance à exécuter les travaux pour le compte desdites PME. b) Pérennisation Les dispositions prises pour la pérennisation du programme par composante se présentent comme ci-après : - Travaux L'engagement pris avec les bailleurs de fonds consistait à entretenir les routes récemment réhabilitées sous financement des partenaires au développement. Les routes du réseau classé ont toutes été intégrées dans le programme pluri-annuel d'entretien. Pour les routes rurales, compte tenu du retard accusé pour la promulgation de la loi sur la décentralisation, une stratégie intermédiaire d'entretien courant post-réhabilitation des routes rurales a été élaborée et va être expérimentée à partir de l'exercice 2004. - Fournitures Tous les équipements acquis dans le cadre du projet ont fait l'objet d'un inventaire exhaustif, et ils ont été transférés aux Administrations. - Etudes Dans le cas de la programmation et de la planification des transports et des travaux d'entretien routier, les banques de données ont été constituées respectivement au Ministère des Transports (DEPP) et au Ministère des Travaux Publics (Cellule de la Programmation). - Financement des travaux d'entretien routier Le Gouvernement a engagé une réforme du Fonds Routier dans le but de renforcer ses capacités et ses performances. Cette réforme porte sur l'augmentation du niveau des ressources mobilisées notamment par : - l'augmentation du pourcentage de la Redevance d'Usage de la Route (RUR) à prélever sur la Taxe Spéciale sur les Produits Pétroliers (TSPP), - le déplafonnement de la Redevance d'Usage de la Route, - la sécurisation des autres ressources et, - l'extension de l'assiette à d'autres taxes spécifiques à la route (taxe à l'essieu, ...). Il est également envisagé la création d'un guichet d'investissement et d'un organe de concertation et de coordination des actions et des financements du secteur, le Conseil National de la Route (CNR). - Internalisation La dislocation de la Cellule de Coordination du projet est un risque important ; pour toute la documentation issue du programme et du projet, pour l'expérience dans la gestion de projet. - 42 - Etat d'avancement de la matrice d'action du Programme Sectoriel des Transports (avr. 2004) Domaine d'action Stratégie/objectifs Actions Résultats obtenus Observations 1. Restructuration - Restructurer l'efficacité des 7 des 8 entreprises initialement des entreprises entreprises, améliorer les envisagées sorties du publiques du secteur finances publiques, arrêter portefeuille de l'Etat ou avec des transports l'endettement et des participations publiques l'accumulation des arriérés marginales des principales entreprises Retrait des secteurs publiques du secteur opérationnels au niveau (SOTUC, CAMAIR, CNCC, portuaire et aéroportuaire REGIFERCAM, CAMSHIP, CAMTAINER, SOCAMAC, CNIC) 1. Restructuration - Restructurer l'efficacité des - concéder les ADC opérationnelle depuis Le partenaire des entreprises entreprises, améliorer les finances aéroports 1994, actionnariat de l'Etat stratégique d'ADC publiques Aéroports publiques, arrêter l'endettement et principaux limité à 29%. Difficultés (ADP) n'a pas joué et aviation civile l'accumulation des arriérés financières et opérationnelles le rôle escompté, et n'ayant pas permis l'atteinte des les relations avec objectifs initialement fixé CAMAIR ont également complexifié la gestion 1 CNCC Améliorer le service des chargeurs et - - CNCC restructuré et de facto Une liquidation ( Conseil National limiter les coûts du transport Liquidation/Priv retiré des opérations du secteur serait souhaitable des Chargeurs international atisation du des transports maritimes. Pas de compte tenu du camerounais) CNCC transformation/privatisation, la manque structure subsiste comme d'enthousiasme des gestionnaire de patrimoine privés à reprendre la structure 1. Restructuration - Restructurer l'efficacité des Liquidation de - ONPC en cours de des entreprises entreprises, améliorer les finances l'ONPC et liquidation , publiques. Ports publiques, arrêter l'endettement et création de - Port Autonome de l'accumulation des arriérés Ports Douala (PAD) créé depuis 1999, Autonomes mais capital non complètement libéré par l'Etat - Autres Ports autonomes créés depuis 1999 mais non complètement opérationnels 1. Restructuration - Restructurer l'efficacité des Privatisation de - Remorquage et arrangement des entreprises entreprises, améliorer les finances services lamanage concédés fin 2003 provisoire pour le publiques. Ports publiques, arrêter l'endettement et portuaires - Ensemble des services TAC depuis 2001 l'accumulation des arriérés opérationnels privés avec les acconiers. - Terminal à conteneur en cours de mise en concession 1.1 SOTUC - Liquidation de la SOTUC Cessation des Clôture de liquidation de Service encore activités de la SOTUCprononcée largement mal SOTUC et organisé et liquidation Emergence de quelques dégradation des entreprises privées de transport conditions de urbain dont SOCATUR déplacement à (Douala, 400 employés) Douala et Yaoundé 1.2 CAMAIR - Restructurer l'efficacité des - Inclusion d'un Expérience de gestion « privée Expérience non entreprises, améliorer les finances mode de gestion » entre 1999 et 2003, sans réussie de publiques, arrêter l'endettement et privé dans amélioration de long terme restructuration l'accumulation des arriérés l'entreprise interne préalable à privatisation - définition Etude SH&E (fin 2002) sur d'une stratégie Projet PPRCP, nouveau plan de privatisation élaboré par le MinF en Déc 2003 - 43 - 1.3 - Privatisation de l'exploitation et - Liquidation de - RNCFC en fin de liquidation Finalisation de la REGIFERCAM liquidation de l'entreprise la RNCFC cession des actifs à (RNCFC) faire avant la clôture - octroi d'une - CAMRAIL créée , concession Concession concession et signée en 1999 opérationnelle concession opérationnelle 1.4 CAMSHIP Désengagement de l'Etat dans le - Privatisation CAMSHIP privatisé (1999) Participations très capital social de CAMSHIP minoritaires du PAD - Mise en vente et de la SNI des actions 1.5 CAMTAINER/ - Restructurer l'efficacité des - - SOCAMAC Privatisé Actionnaires de SOCAMAC entreprises, améliorer les finances Liquidation/Priv (1999) CAMTAINER sans publiques, arrêter l'endettement et atisation - CAMTAINER objectif vis à vis de l'accumulation des arriérés Privatisé de facto (actionnaires : l'entreprise CAMSHIP et SOCAMAC) 1.6 CNIC Optimisation des opération du CNIC et Privatisation Capital privatisé, libération du maintien d'une activité de chantier quai du PAD mobilisé pour le naval au Cameroun CNIC, transfert à Limbé prévu 2. Réformes Amélioration de l'efficacité, institutionnelles clarification des responsabilités 2.1 MINTP - Recentrage des activités sur la - Mise en place Cellule mise en place depuis BDR à consolider définition des politiques, la d'une cellule 1996 planification, la programmation et la chargé de la budgétisation des investissements mise en oeuvre routiers et des travaux d'entretien des d'une banque de infrastructures des transports donnée routière - Mise en place d'un système de - Système de Restructuration programmation, réorientation programmation à du Ministère des du personnel sur la maîtrise consolider Travaux Publics d'ouvrage et la maîtrise d'oeuvre depuis 1996 2.2 MINT Concentrer le MINT sur la Etude et mise en Réorganisation effectuée depuis moyens en personnel planification des investissements du oeuvre de la 1998 et financiers pour le secteur, la programmation, réorganisation suivi des politiques l'élaboration, l'application et le suivi du MINT insuffisant. des politiques et des réglementations sectorielles - 44 - 2.3 Organes de - Assurer une bonne coordination des - Création du Action continue, à objet Coordination activités d'ajustement du secteur des Comité beaucoup plus large que le PST transports Interministériel de suivi des programmes économiques en tant qu'organe de décision du PST (CIS) - Comité Action continue, à objet Technique de beaucoup plus large que le PST suivi des Programmes Economiques en tant qu'organe de préparation des décisions du PST (CTS) - Poursuite de la Réalisé en matière de Projet de création concertation facilitation des transports d'un conseil national technique avec (Comité FAL) le secteur de la route par les opérateurs portuaire (Comité de décret économiques et coordination), moins les bailleurs systématique dans les secteurs fonds par les des routes, des transports autorités terrestres et en sécurité routière compétentes de l'Etat. 3 Entretien routier 3.1 Efficacité - Désengagement de l'Etat et - Privatisation Privatisation totale de Voir indicateurs opérationnelle amélioration de l'efficacité de progressive de l'entretien routier depuis 1997, spécifiques au projet l'entretien routier l'entretien essentiel de l'entretien réalisé routier et par des PME, volume des promotion des travaux multiplié par 4 par PME rapport au début du projet - Mise en place Audits réguliers par le fonds Dépendance d'un système routier partielle de efficace de Suivi de l'entretien par des financements suivi, de bureaux d'études privés extérieurs pour cette contrôle des tâche travaux et d'audit externe - nouveau code Code passé en 2002. Les délais Impact effectif sur des marchés de passation des marché restent les délais. Difficulté publics avec encore relativement longs (6 à analyser l'impact changements mois) mais sont améliorés par sur les coûts des seuils, rapport au circuit administratif création de 3 classique antérieur. Commissions de Passation des Marchés au MINTP: - travaux neufs - travaux d'entretien routier - autres travaux Création d'une Commission des marchés au MINT 3.2 MATGENIE - Désengagement de l'Etat -Régionalis. de Régionalisation effectuée en Problème résiduel de l'activité 1997, mais privatisation non disponibilité des -Privatisation aboutie. Le secteur a cependant engins de travaux d'une des été ouvert au secteur privé et publics pour couvrir - 45 - régions des entreprises de location ont le volume des -Ouverture du vu le jour travaux. secteur au privé Privatisation de MATGENIE toujours envisagée 3.3 LABOGENIE Restructuration et mise en concurrence Restructur du Labogénie restructuré, Labogénie reste le LABOGENIE ouverture du secteur au privé principal et mise en effective avec plusieurs laboratoire, avec des concurrence laboratoires risques de conflit d'intérêt. 3.4 Planification et - Amélioration de l'objectif des choix, - Définition - Réseau prioritaire retenu en Le système de Programmation et coordination des actions de d'un réseau 1997 et actualiser en 2002, programmation et de planification, en adéquation avec les prioritaire comprenant maintenant 28 000 planification a déjà ressources disponibles km été rodé mais nécessité de consolidation - Mise en place L'essentiel des routes Compte tenu de la d'un système de principales est entretenue sur la limitation des programmation base de contrats pluriannuels, moyens financiers, pluriannuelle de avec des contrats biennaux ou de facto non mis en l'entretien annuels pour les routes en terre oeuvre pour tout le routier suivant l'importance du trafic. réseau - Mise en place - BDR mise en place La BDR pourrait d'une BDR - Collecte d'information gagner en fiabilité si systématisée pour l'actualisation les données existantes en matière de marchés d'entretien étaient mieux diffusées - Reprise dans le - Réalisé depuis 1996 programme d'entretien courant, des routes qui viennent d'être réhabilitées 3.5 Financement Mise en place d'un mécanisme - Réforme de la La création d'un fonds pérenne, autonome et régulier du fiscalité routière d'entretien routier et financement de l'entretien l'affectation d'une partie des recettes pétrolières au secteur est la principale réalisation de la réforme. fiscalité non véritablement réformée - Amélioration des procédures pour - Mise en place Réalisé, procédure de paiement raccourcir les délais de paiement aux d'un fonds rapide effective, avec des délais PME d'entretien de paiement inférieur à 15 jours routier - Mise en place d'un mécanisme - Réforme du - séminaire en mai 2003, Projets révisés pérenne, autonome et régulier du financement et propositions de textes à l'étude soumis à l'examen financement de l'entretien du au niveau du gouvernement des bailleurs de fonctionnement fonds en avril 2004 du fonds d'entretien routier - Mise en place d'un mécanisme - Participation Peu expérimentée faute de cadre pérenne, autonome et régulier du des institutionnel adéquat financement de l'entretien communautés dans l'entretien des routes rurales - 46 - - Recouvrement des coûts des - - Seules les cartes grises ont Difficulté de mener à services rendus par l'administration, Informatisatio été informatisées à Yaoundé en bien une réforme sans maîtrise des recettes à affecter au n des titres de 1999, sans que l' opération soit bénéfice direct pour le secteur routier transports poursuivie ou étendue personnel de l'administration sectorielle. 3.6 Protection du - Faire respecter les barrières de - Mise en Effective depuis 1998, Patrimoine pluies, les règles de charge à l'essieu place actualisée récemment pour Routier et autres règles de circulation réglementatio tenir compte des routière n adéquate réglementations CEMAC - Mise en Fait sur Douala-Yaoundé- Seule une petite partie place du Ngaoundéré, en cours du réseau est pesage routier d'extension sur les principales correctement sur les routes surveillée. principaux axes - Prise en Effectif compte de la gestion des barrières de pluies dans les contrats d'entretien routier 4 Industrie des Protéger le patrimoine routier - Mettre en -Création du CISOP (comité Manque de moyen transports place le interministériel de suivi) pour étendre pesage routier effectif. effectivement la et un cadre de couverture du concertation/s territoire en matière upervision de de suivi cette activité - Renforcement de la sécurité - Code de la - Nouveau code de la route routière route révisé adopté et révisé au niveau de la pour préciser CEMAC en 2001 les normes, gabarit, protection patrimoine routier, dimension et poids de véhicules et leurs éléments - Mettre en - Création du Comité Le comité n'a pas eu place un code Interministériel de l'impact escompté de Prévention et de Sécurité faute d'implication responsabilisa Routière des partenaires privés tion en - Achat d'équipements et et publics, et a matière réalisation de campagnes manqué de moyens d'accidents de d'information la route, de destruction des équipements routiers - 47 - 4.1 Transport de - Améliorer et faciliter le transit - - Itinéraires régionaux Recherche en cours Transit Réhabilitation définis : pour les financements des itinéraires travaux achevés : de la construction des de transit * Bertoua-Gar.Boulaï autres maillons (FED) manquants. * Ebolowa-Ambam (AFD) Nécessité de Travaux en cours : réhabilitation de * Ngdéré-Touboro/FED plusieurs sections déjà * Ponts sur le Ntem/FED bitumées sur les axes * Gar.Boulaï-Ngdéré/FED principaux * Ambam-Eking/BAD * Ambam-Kye Ossi /AFD * Ayos-Bonis/FSD * Mamfé-Ekok Recherche financement * Kumba-Mamfé * Kribi-Ebolowa * Sangmélima-Djoum- Frontière Congo - Marché pour la mise en place - Poursuivre et mettre Réhabilitation du nouveau système signé, en oeuvre les travaux du système travaux initiés engagés dans le cadre informatique de la stratégie douanier régionale CEMAC - Mesures de - Instruments de facilitation Pas de bilan complet facilitation sur adoptés (LVI, vignette de ces mesures le corridor spéciale, sauf conduit) ­ Réglementations routières harmonisées - Mise en - Adoption d'un manuel des Les impacts en terme place du procédures de passage de réduction de délai Guichet portuaire et des mesures de de passage au Port Unique facilitation sont significatifs mais - informatisation encore en deçà des attentes 4.2 Transports - Désengagement de l'Etat des - Décret libéralisant Cadre en cours urbains opérations Libéralisation l'exploitation des lignes à d'organisation à - Libéralisation des activités des activités Douala et à Yaoundé signé Douala et Yaoundé Création de micro-entreprises de transport urbain mais l'activité reste mal organisée sur le terrain - 48 - 5 Secteur - Améliorer l'efficacité du port Privatisation/r Emergence d'un Portuaire - Réduire les délais et les coûts de estructuration partenariat secteur passage portuaire : voir item 1 public/secteur privé 5.1 Périmètre - Délimitation Textes signés en 2001 d'activité géographique des circonscriptio ns portuaires 5.2 Organisation - Réforme Institutionnelle - Adoption de la loi - Seule la définition complète portuaire des organes de gestion de La situation des autres * création de l'APN et du PAD a été faite Ports doit être l'APN, des depuis 1999, révisé 2002. examinée pour OPA avec - Pour les autres ports, concilier autonomie et institution des nomination des membres économies de gestion CCO dans du CA et des CCO faite, mais chaque port, textes non totalement mis en application - Autonomisati on des OPA : Seul le bilan d'ouverture du PAD a été réalisé * Bilan d'ouverture Non achevé des OPA approuvé Non achevée * Prononcer - Besoin de 10 milliards de la dévolution FCFA en cours de mobilisation du patrimoine - en cours d'élaboration pour * Liquidation le PAD de l'ex-ONPC en cours * Recapitalisati on du PAD en cours * Préparation du plan d'entreprise et du plan social - Transfert des activités au secteur Définitio - Cadre de transfert défini privé n du - concession du remorquage et cadre de du lamanage réalisée en 2003 transfert Mise en - AO lancé pour la concession concessi du TAC on des opératio ns 5.3 - Maîtrise du dragage du chenal du - - Profondeur du chenal portée Non paiement par Investissements port Douala Entretien/Réh de ­5,40m à ­6,5m, puis 7m et l'Etat de ses abilitation 7.5 m par plusieurs contrats engagements puis successifs financiers sur le approfondisse dragage, ment pérennisation des contrats de dragage à faire - 49 - 5.4 Tarification et - Réduction des coûts * Réduction Réalisé entre 1998 et 2000. Les coûts portuaires relations avec les des tarifs Réduction supplémentaire sur dans leur ensemble (y usagers portuaires de le coût des services attendue de compris prestataires 10% sur les la concession du terminal à de services privés au navires et de conteneur. Port) restent encore 10% sur les élevés. marchandises et réduction de 10% * Réduction des tarifs d'acconage de 7,5% * Libéralisation et réduction des tarifs de transit - facilitation du transit des Création d'un GUCE créé en 1999, marchandises au Port Guichet opérationnel Unique rassemblant tous les intervenants 5.5 - Informatique - Mise en A l'étude A relier aux projets du portuaire place d'un GUCE Système Informatique Portuaire (SIP) au PAD - Mise en - Marché attribué, mise en place d'un place en cours système informatique au GUCE - Marché attribué, système Modernisation SIAM choisi du système informatique douanier 6. Sous-Secteur - Améliorer la capacité du commerce - - Loi adoptée en décembre Maritime extérieur national à exploiter de Libéralisation 1998 nouveaux marchés du Transport Maritime - Disposer d'un secteur maritime - - Loi adoptée en 1995. Impact : performant Libéralisation maintenant plus de 250 de l'accès aux sociétés camerounaises opérant professions dans le secteur, y compris dans maritimes le cabotage maritime - Rendre les différents acteurs abolition du Impact sur les coûts de compétitifs au plan économique principe de transports maritimes très quota de sensible et renforçant l'impact cargaison de la chute des prix mondiaux de transport maritime. - Demeurer présent dans le secteur - Privatisation Réalisé, CAMSHIP et des des transports maritimes de CAMSHIP sociétés de cabotage et camerounaises sont présentes CAMTAINE sur le marché, ainsi que dans R l'ensemble des professions de - prestataires de service restructuration du CNCC avec suppression de la taxe CNCC - 50 - 5.4 Tarification et - Réduction des coûts * Réduction Réalisé entre 1998 et 2000. Les coûts portuaires relations avec les des tarifs Réduction supplémentaire sur dans leur ensemble (y usagers portuaires de le coût des services attendue de compris prestataires 10% sur les la concession du terminal à de services privés au navires et de conteneur. Port) restent encore 10% sur les élevés. marchandises et réduction de 10% * Réduction des tarifs d'acconage de 7,5% * Libéralisation et réduction des tarifs de transit - facilitation du transit des Création d'un GUCE créé en 1999, marchandises au Port Guichet opérationnel Unique rassemblant tous les intervenants 5.5 - Informatique - Mise en A l'étude A relier aux projets du portuaire place d'un GUCE Système Informatique Portuaire (SIP) au PAD - Mise en - Marché attribué, mise en place d'un place en cours système informatique au GUCE - Marché attribué, système Modernisation SIAM choisi du système informatique douanier 6. Sous-Secteur - Améliorer la capacité du commerce - - Loi adoptée en décembre Maritime extérieur national à exploiter de Libéralisation 1998 nouveaux marchés du Transport Maritime - Disposer d'un secteur maritime - - Loi adoptée en 1995. Impact : performant Libéralisation maintenant plus de 250 de l'accès aux sociétés camerounaises opérant professions dans le secteur, y compris dans maritimes le cabotage maritime - Rendre les différents acteurs abolition du Impact sur les coûts de compétitifs au plan économique principe de transports maritimes très quota de sensible et renforçant l'impact cargaison de la chute des prix mondiaux de transport maritime. - Demeurer présent dans le secteur - Privatisation Réalisé, CAMSHIP et des des transports maritimes de CAMSHIP sociétés de cabotage et camerounaises sont présentes CAMTAINE sur le marché, ainsi que dans R l'ensemble des professions de - prestataires de service restructuration du CNCC avec suppression de la taxe CNCC - 51 - 7. Utilisation des - Développer la profession des Définition les Développement important de Professionnalisation à compétences consultants locaux tâches qui la profession, forte présence de poursuivre, locales - Encourager le recours aux peuvent être consultants locaux dans le notamment dans consultants locaux confiées aux secteur routier, développement l'entretien routier. consultants de la profession dans le secteur locaux des transports, notamment Recours aux maritimes. consultant locaux notamment par AON 8. Sous-secteur Réforme de la politique et du cadre - Passation de Non réalisé De quoi s'agissait Transport aérien réglementaire du transport aérien contrat il ??? pour le rendre plus efficace et plus d'obligation utile à l'économie nationale de service public sur appel d'offres - Non effectif Réalisé ?? (a priori, Libéralisation non) transport du fret Réforme de Code de l'aviation civile révisé Cadre conforme aux l'aviation (1998), autorité aéronautique normes civile nationale créée (1999) internationales, mais à renforcer au niveau organisation et réglementation - Contribuer Décision de Yamoussoukro au adoptée en 1999, développemen développement de trafic vers t des accords l'Afrique de l'Ouest, mais la régionaux en sous région reste très mal vue d'une desservie et dépendante libéralisation d'accords nationaux du transport aérien entre pays de l'Afrique Centrale 9. Environnement - Protection de l'environnement dans - Etude de - Cellule environnementale les travaux routiers l'impact des créée au MINTP avec un problèmes fonctionnement satisfaisant et environnemen reconnu taux dans les travaux routier - Protection faune et flore au niveau - Pan de - Analyse réalisée Suivi dans le cadre du de Camrail Gestion projet CAMRAIL Environneme ntal et Social du Projet (PGES) élaboré et en cours de mise en oeuvre - 52 - - 53 -