Young People in South Eastern Europe: From Risk to Empowerment Draft Report Gloria La Cava Paula Lytle Alexandre Kolev Carine Clert June 14, 2004 THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTALLY AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TEAM EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION CONTENTS Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................vi Acknowledgements .........................................................................................................viii Executive Summary..........................................................................................................ix Introduction........................................................................................................................1 Background on youth exclusion and poverty.................................................................1 Objectives.......................................................................................................................2 Multidimensional analytic framework...........................................................................3 Methodology ..................................................................................................................5 Chapter 1. Population Trends: Individual and Family Level......................................7 Size and growth of youth population in SEE.................................................................7 Negative implications of dependency rations in SEE....................................................9 Demographic changes in SEE, 1950-2000..................................................................10 Chapter 2. Risky Behaviors and Social Exclusion.......................................................15 Violence on the individual and family level................................................................15 Unsafe sex and HIV/AIDS...........................................................................................17 Substance abuse ...........................................................................................................19 Crime and violence ......................................................................................................21 Exclusion in education and school leaving..................................................................24 Chapter 3. Youth Labor-Market Disadvantage in SEE ..............................................29 Challenge of monitoring youth labor-market disadvantage.........................................29 Data limitation........................................................................................................30 Measuring youth labor-market disadvantage.........................................................31 Employment prospects of youth remain daunting .......................................................32 Large youth ILO unemployment............................................................................32 Widespread youth discouragement and idleness ...................................................38 Large incidence of low-quality jobs .......................................................................39 Not all youth face the same risk of being jobless ..................................................40 Troubled entry into the labor market has serious effect on youth ...............................44 Welfare repercussions of youth joblessness..........................................................44 Erosion of human and social capital......................................................................46 Social and economic outcomes related to youth responses ...................................46 Delayed entry into the labor market.......................................................................46 Informalization.......................................................................................................47 Barriers to participation in the workforce: Beliefs and evidence.................................49 i Demand-side factors ....................................................................................................49 Level of aggregate demand and economic output .......................................................49 Supply-side factors.......................................................................................................51 Poor quality of skills possessed by new labor market entrants..............................51 Corruption, nepotism, and the role of connections ......................................................53 Unemployment compensations systems and work incentives .....................................54 Youth face specific barriers to self-employment.........................................................55 Chapter 4. Labor Mobility and Brain Drain................................................................57 Labor migration and brain drain ..................................................................................57 Trafficking ...................................................................................................................60 Chapter 5. Building Effective Youth Policy in SEE.....................................................63 Cost of not investing in SEE youth..............................................................................63 The monetary value of preventing a career criminal.............................................64 The monetary value of preventing a heavy drug user............................................65 Potential benefits of investments in high-risk youth..............................................66 Formal and non-formal education................................................................................68 Investments designed to improve the quality of public schools ............................68 Targeted scholarships for secondary schooling .....................................................69 Non-formal (continuing) education .......................................................................70 Vocational and technical training ..........................................................................71 Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs) ...................................................................72 Targeted programs for vulnerable youth......................................................................73 Policies supporting youth empowerment.....................................................................74 Non-formal education ............................................................................................75 Youth organizations ...............................................................................................78 Youth participation and representation in governance ..........................................81 National youth policies ..........................................................................................82 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................88 Appendix 1. The cost of Career Criminal and Heavy Drug Users in Serbia- Montenegro.................................................................................................................91 Appendix 2. European Union Youth Policies and their Implications for SEE .......103 Bibliography...................................................................................................................107 Boxes Box 1. Gender and youth in South Eastern Europe ......................................................4 Box 2. Defining unemployment indicators.................................................................32 Box 3. Forced to migrate: Impact of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.....................59 Box 4. Opportunities for youth mobility.....................................................................60 Box 5. The costs of not investing in youth: The March 2004 uprisings in Kosovo ...67 ii Box 6. Education: A beneficiary's perspective..........................................................68 Box 7. Youth Albania Parcel Service .........................................................................73 Box 8. Kaizen Program: Integrating non-formal education into the Romanian school system.............................................................................................76 Box 9. World Bank youth investment projects in SEE...............................................78 Box 10. Strengthening Roma youth leadership ..........................................................80 Box 11. Co-management of youth policies.................................................................81 Box 12. Rome conference on youth participation, empowerment and social inclusion in SEE, May 2002 ......................................................................82 Figures Figure 1. Population aged 15-24 as percent of total SEE population, 1950-2010......7 Figure 2. Population aged 15-24 as percent of total population in economies of SEE, 2000.....................................................................................................8 Figure 3. Annual SEE growth rates, 1950-2005 ..........................................................9 Figure 4. Dependency ratios in SEE economies, 1950-2010.....................................10 Figure 5. Total fertility rates in SEE, 1970-2000.......................................................11 Figure 6. Childbearing at young ages (15-24) as percentage of reproductive ages in SEE........................................................................................................12 Figure 7. Mean age of first marriage for females in SEE economies, 1970-2000....13 Figure 8. Standardized death rates for ages 15-24 in SEE for suicide and self- inflicted injuries, selected years.................................................................17 Figure 9. Standardized death rates for ages 15-24 in SEE, 2000: Homicide and purposeful injuries......................................................................................23 Figure 10. Real GDP growth in SEE, 1989-2001......................................................35 Figure 11. Youth aged 15-24 in SEE as percentage of registered unemployed, 1989-2000.................................................................................................38 Figure 12. Relative poverty risk associated with different youth labor-market outcomes in selected SEE economies, approximately 2001......................45 Figure 13. Higher education enrollments by youth in South Eastern Europe, 1989 and 2000.....................................................................................................47 Figure 14. Sensitivity of youth unemployment to overall unemployment in SEE.....50 Figure 15. Youth unemployment and economic output in selected SEE economies, 2001............................................................................................................50 Figure 16. Public expenditures on education and absolute youth unemployment rate in selected countries of South Eastern Europe, 2001.................................53 Figure 17. Share of self-employment in total employment in SEE, 2001..................56 Figure 18. Net external migration in SEE, 1989-2000...............................................57 Figure 19. Serbia and Montenegro: Youth programs developed by NGOs, 2003.....79 Figure 20: Funding sources for youth initiatives in Serbia and Montenegro, 2003 ...80 Figure 21. Age distribution of crimes committed by career criminals .......................92 Figure 22. Composition of criminal offenses .............................................................92 Figure 23. Annual retention rtes for heavy drug users................................................98 Figure 24. Age distribution of crimes committed by heavy drug users......................98 Figure 25. Composition of criminal offenses committed by heavy drug users ..........99 iii Tables Table 1. Youth aged 15-24 in SEE, 2000.....................................................................2 Table 2. Urbanization in SEE, 1990-2000.................................................................14 Table 3. Selected comparable macro and labor market indicators in SEE, approximately 2001....................................................................................34 Table 4. Trends in unemployment rates among youth in selected SEE economies, 1990-2001.................................................................................................36 Table 5. Ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate in selected SEE economies, 1990-2001.................................................................................................37 Table 6. Selected indicators of youth idleness and discouragement in six SEE economies, approximately 2001................................................................39 Table 7. Incidence of low-quality wage employment in selected SEE economies, approximately 2001....................................................................................40 Table 8. Youth strict ILO unemployment rates by selected socioeconomic characteristics in SEE, 2001.......................................................................42 Table 9. Share of youth in SEE neither in school nor employed, by selected socioeconomic characteristics (2001) ........................................................44 Table 10. Role of friends and relatives versus employment-office services in youth job searches, 2001 and 2002......................................................................54 Table 11. Youth and adults receiving unemployment benefits in selected SEE economies in years 2000-2003..................................................................55 Table 12. Monetary value of preventing a high-risk youth in Serbia and Montenegro from becoming a career criminal...........................................64 Table 13. Monetary value of preventing a high-risk youth in Serbia and Montenegro from becoming heavy drug user............................................65 Table 14. Discounted social costs of not preventing selected negative youth outcomes in Serbia and Montenegro..........................................................66 Table 15. Typology of SEE countries: Risks, opportunities, and policy implications ................................................................................................85 Table 16. Number of crimes committed by a career criminal by age and type of offense, Serbia-Montenegro, 2002.............................................................93 Table 17. Unit victim cost of crime by type of cost category and offense, Serbia .....94 Table 18. Unit criminal justice-related costs by cost category and type of offense, Serbia and Montenegro..............................................................................94 Table 19. The opportunity cost of prisoners' time, Serbia-Montenegro.....................95 Table 20. Total social cost of a career criminal by age and type of offense in Serbia and Montenegro.........................................................................................96 Table 21. Public costs of career criminal by age and type of offense, discounted to age 13.........................................................................................................97 Table 22. Number of crimes committed by heavy drug users by age and type of offense, Serbia-Montenegro.......................................................................99 Table 23. Estimated social cost of crimes committed by heavy drug users, Serbia- Montenegro, 2002....................................................................................100 Table 24. Estimates of the non-crime related costs of a heavy drug user, Serbia- Montenegro..............................................................................................101 iv Table 25. Summary estimates of the costs of a heavy drug user, Serbia- Montenegro..............................................................................................102 v ACRONYMS AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ALMP Active Labor Market Program BiH Bosnia-Herzegovina CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDD Community-Driven Development CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CPA/CPS Centar zu poucavanje alternativa/Center for Policy Studies (Yugoslavia) EBRD European Bank of Reconstruction and Development ECA Europe and Central Asia ECSSD Europe and Central Asia Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit EPL employment protection legislation ESPAD European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Drugs ESW Economic and Sector Work EU European Union EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities EYF European Youth Forum GDP gross domestic product HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus IBHI Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA International Development Association IDP internally displaced person IDU intravenous drug use ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IOM International Organization for Migration KEI Key Employment Indicators KILM Key Indicators of the Labor Market LAC Latin America and the Caribbean LFS Labor Force Surveys LSD lysergic acid diethylamide LSMS Living Standard Measurement Surveys LIL Learning and Innovation Loan MDG Millennium Development Goal MONEE Monitoring the human impact of socio-economic change in CEE/CIS and the Baltics (UNICEF) MV motor vehicle NGO nongovernmental organization OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers SEE South Eastern Europe SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SJCRKC Saudi Joint Committee on the Relief of Kosovo and Chechnya S-M Serbia and Montenegro vi STI sexually transmitted infection TB tuberculosis TIMSS Third International Mathematics and Science Study UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development WDI World Development Indicators WDR World Development Report WHO World Health Organization WID Women in Development YAPS Youth Albania Parcel Service YLMD youth labor market disadvantage vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study was prepared by a team led by Gloria La Cava that consisted of Paula Lytle, Alexandre Kolev, and Carine Clert. Research assistance was provided by Ivana Aleksic. The team's work on the Concept Note benefited from the guidance of Daniela Gressani, chair of the review meeting, and that of the reviewers, Viviana Mangiaterra and Wendy Cunningham, as well as from the initial comments of Richard Burcroff, Indira Konjhodzic, Vera Dugandzic, and Taies Nezam. This report is based on several key inputs. Arjan Gjonca's demographic analysis served as the background for chapter 1. The QED Group prepared a background report for chapter 2. Catherine Saget of the International Labour Office and Alexandre Kolev co-wrote a background paper on youth labor-market disadvantage that was used for chapter 3. Jere Behrman and James Knowles prepared a background report used for chapter 4, for which Tiziana Tamborrini provided research assistance. The discussion of human trafficking in chapter 3 is based on a forthcoming economic and sector work (ESW) by Carine Clert and Elizabeth Gomart. Zlatko Nikoloski prepared appendix 2 and Diana Marginean contributed substantially to the preparation of the bibliography. The team thanks Alexandre Marc, Joana Godinho, Helen Shahriari, Merrell Tuck-Primdahl, and Pasi Sahlberg for their extensive comments on earlier drafts of the report, and Blasko Smilevski for his inputs. The authors also thank the Development Co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy for its financial support (through the Social Development Initiative for South Eastern Europe) and its early endorsement of and financial assistance to the youth agenda in the subregion. Peggy McInerny and Alicia Hetzner edited the study, and Daphne Sawyer-Dunn processed and formatted it. viii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Young people are assets in development and, in many cases, agents of social and political change. Yet in South Eastern Europe (SEE), youth who have come of age during the years of transition have been strongly affected by increased poverty and neglect. This study addresses the following questions regarding youth aged 15 to 24 in SEE: What is the age structure of the economies of SEE? How are young people at risk in the subregion? What are the dimensions of these risks? What are the economic and social implications of these risks? How is youth disadvantaged in the labor market? How does economic exclusion influence risky behaviors of youth? What are the elements of an effective youth policy? The study finds that youth in SEE need urgent attention, particularly young males in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). To a greater degree than elsewhere in the subregion, these two conflict-affected areas have large youth population bulges and high rates of school leaving, youth unemployment, substance abuse, post-traumatic stress disorder, and young male suicide. Young males in these areas also risk being recruited into extremist organizations, which increases the potential for renewed ethnic violence. Young women throughout SEE are vulnerable to the risks of domestic violence, early pregnancy, human trafficking, and, especially in Kosovo, early school leaving. The study finds that unemployment is contributing to risky behaviors among youth in SEE. Youth in the region have become marginalized--socially, economically, and politically. They are dropping out of secondary school, failing to find jobs, engaging in unsafe sex and substance abuse, and becoming victims of violent crime. They are marrying later, but continuing to have children younger (in many cases, as single mothers). The social and economic implications of these conditions are significant, including costly potential health crises and the transmission of poverty to the next generation in SEE. The study contends that, to be effective, youth policy in SEE must adopt an integrated approach to the social, economic, and political participation of young people in society. Specifically, these needs are for education appropriate to the job market (formal and non-formal), employment, childcare and development, preventive health practices, youth-friendly services (particularly mental health and rehabilitation services), and participation in decision-making. Finally, the study finds that youth concerns need to be mainstreamed within World Bank development policy and practice. Traditional sectoral approaches are not well suited to addressing the multidimensional nature of youth issues, particularly the multiple risks faced by male adolescents and young men. Ideally, each client country should have a well-developed, gender-sensitive youth policy that integrates the following key components: (a) community- based, informal education, (b) practical work experience and support to small businesses, and (c) youth policies developed in conjunction with national and sub-regional youth councils and/or organizations. As used in this report, South Eastern Europe consists of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro, which are collectively referred to as the "subregion." ix YOUTH NEEDURGENTPOLICY ATTENTION Youth in SEE have fallen through the cracks of public policy. Failure to provide adequately for young people's needs has profound short- and long-term development implications for the subregion. The over 9 million youth who have come of age during the years of transition away from communism have been strongly affected by increased poverty, conflict, and neglect. The collapse of the communist system and its corresponding youth programs created a policy vacuum regarding young people. Tapping the potential of youth in SEE is crucial to building more stable and cohesive societies. The situation of youth in SEE has declined precisely at a time when it should be improving to meet the challenges of European Union (EU) accession. Unlike their EU peers, the majority of youth in SEE practice unsafe sex and thus risk a potential HIV/AIDS epidemic. Secondary school enrollment rates have declined in the post-transition period and are now lower in SEE than in southern European countries. Youth unemployment in the subregion is 2.5 times higher than EU youth unemployment, and inadequate education is leaving young people unprepared for the more competitive EU economy. POPULATIONTRENDS The contemporary population of youth aged 15 to 24 in SEE is the largest youth cohort that the subregion will experience for years to come. With the exception of Albania and Kosovo, fertility rates throughout SEE are below replacement levels. The size of this youth cohort is roughly the same throughout the subregion, varying from 14 percent of the total population in Croatia to 18 percent in Moldova (2000). Albania and Moldova have the highest percentage of population in this age group. Although the fertility rate has decreased in SEE in general, a significant percentage of childbearing occurs among youth aged 15 to 24. The youth cohort clearly plays a major reproductive role today. Bulgaria has the highest rate of childbearing among this cohort (57 percent) and Albania, the lowest (34 percent). Population growth in the subregion is highest in Kosovo, which has and will continue to have the highest total fertility rate for the next 15 to 20 years. Combined trends suggest that more childbearing is taking place outside of marriage. The mean age of females at first marriage has increased rapidly in the subregion, indicating late entrance to marriage. For example, the mean age of females at first marriage in Croatia increased from 21.4 in 1970 to 25.1 years in 2000. Age at first marriage also increased in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), and Serbia and Montenegro. Yet youths between 15 and 24 still account for the highest number of births in the subregion. High levels of unsafe sex may explain the high percentage of childbearing in this age group and the trend of out-of-wedlock births. Children born out of wedlock are more vulnerable than those born to married couples. In the context of weakening family structures and cuts in the provision of social services, this trend has serious implications for the inter-generational transmission of poverty. With the exception of Moldova, urbanization has increased in SEE. One implication of urbanization is that youth are less likely to be integrated into social networks and more vulnerable to heroin addiction, violence, and crime. x RISKY BEHAVIORSAND VULNERABILITIES Although young women are subject to the specific vulnerabilities of domestic violence, early pregnancy, and human trafficking, young men in SEE suffer greater overall vulnerability to risk, including the risks of school leaving, suicide, substance abuse, crime, violence, and unemployment. The combined effect of risky behaviors and social and economic marginalization is detrimental not only to the lives of young men, but to society at large, particularly in countries where ethnic divisions and instability remain significant. Suicide rates among young men in SEE are much higher than among young women, and are highest in the post-conflict countries of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Young male suicides are testaments of the continuing trauma of war. Psychosocial services to heal war trauma are urgently needed, but are inadequate or non-existent in these regions. Family structures in the subregion are fragile, unable to address post-traumatic stress disorder, and coming under greater stress due to decreased access to resources. Only a minority of SEE youth appears to use contraception and practice safe sex (defined as abstinence, fewer sexual partners, and the use of condoms). Many youth lack knowledge about the consequences of risky sexual behaviors and do not discuss these issues in their families. Comparisons to the pre-transition period indicate that youth are engaging in their first sexual experiences at younger ages. Research findings demonstrate a low level of knowledge about HIV/AIDS, early pregnancy, and related health issues. Although current rates of HIV/AIDS infection are low, high rates of unsafe sex indicate that the epidemic could spread dramatically in SEE. As a recent World Bank study of HIV/AIDS explained, "Two epidemics are... intertwined in these countries; a well-established IDU [intravenous drug use] since 1995, and an incipient HIV epidemic. Young people are at the center of both."1 The rate of heroin and other substance abuse is rising. It is currently estimated that Macedonia has over 50,000 heroin addicts in a population of just 2 million, but lacks community-based support services. Of the 20,000 registered drug addicts in Croatia, nearly two-thirds are heroin addicts. Alcohol consumption is starting at very early ages and, although chronic drinking is prevalent among the more mature adult population, intensified youth drinking may become a worrisome trend. In general, young men are more likely to consume and/or abuse alcohol than young women. Young people cite such reasons for drug and alcohol abuse as loss of hope for a better future, a profound sense of displacement, and loss of friendships due to forced migration and ethnic conflict. Responding to these youth needs requires careful design of rehabilitation services as well as preventive, community-based approaches that actively engage families and schools. Young men are both targets for ethnic violence and potential recruits for extremists. Conflict-affected societies in SEE are often still armed. High rates of unemployment, idleness, and social alienation make young men ripe recruits for extremists and terrorists, posing great dangers to social stability. In Kosovo, lack of adequate secondary schooling and job training for rural youth has created a vacuum that has been filled by non-formal, fundamentalist education, a trend that has potentially negative consequences for social cohesion and inclusion. 1Novotny, Haazen, Adeyi, 2003, HIV/AIDS in Southeastern Europe, 4. xi Crime affects youth in SEE two ways: youth are engaging in criminal behavior (mostly property crimes), but are also direct victims of crime. The relatively young age of offenders in SEE transition countries is a troubling trend. Juvenile crime rates in the subregion are higher than total general crime rates. The decline in social capital and increasing family dysfunction may explain the rising rate of youth crime in SEE. Youth, primarily young men, are also victims of crime. With the exception of Croatia, all SEE societies have higher rates of homicide and purposeful injury among youth than do Central European countries. More than two-thirds of the children and youth in the subregion have witnessed violence in their homes. Data indicate that domestic violence has increased, often coupled with alcohol abuse. Families are exhibiting increasing dysfunction, including domestic conflict, lack of parental control, weak intergenerational ties, premature autonomy and the associated risk of delinquency. Instead of progressing on MDG education indicators, SEE is moving backward. Secondary school enrollments in SEE are considerably lower than in southern European countries such as Greece, Cyprus, and Malta. Dropout rates are increasing and are higher among young men than young women. Secondary school enrollments declined in the immediate post-transition period, then recovered slightly, but have yet to reach pre-transition levels of universal enrollment. Variation in enrollment rates is higher among countries experiencing political and economic instability. In addition, corruption in the educational system is widespread in SEE and ethnic divisions in education persist, particularly in BiH and Macedonia. Young people consider their formal education inadequate preparation for the contemporary job market. Youth have stressed in consultations that the quality and relevance of education need to be improved. They also seek a voice in educational reform because they are directly affected by educational content. Fieldwork and the experience of young people themselves demonstrate the effectiveness of non-formal education in developing life and livelihood skills. Non-formal education can be defined as "organized and semi-organized educational activities operating outside the structure and routines of the formal education system."2 It also includes sports and cultural activities, which support the development of positive individual and group identities while providing opportunities for income generation. Many youth organizations have expressed interest in extending the recognition of non-formal education. The European Youth Forum, the main EU- wide youth platform, has in particular emphasized the need for non-formal education, including a role for youth organizations as educators. HIGH YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS Despite the resumption of economic growth in most SEE countries, youth unemployment rates remain very high more than ten years after the fall of communist regimes in the region. In 2001, youth unemployment rates in SEE were already high by EU standards, averaging 38.6 percent according to World Bank Labor Force Survey data for seven SEE economies, and 31.2 percent according to Bank Living Standards Measurement Surveys data 2Sahlberg, Building Bridges, 10. xii for six SEE regions. In comparison, LFS data for the same period showed that youth unemployment in the EU was 14.9 percent. There are large disparities in youth unemployment in SEE. The LFS-based unemployment rate in the subregion ranges from 16.2 percent in Moldova to 69.2 percent in Kosovo. Absolute youth unemployment rates are highest in Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia- Herzegovina. Labor-market disadvantages are not spread equally among young people. Youth with little education, youth with disabilities, and youth from certain minorities (such as the Roma) are disproportionately affected, as are young males. In 2001, the unemployment rate was higher for young men in 7 of the 10 SEE economies for whichdata was available. Large numbers of jobless youth in the subregion are no longer looking for work. The inclusion of these young people in the category of "officially unemployed" would raise unemployment rates among youth considerably. If we depart from the "strict" ILO definition of unemployment to a more "relaxed" definition that captures discouraged unemployed young people, the average youth unemployment rate in 2001 (approximately) rises from 31.2 percent (strict definition) to 41 percent (relaxeddefinition). The proportion of jobless youth who do not report looking for work is particularly significant in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, where the gray economy seems to be widespread. Young people who were both joblessand out of school accounted for more than 35.6 percent of the youth population in 2001. In Albania, Bosnia -Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Kosovo, approximately one in three young persons aged 15­19 is neither in school nor employed. In most SEE economies, with the exception of Kosovo, there is a greater proportion of young men than young women in this category. A large number of young people in SEE are working in environments where they are deprived of basic employment rights and entitlements. Low-quality employment in the subregion includes jobs that may provide higher salaries, but do not provide health, pension, or unemployment insurance. In Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, a very large proportion of the wage-employed work in low-quality jobs. Large absolute youth unemployment is only one aspect of high aggregate unemployment and low job creation in SEE; it cannot be addressed in isolation from the wider employment problem. While economic growth is essential to supporting youth employment, the quality of that growth is equally important. The impact of economic growth on youth labor markets is not uniform throughout SEE. In Macedonia, employment prospects of youth remained particularly troubling until 1997, but improved slightly thereafter with the return of economic growth. In Bulgaria, however, the labor-market situation of youth has continued to deteriorate, despite the fact that the economy began to grow in 1997. Youth unemployment rates in Bulgaria rose from 32 percent in 1998 to 38 percent in 2001. In Romania, weak economic growth has gone hand-in-hand with stagnation in youth unemployment. Policymakers need to address the barriers to young people's entry into the labor market. The existence of these barriers is indicated by higher rates of youth unemployment relative to adult unemployment. Barriers include the poor quality of skills possessed by labor-market entrants, low incentives for employers to hire first job seekers, a lack of mechanisms to give young graduates exposure to work, and credit access that disproportionately affects young adults, preventing them from starting up micro- and small enterprises. xiii A difficult entry into the work force has serious welfare repercussions on young people, increasing the risks of income poverty and the deterioration of human and social capital. Data show that lack of a job is a strong correlate of poverty in SEE. There is large heterogeneity in the subregion, however, regarding the extent to which joblessness affects the relative risk of poverty. International evidence shows that the longer an unemployment spell, the more difficult it is to find work because of the loss of skills, poor morale, and stress. Early unemployment in a person's life may permanently impair his or her future employability in decent jobs. The evidence indicates that a great incidence of poverty among jobless youth is not captured in unemployment data. One of the most positive ways that youth in SEE are responding to unemployment is by staying in educational institutions longer, thus delaying their entry into the labor force. This option is not a possibility for vulnerable youth, who have a tougher time completing education even at the primary level. Given high unemployment in SEE, many youth have left their countries to look for jobs abroad. According to official data, emigration from Bulgaria and Romania is the most significant in SEE, but real migration levels throughout the region are probably greater than indicated by official figures. In Moldova, the official estimate of citizens working abroad is 234,000, but unofficial estimates range between 600,000 and 1,000,000. Survey findings from BiH, Macedonia, Moldova, and Serbia confirm that a majority of youth would emigrate if they had the opportunity to do so. International migration can have a positive outcome. Young people and their households can exit unemployment and poverty by working abroad and sending private remittances home. For Kosovo Albanians, such remittances are estimated at 43 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The negative aspects of labor migration are a brain drain in the subregion and lost investment in education in the home country. While low-qualified migrants are usually part of short-term and seasonalmigration, highly qualified workers are prone to long-term or permanent migration. Unemployment and poverty in the region have been instrumental in contributing to the development of a large informal sector. Informal activities often mitigate, but do not necessarily prevent, income poverty. Growth in the informal economy, moreover, has seen a rise in the number of young workers who do not enjoy labor code protections and are not adequately protected against health risks and old age. The growth of human trafficking in SEE is a negative aspect of labor migration and a flourishing informal economy. Lack of economic opportunities establishes conditions in which young women are vulnerable to trafficking. An estimated 175,000 persons from Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are trafficked annually, that is, up to 25 percent of the 700,000 to 2 million people trafficked around the world each year. Moldova, Romania, and Albania, followed by Bulgaria, are the major countries of origin of trafficking in South Eastern Europe. Data is limited, but it is apparent that females vulnerable to trafficking are either very young or young, single or not married, single mothers, and come from either a poor or very poor family background. xiv COMPONENTS OF ANEFFECTIVE YOUTH POLICY IN SEE Effective youth policies must view young people as agents of change and active participants in local, national, and global governance. Youth policies need to address young people as stakeholders and key decision makers in the policies and programs that affect their lives. Youth need to be the center of sectoral investment programs that address their needs in a comprehensive way. Youth policies--whether focused on education, health, culture, sports, justice, and/or active labor markets--will have greater impact if they approach youth inclusion and empowerment in a comprehensive manner. Such an approach would provide youth a much-desired voice in decision-making and contribute to more efficient use of budgetary resources. The costs of not investing in youth in SEE are alarmingly high. This study clearly links risky behaviors to youth labor-market disadvantage, demonstrating the high social cost of not investing in youth. The discounted per capita cost of, for example, a young person infected with HIV in the subregion is estimated as high as US$400,000; of a young career criminal and/or heavy drug user, US$49,000; and of a high school dropout, US$9,000. At the national level, it has been estimated that the current cost of not investing in youth in Kosovo is 204 million euros (one-third of the government budget), based on the cost of youth riots that occurred there in March 2004. Preventive policies in both formal and non-formal education, health, and first-chance active labor market programs appear to be more cost-effective than curative policies. Reviews of international programs addressing youth employment have found that effective programs integrate youth employment policy into an integrated package of community-based services tailored to youth needs. One of the most promising areas for youth investment is non-formal education, which would provide a much-needed complement to formal education. Such programs would be particularly beneficial for youth who have either not entered or have dropped out of secondary school. This group is at high risk for imposing costs on society over the entire course of their lives. Cost-effective, non-formal education programs that permit young people to complete secondary schooling in ethnically integrated programs, combined with life skills training in a variety of areas and opportunities for sports and recreation, appear to be economically beneficial investments for SEE as a whole. The literature on youth development cites a wide range of potential benefits, although information on the cost and effectiveness of community-based youth centers, sports and recreation programs, and youth rehabilitation programs is limited. Because of their possible social, in addition to private, benefits, the rationale for public support of such centers and programs is strong. The experience of the World Bank-funded Babylon Youth Centers in Macedonia indicates that youth-friendly spaces can effectively promote social cohesion among different communities and ethnic groups through non-formal educational activities at a limited per capita cost (US$30­60 per young person per year). Similarly, evaluations of selected active labor-market programs (ALMPs) in Bosnia -Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania indicate some positive employment results, with the exception of public work programs. Programs that xv offered job search assistance and training linked to guaranteed jobs were found to be more effective than programs in vocational and technical training. CONCLUSIONS The World Bank can best support youth in SEE by mainstreaming youth issues into current macro-level policies. This means increasing the role of youth in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and country assistance strategies (CASs). Other important steps in this direction would include setting up youth advisory groups, known as Youth Voices, in country offices and complementing country-level youth strategies with institution building for youth organizations. The policy dialogue the World Bank has established with governments can also be used to promote youth issues. Mainstreaming youth in World Bank country work will require breaking up certain sectoral barriers and revisiting standard practices. In those countries where Youth Voices advisory groups are being established, these mechanisms can be instrumental in helping World Bank staff address youth concerns in PRSPs and CASs, as well as in priority sectors such as education (both formal and non-formal), health, labor markets, rural development, environment, and urban development. Within the context of mainstreaming youth, young men in SEE should be a clear priority. The multiple dimensions of risk faced by adolescent boys and young men have not been adequately addressed by traditional sectoral projects. In education, for instance, the emphasis has been mainly on girls. Non-formal education, in particular, offers a means of reaching the significant percentage of young men who are neither in school nor employed, and could be integrated effectively into community-basedapproaches. The involvement of male educators and young male peer educators as positive role models acceptable to young men will be critical to the outreach of such programs. Country-level youth policies need to incorporate three major elements: (1) non-formal education, (2)practical work experience and support to small business, and (3) development of national youth policies with national youth councils. These three dimensions reflect the key priorities expressed by youth forums worldwide and should constitute the foundation of all youth-focused interventions. Ideally, every country in SEE should have a well developed and sustainable youth policy and adequate financial allocations to address their needs in a multidimensional way. The study develops a typology of the countries/areas of SEE as either (a) frontrunners in EU accession, (b) conflict-affected, or (c) lower-income. It then outlines youth policy implications for each typology. Youth-focused investment projects that address the multiple dimensions of risk described in this study should be the priority option. A second-best option would be to integrate a youth component into sectoral projects. Given the multiple dimensions of risk faced by youth in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, delay in youth investment in these regions is not an option. Kosovo in particular has the highest absolute youth unemployment rate and the largest youth population bulge in SEE. These conditions exacerbate young people's vulnerability to risk, increasing the possibility of political extremism and renewed outbreaks of ethnic violence. xvi Certain conditions of youth vulnerability in SEEincluding trauma, depression, and drug addictionrequire instruments that cannot be provided by demand-driven or family support models. Given high rates of youth suicide, psychosocial support services are greatly needed in conflict-affected areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo. As the use of injected heroin increases throughout SEE, there is also a need for community-based rehabilitation services in addition to broader drug prevention activities. This study provides a roadmap for youth inclusion and empowerment in SEE that can help overcome existing programming fragmentation and increase development effectiveness. In partnership with selected donors such as Italy, Germany, UNICEF, and the Council of Europe, the World Bank can play catalytic role in providing incentives for a coherent youth policy through capacity building and strategic support of youth policy coordinating bodies. In South Eastern Europe, the active involvement of youth is necessary to build more stable and cohesive societies prepared to enter the European Union. xvii INTRODUCTION Background on youth exclusion and poverty Youth are assets to development and potential agents of social change, yet youth poverty and exclusion are widespread and increasing. Globally, the major issues affecting youth in specific ways are lack of adequate education and employment, lack of assets and property rights, exposure to risky behaviors, violence and crime, and, most important, lack of participation in decision-making. Excluded from access to economic and societal resources, in some dimensions, youth tend to be more vulnerable than older age groups, who are relatively more protected by the economy, social policy, and customs. Many countries lack an adequate policy response to young people's needs. Over the past decade, youth3 has emerged as a key focus in development, due in part to increased challenges youth face in developing countries. International development organizations, governments, and NGOs have placed youth issues on the agenda as a concern to be addressed.4 In September 2000, the Millennium Declaration adopted during the United Nations General Assembly set the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to be achieved by countries by 2015. Fully half of the MDGs include specific targets and indicators to be measured that relate directly to youth. These goals are: Ø Goal2.Achievinguniversalprimaryeducation · Indicator: literacy rates among 15­24 year olds Ø Goal3.Promotegenderequalityandempowerwomen · Indicator: ratio of literate females to males of 15­24 year olds Ø Goal6.CombatHIV/AIDS,malaria,andotherdiseases · Indicator: HIV prevalence among 15­24-year-old pregnant women Ø Goal8.Developaglobalpartnershipfordevelopment · Target: in cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth · Indicator: unemployment rate of 15­24 year olds South Eastern Europe, as used in this report, is comprised of : Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Table 1 shows the absolute numbers of youth and the percentage of youth in the population in this subregion. This particular youth cohort has come of age during the post-communist transition years and has been strongly affected by increased poverty during the transition. 3In any study or policy paper focusing on youth, the first requirement is to clarify to whom one is referring. Many international organizations, including the World Bank, currently define youth as those between the ages of 15 and 24. While this paper employs 15­24 years of age as the principal definition, many ECA countries define youth within the range of 16­30 years old. 4Specific forms that this concern has taken include the 1998 Braga Youth Action Plan at the UN Youth Forum, 2000 UN Program of Action for Youth, Youth Development and Outreach Program at the Inter- American Development Bank, and USAID's YouthNET (this last focuses on reproductive health). 1 Youth are less likely to be employed and are less educated as well. In the Yugoslav successor states, they have been directly or indirectly affected by conflict­through violence, displacement, and interrupted or inadequate education. The effects of these disruptions will have profound short- and long-term development implications for a generation that is more vulnerable than its predecessors. Table 1. Youth aged 15-24 in SEE, 2000 % of population Absolute number (000s) SEE 15.7% 9,240.9 Albania 17.2% 522.9 Bosnia ­Herzegovina . 15.0% 598.0 Bulgaria 14.6% 1,161.0 Croatia 13.8% 641.0 Moldova 17.7% 760.0 Romania 16.1% 3,612.0 FYRO Macedonia 16.3% 333.0 FR Yugoslavia 15.3% 1,613.0 (now Serbia and Montenegro) Social exclusion, vulnerability, and poverty are strongly interconnected in the subregion and cause the current generation of children, teenagers, and young adults to engage in risky behaviors with long-term health and social consequences. Risky behaviors such as substance abuse, unsafe sex, and participation in prostitution and human trafficking­and the results or correlates of those behaviors such as early pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), addiction, poor health, lack of training for sustainable employment, and dropping out of school­pose threats to healthy, productive lives for young adults in South Eastern Europe. The ability of SEE economies to respond to these challenges in an integrated manner has been circumscribed due to a policy vacuum created by the collapse of the communist parties and their corresponding youth wings. Therefore, at a time when youth issues required policy responses and increased coordination to address multidimensional challenges, appropriate policy mechanisms had not been established. In the past few years, central coordinating agencies, ministries, or directorates have been established in several countries.5 Now that institutional counterparts exist for youth policy, the next step is to review available data on key youth issues and assess current policy frameworks and programs for youth development in order to design more effective youth policies and investments. Objectives The key objective of this study is to provide a roadmap for youth development in SEE that governments, donors, and the World Bank can use to align public expenditures and investments with youth needs and priorities. This study also aims at a better understanding of the complex processes that prevent youth from developingtheir full potential. The Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region has pioneered multidimensional approaches to youth inclusion and 5Specifically in SEE, in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro. See "Youth in ECA: A Vulnerability and Social Exclusion Perspective," World Bank 2002, 53­56; and UNICEF, "Young People in Changing Societies: The MONEE Project," 2000, 117. 2 empowerment. In the context of youth as a World Bank corporate priority, but also given this regional experience on youth issues, the study identifies at what further efforts should be directed and the urgent priorities in the subregion. More specifically, the study addresses the following questions: What is the underlying age structure within SEE economies? What are the youth policy implications of different countries' demographic profiles, considering the impact of other factors (for example, economic transition, conflict)? What are the dimensions of risky behaviors and their economic implications? What is the relationship between social exclusion and these ? What are the patterns of youth labor market disadvantage in SEE? To what extent has youth empowerment materialized in SEE and what are the ongoing prospects? Multidimensional analytic framework This report integrates social analysis and economic analysis. Evidence found in both ECA learning activities and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region analytical studies suggested the need to acknowledge the multidimensional nature of youth's experience and perception of marginalization. Available quantitative evidence generally focused on the socioeconomic dimensions of youth disadvantage. These elements are essential to understand the types of processes that may lead youth to fall into poverty and vulnerability. However, the literature on youth processes of socialization and existing qualitative evidence clearly suggested that they do not provide a sufficient frame of analysis. For example, the qualitative social analysis described youth idleness and frustration, identifying how the lack of opportunities may lead to violent behaviors. The economic analysis of youth labor market disadvantage demonstrated the extent of the problem and assessed it relative to different measures. Recognizing multidimensionality does not mean setting out a catalogue of missing assets but rather emphasizing the cumulative and complex processes involved.6 The analytic framework adopted for this study combined a social inclusion perspective aimed at establishing the right environment for youth, with an empowerment perspective, emphasizing the role of youth as agents of positive change and assets for development. The social inclusion perspective involves the identification of the interrelated dimensions and processes of exclusion that create the socialdisadvantage of youth in a particular context. This identification is a prerequisite for (1) the development of inclusive policies aimed at the removal of institutional barriers and the enhancement of incentives to increase access of youth to assets and development opportunities,; and (2) the process of youth empowerment, defined as the "expansion of assets and capabilities of young people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold accountable the institutions that affect their lives."7 The social inclusion and empowerment approach adopted here is consistent with the World Development Report 2000/01: Attacking Poverty, which proposed a framework addressing three areas: promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment, and enhancing security. Promoting opportunities relates to social inclusion in various domains, ranging from education to labor markets.As mentioned, facilitating empowerment includes removing barriers to youth participation in decision-making. Enhancing security involves addressing vulnerability to risk, including health risks and risks posed by violence and conflict. Bearing in mind this 6Clert, 1998, 2000b. 7 UNICEF and World Bank, Youth in Southeastern Europe: Report of the Rome Conference on Participation, Empowerment and Social Inclusion, June 2002, 29. Adapted from Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook , World Bank, 2002. 3 framework, analytical challenges in youth development include: What are the main barriers or processes that prevent access of youth to assets? (and what are the processes that seem to enhance assets?) What are the consequences for youth lack of opportunities (social, economic, and/or political)? Young people experience exclusion from labor markets (they face specific barriers as new entrants) and credit markets. They rarely possess the material assets such as land or housing that could serve as collateral, so they have little access to credit. They also experience isolation, vulnerability, powerlessness, and idleness (due to lack of free-time activities). Their disadvantages derives from lack of access to assets in three interrelated dimensions: (1) economic (assets leading to income generation), (2) social (access to information, social capital, free-time activities, cultural expression, educational opportunities, care and mentoring in youth- friendly venues), and (3) participation in decision-making (empowerment, governance). The multiple dimensions of youth exclusion informing the analytic approaches in this study include social, economic, demographic, gender,8 and risk analyses (see box 1). Demographic analysis can serve as an entry point to social analysis, because it highlights and provides insight into specific issues as well as risky behaviors. Large youth cohorts also are associated with violence and domestic armed conflict.9 The specifics of the demographic profile in the subregion aid in the process of identifying policy priorities. Box1. Gender and youth in South Eastern Europe In the past decade at least, development interventions and analyses that incorporate a gender focus have focused on girls and young women. As the results of the present economic and sector work (ESW) demonstrate, gender analysis also can illustrate the risks faced by boys and young men. The different findings discussed in the study highlight the greater vulnerability of young men along multiple dimensions and the risks posed in ethnic divided societies by disaffected male youth. Furthermore, targeting young men who are out of work and out of education requires specific efforts at outreach and more attention to their needs. This report also integrates elements of risk analysis, specifically through elements of youth exclusion that create or reinforce exposure to risk and through identifying specific groups among youth that are more vulnerable than others. More specifically, youth in conflict and post-conflict areas may suffer the most of any group from political and institutional uncertainty. Exclusion takes on spatial and mobility dimensions in ethnically segregated post-conflict countries. Male youth unemployment is classified as one of the key determinants leading to protracted or re-emerging conflict.10 Onthe other hand, youth represent great potential for conflict prevention and for the establishment of social cohesion, as the WB financed Macedonia Children and Youth Project is showing. 8Gender analysis examines the different roles and tasks of men and women, the relationships between them, their different needs, the different access they have to resources, and their control over these. 9Urdal, "The Devil in the Demographics: How Youth Bulges Influence the Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict," International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, March 2002. 10World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework. 4 The multidimensional analysis outlined here posits youth as assets for the development process, in their roles as individuals and as members of communities, in the context of the macro- environment. On the positive side, supporting the development of life11 and livelihood12 skills for youth can result in increased social capital on the community level. This social capital, in turn, builds social cohesion in the society as a whole, as well as political stability within and among countries. The overall environment can contribute to this process by providing resources for youth or having policies that enhance youth empowerment. Interventions at different levels can have a dynamic impact on youth development as a whole. On the negative side, institutional barriers to youth participation and to their access to economic assets (livelihood skills, credit, training, income generation, and housing) and social assets (life skills, information, social capital, culture, and leisure opportunities) all disempower youth. On the community level, this disempowerment manifests as social exclusion and a lack of social cohesion. When youth engage in risky behaviors, there is a direct impact on the community, and the overall effect is multiplied for the society as a whole, with high economic and social costs.13 Development interventions can facilitate successful transitions between life cycle stages14 and should aim at preventing exposure to risk that the individual is not capable of managing him/herself and at preventing disadvantages from accumulating throughout the life cycle. Public policies for young people can be divided in three broad categories: (1) preventive, (2) curative, and (3) empowerment. Generally, preventive interventions are aimed at counteracting the processes that generate the problem, while a curative intervention addresses their consequences. Recent analysis indicates that a shift in the emphasis from curative toward preventive interventions­from treating the symptoms to addressing the causes­is more effective.15 Broadly speaking, empowerment policies focus on the full development of the capacity of young people. Preventive, curative, and empowerment policies are complementary, and the precise mix should depend on country and local context. These policy dimensions for SEE youth will be analyzed more thoroughly in section 6. Methodology The methodology for this study consists of qualitative and quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis includes desk reviews, analytical stocktaking of a range of materials reflecting the different dimensions of SEE youth as well as selected consultations with youth representatives and policymakers throughout SEE. By reviewing the existing surveys and assessments, the study identifies common themes and traces interrelationships as well as to find the gaps. 11Life skills include communication, decisionmaking, and leadership skills; critical and creative thinking; skills for coping with emotions, stress and conflict; and overall healthy behavior. 12Livelihood skills include job searching skills, interviewing skills, entrepreneurial and marketable skills appropriate to the local economy. 13For a more thorough discussion of these points and the linkages with the life -cycle, see La Cava and Lytle, "Youth: Strategic Directions for the World Bank," World Bank, 2003, www.worldbank.org/childrenandyouth 14See Inter-American Development Bank,Social Development Strategy[draft], 4. 15Martin Godfrey, "Youth Employment Policies in Developing and Transition Countries: Prevention as Well as Cure" draft World Bank commissioned paper, March 2003. Alexandre Kolev and Catherine Saget. "Towards a Better Understanding of the Nature, Causes and Consequences of Youth Labor Market Disadvantage: Evidence for South East Europe." 5 The quantitative analysis includes analyses of Labor Force Surveys (LFS), Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS), census data, and public finance data. These data sources were analyzed with a focus on youth. Two background papers were prepared on the basis of these statistical sources, one on youth labor market disadvantage and the other on the cost- effectiveness of selected youth investments.16 For the paper on youth labor market disadvantage, comparable indicators of youth labor market outcomes were developed for 10 SEE economies, relying on 7LFS and 6 LSMS conducted in approximately 2001. 16Alexandre Kolev and Catherine Saget. "Towards a Better Understanding of the Nature, Causes and Consequences of Youth Labor Market Disadvantage: Evidence for South East Europe." Jere Behrman and James C. Knowles. Economic Evaluation of Investments in Youth in Selected SEE Countries. 6 CHAPTER 1. POPULATION TRENDS: INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY LEVEL From a demographic point of view, the youth population is of particular importance. Because the population of SEE economies is no longer growing, the 1995­2000 youth cohort, aged 15­ 24, is the largest cohort that South Eastern Europe will have in the coming years. Although fertility in all SEE economies is below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman (with the exception of Albania with 2.2 ), youth still have a key reproductive role, because more than 40 percent of childbearing occurs at ages 15­24. At the same time, the high levels of unsafe sex (described in chapter 2) help to explain the high percentage of childbearing in this young age group and are likely to contribute to the trend of out-of-marriage births. Size and growth of youth population in SEE While, compared to North Western countries, most of the SEE economies have relatively young populations, this situation began to change in 1995, with most of SEE experiencing rapid reduction in fertility rates, resulting in an aging population. Comparing the percentages of the population aged 15­24 over the last 50 years, figure 1 shows that today's percentage of youth population is smaller than 50 to 60 years ago. In SEE the 1995­2000 cohort is the largest that the subregion will have in the coming years. Figure 1. Population aged 15­24 as percent of total SEE population, 1950-2010 Population 15-24 in % 0.21 South East Europe 0.20 0.19 0.18 Male-Female 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Gjonca, "Demographic Situation of Youth in South Eastern Europe." Based on "UN Population Prospects 2001 Rev." The long-term trend in the relative size of the population aged 15­24 is similar among SEE countries, and the variation among them is quite small. The size of the 15­24-year-old cohort varies from 14 percent in Croatia to 18 percent in Moldova in 2000. The two countries with the highest percentage of population at ages 15­24 in SEE are Albania and Moldova (figure 2). 7 Figure 2. Populationaged 15­24 as percent of total population in economies of SEE, 2000 Population aged 15-24 in Percentage, 2000 Former Yug. FYROM Romania Moldova Croatia Bulgaria Bosn.-Herz. Albania SEE 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% Source: Gjonca, "Demographic Situation of Youth in South Eastern Europe." Based on "UN Population Prospects 2001 Rev." On the other hand, Bulgaria and Croatia have the smallest percentage of people aged 15­24. The total picture from the demographic data below shows that Kosovo has the most significant youth bulge, with the highest growth rate in the area. Kosovo also has and will have the highest total fertility rate for the next 15­20 years.. The population of SEE economies grew slowly from 1950 to 1990, but this growth became negative after 1990. Figure 3 shows the annual growth rate of countries in SEE from 1950­ 2010. Since the 1990s, the growth rates of the SEE populations have been either negative or very close to zero. The most important factor for the sharp drop in annual growth rate during the 1990s and the early 2000s was the very low levels of fertility in SEE economies, which all were impacted by the conflict in the Yugoslav successor states. in the exception is Albania, whose negative growth rate was determined by the large emigration of the youth population (23 percent of the population migrated between 1990­2000). 8 Figure 3. Annual SEE growth rates in percentages, 1950­2005 3.5% 2.5% 1.5% 0.5% -0.5% Annual growth rate in % -1.5% -2.5% -3.5% 1950-55 1960-65 1970-75 1980-85 1990-95 2000-05 Albania Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Moldova Romania FYROM Former Yug. SEE Kosovo Source: Gjonca, "Demographic Situation of Youth in South Eastern Europe." Based on "UN Population Prospects 2001 Rev." Negative implications of dependency ratios in SEE The consequences of aging populations are reflected in the values of dependency ratios (figure 4). The dependency ratios, calculated here as the ratio of population aged 0­14 and 65 and older over the working age population (15­64) also are indicators of how the population distribution of a country or region will affect its economic development. It is argued that the higher the number of people in the active population (15­64), the higher will be the productivity of its economy and the better the country will cope with retirement issues. Figure 4 shows clearly that SEE dependency ratios have decreased dramatically from approximately 57 percent in 1960 to approximately 47 percent in 2000. This reduction in dependency ratios is due mainly to the long-term reduction in the number of children aged 0­14, who initially affect the numerator and later the denominator of the dependency ratio. 9 Figure 4. Dependency ratios in SEE economies, 1950-2010 0.65 South East Europe Dependency Ratios 0.60 Male-Female 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Gjonca, "Demographic Situation of Youth in South Eastern Europe." Based on "UN Population Prospects 2001 Rev." As dependency ratios decrease, it is not only the problems associated with aging such as pensions and care for the elderly that must be faced. The failure of the current youth cohort to be well-integrated into the labor market exacerbates the problems indicated by the decreasing dependency ratios. Demographic changes in SEE, 1950-2000 By 2000 all SEE economies, with exception of Albania, had total fertility rates below the replacement level (2.1 children per woman). Even Albania showed dramatic reduction in total fertility rate­from 3.0 in 1990 to 2.2 children per woman in 2000. SEE economies show very similar pattern of changes in fertility (see figure 5). Some SEE countries, such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, have levels of fertility below 1.5 children per woman, levels even lower than those of most of the developed countries of the North Western Europe.17 Although Kosovo has experienced a decline in fertility, its fertility rate is still the highest in the subregion and remains above replacement levels. 17Coleman, D., 1996. 10 Figure 5. Total fertility rates in SEE, 1970-2000 6.0 Total fertility rate Albania Bosn.-Herz. Bulgaria Croatia 5.5 Moldova Romania FYROM F. Yug. 5.0 Kosovo 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Source: Council of Europe, "Recent Demographic Experiences in Europe, 2001." The 2000 figure on Albania is based on data from the latest census 2001 and vital registration data. Although the fertility rate has decreased in general, significant percentages of childbearing are occurring among young population, aged 15­24 (see figure 6). Bulgaria has the highest percentage of childbearing at these ages, with almost 57 percent of childbearing occurring in this age group; while Albania has the lowest, approximately 33.7 percent. These percentages are clear indicators that the current youth cohort has a major reproductive role. At the same time, the high levels of unsafe sex (see chapter 2) help to explain the high percentage of childbearing in this young age group and are likely to contribute to the trend of out-of-marriage births. 11 Figure 6. Childbearing at young ages (15­24) as percentage of reproductive ages in SEE (latest available year) Kosovo (2000) Former Yug. (1998) FYROM (1998) Romania (1999) Moldova (1997) Croatia (1999) Bulgaria (1999) Bosn.-Herz. (1998) Albania (2000) 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 Source: Based on data from Council of Europe, "Recent Demographic Development in Europe, 2001." This cohort is the most affected by higher unemployment rates, higher rates of suicide and homicides, and higher exposure to various risky behaviors, yet still has a central reproductive role. This youth reproductive role has implications for investments that have an impact across the life cycle, not just in this generation`s youth but also in terms of their role as parents, that is, early child care and development. The mean age of females at first marriage has increased rapidly, indicating a late entrance into marriage (see figure 7). In Croatia, from 1970 to 2000, the mean age of females at first marriage increased from 21.4 to 25.1 years; in former Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia, , it also increased. Taken with the data above, these combined trends suggest that more child-bearing is taking place outside of marriage. 12 Figure 7. Mean age of first marriage for females in SEE economies, 1970-2000 Mean age of female first marriage rates 25.5 25.0 Albania Bosn.-Herz. 24.5 Bulgaria Croatia 24.0 Moldova Romania 23.5 FYROM F. Yug. 23.0 22.5 22.0 21.5 21.0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Source:Based on data from Council of Europe, "Recent Demographic Development in Europe, 2001." Taken together and placed in the context of the life-cycle, these demographic data point to issues of concern in SEE with respect to family structure and childrearing. If cohabitation is not widespread, the implications are that more single mothers are childrearing. At the same time, services such as preschool and accessible health care, which previously were provided through workplace/enterprises, no longer are available or charge fees beyond a single income. Other social institutions and social capital remain weak.18 Thus, more young women are raising children without access to services that would increase their children's viability. Finally, table 2 demonstrates the extent to which SEE has become more urbanized, with the exception of Moldova. Although specific data is not available for youth, it is well known that youth in SEE have become increasingly urbanized due to internal migrations, following similar trends globally. 19 Youth move to urban areas in pursuit of better education or job opportunities, leaving rural areas depopulated and with a higher proportion of elderly residents. As youth move to urban areas, they are less likely to be integrated into social networks and are more subject to specific vulnerabilities due to the relative lack of social institutions, as will be described in the following sections. Although urbanization also has increased in Kosovo, as of 2000, the area was still predominately rural (58.6 percent), with clear implications for youth policies.20 18See, for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina Local Level Institutions and Social Capitaland Conflict and Change in Kosovo: Impact on Institutions and Society, World Bank, 2001. 19Woodrow Wilson Center Conference report. 20Conflict and Change in Kosovo, x. 13 Table 2. Urbanization in SEE, 1990-2000 (as percentage of population) Change, 1990-2000 Percentage of urban population 1990 2000 (%) Albania 36.1 41.6 15.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina 39.2 43.0 9.7 Bulgaria 66.5 69.6 4.7 Croatia 54.0 57.7 6.9 Moldova 46.9 46.1 -1.7 Romania 53.6 56.2 4.9 FYROM 57.8 62.0 7.3 F. Yugoslavia 50.9 52.2 2.6 Source: World Urbanization Prospects, 1999 rev. UN, New York, 2001. 14 CHAPTER 2. RISKY BEHAVIORS AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION Young people have been falling through the cracks of social policy in SEE for over a decade. This policy vacuum resulted from the collapse of communist parties and youth wings, along with their traditional attention to youth matters. At the same time, as discussed in the previous section, the family structure has been under increased pressure and demands due to the decline of enterprise-based services, decreased access to resources, and destabilized environments. In this context, the incidence of risky behaviors may have been amplified by policy failures, but these behaviors, once identified, can be prevented or reduced in the future through adequate policy interventions. This section highlights the risky behaviors in which young people engage: involvement in crime and violence, unsafe sex, substance abuse, and school leaving. These behaviors are associated with a high degree of risk: risk of ill health, loss of economic productivity, and diminished function in family and community life, among others. As a recent World Bank study of HIV/AIDS explained, "Two epidemics are therefore intertwined in these countries; a well-established IDU [intravenous drug use] since 1995, and an incipient HIV epidemic. Young people are at the center of both."21 This section also highlights the specific gender dimensions of youth risky behaviors and, in particular, the young men's higher vulnerability to most risks, in ways that have been perhaps underestimated in the past. Violence on the individual and family level Current risky behaviors of young people in many cases are associated with vulnerability due to weak family structure and other social institutions, and this correlation can be seen in the impact of missing protective bonds in the family. As youth move through the life cycle, they may experience violence in different ways; young adolescents directly and second-hand (witnessing abuse, usually of their mothers) in the home from parents and other adult household members. Once young women have left their parents' home, they are more vulnerable than young men to domestic abuse from spouses, partners, or members of the spouse's family. In the Young Voices Poll, 7 of 10 children and young people say that they sometimes face violent or aggressive behavior at home, generally verbal.22 One-fifth said that physicalviolence sometimes happens at home.23 Similarly, 17 percent of Macedonian university students surveyed had witnessed acts of domestic violence at home.24 A 1999 survey of students aged 15 21Thomas Novotny and others, HIV/AIDS in Southeastern Europe: Case Studies from Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. February 2003, 4. 22Provide ref for the Youth Voices poll. 23 UNICEF, "A Brave New Generation, Youth in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Findin gs and Recommendations" (Belgrade: FRY, 2002), 82. 24 "Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, "Domestic Violence in Macedonia," September 1998, 7. 15 to 19 in Serbia-Montenegro found that the majority of girls who had suffered sexual abuse in some form were close to the offender (boyfriend, relative, boss, family friend).25 According to a 1996 study, 64 percent of women in Albania had experienced physical, emotional, or sexual abuse.26 Women who were less educated and below the age of 30 were found to be at a greater risk. When women were asked to identify causes of the abuse, 80 percent stated alcohol; 52 percent, unemployment; 50 percent, poor living conditions; and 43 percent, stress.27 Women have reported more abuse in arranged marriages.28 In Macedonia, 31 percent of surveyed female university students reported being the victims of physical or psychological violence.29 In Moldova, 22 percent of women interviewed in a survey had been abused by a partner or former partner,30 and women who were married were 15 times more likely to have been victims of severe physical violence than women who had never been married.31 In Romania in 1995, indications were that violence had increased and was attributed to economic decline, coupled with alcohol abuse.32 Domestic violence also is associated with post-conflict situations and demobilization of soldiers. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, given the lack of baseline data, it is difficult to determine whether the war has increased spousal abuse, but focus groups with young women conducted for Voices of the Poor identified spousal abuse as a problem and linked it to alcohol abuse.33 Violence from sons to mothers also has increased dramatically in post-conflict BiH.34 Violence also can be turned against oneself. Figure 8 shows the suicide rates for youth in SEE, disaggregated by gender in most cases. Suicide rates are highest in Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina, which have the respective rates of 18 and 24 suicides per 10,000 population. These data clearly demonstrate that young men are at greater risk for suicide than young women, with the exception of Albania, in which young women are at equal risk. 2525 Ivana Aleksic, "Youth Development in Transitioning Countries: Case of Serbia," Background paper prepared for the MultiSector Team Learning Project on Youth Vulnerability and Exclusion in ECA, June 2002, 24. 26The first Albanian nationwide study on domestic violence was conducted in 1996 by the NGO Refleksione and funded by PHARE. UNICEF, 9­12. 27UNICEF, 9­12. 28 "Refugee Women­Albania," 24. 29 Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, "Domestic Violence in Macedonia," September 1998, 7. Survey conducted by the Humanitarian Association for Emancipation, Solidarity and Equality for Women. 30 Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, "Domestic Violence in Moldova," December 2000, 5. Survey was conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Moldova. 31 Ibid., 13. 32 Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, "Lifting the Last Curtain: A Report on Domestic Violence in Romania," February 1995, 3, 9­10. 33Dino Djipa and others. "Bosnia-Herzegovina: National Synthesis Report." 34 "Refugee Women­Bosnia-Herzegovina, 19. 16 Figure 8.Standardized death rates for ages 15­24 in SEE for suicide and self-inflicted injuries, selected years (per 10,000 deaths) Central Eastern Europe FYROM (2000) Females Romania (2000) Males Moldova (2000) Croatia (2000) Bulgaria (2000) Bosn.-Herz. (1991) Albania (2000) 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 Source:Gjonca, "Demographic Situation of Youth in South Eastern Europe." Based on "UN Population Prospects 2001 Rev." Bosnia-Herzegovina figures are based on WHO estimates. Given that domestic violence is underreported, and especially that more than two-thirds of the children and youth in SEE have witnessed violence in the home, the discussion above illustrates the potential magnitude of the problem. Suicide rates among male youth also speak to the breakdown of social bonds. The data also indicate the fragility of family structures in the region, indicating a potential role for support services for young families. Unsafe sex and HIV/AIDS As youth become sexually active, the implications of engaging in risky sexual behaviors affects their individual health and can affect public health in the community as a whole. Only a minority of youth in SEE appear to use contraception and practice safe sex (defined as abstinence, fewer sexual partners, and the use of condoms), a percentage much lower than their counterparts in EU countries. Many youth lack knowledge about the consequences of risky sexual behaviors, and these issues are not discussed in their families. With respect to specific countries, 33 percent of sexually active young adolescents (ages 11­15) surveyed in Serbia in 2002 did not use condoms regularly and, among 15­19 year-olds, 43 percent of girls and 20 percent of boys had unprotected sex. More than half of university students surveyed, 51 percent, did not use condoms.35 In Romania, according to a 1996 survey, fewer than 25 percent of girls aged 15­19 relied on contraceptives.36 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, half of youth surveyed do not use contraception.37 Data by ethnicity showed differences in the 35A Brave New Generation: Youth in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 69. 36 "Young People in Changing Societies," op. cit.,.34­35. 37Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI), UNDP, Human Development Report, "Bosnia- Herzegovina 2000 Youth," 44. 17 use of contraceptives among sexually active youth aged 18­30. Specifically, 38 percent of Bosniacs, 46 percent of Croats, and 27 percent of Serbs reported that they were currently using contraceptive devices.38 These high rates of unsafe sex stand in contrast to more developed parts of Europe: in Belgium, France, and Spain, 75 percent of women aged 20­24 used contraceptives during their first intercourse.Comparisons to the pre-transition period indicate that SEE youth are engaging in their first sexual experience at a younger age.39 Young women in Bosnia have their first sexual experience at ages 17 to 19, and men between ages 15 and 17. 40 The data on high rates of unsafe sex indicate that, although current rates of HIV/AIDS are low, the epidemic could spread dramatically in the region. Half of new HIV positives in Bulgaria are below 25 years of age.41 In Romania, a specific vulnerable population of children is now reaching the age of sexual maturity.42 These findings suggest the urgency of targeting youth in HIV/AIDS prevention projects as well as addressing youth health needs in the context of health reform projects to a much greater extent than is common practice. The HIV/AIDS project in Moldova included youth among the target groups in the project's assessment, and then shared the findings of the assessment with organizations that work with youth on this issue to discuss the implications for the project's implementation; the project appears to be unique in SEE in adopting this approach. Finding appropriate methods of reaching out to and engaging youth is crucial. Youth's sources of information as well as the information's impact vary. The 2001 global survey of children and adolescents conducted by UNICEF found that 52 percent of the respondents in the former Yugoslav states and 59 percent in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania did not consider themselves informed on HIV/AIDS.43 Macedonian youth did not know much about other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and would not turn to their parents to learn more about sex, contraception, HIV/AIDS, and drugs.44 Another survey in Macedonia indicates that parents do not volunteer information; 75 percent of girls between 15­17 were not informed by their parents about how to protect themselves against pregnancy.45 In Serbia and Montenegro, young people who consider themselves as having limited knowledge about HIV/AIDS knowledge tend to live outside large population centers and come from large or lower- income families. Test results among youth who claimed to have knowledge showed that less than 25 percent of them had sufficient knowledge.46 In Kosovo, information about HIV/AIDS epidemics, early pregnancies, and related health issues is not widespread. Only approximately one-third of interviewed youth declared some knowledge 38 Ibid., 98. 39 UNICEF Social Monitor, 2002, 22. 40"Human Development Report. Bosnia-Herzegovina 2000 Youth, 98. 41Novotny and others, HIV/AIDS in Southeastern Europe, 22. 42Ibid., 9, 29. 43UNICEF, Young Voices, 94. This survey is somewhat distorting as these percentages include respondents aged 9­13. 44 Author? "Rapid Assessment and Response on HIV/AIDS among Especially Vulnerable Young People in South Eastern Europe," op. cit., 101. 45Ljubica Balaban, "School Girls Get Pregnant before They Reach the Lesson on Contraception," Reality Macedonia,May 21, 2003. 46UNICEF, A Brave New Generation: Youth in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:Findings and Recommendations, 2002. 18 about contraception and the risks from transmitted diseases. Females appear to be more informed about transmitted diseases and early pregnancy risks than males,47 and the 19­24 age group was generally more informed about risky behaviors than the younger 15­19 group, although a significant percentage of this younger age group is sexually active.48 In terms of specific high-risk groups, data from Croatia indicate low levels of knowledge among drug users of the risks of unsafe sex. 49 In terms of designing policy interventions, the data indicate that youth receive information from the media, but that knowledge alone may not translate into avoidance of risky behaviors. Respondents in the Moldova HIV/AIDS assessment indicated that media (especially radio and TV programs) were their primary source of information about healthy lifestyles. Survey data in Serbia and Montenegro indicate that despite engaging in risky behaviors, over two-thirds of youth believe that alcohol and drugs are harmful to their health. Substance abuse Use of drugs, such as cannabis, heroin and ecstasy, is growing in the sub-region. Between 1995 and 1999, the European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Drugs (ESPAD) survey found an increase in the percentage of the general population, especially schoolchildren, who had tried illicit drugs.50 Among the children and youth polled by UNICEF, the use of illegal drugs and inhalants comes third, after tobacco and alcohol, as an addiction to a harmful or illegal substance.51 In Moldova, from 1995 to 1998, drug use among women increased by 60 percent.52 Heroin is becoming more common in South Eastern Europe, particularly among young males, and intravenous drug use increases the possibilities of HIV infection through needle sharing. Heroin has spread rapidly in Kosovo, where a "growing number of young heroin addicts are beginning to inject the drug;"53 16.6 percent of the youth surveyed had tried some type of narcotics at least once, and approximately 3 percent had used narcotics twice or more.54 In Albania, official estimates55 show that in late 1997, 8,000 people from the age group 15­35 were using drugs, up from 5,000 in 1995.56 Of the 20,000 registered drug addicts in Croatia, nearly two-thirds are heroin addicts.57 In Macedonia, current estimates indicate the presence of over 50,000 drug users in a country of just 2 million, in an environment that lacks adequate community-based drug rehabilitation programs and services, beyond the limited methadone available in hospitals. 47 52.7 percent of females in Kosovo knew about the risks of transmitted diseases versus 47.3 percent of males. 63.8 percent of females were informed about the risks of early pregnancies versus 36.2 percent of males. Hasnije Ilazi, "Research on Youth in Kosove," cit. p.23. 48 Hasnije Ilazi, "Research on Youth in Kosove," cit., p.23. 49Thomas Novotny, Dominic Haazen, Olusoji Adeyi, HIV/AIDS in Southeastern Europe: Case Studies from Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, February 2003. p.16 50 Annual Report 2001 On the State of the Drug Problem, see http://ar2001.emcdda.eu.int 51 "Young Voices. Opinion Survey," cit., p.87. 52 "The Republican Narcological Dispensary," 1995­266; 1998­423. 53 "Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002, 74. 54 Hasnije Ilazi, "Research on Youth in Kosove," p.25. 55 Data are proposed by the Ministry of Health and Public Order and endorsed by the NGO, Monitoring Center for Alcohol and Drugs 56 World Bank, Vulnerability Needs and Institutional Capacity Needs Assessment, Albania, 30. 57 Bijana Bijelik, Status of Youth in Croatia, 5. 19 Reasons given by young people for drug addiction include using drugs to cope with social exclusion and uncertainty; many Bosnian youth take drugs to deal with the stress of leaving their home locales, the loss or departure of friends, as well as the feelings of rejection in their new residence locations.58Surveys of youth who use drugs (including injectable drugs) in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia identified reasons for sharing needles, specifically: lack of money for needles, sharing as a sign of trust and as providing a sense of belonging to a group, and an imminent desire to inject so that the risk of sharing is not considered. 59 Regarding both needle-sharing and lack of use of condoms, the most common answer related to trust­either of one's partner or of fellow drug users. In the context of other forms of declining social capital, this (misplaced) focus on trust may be an attempt to preserve what relationships do exist. Similarly to Western Europe at the beginning of the heroin consumption boom a few decades earlier, families prefer not to acknowledge or report this phenomenon, as drug addiction is perceived as a source of shame for the household. Secondary schools teachers and students also lack capacity to detect cases and support prevention, while national governments are only recently beginning to dedicate some attention to this issue. Much greater efforts are required in awareness raising at the household, community and secondary school levels, in addition to extensive use of peer counseling and peer non-formal education which is known to be very effective in reaching at-risk youth. The rate of alcohol abuse is also rising in South Eastern Europe. Among substance users in SEE surveyed between 2001 and 2002, 80.7 percent reported using alcohol, 55.5 percent reported using cannabis, and 17.3 percent reported using ecstasy over the previous month.60 Alcohol consumption is starting at very early ages: a UNICEF survey in Romania found that one-third of 11-year-old boys had consumed alcohol at least once in their lives, while most males become occasional or regular drinkers by age 16.61 Although chronic drinking is prevalent among a more mature adult population and fewer than 10 percent of registered abusers are aged 15 to 24,62 a disturbing trend of intensified drinking may be forming. The total percent of youths considered lifetime users is 16 percent in Bulgaria, 18 percent in Croatia, 9 percent in the FYR Macedonia, and 18 percent in Romania ("lifetime" is defined as having used alcohol 40 or more times during their lifetimes; or having used alcohol more than 10 times or having partaken in binge drinking in the past month).63 The UNICEF survey confirmed this trend through identifying patterns of use tangentially, asking both children and adolescents about the use of harmful or illegal substances among their peers. Forty-five percent of the surveyed 9­17 years olds have friends or peer acquaintances who have tried alcohol.64 As with drugs, some reasons given for youth alcohol abuse include loss of hope for a better future, a profound sense of displacement, and loss of friendships due to forced migration and ethnic conflict.65 UNDP data collected on Bosnia-Herzegovina youth support this finding by 58 "Human Development Report. Bosnia-Herzegovina 2000 Youth," cit., p.28. 59Elsie Wong, Rapid Assessment and Response on HIV/AIDS among Especially Vulnerable Young People in South Eastern Europe, UNICEF/ CIDA, 2002. The other respondents were: sex workers, mobile youth, out-of-school youth, young men who engage in sex with men. 60 Elsie Wong., Rapid Assessment and Response on HIV/AIDs among Especially Vulnerable People in South Eastern Europe, p 19. 61 UNICEF-MONEE, p.27. 62 UNICEF-MONEE, p.27. 63 David H. Jerningan, Global Status Report: Alcohol and Young People, 25-26. 64"Young Voices. Opinion Survey of Children and Young People in Europe and Central Asia," UNICEF, 2001. 65 Gomart, Elizabeth. Youth in ECA: A Vulnerability and Social Exclusion Perspective, Draft. The World Bank, 2002, 20. 20 listing marginalization and lack of involvement in civil society as potentially dangerous causes behind risky behaviors.66 In Kosovo, it was reported that alcohol abuse, particularly among young men, was high in Serb enclaves in which "youth are more frustrated and bored than their Albanian counterparts."67 In Moldova, economic woes also are tied to increased alcohol and drug use.68 Young men are more likely to consume and/or abuse alcohol than young women. In a 1999 survey of university students in Serbia, 92 percent had tried alcohol, beginning at an average age of 15 for both men and women, but female students were less likely to get drunk than their male classmates.69 According to a UNDP survey of young people aged 14­30, 11 percent of youth in Bosnia-Herzegovina consume alcohol regularly, 70and more specifically, 19 percent of young men, and 4 percent of young women consume alcohol regularly.71 In Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, and Romania, 15­16-year-old boys are more than twice as likely as girls to have used alcohol 40 or more times during their lifetimes, to have used alcohol more than 10 times, or to have partaken in binge drinking in the past month. Smoking as a risky behavior is widespread among youth in the subregion; almost half of the youth in Kosovo smoke,72 and similar estimates indicate that 46 percent of Bosnian youth are regular smokers.73 According to the UNDP survey, 53 percent of young men smoke regularly compared to 38 percent of young women.74 Crime and violence In much of the ECA region, an increasing number of young people are at greater risk of coming into conflict with the law, and not only from substance abuse. The rate of registered crimes per 100,000 inhabitants committed by those under 18 appears to be higher in 1998 than in 1989 for the ECA region as a whole; mixed data is available for the Balkans. Most juvenile crimes are committed by males­approximately 90 percent to 95 percent of young offenders in ECA.75 However, the percentage of young women in conflict with the law is on the rise. One explanation posited for rising rates of youth crime is the decline of social capital and increasing incidence of family dysfunction, such as conflict, lack of parental control, weak intergenerational ties, premature autonomy, and the associated risk of delinquency. Child neglect and abuse was flagged by UNICEF data in 1997 as contributing to youth predisposition to crime.76 A 1999 survey in Serbia correlated 80 percent of juvenile crimes with dysfunctional 66 UNDPand Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI), "Human Development Report. Bosnia-Herzegovina 2000 Youth," p.11. 67 John Richardson, Youth in Kosova/Kosovo: A Situation Analysis, 16 68 "Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Moldova," UNICEF, 2000, 22 -3. 69 Aleksic, Ivana, "Youth Development in Transitioning Countries: Case of Serbia," draft report, February 2002, World Bank, 13. 70 UNDP and Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI), "Human Development Report, Bosnia-Herzegovina 2000 Youth," 2000, 27. 71 "Bosnia Youth" as part of the Multisector Team Initiative on ECA Youth, 2002. 72 Hasnije Ilazi, "Research on Youth in Kosove," p.25. 73 World Bank (SACG) prepared for ECSSD, Youth in Bosnia, p3. 74 UNDP and Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI), "Human Development Report. Bosnia-Herzegovina 2000 Youth,", p.27. 75 "Young People in Changing Societies," cit., p.84-85. 76 "Children at Risk in Central and Eastern Europe: Perils and Promises," UNICEF, 1997, cit. in "Young People in Changing Societies," UNICEF, 2000, p.93. 21 families, particularly child neglect.77 The survey also linked criminalbehaviors among young adults to other risky and/or illegal behaviors, such as alcohol or drug abuse, gambling, or family violence.78 Juvenile delinquency in Macedonia has been linked directly to dysfunctional families, in which one or both parents are unemployed and struggling with poverty, and there is a history of parental violence against, or abuse or neglect of, children.79 In Moldova, crime is linked to inactivity of the youth as well as alcohol abuse; over 85 percent of the youth (14­18) involved in crimes in 2000 did not work or study, and one-fifth were under the influence of alcohol at the time the crime was committed.80 The relatively young age of the offenders in the transition countries is a troubling trend: juvenile crime rates are higher than total general crime rates.81 Between 1998 and 2000, the number of all recorded crimes decreased in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania. Yet the total number of juveniles convicted in criminal court increased from 32.05 per 100,000 in 1998 to 41.53 per 100,000 in 1999 in Bulgaria. and remained essentially the same for Macedonia, with a rate of 42.23 per 100,000. In Romania, although the total numbers of convicted juveniles steadily decreased from 49.76 per 100,000 in 1998 to 39.1 in 1999 to 30.08 in 2000, it is still very high.82 In Macedonia, the rate has remained higher, at 42.3 per 100,000. Between 1997 and 1999, approximately 28 percent of all resolved criminal offenses in Macedonia were committed by juveniles, of which one-quarter were children not older than 14 years old.83 This trend continued, and in 2000 almost one-third of the Macedonian offenders arrested were juveniles.84 In Croatia, the juvenile conviction rate nearly doubled in two years, from 11.51 per 100,000 in 1998 to 19.97 per 100,000 in 2000. Moldova experienced an increase as well from 35.69 convicted juveniles per 100,000 in 1999 to 41.62 per 100,000 in year 2000. Property crimes still account for more than two-third of juvenile crimes in the ECA region at large. However, violent crimes such as homicides, rapes, aggravated assaults, and armed conflicts are on the rise.85 In Bulgaria, in the last 10 years of transition, violent crime rates have more than tripled compared to the rates of property crimes. On the contrary, Moldova is showing a decline in violent crime rates committed by juveniles, although this decline may be related to crime underreporting, especially if the violent crime committed was rape against women.86 77 E. Gomart, cit., p.43. Data consulted in: Aleksic, I., "Youth Development in transition Countries, Case of Serbia," Mimeo, prepared for the MTL Learning *, World Bank, Belgrade, Serbia, 2000. Survey conducted in Serbia by the Yugoslav Child Rights Center 78 On a sample of 250 minor offenders in the Serbian capital Belgrade, about 45 percent of the sentenced minors were not living with either parents; 44 percent had an alcoholic family member; 21 percent had a family member with a gambling problem, while almost 9 percent of the minors surveyed had a family member consuming drugs. 34.4 percent of the minors reported violence in the family, and 40 percent reported problems between a family member and the justice system. Consulted in E. Gomart, cit., p.43- 44. 79 "Youth in Macedonia," p.3. Juvenile delinquency in such cases may take the form of begging or involvement in sex trade or they may be street children. 80 "Women and Children in Moldova," UNICEF, 2000, 44. 81 Young People in Changing Societies," cit., p.84-85. 82 UN Office on Drugs and Crime. 83 "Youth in Macedonia," survey commissioned for the Multisector Team Initiative on ECA Youth, 2002, p.3. 84 Ibid., cit., p.3. 85 Ibid., p.89. 86 Ibid., p.90. 22 Youth, primarily young men, also suffer directly as victims of crimes. With the exception of Croatia, all SEE economies have higher rates of homicides and purposeful injuries among youth than Central European countries (figure 9). Compared to the rest of SEE, Albania and Moldova in particular have significant high rates of homicide and purposeful injuries against youths. Figure 9. Standardized death rates for ages 15­24 in SEE, 2000: Homicide and purposeful injuries (per 10,000 deaths) Central Eastern Europe FYROM (2000) Females Romania (2000) Males Moldova (2000) Croatia (2000) Bulgaria (2000) Albania (2000) 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00 Source: Gjonca, "Demographic Situation of Youth in South Eastern Europe." Based on "UN Population Prospects 2001 Rev." Bosnia-Herzegovina figures based on WHO estimates. Persistence of interethnic violence combined with the widespread availability of firearms and other small weapons, even after overt fighting has ceased, have resulted in youth becoming targets. In Kosovo, two Serb youth were killed and others wounded when a gunman opened fire on a group of teenagers swimming in the river near the Serbian enclave, Gorazdevac.87 In December 2002, a bomb exploded in front of a Kumanovo high school; a delay in releasing the students limited casualties to one. In the context of still-armed and conflictual societies, youth also are potential recruits for extremists, a risk exacerbated by the growth of radical Islam elsewhere in the world. After the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a group of young Bosnian Muslims who had fought with Arab volunteers in the El Mujahid unit formed the Active Islamic Youth in BiH, which has been the focus of investigations on terrorism in BiH.88 Its activities have included disrupting an International Women's Day presentation in Sarajevo on women in Afghanistan, with protests that women lived as they should under the Taliban89 and organizing protests to attempt to block the extradition of six suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists.90 87The New York Times, August 15, 2003. 88Ena Latin, "Suspicious Islamic Missionaries: Active Islamic Youth" Southeast European Times, Sarajevo, June 30, 2003. 89Sandra Kasalo, "Taliban at the Gates" Index Online- Latest Censorship News, 1 April 1998. 90Jolyon Naegele, "Bosnia: Transfer Of Terrorist Suspects To U.S. Raises Many Questions," RFE/RL Report, 21 January 2002. 23 In Kosovo, educational facilities have been the locus of recruitment. According to recent reports, Islamic cadres originating from several countries outside SEE and mostly veterans of the Bosnia war, are recruiting and training young Albanians in paramilitary training camps around Prizren (Kosovo), Kukes, and Trpoje (Albania), and in Western Macedonia around Tetovo.91 In Kosovo, lack of adequate secondary schooling and/or non-formal education has created a gap thathas been filled with religious non-formal education with potentially negative consequences for social cohesion and inclusion. The Islamic Endowment Foundation, operating under the Saudi Joint Committee on the Relief of Kosovo and Chechnya (SJCRKC), has established 30 specialized Koranic schools for young men in rural Kosovo. Locals have complained that the schools do not address the needs of the rural communities, and some observers believe that the schools are fueling intolerance and grievances.92 Exclusion in education and school leaving Instead of progressing on the MDG indicators on education, SEE is moving backward. Secondary school enrollments declined in the post-transition period, then recovered slightly, but still have not reached pre-transition levels of universal enrollment. Variation in enrollment rates is higher among countries experiencing political and economic instability. Compared to southern European countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, secondary school enrollments in SEE are considerably lower.93 Throughout the ECA region, the number of youth who are of secondary school age but are not enrolled or attending school has increased. Prior to the transition, in 1989 nearly 6 million (25 percent) of 15­18-year-olds were not in school. By 1998, the numbers had risen by 50 percent to 9 million (over 33 percent).94 In SEE, illiteracy and school leaving are both on the increase. In Kosovo, for example, illiteracy of "other ethnic groups" has risen over the last decade to 22 percent of the 16­17-year-olds and 15 percent of the 18­25-year-olds.95 Among Albanian children 8 to 14 years old, 33 percent are illiterate.96 Basic school graduation rates of 80 percent or lower were reported in 1997 for 15­24 year olds in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. Dropout rates for secondary and upper secondary level education for ECA show that rates vary from 1.5 percent in Romania to 17 percent in Albania for general secondary education.97 In Kosovo, only one-third of young adolescents (15­19) are 91 Laura Iucci, "La Bosnia Resta Un Serbato di Terroristi" Limes: Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, p. 204. 92Isa Blumi, "Political Islam among the Albanians: Are the Taliban Coming to the Balkans?" Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, Policy Research Series #2, July 2003, p.15. The article includes a thoughtful analysis of the foundations of Kosovar localized Islamic traditions, efforts to establish centralized institutional control during the Yugoslav era, and compares current developments in Kosovo with Albania. See also by the same author, "Indoctrinating Albanians: Dynamics of Islamic Aid" in ISIM Newsletter, November 2002, p.9. 93 Arjan Gjonca, personal communication, 15 April 2004. Accurate comparable time-series data on secondary school enrollment are difficult to obtain, but estimates can be using several sources and the general trends are clear. For example, some data on Albania show as much as 30% variation in enrollment levels, but agreement between two sources confirm observations. 94 "Young People in Changing Societies," UNICEF 2000, cit., p.53 95Kosovo Poverty Assessment 96 Galliano, 22. 97"Young People in Changing Societies," UNICEF 2000, cit., p.54. 24 enrolled in secondary education and approximately 24 percent of young adults (19­24) are enrolled in higher secondary and post-secondary education.98 Consistent with lower graduation figures, youth enrollment in upper secondary and tertiary education in Romania over the last 10 years has decreased by nearly one-quarter, from 49 percent to 39 percent. Similarly, during the same period, the percentage of enrollment in Moldova decreased from 39 percent to 31 percent.99 As in most of the Central and Eastern European countries, dropout rates are higher among young men than young women. In Albania, for example, one-third of secondary school girls enroll in higher education, while only 1 in 5 adolescent males do so.100 For the entire ECA region, disparities by income appear when looking at primary and secondary enrollments. Some 40 percent of the poorest children aged 7­ 14 years drop out between primary and secondary school, compared with 20 percent of the richest children.101 Increased school leaving, particularly between primary and secondary school, is a response to policy failures in which education lacks relevance and quality. In the context of rising costs, remaining in school is often perceived as forgoing opportunities for additional family income, by youth themselves or by their parents. The school environment has been disrupted,102 particularly in post-conflict countries. Many youth perceive corruption as further eroding the value of education since corruption or bribes are substituted for attainment. Costs associated with education have become barriers for many youth in SEE; these can include transportation, textbooks and other supplies, fees for activities, "illegal taxes" such as school repair funds and school fund contributions, and bribes.103After costs of education, lack of security has been cited in Kosovo104 and Albania. Young Kosovar Albanian women considered the combination of lack of money and the poor security situation as barriers to continuing their education in secondary school.105 In urban areas of Albania, girls and young women travel to school in groups of three or four and do not engage in evening activities or social events due to the threat of street and gang violence.106 In rural areas, many young women have been withdrawn from school entirely out of fear of kidnapping,107 and some parents pay protection money. 108 98 Ibid., cit., p.24. 99 Ibid., p.43. 100 Galliano, 22. 101 UNICEF/MONEE Report., p.29. 102 Examples are the parallel education system and the extended closure and damage to school facilities during the 1999 conflict in Kosovo; understaffing caused by the outflow of qualified and experienced teachers, especially in rural areas, in Moldova; destruction, looting, and vandalism d irected toward schools in 1991 and again in 1997 in Albania; and schools being converted into military barracks in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia. 103The LSMS questionnaires for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo directly address travel and expense factors and ask respondents who have left school their reasons for leaving. These include too expensive, no interest, agricultural work, other job, school too far, no teacher, no teaching materials, school closed, illness, displaced, security, harassment, language. 104These are identified as non-Serb, non-Albanian respondents in the Poverty Assessment and are probably Roma. 105La Cava and others, Conflict and Change in Kosovo, 51. 106Dudwick and Shahriari, Education in Albania, p.13. 107One respondent described the attempted kidnapping of his daughter. 108Gloria La Cava and Rafaella Nanetti, Albania: Filling the Vulnerability Gap, 29. 25 In Albania, the main reasons for which children abandon school seem to be: critical economic conditions at home (41 percent), lack of interest in school programs and poor performance (some have repeated the same class for 2 or more years) (25 percent); and parents' belief that their children do not need more education than what they already have (24 percent).109Concerns about the decline in quality of the education system also are present.110 In Kosovo, "the reason most often cited for lack of school attendance is an economic one: many young people work to support their families, and experience has shown many that getting an education will not necessarily improve their earning potential."111 Similarly, in Moldova, a low but steady rate of leaving school before completing the full cycle of 9 years of basic education results from having to help parents with farm work, or having to work full-time as herders to bring home cash or in-kind income for their families. Some children also work on farms as wage laborers beginning at the age of 10.112 One of the results of ethnic conflict in SEE has been the establishment of separate schools. As of August 2003, over 50 schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained ethnically segregated, referred to as "two schools under one roof." Students enter the schools through separate entrances and have separate breaks, and the teachers do not use the same staff rooms.113 In Macedonia, in 2002, protests by ethnic Albanians about overcrowding in a secondary school escalated into riots by both ethnic Albanians and Macedonians, kidnappings, and several incidents of reprisals.114 An additional round of protests occurred in May 2003 over the inferior quality of the school buildings for ethnic Albanians. In September 2003 Macedonian parents withdrew their children from a high school near Skopje due to a decision to transfer several classes of Albanian students into the school, and in Bitola, a boycott was initiated in response to the decision to have Albanian taught in the high school.115 In Moldova, students have engaged in strikes to protest pro-Russian education policies by the government. 116 For youth themselves, globally as well as in SEE,inadequacy of education in preparing for the labor market is a major issue. A Serbian survey found that 42 percent of employed youth respondents do not work at the jobs for which they were educated.117 In consultations held on the draft of the youth component of the World Bank global Children and Youth Strategy,118 SEE youth expressed strong concerns about the irrelevancy of formal education and stated that education does not prepare them for employment. Similarly, youth representatives from SEE at the 2003 Youth, Development and Peace conference in Paris stressed that quality and relevance of education need to be improved and 109 Galliano, 22. 110 Hermine Desoto, Peter Gordon, et al, "A Qualitative Assessment of Poverty in 10 Areas of Albania," 56-62. 111 John Richardson, "Youth in Kosova/Kosovo: A Situation Analysis," 8. 112 Elizabeth Gomart, ECSSD. MultiSector Team Learning Project on Youth Vulnerability and exclusion in ECA: Draft part II. June 2002, p 18. 113These policies are counter to the principles in the Education Reform Strategy for BiH. 114Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Macedonia, Human Rights in 2002. 115International Crisis Group, "Macedonia: No Room for Complacency." Europe Report No. 149, Skopje/Brussels: 23 October 2003, 22. 116Elizabeth Gomart, "Note on Youth in Moldova" Background paper prepared for the MultiSector Team Learning Project on Youth Vulnerability and Exclusion in ECA, June 2002, 2. 117"Youth in Serbia- 2002," 51. 118Held in April 2003 via videoconference and through online forum. 26 that youth need to have a voice in education reforms because they are directly affected.119 In this regard, the majority of World Bank education projects do not consider youth themselves as stakeholders. If local stakeholder consultation does occur, parents, teachers, school administrators, and political leaders may be interviewed. This study could identify only two World Bank assessments of education in SEE that has conducted interviews with youth themselves, and out-of-school youth (whether unemployed or employed) had never be